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The British and German financial systems constitute a significant part of the 
European financial system(s). Banks are important institutional pillars of any 
financial system. The largest British and German banks are therefore agents 
that determine the structure of these financial systems. By studying the 
corporate strategies of eight publicly listed banks, this research shows how 
and why British and German banks pursued entirely different strategies 
between 1993 and 2003. The banks researched are The Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds TSB in Britain and Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and HVB in Germany.
This two-country, longitudinal multiple case research argues that the 
beginning of the “completed” European Common Market in 1993, along with 
the global market liberalisation, disintermediation and rapid technological 
progress in the 1990s, provoked two fundamentally different strategic 
reactions by the banks. One took the form of a defensive strategy, whereby 
the bank remained focused on its domestic market. The other fully embraced 
all new opportunities and led to an international multi-business strategy. Yet, 
the attempt to capture all, or at least many, of the new opportunities deprived 
banks of their strategic focus. Effectively, neither of these corporate strategies 
promoted European financial integration to any significant degree.
There exists little work on the interdependence of micro and macro structures 
in the banking industry. This investigation aims to fill the gap which has 
emerged following ample research into the European banking sector as an 
aggregate and the few case studies of specific German and British banks. 
Evidence is provided that banks which pursued a defensive strategy and 
accepted the premise of a coherent national financial system fared better than 
those which attempted to break out of a coherent financial system in order to 
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1. The problem and the objective of this research
1. The problem and the objective of this research
The member states of the European Union created a Common Market in 
1993, which also led to one of the world’s financially most integrated regions. 
Deregulating the European banking market was one of the primary objectives 
of the Single European Act, which paved the way for the creation of the 
Common Market. A range of policy measures, foremost among them the 
Second Banking Directive, raised expectations that the Common Market 
would stimulate cross-border banking (Buch, 2000; Buch, 2001).
These expectations were fuelled by several research projects initiated by the 
European Commission. The first and most widely discussed was “Cost of Non- 
Europe”, carried out under the auspices of Paolo Cecchini (Cecchini, 1988). 
Known as the Cecchini Report, it concluded that the Single Market 
Programme would have a major macroeconomic impact, increasing the EU’s 
(at that time EC’s) GDP by approximately 4.5% (Cecchini, 1988, p. 97). Of this 
potential incremental increase in GDP, 1.5% could be attributed to the 
liberalisation of financial services (Cecchini, 1988, p. 98). The Cecchini Report 
assumed that the European Common Market would trigger competitive forces 
in financial systems (Cecchini, 1988; Howells & Bain, 2002). However, more 
than a decade after the creation of the Common Market, European banking 
integration is far from having met the expectations raised by studies such as 
the Cecchini Report.
European banking integration has been extensively analysed on an aggregate 
level as part of macroeconomic research projects on the integration of 
European financial systems (Belaisch, 2001; Buch & Heinrich, 2002; Cabral et 
al., 2002; Dermine, 1996; Goddard et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 1998; White,
1998). Conventional explanations identify high entry costs, the difficulty of 
realising transnational economies of scale and imperfect information as 
reasons why the European banking market remains fragmented and nationally 
segmented.
Despite these insights into the slowness of the integration process, there is 
little research about the interdependence between micro and macro structures 
in the banking industry. Therefore, this research approaches the
19
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macroeconomic integration of the European banking sector through a 
microeconomic perspective, namely the study of realised banking strategies. 
In contrast to Cecchini’s model, which primarily considered the opportunities of 
economic integration, it aims to show why large banks’ strategic reactions to 
market liberalisation did not significantly contribute to financial integration.
A study commissioned by the European Financial Services Round Table, also 
known as the Gyllenhammar Report (prepared by F. Heinemann and M. Jopp 
in 2002), points out the need for an examination of individual banks and their 
strategies to complement the extensive analyses of aggregate data on the 
European banking sector, a view which is shared by Buch (Buch, 2001b), 
Giannetti (Giannetti, et al., 2002,) and Beckmann (Beckmann, et al., 2002).
This research studies major corporate developments at eight publicly listed 
banks in Britain and Germany between 1993 and 2003. Using a two-country, 
longitudinal multiple case study approach, it aims to fill the gap between the 
ample research into the European banking sector in aggregate and the few 
case studies of specific German and British banks.1 Most existing case studies 
concentrate either on a time-span that is too short to identify certain strategic 
patterns or focus too exclusively on specific business strategies (e.g. "retail 
banking strategy”). This research therefore concentrates on the principal 
players within a macrostructure and looks at the changing positions of British 
and German banks within the financial system, from the beginning of the 
Single European Market in 1993 until the end of 2003.
For three reasons it appears pertinent to analyse the period between 1993 
and 2003. First, in 1993 the Single Market Programme (SMP) was completed, 
bringing about wide-ranging changes for the financial services industry in the 
following years. Second, it takes several years for strategic adjustments to be 
implemented at large financial institutions and to show results. Third, the time 
between 1993 and 2003 spans one full business cycle in Britain and Germany. 
The business cycle, measured as real GDP growth (year-on-year), is an 
important indicator of the macroeconomic conditions in which banks operate.
1 Case studies produced by investment banks, consultants, academics and well-informed financial 
journalists. For case studies produced by academics, see e.g. Channon (1986), Rogers (1999), Beckmann 
et al. (2002).
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The title of this thesis, “A comparison of British and German banking 
strategies in the context of European financial integration between 1993 and 
2003” indicates that it is concerned with the analysis of realised strategies in a 
changing macroeconomic and political environment. This analysis does not 
focus on the question of whether a realised strategy differs from the strategy 
initially intended, i.e. how strategies emerge. Rather, it aims to increase 
understanding of European financial integration by enhancing knowledge of 
“realised” corporate strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).2
The largest British and German banks are major pillars of the European 
financial system. It is widely argued that the British and German financial 
systems demonstrate fundamental differences (Butt Philip, 1978; Davis, 1998; 
Schmidt, 1999; ECB, 1999; Howells & Bain, 2002). While the British financial 
system is more capital-market oriented and far more concentrated, a highly 
fragmented banking market dominates the German system. These structural 
differences and subsequently the different approaches of British and German 
banks render a comparative investigation of the varying banking strategies in 
these two countries worthwhile, especially if the aim is to comprehend how 
these differences could possibly lead to the emergence of one coherent 
European financial system (Schmidt, 1999).
The rapid liberalisation of the European market and the rest of the world in the 
1990s opened up unprecedented strategic opportunities for banks. New 
opportunities emerged from greater geographic reach, progress in information 
technologies, disintermediation and the development of new financial 
products. The broadening of choices required banks to prioritise and make 
decisions. Effectively, they needed a strategy, or had to review their existing 
strategies in the context of the changing macroeconomic environment. 
Although the emergence of new opportunities was managed differently by 
different institutions, market liberalisation basically seems to have prompted 
two fundamentally different strategic reactions among the banks analysed.
It is hypothesised that one reaction took the form of a defensive strategy, in 
other words, certain banks remained focused on their domestic market. For a 
strategy of this type to be successful, a bank needs assets and capabilities
2 Mintzberg and Waters distinguish between “realised” and “intended” strategies -  an approach which will be 
discussed in the third chapter of this thesis.
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that are specific to the domestic market (Adamides, et al., 2003). The other 
strategic reaction fully embraced all new opportunities and led to an 
international multi-business strategy.
The different outcomes of these two strategic reactions appear to corroborate 
the theory that a financial system is a configuration of its subsystems with a 
coherent structure (Schmidt, 2001). It is argued that this coherence, which 
contributes to the stability of a financial system, also poses a challenge for the 
integration of national financial systems. Thus, the stability of such a coherent 
system also renders it relatively resistant to structural change (Hackethal & 
Tyrell, 1998; Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2001).
This research investigates whether banks which pursued a defensive strategy 
and therefore stayed within a coherent financial system fared better than those 
which attempted to break out of a coherent financial system in order to 
embrace new, for example, international, opportunities which were not 
compatible with the prevailing system. More specifically, this thesis seeks to 
enhance understanding of
A) how and why British and German banking strategies differed in an 
increasingly integrated European economic system and
B) why market liberalisation seems to have provoked two 
fundamentally different strategic reactions among banks, neither of 
which appears to have significantly promoted European banking 
integration.
By answering these two questions this research should also offer an 
explanation of why European banking integration did not progress as far as 
had been envisioned by the European Commission and suggested by 
analyses such as the Cecchini Report at the outset of the Single European 
Market. Moreover, as an intertemporal two-country analysis, this research 
endeavours to identify whether there were national or periodic patterns in 
banking strategies. Besides theory building and offering an alternative 
explanation as to why banking integration remained slow during the first 
decade of the Common Market, this research also serves two additional 
purposes, which are of academic and practical importance.
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First, at least to the knowledge of the author, no condensed and comparative 
analysis of the strategic positioning of major European banks (after 1993), has 
yet been undertaken. A comparison of past successes and failures may help 
senior management to better evaluate the opportunities and risks inherent in 
managing their institutions. This is even more important as there appears to 
be ample evidence that banks suffer from institutional memory loss, which 
makes them prone to repeat the same mistakes (Berger & Udell, 2003).
Second, only a few regulators, central bankers, politicians, and policymakers 
have the resources to study developments at individual banks, corporate 
strategies in general and banking strategies in particular. For them this 
research should also offer a valuable source of information about the 
interaction of the micro and macro structures of the financial system they are 
expected to manage.
This research applies a methodology that is unique in the study of European 
financial integration and the banking sector. The methodology, which is rooted 
in Giddens’ ontological concept of structuration (Giddens, 1984, 1988), 
recognises the interdependence of the macro and micro levels of a financial 
system. The multiple longitudinal cross-country case study approach requires 
a thorough understanding of the macro themes that condition banking 
strategies, the microeconomics of banking and strategic management 
theories. In order to deal with the intrinsic complexity of this investigation and 
to narrow the research problem, bank-specific issues arising from European 
integration and strategic management concepts are reviewed and discussed 
ahead of the empirical research, i.e. the case studies.
Although this research assumes that the realised corporate strategies are a 
reality that can be observed, multiple perspectives are adopted (Easterby- 
Smith et al., 2002). In order to strengthen the validity of this research, different 
methods are used to study the realised strategies of banks. Triangulation is 
achieved through two qualitative methods with two different data sources and 
one quantitative method with a third set of data. Interviews fulfil only a 
supplementary function where the other sources do not show a clear picture.
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The subordinated role of interviews results from the decision to analyse the 
realised corporate strategies of publicly listed banks as opposed to emerging 
business strategies at non-listed institutions. Corporate strategy involves the 
allocation of resources and capital in a manner that entails a structural shift for 
the organisation which cannot be easily reversed. Since corporate strategies 
can imply substantial structural, financial and legal consequences, the firm’s 
owners have to be notified. Thus, management of publicly listed companies 
must inform the shareholders about the firm’s corporate strategy. 
Consequently, all relevant strategic decisions are public knowledge and an 
interviewee can only provide limited additional information.
Chapter two reviews the changing playing field for banks and deals with the 
question of what is a financial system in general and what is the European 
financial system in particular. In chapter three corporate strategy analysis and 
its applicability to the banking sector is outlined. It is regarded as pivotal to 
discuss the understanding of the term strategy prior to discussing strategic 
management concepts. For this reason, and because of the politically 
sensitive nature of national banking systems, this starts from a review of the 
origins of the term strategy and then links its political/military roots to 
contemporary banking strategies. Chapter four elaborates the underlying 
ontological concept of structuration, the methodology and the different 
research methods used.
In chapter five the eight case studies are presented and discussed. The 
analysis of the individual banks is preceded by a concise introduction about 
the specific features of the British and German banking landscape. The banks 
researched are The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), HSBC, Barclays and 
Lloyds TSB in Britain and Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and 
HVB in Germany. In chapter six the microeconomic findings of the case 
studies are tied together and a cross-case pattern analysis puts them into the 
context of European financial integration. This chapter concludes by 
answering the research questions, recommends complementary research and 
ends with an epilogue and a tentative outlook.
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2. The playing field for banking strategies -  EU financial integration
2. The plavina field for banking strategies -  Ell 
financial integration
2.1. Introduction
Banks constitute an integral part of a financial system. Financial systems are 
subject to political, economic, social and technological changes (White, 1998, 
pp. 4-9; Schmidt, 2001, pp. 7-15). “PEST analysis”1 distinguishes between 
influences from the macro-environment and the micro-environment (Grant, 
2002, pp. 66-67; Narayanan, & Fahey, 2001, pp. 189-214). The financial 
system provides the macro-environment for a bank, although the aggregated 
banking sector is itself a vital part of this macro-environment. In contrast, the 
influences that form the micro-environment originate from the other competing 
banks and customers who, as providers of deposits, are also the bank’s 
“suppliers” (Grant, 2002, pp. 66-67).
Political changes in Europe, in particular the project to create a Single Market 
in Europe, impacted Europe’s financial systems.2 The Single European Market 
initiative and monetary union have significantly changed the macro­
environment for European banks. Since the extent of integration is unique to 
European banks, this thesis concentrates on the environmental changes 
which come from the political sphere -  banks in other parts of the world are 
equally exposed to technological changes, global economic issues and social 
factors.
Narayanan distinguishes between “scanning”, “monitoring” and “forecasting” 
environmental changes which effectively lead on to an assessment of how 
they might affect an organisation. “In assessment, the frame of reference 
moves from understanding the environment - the focus of scanning, 
monitoring, and forecasting - to identifying what that understanding of the 
environment means for the organization” (Narayanan, undated, p. 14). 
Evaluating British and German bank strategies from 1993 to 2003 
necessitates sketching out the most relevant macro-environmental change
1 Analysis of Political, Economic, Social and Technological (PEST) factors affecting corporate strategies.
2 It is arguable whether the singular or plural form of system(s) should be used. The more open and 
interconnected the coexisting systems are, the more they become one system.
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affecting banks in Europe in that period, namely the integration of European 
financial systems.
Studying the integration of Europe’s financial systems requires some clarity 
about what a “financial system” is and the meaning of “integration”. Generally, 
financial integration is understood as the process that transforms formerly 
regionally separate financial systems so that they operate as a single 
integrated system (London Economics et al., 2002, pp. 12-13).3 The concept 
of integration entails the difficulty that there is no definition of when such a 
process is completed, unless the final state is assumed to be one of complete 
homogeneity in all areas, which would then raise questions about the stability 
of such a system.
In fact, this problem is encapsulated in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome in 
which the founding members of what is now the European Union declared 
their determination to create an “ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe” (Treaty of Rome, Preamble, 1957), suggesting an ongoing integration 
process. Nevertheless, on a more pragmatic level there are some indicators 
which can be used to measure the progress of financial integration. Foremost 
among them are the existence of a monetary union and complete freedom of 
capital, representing a high degree of financial integration. Other indicators4 of 
the degree of financial integration could be a lack of barriers to trading 
financial products across borders, few price discrepancies for the same 
financial product (Cecchini, 1988, pp. 37-42) and EU-wide diversification of 
financial intermediaries’ assets and liabilities (Buch & Heinrich, 2002, p. 6).5
This chapter discusses the changing “playing field” for banking strategies and 
deals with the question of what is a financial system in general and the 
European financial system in particular. Building on a review of the 
considerations about disintermediation within a financial system, section three, 
“European financial markets -  pooling liquidity” elaborates the relative 
importance of capital markets and financial institutions within the European
3 In this report prepared by London Economics, PWC and Oxford Economic Forecasting for the European 
Commission, the term financial markets also comprises the banking sector, therefore “financial market” is 
actually understood to refer to “financial system”.
4 This list is far from being exhaustive and serves only to illustrate what different aspects might be 
considered for measuring financial integration. Part five of chapter one deals with the concept of integration 
at greater length.
5 Although Buch and Lapp (Buch & Lapp, 2000) suggest that diversification within Europe is not necessarily 
an optimal strategy.
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financial system(s). Subsequently this chapter addresses the strategically 
relevant question of what a bank is, thereby sketching the main legal, 
regulatory and policy measures which provide the background for this 
analysis. Section five concludes by documenting the debate about the benefits 
of European financial integration and the expectations at the outset of the 
European Common Market.
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2.2. European financial system(s): between markets and 
institutions
The purpose of a financial system is to channel funds from those who have a 
pecuniary surplus to their current spending plans to those who have a deficit. 
The facilities offered by a financial system can be distinguished between the 
matching of surplus and deficit units, financial services (e.g. insurance and 
pensions), payment mechanisms and portfolio adjustments (Henderson, 1993, 
p. 169; Howells & Bain, 2002). According to Howells and Bain, a financial 
system is “a set of markets for financial instruments, and the individuals and 
institutions who trade in those markets” (Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 3).
As financial markets essentially imply the trading of claims and rights, these 
markets are particularly dependent on a sound legal system, which provides a 
basis for contractual law. Consequently, financial markets are highly regulated 
markets. In particular, banking is one of the most regulated sectors in the 
European Union (Henderson, 1993, p. 23; Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, pp. 
22-26). The judiciary of a sovereign nation state provides the legal framework 
for the financial market. Thus, it may be assumed that a financial system is 
also a national system (Henderson, 1993, p. 22). Financial integration 
therefore comprises integrating national financial systems. Subsequently, it 
may be postulated that the standardisation of legal parameters for financial 
markets is a necessary precondition for the integration of financial systems.
La Porta et al. (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) and Cecchetti (Cecchetti, 1999) 
argue that the structure of a financial system is contingent upon the rights of 
shareholders and creditors and how these rights are enforced. Evidence 
presented by La Porta et al. suggests that countries with a common law 
system, for example, the United Kingdom, provide better investor protection 
than the civil law system prevalent in Germany and Scandinavia. Therefore, 
countries with a common law system foster the development of capital 
markets. This reasoning appears consistent with the argument that a financial 
system is a configuration of its subsystems, which complement each other, 
and that the coherence of such a system renders it resistant to structural 
change (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2001).
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For the purpose of this thesis, a broad definition of a financial system, as put 
forward by Schmidt, (Schmidt, 1999) appears pertinent. He suggests that a 
“financial system includes the financial sector as the provider of financial 
services as well as the real sectors of the economy insofar as they demand or, 
as the case maybe, fail to demand, these services, and the complex 
relationships between the financial and the non-financial sectors” (Schmidt, 
1999, p. 9). According to Schmidt, such a financial system is composed of four 
interrelated subsystems. The four subsystems he identifies are the “financial 
sector system”, the “financial patterns system” (the surplus and the deficit 
units), the “corporate governance system” and the “business system” (strategy 
regarding corporate finance), whereby in a stable system all four subsystems 
coherently coexist and complement each other (Schmidt, 1999, pp. 9-13).
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2.2.1. Disintermediation within a financial system from a market 
perspective
A company can obtain capital through equity, bonds and loans. Bond and 
equity finance rely on the existence of liquid capital markets, i.e. markets with 
sufficient demand and supply, whereas the provision of loans requires a 
banking sector. Within the European Union, financial systems vary depending 
on the degree of credit finance, i.e. the relative significance of the banking 
sector. The importance of financial intermediaries relative to the financial 
markets determines the structure of a financial system. According to the 
European Central Bank, disintermediation, i.e. the “movement of services or 
functions (notably borrowing and saving) away from the banking business 
towards other financial or non-financial intermediaries, economic agents or 
markets” (European Central Bank, 1999, pp. 16-18) is a development across 
the EU financial systems, which should receive additional impetus from the 
European Monetary Union (European Central Bank, 1999, pp. 16-18).
It is widely argued that disintermediation is a general trend, which changes 
banks’ balance sheet structures and furthers the liquidity of capital markets 
(McCauley & White, 1997; Davis, 1997; ECB, 1999; Eijffinger & Haan, 2000; 
Buch, 2001a; European Commission, 2002b; Walter, 2002). As markets can 
trade large volumes of savings while offering a diverse range of assets with 
varying risk-reward profiles, the transition from a bank-dominated to a market- 
oriented system seems to raise the risk-carrying capacity of a financial system 
(Henderson, 1993, p.169). Rybcynski suggests that the structural evolution of 
a financial system is dependent upon its ability to absorb risk, which is 
essential for innovation, capital formation, savings and growth (Rybcynski, 
1984). He holds that a financial system develops in a three-phase process 
where the first phase is dominated by intermediation, the second is more 
market-orientated, leading to a third phase comprising a strong market 
orientation with extensive securitisation (Rybcynski, 1984).
In contrast, Schmidt et al. suggest that there is no general tendency towards 
disintermediation and securitisation in Europe, at least not in the UK and in 
Germany. Moreover, they dismiss the idea of an ongoing transformation from 
bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, which would imply a 
reduction in the relative importance of banks (Schmidt et al., 1998; Schmidt,
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1999). Different definitions of “disintermediation” and different methodologies 
to measure the degree of disintermediation lead to such diverging arguments, 
which will not be discussed at great length as part of this research. In fact, in a 
later paper Schmidt concedes, “the importance of banks relative to capital 
markets will decline in the future" (Schmidt, 2001, p. 21). Yet he maintains, 
“this does not imply that the financial systems in continental European 
countries will soon change their general character and become capital market- 
dominated” (Schmidt, 2001, p. 21).
Different degrees of disintermediation matter particularly for the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policies in a financially integrated Europe. For this 
reason, monetary economists show concern about possible spill-over effects 
from the international activities of banks which could contribute to contagious 
cross-border bank runs (Allen & Gale, 2000; Buch, 2001b). A review of the 
literature about monetary transmission mechanisms in Europe is provided by 
Dornbusch et al. (Dornbusch et al., 1998), Eijffinger and Haan (2000, pp. 146- 
155) and can also be found in Buch’s “Financial Market Integration in a 
Monetary Union” (Buch, 2001a).
For the context of this doctoral research, it is worth pointing out that Buch 
presents “some evidence for the hypothesis that German shocks are 
transmitted through the international lending activities of commercial banks, 
and that these transmission effects affect credit conditions in the host 
economies to some extent.”6 (Buch, 2001b, p. 5) However, the overall 
conclusion by Buch is that at an advanced stage of financial integration 
bilateral linkages are less important. Consequently, financial shocks are likely 
to spread more evenly across regions, thus the risk of contagion declines 
(Buch, 2001b, p. 41).
In his research into monetary transmission mechanisms and European 
financial systems, Schmidt emphasises that the greatest distortion for the 
transmission mechanisms of a monetary union emerges when a consistent 
financial system partially loses its consistency and its intrinsic balance 
(Schmidt, 1999). It is during the phase when there is growing pressure to 
restore consistency, which leads to an instable transmission mechanism, that 
monetary policymakers find it difficult to determine the impact of their
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decisions. He concludes that the risk of systemic instability and the 
disorientation of monetary policymakers “constitutes a bigger problem for a 
common currency than the need to design and implement a common 
monetary policy for different, but essentially stable, financial systems [...]” 
(Schmidt, 1999, p. 27).
Consequences of disintermediation for monetary transmission mechanisms 
are one side of the coin and changing patterns of corporate finance are the 
other. While there is severe competitive pressure among banks within the 
fragmented European banking market, other industries benefit from more 
advanced consolidation of their sector by reaping synergies, which lead to 
greater efficiency. As noted by White (White, 1998, p. 13) lower information 
costs, greater transparency of accounting and the increased importance of 
rating agencies enable some companies to compete with financial 
intermediaries by raising funds on the capital markets. Therefore, 
disintermediation could also receive impetus from the growing competition 
between financial intermediaries and large corporates, which find it cheaper to 
raise finance via the capital market than via bank loans (White, 1998, p. 13).7
6 The countries most affected are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland.
7 In this respect, the introduction of Basel II could increase the pressure on banks in their role as financial 
intermediaries. “In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a proposal for a New 
Basel Capital Accord that, once finalised, will replace the 1988 Capital Accord. The proposal is based on 
three mutually reinforcing pillars that allow banks and supervisors to evaluate properly the various risks that 
banks face. The New Basel Capital Accord focuses on: (1) minimum capital requirements, which seek to 
refine the measurement framework set out in the 1988 Accord; (2) supervisory review of an institution's 
capital adequacy and internal assessment process; (3) market discipline through effective disclosure to 
encourage safe and sound banking practices” (Bank for International Settlement, 2003).
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2.2.3. Pension reform and the implications for the financial system
Some commentators also argue that the need to reform unfunded state 
pension schemes in many European countries in the wake of dramatic 
demographic change is an additional underlying force that might enhance 
disintermediation (Butt Philip, 1978; Davis, 1997; Eijffinger & Haan, 2000). 
Unfunded old age pension systems, whereby a country’s current working 
population finances the pensions of the present retired population, suffer from 
the longevity of citizens, along with shorter working lives. Consequently, this 
leads to an imbalance of the working force relative to the number of 
pensioners. Given that this development burdens government budgets, 
European states which retain generous unfunded social security systems are 
likely to weaken their position as international debtors and could thus face 
higher long-term interest rates. Therefore, many of these states are under 
great pressure to introduce pension reforms (De Ryck, 1997; Davis, 1997).
The overwhelming majority of literature on pension reform recommends 
greater reliance on funded pension schemes (for a detailed literature review 
see: Davis, 1997; Mantel, 1999; Holzmann, 1999). A funded scheme means 
that workers accumulate a stock of assets throughout their working life in 
order to finance their own pension. Further recommendations essentially 
comprise longer working periods (i.e. later retirement and less time spent in 
education), lower net pensions as a percentage of average net salary and 
higher pension contributions (Mantel, 1999).
Since funded pension schemes require suitable asset classes in which the 
accumulated capital can be invested, it is argued that the transition towards a 
more funded pension system would have repercussions for the financial 
market structure. Davis postulates that pension funds promote the supply of 
long-term funds to capital markets, financial innovation and modernisation of 
market structures which enhance the efficient allocation of funds (Davis, 1995, 
p. 178). However, he also concedes that the growing prominence of pension 
funds may also lead to higher market volatility, possibly raising the cost of 
capital for firms (Davis, 1995, p. 178).
On the significance of pension systems for European financial integration, Butt 
Philip remarks, “the way in which pension funds operate and are financed is
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one of the most important factors in shaping the financial systems of different 
countries and in determining their functional efficiency” (Butt Philip, 1978, p. 
322). Pension reform is arguably one of the prime strategic challenges 
financial services companies face at the beginning of the 21st century.
On the one hand, there are the implications for the capital markets, i.e. the 
impact of disintermediation and corporate finance. On the other hand, financial 
services companies need to answer the question of whether and how to 
position themselves in order to benefit from the “value chain” that provides 
private retirement-income solutions. These strategic considerations range 
from the practicability of online banking for elderly people to different 
approaches to institutional asset management.
Davis considers the forces unleashed by the introduction of a funded pension 
system sufficient to change a bank-dominated financial system, like the 
German one, into a capital market Anglo-Saxon-type financial system. He 
concludes: “on balance, the position of European banks would be weakened 
by pension-fund growth, but not wholly compromised” (Davis, 1995, p. 178).
While pension funds play an important role as providers of corporate finance 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, the strong role of the state, along with a bank- 
dominated financial system, seems to have discouraged the development of 
financial markets in continental European countries (White, 1998, p. 6). White 
hypothesises that the well-developed state social security funds are an 
important reason for the rudimentary levels of private savings in states like 
Germany. He maintains that this resulted in a public policy which, until the mid 
1990s, emphasised considerations relating to “stability” over those relating to 
“efficiency” (White, 1998, p. 6).
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2.2.3. The role of the state in the financial system
In France, Italy, Germany and Spain a significant proportion of the market 
share has traditionally been controlled by the state, largely via the savings 
banks sector (White, 1998, p. 6). However, the EU’s competition policy 
requires the state to gradually withdraw from the banking sector (Van Miert, 
1998; Monti, 2002). Nevertheless, the influence and in particular the changing 
influence of the state on the continental European banking sector must not be 
underestimated in an analysis like this. In chapter five of this research the 
repercussions of the state’s retreat from the banking sector for Germany’s 
savings banks (Sparkassen), state-owned regional banks (Landesbanks) and 
cooperative banks (Volksbanks) and other private banks is considered.
The prominence of the state in the banking industry led to a constellation 
within some European financial systems that made it impossible for financial 
institutions to take decisions on the basis of free market principles. It is argued 
that the extent of intermediation within a financial system is derived from the 
risk-return optimisation of financial institutions, contingent upon the operating 
costs, regulation, and not least the prevailing market structure (Henderson, 
1993, p. 169). However, this argument does not consider that state actors 
within the financial services industry might largely determine the “market 
organisation" because their risk-return requirements may differ from those of 
non-state market participants.
Moreover the interests pursued by the state through its financial institutions 
may focus on objectives other than profit maximisation, for example, the 
financing of infrastructure projects, which might be appropriate as part of the 
government’s economic policy. However, in some cases these state 
institutions are so well-established that the economy has become structured 
accordingly. This is, for example, the situation in Germany where savings 
banks still enjoyed state credit guarantees some 45 years after the end of the 
European Recovery Program (1948-1957), which was aimed at rebuilding 
European infrastructure.
When evaluating the role of the state in Europe’s financial systems, it has to 
be recognised that the ultimate decisions and the specific policies leading to, 
for example, a reform of the pension system remain in the hands of national
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governments. By providing certain incentives (e.g. tax breaks) and modifying 
the legal framework, the conditions under which a bank would benefit from the 
introduction of a funded pension system are determined by the state. 
Effectively scaling back the state’s role as a provider of social security is a 
sovereign decision which has to be taken by the state itself.
Not least because of the differing roles of the state, it is argued that the 
German and British financial systems are the most widely divergent in Europe 
(Schmidt, 1999, pp. 13-17). Within the European Union, Britain enjoys the 
most developed, open, diverse and strongly market-oriented financial system, 
characterised by low levels of gearing. Whether a financial system is 
considered more bank-based or more market-oriented is usually measured by 
indicators such as the total assets of banks and stock market capitalisation as 
a percentage of GDP (Schmidt, 1999, p. 13). Given the large and liquid capital 
markets in the UK, the British corporate sector depends on equity and bond 
finance rather than bank finance. Therefore, insurance companies and 
pension funds play a major role in channelling funds to British industry (Butt 
Philip, 1978; Henderson, 1993; Schmidt, 2001).
On the other hand, the continental European systems, foremost the German 
bank-based system, feature capital markets and capital market-oriented 
institutions such as pension funds which appear ‘underdeveloped’ relative to 
Britain (Schmidt, 1999, p. 13). Howells and Bain point out that the total value 
of equities in the financing of German non-financial firms in 1998 was about
0.5 percent of GDP, whereas the comparable figure in the UK was 2.3 percent 
(Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 117). One characteristic of the German financial 
system is that companies have a high proportion of bank loans on their 
balance sheets. This high gearing and the implicit low level of equity financing, 
along with the well-developed social security system have not helped the 
development of an “equity culture” among German retail investors. 
Consequently, capital markets are narrow and bank instruments dominate 
households’ asset portfolios (Butt Philip, 1978, p. 302; Henderson, 1993, p. 
185; Schmidt, 1999, pp. 13-14; Schmidt, 2001, pp. 5-7; Howells & Bain, 2002,
p. 120).
Contrasting British and German bank systems at the beginning of chapter five 
reveals some of the country-specific conditions with which banks are
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confronted. Of all the multifaceted developments in the European financial 
system, one of the most daunting strategic tasks for banks is how to optimise 
their function as intermediaries (Diamond, 1984, pp. 393-414). More 
specifically, banks face the question of whether and how they could benefit 
from a possible trend towards disintermediation. In order to successfully tackle 
these challenges, banks should correctly assess the dynamics and patterns of 
the European financial system. Whether banks deal with disintermediation by 
providing transaction services or attempt to manage information asymmetry 
more efficiently in order to maintain a competitive advantage, in either case, 
they will develop financial instruments and take advantage of liquid capital 
markets. Therefore, the multiple markets for financial products, which are 
addressed in the following section, will remain their playing field.
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2.3. European financial markets -  pooling liquidity
Deregulating the European banking market was one of the primary objectives 
of the Single European Act, which paved the way for the creation of the Single 
Market. Specific policy measures, especially the Second Banking Directive, 
facilitated the creation of a Single Market and in particular raised expectations 
that cross-border banking would be stimulated (Buch, 2000; Buch, 2001, p.6). 
Before documenting the debate about the integration of the European banking 
market, this section considers the degree of integration of the financial 
markets, where banks are clearly the principal actors, alongside insurance 
companies and various types of asset managers. According to the European 
Commission, “the primary function of any financial market is to allocate 
economic resources, both across borders and across time, in an uncertain 
world. Viable investment projects are selected and funded, thereby 
contributing to the development of the economy” (European Commission, 
2002a, p. 11).
Bodie and Merton (Bodie & Merton, 1995) identify six core functions of the 
financial markets. First, financial markets provide ways of clearing and settling 
payments, thus enabling trade and the exchange of goods, services, and 
assets. Second, a mechanism is provided for the pooling of funds and for 
subdividing shares in enterprises to facilitate portfolio diversification. Third, 
financial markets facilitate the allocation of resources across time and space. 
Fourth, by using financial products that can be bought and sold on these 
markets financial risk can be better managed. Fifth, prices convey condensed 
information, thus a liquid financial market facilitates decentralised decision­
making. Finally, financial markets provide an infrastructure to deal with “the 
incentive problems created when one party to a transaction has information 
that the other party does not or when one party acts as an agent for another,”
i.e. they offer ways of dealing with information asymmetry (Bodie & Merton, 
1995, p. 5).
Essentially, there are three distinct financial markets within a financial system: 
the equity market, the bond market and the money market - all of which can 
be further subdivided into segments. For example, the derivatives market may 
be regarded as a separate market in its own right (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp.
38
2. The playing field for banking strategies -  EU financial integration
283-436). Financial markets that are part of different currency zones are linked 
with each other via foreign exchange markets.
Another classification of financial markets distinguishes between groups of 
market participants. As most actors on these three markets are financial 
institutions that carry out large transactions8 with each other, these markets 
are often described as wholesale markets (Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 11). In 
contrast, there are also retail markets for financial products, with households 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on one side and financial 
institutions on the other. Wholesale and retail markets and thus the financial 
institutions which operate in these markets constitute an important part of a 
financial system.
The introduction of the euro has provided remarkable impetus for the 
integration and growth of capital markets. Prior to European Monetary Union, 
foreign exchange risk, different risk-free yield curves and currency-matching 
rules impeded geographical diversification of investment by institutional 
investors (Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 20). Therefore, the size of capital markets 
was limited and thus fragmented. Following the launch of the euro, these 
constraints have essentially been eliminated (Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 20).
8 Often these transactions are carried out on behalf of two parties that bank with different institutions.
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2.3.1. Money markets
Following the introduction of the euro, the wholesale markets have rapidly 
integrated, although the degree of integration varies across the different 
market segments (European Commission, 2002a). Most prominent has been 
the emergence of a single European money market (Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 
11), in which funds are borrowed and lent for a maximum of one year (Howells 
& Bain, 2002, p. 284).9 The money market consists of various “submarkets” 
which are usually distinguished by instruments, e.g. commercial paper, 
treasury bills, repurchase agreements, etc.
The integration of money markets after European Monetary Union was greatly 
facilitated by E U R O I10 and TARGET11, the real-time gross settlement systems 
for euro-denominated payments throughout the EU. For example, around 60% 
of total interbank activity of the largest market participants is cross-border, 
illustrating that the market for interbank deposits has more or less completely 
converged (Solans, 2002; European Commission, 2002a).
Overall the money market is highly integrated. The “law of one price” took 
effect only a few days after the launch of the euro and seems to have hold up 
well since then (Solans, 2002; Cabral, et al., 2002). The only exception 
appears to be found in the repo market (repurchase market),12 where research 
by Ciampolini and Rhode (Ciampolini & Rhode, 2000) identified price 
differentials, indicating that this segment was the least integrated of the money 
markets.
For banks, particularly commercial and retail banks, the money market is the 
key to liquidity management and therefore crucial for operational 
management. A large and well-integrated money market, without foreign 
exchange risk, should lead to cost benefits and efficiency gains. Liquidity, 
defined as “the ability to refinance maturing liabilities at or below market rates” 
(Golin, 2001, p. 300), is essential for a bank’s survival. Insufficient liquidity is 
one of the main reasons for bank failures (Golin, 2001, p. 299). Consequently,
9 In fact, many are just “overnight” transactions.
10 EUR01 is the Euro Banking Association’s net settlement system.
11 TARGET = Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System.
12 “Under a repo agreement, a bank agrees to sell fixed income securities, usually government treasury bills 
or bonds, with guarantee to repurchase them later at a predetermined rate and price" (Golin, 2001, p. 320).
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a bank’s liquidity management could pose a major threat to the realisation of 
its strategic objectives. That said, money markets, as any market, also open 
up trading opportunities, which may allow for trading gains.
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2.3.2. Bond markets
Proprietary trading in bonds has also gained significance among European 
banks following the creation of EMU. More profoundly, the progress towards 
financial integration has had an even greater impact on the bond market 
structure in Europe. A fourfold distinction seems pertinent for the purpose of 
this research: First, it is worthwhile distinguishing between corporate and 
government bonds as corporate bonds are an important force behind 
disintermediation. Second, it is helpful to separate the analysis of the primary 
bond markets, i.e. bond issuance, from the analysis of secondary market, i.e. 
bond trading, as these two markets also differently affect distinct divisions of a 
bank.
Although the introduction of the euro has triggered strong growth in euro- 
denominated corporate bond issues by European non-financial corporations, 
this market appears to be still in its infancy compared to that of the United 
States.13 Research by the European Commission also suggests that the 
corporate, i.e. non-financial, bond market has not lived up to its potential 
(European Commission, 2002a, p. 15; 2002b, p. 160).
Direct market access to long-term capital at low cost enables companies to 
diversify their range of options to finance long-term investments. A large and 
liquid corporate bond market should reduce the cost of debt for companies 
outside the financial sector. This is supported by a noticeable decline of credit 
spreads as investors have become more familiar with European non-financial 
corporate debt (London Economics et al., 2002, p. 97). Given that corporate 
bonds are likely to be a substitute for bank lending and promote 
disintermediation, an economy’s dependency on bank financing should 
diminish relative to bond financing. This wider risk-sharing basis enhances the 
stability of the financial system (European Commission, 2002b, p. 159).
Differences in bond yields result from expectations of exchange rate 
fluctuations, different tax regimes, credit risk and liquidity. The exchange rate 
uncertainty was eliminated when the euro was introduced in January 1999.
13 For example, in mid 2002 the total size of euro-denominated bond market stood at around USD 8,137 
billion, whereas the dollar-denominated bond market was valued at USD 19,539 billion (London Economics, 
et al., 2002, p. 56).
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Despite yield spreads of 10 to 50 basis points for government bonds, the 
European Commission describes the government bond market within the euro 
area as highly integrated (European Commission, 2002b, p. 11).
Although it is argued that the persisting yield spreads, which largely exist 
relative to German government bonds, due to varying liquidity and are thus not 
a reflection of credit quality, it appears plausible that follow the end of national 
interest rate policies the market for European government debt securities 
mirrors the national budgetary situation (European Commission, 2002b, p. 
158). As the budgetary situation could deteriorate more in some euro zone 
member states than in others, a widening of yield spreads might result.14 In 
that respect the European Monetary Union has enhanced the competition 
between national governments, with each nation struggling for better 
refinancing conditions on the capital markets.
From a European investor’s perspective one positive consequence of differing 
yield spreads is the greater opportunity to diversify government bond 
portfolios, of which they have largely been deprived since EMU (Brookes, 
1999, p. 22). As many European investors are inclined to hold bonds to 
maturity, (London Economics et al., 2002, p. 97) it is foremost the primary 
bond market, i.e. the market for issuing debt, which has received impetus from 
the existence of a single currency in Europe.
Euro-denominated corporate bond issuance has risen markedly since the 
introduction of the euro. The European Commission notes, “[...] the market 
share of private issuance is now about half of total issuance (more than 
quadrupling since 1998), average maturities have lengthened, and issue sizes 
have increased with tranches above EUR 1 billion now commonplace” 
(European Commission, 2002a, p. 15). Cabral, et al. remark that the corporate 
issue volumes in 2001 are sixteen times higher than in 1995 and conclude that 
“this reflects the increased trust in stable borrowing costs and the ability of 
firms to go beyond their domestic markets under the single currency 
conditions” (Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 11).
However, the secondary corporate bond market, i.e. the market where 
corporate bonds are actually traded, is still not very liquid. Most non­
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government bonds are still traded over-the-counter (OTC), which impedes 
transparency and liquidity. Yet it seems inevitable that the increasing activity 
of the primary corporate bond market will lead to the emergence of a liquid 
and transparent secondary bond market.
By assuming that the European financial market could increasingly resemble 
the US financial market, London Economics concludes that “[...] the share of 
bond financing will increase while the share of bank financing will fall so that 
the current gap between the share of bond financing in total debt financing 
between the U.S. and the European Union is reduced by a quarter” (London 
Economics et al., 2002, p. iv).
The changing landscape of Europe’s bond markets requires banks to actively 
address the ongoing process of disintermediation by strategically refocusing 
on bond underwriting services in order to benefit from this trend. Developing a 
core competency as a bond underwriter could also help institutions generate 
profits from bond trading, which might even out the more volatile equity 
business. Moreover, the advance of corporate bonds results in a convergence 
of equity and bond products, giving rise to hybrid products, such as 
subordinated loans and convertible bonds.
The European Commission argues that the wholesale market for financial 
products has integrated relatively well, with the exception of the equity 
markets. This has been especially the case since the launch of the euro. One 
elemental reason being the ability of players on the wholesale market to 
access and assess information in order to overcome obstacles to integration, 
e.g. by buying legal expertise (European Commission, 2002a, p. 14). 
However, the European Commission concedes that overcoming these 
obstacles ties resources and thus bears certain costs, which are ultimately 
passed on to consumers and enterprises (European Commission, 2002a, p. 
14).
14 Not all member states of the euro zone have the same credit ratings.
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2.3.3. Equity markets
Bringing down the costs for cross-border trading is a prime concern of the 
European Commission and is at the core of the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP). The 43-point Financial Services Action Plan, launched in 1999, aimed 
to remove the remaining barriers to integration in the European financial 
services industry by 2005 (Deutsche Bank Research, 2002). The FSAP 
agenda which, among other things, aimed to harmonise the EU wholesale 
market, also addressed the continued high cost of cross-border equity trading. 
Due to the high cross-border clearing and settlement fees, which are a 
multiple of the lowest fees charged for national trades, buying and selling of 
equities across different countries within the EU is more expensive than within 
national borders. This illustrates that further integrating the equity markets and 
the eventual emergence of a pan-European stock exchange, needs to be 
preceded by the creation of a single European clearing house (Cabral, et al., 
2002; Janssen, 2003b).
So far, three stock exchange operators have emerged as Europe’s dominant 
players: the London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse and NYSE Euronext15 
challenge the other European stock exchanges by attracting liquidity to their 
trading platforms. Europe’s biggest cash equity market remains in the hands 
of the London Stock Exchange. However, the only pan-European stock 
exchange is NYSE Euronext, which comprises the European cash equity 
markets of the Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Lisbon bourses as well as the 
London-based derivatives market Liffe. Deutsche Borse is the majority 
shareholder of the world’s second largest derivatives market, Eurex, and 
operates Xetra.
The fragmented stock market landscape is also mirrored in the national 
structures of the issuing services for equity (initial public offerings, i.e. IPOs). 
Cabras et al. contrast the more integrated bond markets with the equity 
markets where local banks maintain a prominent position, not least by 
highlighting the importance of local knowledge for adequately assessing risk 
(Cabral, et al., 2002, p. 5). Despite the continued national bias in the equity 
underwriting business, research by Chelley-Steeley and Steeley (1999)
15 In April 2007, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE Group) merged with Euronext to form the first 
transatlantic stock exchange group.
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indicates that, overall, European equity markets have become more integrated 
following the removal of exchange controls. In fact, they demonstrate that the 
abolition of exchange controls has noticeably promoted equity market 
integration within Europe (Chelley-Steeley & Steeley, 1999).
Ahead of EMU, institutional equity investors gradually abandoned national 
approaches to managing investments and chose pan-European indices like 
Euro-Stoxx, as their benchmark. Consequently, fund managers restructured 
their European portfolios along to sector lines. This shift towards sector 
investment has been corroborated by empirical evidence on equity price 
movements (European Commission, 2002a, p. 15). Furthermore, a survey 
carried out by Goldman Sachs, a US investment bank, (Goldman Sachs, 
1998a; 1998b; Brookes, 1999) illustrates that a majority of fund managers 
organised their equity portfolios on a sector basis in the run-up to European 
Monetary Union.
Empirical research undertaken by London Economics (in association with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Oxford Economic Forecasting) for the European 
Commission (London Economics et al., 2002, pp. 16-53) suggested that equity 
trading costs could fall sharply as financial integration progressed. Moreover, 
their research reveals a positive correlation between the cost of trading and 
the cost of equity, whereby “the cost of equity is the rate of return investors 
require on an equity investment in a firm" (Damodaran, p. 182, 2002). This 
“required” rate of return is often derived with the help of the capital asset 
pricing model16 (CAPM), which is the most common risk and return model, 
despite some well-known pitfalls (for a review see: Damodaran, 2002).
London Economics maintains, “the broadening of the investor base for a given 
stock leads to a lower cost of equity, through greater risk pooling. The required 
rate of return on a given risky asset depends crucially on the covariance 
between the payoff to that asset and the payoff to the “market portfolio”, i.e. its 
systematic risk. As a given market becomes more open, the degree of foreign 
ownership rises. The required rates of return fall in the local market, because 
external investors require a lower rate of return to compensate for bearing risk 
that is at least partially diversifiable” (London Economics et al., 2002, p. 3).
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Consequently fully integrated European equity markets could reduce the 
average cost of equity by more than 0.40%. The data used in the research by 
London Economics also reveals that the cost of equity in Germany would 
decline by 0.20 percentage points more than in the UK (London Economics et 
al., 2002, pp. 16-53).
Evening out the volatile equity business poses a major strategic challenge for 
banks. The repercussions of business volatility are aggravated by the serious 
strategic implications of increasingly integrated equity markets. As indicated, 
the consequences range from organisational structure and with it the product 
range offered for asset management clients to advice on equity underwriting 
for the corporate sector. Comparing US and European equity market 
capitalisations suggests that disintermediation in Europe could also be 
expedited by further equity issuance. Banks, which fail to provide underwriting 
services on a pan-European level are likely to find it difficult to place the 
issued equity with institutional investors across Europe.
Moreover, the trading of shares across national borders is effectively impeded 
by 15 barriers to efficient cross-border clearing and settlement within Europe 
(Giovannini Group, 2001). According to the findings of the first Giovannini 
Report (Giovannini Group, 2001) the settlement of cross-border transactions 
within the EU is substantially less efficient than the settlement of domestic 
transactions.17 Clearing and settlement are essential features of a smoothly 
functioning securities market, providing for the efficient and safe transfer of 
ownership from the seller to the buyer (Giovannini Group, 2001, p. i). The 
evidence presented in the Giovannini Report "points to a stark contrast in the 
cost of domestic and cross border settlement in the EU, suggesting a need to 
address sources of fragmentation in the infrastructure” (Giovannini Group, p. 
43, 2001). Resolving the cross-border clearing and settlement issue is likely to 
be accompanied by the aforementioned consolidation of Europe’s stock 
exchange operators.
However, important as these infrastructural matters are for the emergence of a 
truly pan-European equity culture, soft factors, like a better understanding of
16 CAPM: expected return = risk-free rate + beta*(risk premium); whereby beta is defined as the covariance 
of the asset divided by the market portfolio and thus expresses the risk added by an investment to the 
market portfolio (Damodaran, 2002, p. 71).
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foreign stocks are equally important in order to overcome national barriers. 
Cultural differences are another obstacle to integration of Europe’s retail 
markets for financial services. They are addressed in the following section.
17 The Giovannini Report suggests that the costs per cross-border trade are about 11 times higher than for 
domestic transactions.
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2.3.4. Retail markets
“[Financial] retail markets are the part of the financial system where 
consumers and many enterprises [...] purchase financial services” (European 
Commission, 2002a, p. 17). According to the European Commission, the 
financial services retail markets are far less integrated than the wholesale 
markets and the difficulty of overcoming these obstacles appears greater 
(European Commission, 2002a, p. 19). The lack of integration is, for instance, 
reflected in the limited convergence of consumer lending rates (Kleimeier & 
Sander, 2002). An additional example is the absence of a fully automated 
processing of payments within the euro zone, what is known as straight- 
through processing (STP), which keeps the charges for cross-border retail 
payments unnecessarily high (Deutsche Bank Research, 2003). Furthermore, 
the Gyllenhammar Report notes “direct cross-border business between 
financial service suppliers and end consumers is still the exception” 
(Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, p. 11).
As consumer households are likely to be less well informed than enterprises 
and cannot rely to the same extent on extensive legal advice, the retail market 
for financial products is subject to stringent consumer protection regulation. In 
1989, the Second Banking Coordination Directive granted Europe’s banks the 
right to set up branches in other EU member states and to trade in financial 
services across the EU once they had been approved by their home-country 
authorities18 (Deutsche Bank Research, 2002; Howells & Bain, 2002). 
However, this freedom was infringed by applying the “host-country control” 
rule for many aspects of retail banking. Overriding home-country control 
guarantees that the host country’s consumer protection laws remain under 
national control, implying that there is only minimal harmonisation of consumer 
protection rules.
Consequently, foreign banks that sell, for example, consumer credit or saving 
products to retail clients have to comply with the regulatory framework for local 
consumer protection and with laws which serve national public interest 
(Henderson, 1993, pp. 23-25). Given such a policy, economies of scale are 
difficult to realise. This is illustrated by the 15 different regulatory approvals a
18 This established the so-called Single European Passport.
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financial institution requires in order to market one financial product EU-wide.19 
One aim of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP, 1999-2005) was to 
resolve this matter by combining mutual recognition in legal matters, based on 
the country-of-origin principle, with harmonisation of the rules of conduct 
essential for investor protection (European Council, 2002, p. 40). Nine 
measures were forward by the FSAP to promote “open and secure retail 
markets”. These included policies on the distance selling of financial services, 
financial service providers’ duty of information towards purchasers, and cross- 
border payments (Deutsche Bank Research, 2002).
Due partly to national consumer protection laws, and partly to “natural 
barriers” to integration such as language, mentality and cultural issues, the 
retail markets for financial products are much more cumbersome to integration 
than the wholesale markets (Heinemann, & Jopp, 2002, p. 46). Moreover, 
differences in legal and tax regimes prevail and proximity to customers 
appears to be important for the retail business (European Commission 2002a, 
p. 19).
The Gyllenhammar Report20 comments on the market for online 
brokerage/banking that “the impact of the internet on the integration of retail 
markets for financial services does not meet optimistic expectations [...]” and 
that it does not overcome market fragmentation (Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, p. 
11). Heinemann and Jopp, the authors of the Gyllenhammar Report, also 
show that until 2002 most entries into national banking markets occurred 
through mergers and acquisitions and not via “greenfield” investments 
(Heinemann, & Jopp, 2002, p. 22).
In retail banking, more than in wholesale banking, it is increasingly common to 
draw a distinction between the production and distribution of financial 
products. This development raises questions about where a financial services 
firm should be positioned within the value chain, a strategic matter that can be 
found at the core of the debates about bancassurance concepts and online 
banking.
19 For example, there are 39 supervisory authorities responsible for prudential supervision in the EU and on 
average a financial institution has to report to 20 supervisors in the EU (Pearson P.J. (2002) in Kremers, J. 
ed. et al. (2003)).
20 A study commissioned by the European Financial Services Round Table (Gyllenhammar Report -  
prepared by Heinemann, F. and Jopp, M., 2002) suggests that the potential for higher growth through
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Disintermediation seems to be less of a strategic problem in retail banking 
than in wholesale banking, mainly because the size of households means that 
the cost of individually accessing the capital markets for borrowing would be 
too high relative to the benefits. However, since the early 1990s retail clients 
across Europe have increasingly turned to capital market investments, via 
mutual funds (retail funds), unit-linked insurance or direct equity and bond 
investments. This changed savings behaviour has led to a relative decline in 
retail deposits, depriving banks of this source of funding. Although more retail 
clients interact directly with the capital market, thus contributing to 
disintermediation, it seems that a shift in European financial systems towards 
a market-oriented structure is more likely to originate from the wholesale 
market and corporate finance than from the retail sector (European 
Commission, 2002b, p. 159).
Given the pressure resulting from disintermediation in wholesale banking and 
the volatility of the equity business, banks might increasingly favour a strong 
footing in retail banking in order to stabilise their overall revenues. Yet, unfair 
competition in retail banking in some European states renders this a difficult 
undertaking. In Germany, unlike in Britain, low margins in retail banking may 
have conditioned many business decisions by banks. However, once the role 
of the state in banking has been scaled back across the EU, banks are likely 
to gradually focus on pan-European retail banking strategies, so opportunities 
within the most densely populated European countries should be at the 
forefront.
A key strategic problem for European retail banks lies in the question of how 
to benefit from demographic change, which is likely to increase the use of 
funded pension systems throughout Europe.21 Certainly, the incessant debate 
about pension reforms contributed to the prominence of bancassurance 
concepts among strategic considerations of decision-makers in the financial 
services industry. Next to cross-selling considerations, combining savings and 
insurance products is at the heart of the bancassurance debate.
financial integration could be 0.5% of GDP per year, or EUR 43 billion added annually to EU GDP (in 2000 
prices).
Interestingly the Gyllenhammar Report warns that “there is the danger that new obstacles are created as 
a consequence of national pension reforms. The German example shows that very specific national 
requirements on new pension products can constitute additional barriers to entry for foreign suppliers” 
(Heinemann, & Jopp, 2002, p. 13).
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While the bancassurance approach implies the convergence of savings and 
insurance products on the one hand, there also seems to be further 
specialisation on either production or distribution of financial services products 
on the other. In chapter three of this research, the strategic repercussions of 
embarking on a bancassurance and/or a specialisation course are 
investigated. Regardless of the course taken, these aforementioned 
developments inevitably provoke a controversy about the legal and economic 
definitions of a bank. Therefore, the following section deals with the central 
question of what a bank is.
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2.4. What is a bank?
While the preceding sections outlined the discussion about disintermediation 
within a financial system from a market perspective, this section looks at the 
institutional pillars, namely the financial intermediaries. The argument that the 
European financial system might transform itself from a bank-based system to 
a capital market-oriented system calls for clarification of the concept of a 
“financial intermediary”.
Without discussing the theoretical question of what constitutes a financial 
intermediary at great length, this research accepts that there are financial 
intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies and investment 
companies which are instrumental to the functioning of the financial markets 
as their activities provide the institutional framework. Clearly, there would not 
be any significant financial market without these financial institutions, neither 
would there be any financial institution without the existence of such markets.
The structure of a financial system is to a great extent contingent upon the 
institutions that make up the system. Unlike insurance and investment 
companies, banks play the most important role in maintaining the stability of a 
financial system. Therefore, this research focuses on banks, which makes it 
necessary to consider the definition of a “bank”. This can be approached in a 
threefold manner (Buschgen, 1993, pp. 9-26). Buschgen differentiates 
between a legal, a microeconomic and a macroeconomic definition of a bank - 
an approach that also appears functional for this research.
Consequently, this section first provides an overview of the bank-specific 
directives adopted at EU level, and then outlines the legal definitions of a bank 
in the United Kingdom and Germany. The second half of this section 
considers the microeconomic definition of a bank, which is inextricably linked 
to the macroeconomic concept of bank. The macroeconomic considerations 
lead to some concluding remarks about mergers and acquisitions within the 
European banking market.
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2.4.1. The rationale for banking regulation
Prior to the discussion of a bank’s legal status in the EU, Britain and Germany, 
it is necessary to explain why the banking sector is so heavily regulated. The 
banks’ pivotal role within the financial system essentially stems from their 
transformation function, which implies the matching of monetary surplus and 
deficit units (Howells & Bain, 2002; Mishkin, 1986). It follows that the banks’ 
significance for the supply of money to the economy and their function as 
deposit-taking institutions provide the rationale for banking regulation.
The liability side of a bank’s balance sheet comprises many small, short-term 
deposits, while the asset side comprises a smaller number of long-term loans. 
This enables banks to carry out certain transformation functions: maturity, 
size, risk and spatial transformation (Buschgen, 1993, p. 19). It is important to 
recall that this is a demand-driven process, (Howells, & Bain, 2002, p 33), i.e. 
banks do not “generate” loans from deposits, on the contrary, the demand for 
loans is financed through deposits. Alternatively, banks can refinance their 
activities by issuing bonds.
Howells and Bain note that “cash comes into the hands of the public by being 
obtained from a bank [...and not because] there is a vast pool of unwanted 
cash outside banks as a whole waiting to be paid in, in order to increase 
deposits” (Howells, & Bain, 2002, p 33). This illustrates how banks as deposit- 
taking institutions22 take an active role in the supply of money to the economy 
(Mishkin, 1986, p. 9). The liabilities of banks are the money supply of a 
country, so increased financial intermediation by banks leads to greater 
liquidity, i.e. more money in the economy. Resulting from this role as a money 
supplier to the economy, banks’ lending and deposit policies are essential to 
the monetary workings of an economy.
In the event of insolvency of a bank, especially a deposit-taking institution, this 
could lead to a panic among depositors, wanting, or simply having to withdraw 
money from other banks, eventually leading to a bank run. Furthermore, a 
high degree of interbank lending, which is aimed at serving liquidity 
management and to facilitate interbank payment transactions, could
22 A deposit-taking institution is the legal definition for a bank in the UK, according to the Banking Acts 1979 
and 1987 (Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 1997).
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accelerate a risk of interbank contagion.23 The consequence could be 
significantly reduced liquidity, thus the whole financial system might be 
destabilised with detrimental repercussions for the economy (Howells & Bain, 
2000, 2002; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, pp. 
325-329).
Consumer protection is the other important reason for bank regulation. It is 
argued that retail clients have to be protected because of their relative 
ignorance of the workings of the financial system in general and about the 
specific practices of their bank (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, p. 327). 
Virtuous as this line of reasoning appears, the protection of depositors is a 
necessary condition for sufficient confidence in the banking system. Therefore, 
the argument for consumer protection effectively supports the stability of the 
financial system.
For a regulatory, i.e. legal, definition of a bank the varying historical banking 
backgrounds rooted in different cultures and legal systems need to be taken 
into account. In the Anglo-American literature, a distinction is made between 
deposit-taking institutions (DTIs, e.g. banks and building societies) and non­
deposit-taking institutions (NDTIs, e.g. insurance companies and investment 
houses) (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 32-67). These terms originate from the US 
banking system, which legally required a clear separation of commercial 
(deposit-taking) and investment (non-deposit-taking) banking between 1933 
(Glass-Steagall Act) and 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act) (Walter, 2002, p. 24).
23 An additional form of systemic risk can emerge if jointly financed projects are no longer viable and could 
not be completed as a result of one troubled bank, possibly leading to losses at the other banks involved 
(Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 8).
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2.4.2. Legal definition of a bank in the European Union
The distinction between DTIs and NDTIs initially prevailed in the British 
banking landscape with clearinghouses as DTIs and merchant banks as 
NDTIs. This separation served as the basis for the EU’s First Banking 
Directive on Coordination of Regulations Governing Credit Institutions of 
197724 (Buschgen, 1993, p. 13).
This bipolar definition is, however, difficult to reconcile with the German 
concept of a universal bank, which has traditionally offered both retail and 
investment (wholesale) banking services (Walter, 2002, p. 24). Differing 
definitions of banks and other financial services providers can imply 
competitive disadvantages at EU level as was claimed, for example, by some 
German banks in reaction to the First Banking Directive (Buschgen, 1993, p. 
13).
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 paved the way for a common European market in 
financial services. Article 52 of The Treaty of Rome, the right of establishment; 
Article 59, the freedom to supply services across borders, and Article 67, the 
free movement of capital, provide the legal foundation for a common market 
for financial services (Llewellyn, 1992, p. 106).25
24 First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (77/780/EEC).
The freedom of establishment for financial services companies was not translated into an EC Directive 
before the 1973 Directive on the Freedom of Establishment (73/183/EEC), which abolished all restrictions 
on freedom of establishment and guaranteed the freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed 
activities of banks and other financial institutions.
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2.4.2.1. Treaty of Rome
According to Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome, the free movement of capital 
was only a means to ensure integration of the common market in goods and 
services. Therefore, it merely fulfilled a certain function and was not being an 
objective in itself (Treaty of Rome, Article 67; Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 445). 
Article 67 suggests that governments considered monetary and capital issues 
essentially as matters of national sovereignty at the outset of the “European 
project” (Henderson, 1993, pp. 20-22). Europe-wide free movement of capital 
was in fact of secondary interest to the governments at the time. As Butt Philip 
remarks the Commission’s priorities did not change until the 1960s, when EC 
officials recognised that more harmonised European banking laws would be 
necessary for a Common Market to emerge (Butt Philip, 1982, p. 462).
Moreover, Article 73 allowed governments to restrict the freedom of capital 
movement “if movements of capital lead to disturbances in the functioning of 
the capital market in any Member State [...]” (Treaty of Rome, Article 73). 
Existing exchange controls, limitations on cross-border trade in financial 
services and barriers to the free location of financial institutions were 
additional barriers to integration which impeded the emergence of a common 
financial services market following the Treaty of Rome (Llewellyn, 1992, p. 
106).
Paolo Clarotti of the European Commission also notes that Article 57 (2) of the 
original Treaty of Rome required the coordination of legislation relating to the 
banking profession. The implications of this need for “coordination” were 
reflected in the negotiations on directives to abolish restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment for banks and on banking supervision between 1965 
and 1972. The cumbersome negotiating process already indicated that 
harmonisation would be difficult to achieve - even more so after the accession 
of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark to the EC in 1973 (Clarotti, 1984, 
pp. 199-200; Reich, 1994, pp. 49-50).
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2.4.2.2. First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC)
As a result of the growing awareness that harmonisation was too ambitious a 
policy approach to integrate the European banking market, the First Banking 
Directive on Coordination of Regulations Governing Credit Institutions of 1977 
followed the principle of “host-country control”. According to the First Banking 
Directive, a credit institution had to be first licensed in its home country before 
it could enter the market in another EEC member state. On the basis of this 
licence from the county of origin the credit institution was then allowed to 
operate in other EEC member states, providing it was authorised to do so by 
the host country’s regulatory body and only if it complied with the same rules 
applied to local banks (“principle of host country control”) (Howells & Bain, 
2002, p. 450; Buschgen, 1998, pp. 29-32).
For a credit institution to obtain authorisation it had to have adequate and 
separate capital from that of its owners. Moreover, the institution needed at 
least two directors (the so-called “four eyes principle”), plus a reputable and 
experienced management and it had to submit to the authorities a business 
plan (Clarotti, 1984, p. 213; Henderson, 1993, pp. 23-24; Howells & Bain, 
2002, pp. 450). Effectively, the First Banking Directive meant that, for 
example, a UK bank in Germany could only do what German regulation 
allowed German banks to do in Germany (Llewellyn, 1992, p. 127).
Clarotti maintains that the First Banking Directive greatly improved the 
coordination of supervisory regulations within the European Community, which 
is a necessary condition for the creation of a common banking market. 
Following this directive, the supervisory authorities of the member states had 
to collaborate in monitoring the solvency and liquidity requirements of credit 
institutions, thereby “forcing” them to increase harmonisation (Clarotti, 1984, 
pp. 219-220).
Despite an integration policy which recognised the limitations of harmonisation 
in European banking regulation, the Banking Directive of 1977 provided a first 
common definition for a “credit institution”. The directive defined a credit 
institution as an “undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account” 
(European Commission, First Council Directive, 77/780/EEC).
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It may be concluded that the EEC’s First Banking Directive of 1977 
established that all member states must have a formal licensing system for the 
operation of banks. Moreover, it was broadly agreed that all deposit-taking 
institutions should be subject to the same legal framework, with a few 
exceptions. Finally, following the First Banking Directive it became evident that 
the view that future legal harmonisation of the banking sector should remain 
primarily in the hands of the supervisory authorities and the bankers 
themselves (Butt Philip, 1982, p. 463).
In response to heavy lobbying from Britain, the European Commission applied 
a “narrow” definition of a bank in its First Banking Directive which excluded 
investment services (Butt Philip, 1982, pp. 462-463). However, according to 
German banking law (§1 KWG) such investment services are part of a bank’s 
business and therefore have to be regulated by the German banking 
supervisory authority (BAKred, now part of BaFin). Due to different capital 
requirements for retail banks and banks which also offer investment services 
(universal banks), German banks argued that this divergent legal basis implied 
an economic disadvantage for them (Buschgen, 1998, pp. 29-32).
Prior to the Single European Act of 1986, the Directive on the Supervision of 
Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis of 1983 (Directive 83/350/EEC) 
also promoted the cause of a common European banking market. This 
directive took account of the increasing international activities of European 
banks and the numerous opportunities for offshore vehicles. In particular 
against the background of the international debt crisis at the beginning of the 
1980s the European Commission recognised that it was necessary to monitor 
the banks’ global reach. Therefore, this directive made it mandatory for a bank 
to be supervised on the basis of its consolidated accounts and for its capital 
requirements to be measured against its total business, irrespective of 
national boundaries (Clarotti, 1984, pp. 221-222; Llewellyn, 1992, p. 127).
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2.4.2.3. Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC)
In the 1985 Cockfield Report prepared for the European Commission, it was 
argued that a common market in financial services was essential for the 
completion of the internal market (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 446). Therefore, 
it recommended the removal of all restrictions on capital mobility and financial 
services. In order to create a mechanism which could remove these barriers 
the Cockfield Report proposed mutual recognition of each member state’s 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements, thereby introducing the new “home 
country principle”. Subsequently, the home country principle became the 
overriding principle for the Second Banking Coordination Directive (Llewellyn, 
1992, pp. 123-124; Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 446-447). According to the 
principle of “home country control”, which has dominated European banking 
regulation since the Second Banking Coordination Directive of 1989 the legal 
definition of “a bank” is embedded within the national judicial system in which 
the bank operates.
In an article published in the Journal of Common Market Studies in 1984, 
Paolo Clarotti of the European Commission outlines the necessity of the 
principle of “home country control” for the emergence of a truly common 
banking market. He explains that “only by adopting, by means of coordination, 
the principle of “home country control”; that is to say, the supervision of the 
credit institution by its home country, with its corollary, the possibility of a 
credit institution, duly authorized by the competent authorities in its home 
country, able to have branches throughout the Community on the same 
conditions that it can open them within its home country, (conditions which 
moreover should be coordinated), can a truly common banking market come 
into existence, which would have the same characteristics as a present-day 
national market” (Clarotti, 1984, p. 200).
Following the Single European Act, the principles of minimum harmonisation, 
mutual recognition, and home country regulation were established. The 
Second Banking Coordination Directive of 1989 (89/646/EEC), which came 
into force in 1993, enabled banks to operate throughout the EU on the basis of 
a single licence (a “single passport”) granted by the regulatory authorities in 
their home country (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 451-453). The directive also 
explicitly listed all banking activities which had to be mutually recognised, thus 
broadening the definition of a bank. These comprised:
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(1) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; (2) 
Lending; (3) Financial leasing; (4) Money transmission services; (5) Issuing 
and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers’ cheques 
and bankers’ drafts); (6) Guarantees and commitments; (7) Trading for own 
account or for account of customers in: (a) money market instruments 
(cheques, bills, CDs, etc.), (b) foreign exchange, (c) financial futures and 
options, (d) exchange and interest rate instruments, (e) transferable securities; 
(8) Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such 
issues; (9) Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and 
related questions and advice and services relating to mergers and the 
purchase of undertakings; (10) Money broking; (11) Portfolio management and 
advice; (12) Safekeeping and administration of securities; (13) Credit 
reference services; (14) Safe custody services.26
The Second Banking Coordination Directive was followed by further directives 
to harmonise details. These ancillary directives were the “Directive on the 
Annual and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and other Financial Institutions” 
(86/635/EEC) -  harmonizing standards for annual and consolidated accounts 
of credit institutions; the “Own Funds Directive” (89/299/EEC) -  defining 
minimum requirements of the bank’s capital base, i.e. equity capital; the “Bank 
Solvency Ratio Directive” (89/647/EEC) -  setting the standard for prudent 
solvency ratios in accordance with the Basel capital adequacy rules; the 
“Second Consolidated Supervision Directive” (92/30/EEC) -  succeeding the 
“Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis” of 
1983; the “Large Exposures Directive” (92/121/EEC) -  standardising the 
requirements to report on the institution’s largest credit exposure; the “Capital 
Adequacy Directive” (93/6/EEC) -  applying the Basel capital adequacy 
requirements to investment firms and securities activities of banks; the 
“Deposit Guarantee Directive” (94/19/EEC) -  aimed at protecting depositors 
against a loss of their deposits if their bank failed, assuming this to be a single, 
isolated event (Henderson, 1993; European Commission, 1997; Howells &
26 Annex listing activities subject to mutual recognition in the Second Council Directive of 15 December 
1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC (89/646/EEC).
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Bain, 2002, pp. 450-452). Most of these directives were consol id itated as a 
single text in Directive 2000/12/EC.27
Effectively, the Second Banking Coordination Directive acknowledged that 
universal banking prevailed within the EU member states, especially 
Germany. The Second Banking Directive gave universal banks the right to 
undertake securities business in other EU member states, whereas non­
banks, such as UK investment firms, did not enjoy the same rights. By 
stringently applying the home country control principle, banks were even 
allowed to carry out activities in the host country which were not covered by 
the host country’s banking regulations.
Consequently, the British financial services industry, with its numerous 
investment houses, categorised as non-banks under European law, felt 
disadvantaged compared with its competitors with universal banking 
structures. British institutions argued that they could not benefit to the same 
extent from home country control and mutual recognition as some of the 
competing universal banks on the continent. In order to overcome this difficulty 
the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC) also applied the “single 
passport principle" to non-bank investment firms.
Following the Second Banking Coordination Directive, the varying capital 
requirements for different organisational forms of banking which existed 
across Europe also had to be addressed. In particular, since the securities 
operations of Germany’s universal banks would compete with Britain’s non­
bank securities firms, there was a need to harmonise capital requirements. “If 
capital adequacy rules had not been extended to cover non-bank securities 
firms, then they, [...] would have been given a competitive advantage over 
banks engaged in securities business, which were required to meet capital 
adequacy rules” (Howells & Bain, 2000, p. 380).
27 Directive 2000/12/EC consolidates the following Directives: 73/183/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks 
and other financial institutions; 77/780/EEC, as amended by Directive 89/646/EEC, on the coordination of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions; 89/299/EEC on the own funds of credit institutions; 89/646/EEC on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions; 89/647/EEC on a solvency ratio for credit institutions; 92/30/EEC on the supervision of credit 
institutions on a consolidated basis; 92/121/EEC on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit 
institutions.
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The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) of 1993 established uniform capital 
requirements which regulate functions instead of institutions. Therefore, the 
CAD applies to both universal banks’ securities operations and non-bank 
securities firms. In practice, a universal bank identifies the trading positions of 
its balance sheet for which it needs to hold sufficient capital in accordance 
with the CAD. For the remaining assets, the bank provides capital as required 
by the 1989 Bank Solvency Ratio Directive, which is aligned with the 1988 
Basle Accord.
The 1988 Basle Accord has been reviewed and the New Basel Capital 
Accord, often referred to as Basel II, became effective at the beginning of 
2007 in the EU. Basel II comprises three aspects (“pillars”), namely (1) 
minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, 
and (3) public disclosure (Bank for International Settlements, 2003a). In 
essence, Basel II aligns a bank’s regulatory capital requirements with its risks, 
leading to a more differentiated assessment of risk. Along with the review of 
the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), the EU’s capital framework was also 
revised as part of the Financial Services Action Plan (Howells & Bain, 2000, 
2002; Dale, 1996).
Despite the major progress achieved with the Second Banking Coordination 
Directive and its ancillary directives, these measures could not remove all 
restrictions on the mobility of financial services. Exceptions to the home- 
country control principle persisted. For example, host countries could retain 
the right to control bank liquidity for monetary policy reasons. Furthermore, 
consumer protection remained a national icon. Banks selling consumer credit, 
savings and mortgages, still had to comply with local host-nation consumer 
protection rules and similar laws which served the “national public interest” 
(Henderson, 1993, pp. 23-25).
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2.4.2.4. Financial Services Action Plan (COM(1999) 232)
In order to finally overcome these national obstacles and to reap the benefits 
of European Monetary Union (EMU) the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) was launched by the European Commission in 1999. Prior to the 
FSAP initiative, on 1 January 1994 Articles 67 to 73 of the Treaty of Rome 
were replaced by Articles 73b, c, d, e, f and g in anticipation of the imminent 
introduction of EMU. The amended Article 73 (b) identifies a common financial 
market as an objective in its own right, thus placing EU financial integration on 
the policymaking agenda. Article 73 (b) specifies that “within the framework of 
the provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries shall be prohibited.” Moreover “[...] all restrictions on payments 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall 
be prohibited" (Article 73 (b), Treaty of Rome).
The Financial Services Action Plan comprised 43 measures to facilitate the 
emergence of a Single Market in financial services and ensure that the 
benefits of a common currency could be fully exploited by 2005. According to 
the European Commission’s plan, “the EU should be endowed with a 
legislative apparatus capable of responding to new regulatory challenges; any 
remaining capital market fragmentation should be eliminated, thereby reducing 
the cost of capital raised on EU markets; users and suppliers of financial 
services should be able to exploit freely the commercial opportunities offered 
by a single financial market, while benefiting from a high level of consumer 
protection; closer co-ordination of supervisory authorities should be 
encouraged; and an integrated EU infrastructure should be developed to 
underpin retail and wholesale financial transactions” (European Commission, 
1999).
Under the FSAP, the European Commission also acknowledged that the 
greater interconnectedness of actors within the financial services sector 
required solutions which did not deal separately with the issues concerned. 
Consequently, the complexity of the FSAP package and the emergence of 
new challenges during implementation of the FSAP have given rise to calls for 
an FSAP II (Deutsche Bank Research, 2002; Bundesverband deutscher 
Banken, 2003).
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2.4.3. Legal definition of a bank in the UK
Due to the differing legal traditions and national legal systems in Europe, 
definitions of what constitutes a “bank” also differ. Historically, the UK banking 
system featured a “considerable reliance upon self-regulation by the 
institutions concerned,” (Swary & Topf, 1992, p. 4) with very little formal 
regulation, mandatory rules, or prescribed codes, according to the principle of 
common law (Mastropasqua, 1978, p. 81).
Until the 1980s the British banking system featured a dual structure with 
clearing banks as “deposit banks” and merchant banks as “accepting 
houses”28 (Mastropasqua, 1978, p. 87). Although there was no legal 
requirement for a statutory separation of the banking and securities industries, 
even the Bank of England officially distinguished between clearing and 
merchant banks as a matter of custom (Dale, 1992, p. 106; Artis, ed., 1992, 
pp. 81-91). Most merchant banks were established in the 18th and 19th 
centuries to finance international trade by the British Empire, although most 
merchant banks were actually founded by families who had their roots on the 
European continent, predominantly in Germany. Some of the most prominent 
families were Kleinwort, Rothschild, Schroder, and Warburg (Stechow, 1973; 
Chapman, 1984).
In the UK, the first broadly defined supervisory framework was set up by the 
Bank of England in 1974 (Steffens, 1990). In response to the European 
Commission’s First Banking Directive of 1977, the United Kingdom introduced 
the 1979 Banking Act (Butt Philip, 1982, p. 463), which required banks to 
apply for authorisation to the Bank of England. A bank could then either 
receive authorisation as a “deposit taking institution” or fulfil the more stringent 
criteria for receiving authorisation as a “recognised bank”. For a bank to 
become a “recognised bank” it had to be examined by the Bank of England 
which would then acknowledge that the institution meets all conditions of 
being of “high reputation and standing in the financial community” (Clarotti, 
1984, p. 204).
28 The financing of commerce took place by “accepting” bills of exchange (Mastropasqua, 1978, p. 87).
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In anticipation of the European Commission’s Second Banking Directive 
(1989), Britain passed the 1986 Financial Services Act and the 1987 Banking 
Act. Based on the City’s tradition of self-regulation the Financial Services Act 
of 1986 aimed to establish a flexible system of regulation, which enhanced the 
rights of individual investors (Steffens, 1990). Five self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs)29 were set up with the Securities and Investments Board 
(SIB) as the designated agency, responsible for monitoring them. However, 
following the 1986 Financial Services Act it emerged that these SROs 
preferred to fulfil the function of lobbying entities than carry out their 
supervisory duties (Howells & Bain, 2000, p. 362-375).
The Financial Services Act also provided the Bank of England with greater 
regulatory powers for the UK wholesale markets in sterling, foreign exchange 
and gold bullion (Howells & Bain, 2000, p. 372). The Bank of England’s 
supervisory powers were further strengthened by the 1987 Banking Act, which 
introduced tighter regulatory control. The 1987 Banking Act abolished the 
distinction between recognised banks and licensed deposit-taking institutions, 
which had been established by the Banking Act of 1979 (Howells & Bain, 
2000, p. 370). Thus, the 1987 Banking Act established a single class of 
authorised institutions which had to comply with the same regulations and 
rules.
Following the Banking Act of 1987, the Bank of England produced numerous 
papers establishing prudential rules which had to be met in order to be 
granted a banking licence. The Banking Act also anticipated the European 
Commission’s Large Exposures Directive of 1992, which requires banks to 
provide standardised information about its main lending exposures. 
Furthermore, the Banking Act of 1987 empowered the Bank of England “to 
veto acquisition of a shareholding of more than 15 per cent in an authorised 
institution” (Howells & Bain, 2000, p. 371).
The 1986 Financial Services Act and the 1987 Banking Act were accompanied 
by further regulatory changes relating to the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In 
order to avoid prosecution by the UK government under the Restrictive
29 These five self-regulatory organisations were: AFBD (Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers); 
FIMBRA (Financial Intermediaries Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association); IMRO (Investment 
Managers Regulatory Organisation); LAUTRO (Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation); 
TSA (The Securities Association) (Steffens, 1990).
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Practices Act, the LSE ended the fixed commission rates charged by 
stockbrokers to clients. The new legislation allowed firms to operate as both 
brokers and market-makers (dual capacity) (Steffens, 1990; Dictionary of 
Finance and Banking, 1997). Moreover, the 1986 Building Societies Act 
allowed building societies to grant unsecured loans and to become limited 
liability companies, which subsequently led to the transformation of building 
societies into banks (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 78-80). These fundamental 
structural changes in 1986-87, along with the opening up of the LSE’s 
membership to limited liability companies are often referred to as the Big Bang 
in Britain’s financial services industry (Howells & Bain, 2000, p. 362-375).
Yet, even after the 1987 Banking Act the legal definition of a bank remained 
so vague that in 1988 the Review Committee on Banking Services Law, which 
had been appointed by HM Treasury, remarked that “no satisfactory definition 
of ‘bank’ (or, for that matter, ‘banker’) has yet been devised” (Review 
Committee on Banking Services Law, p. 6, chapter 2.03). The Committee 
further notes that “the Banking Act 1987, where one might have expected to 
find some authoritative and up-to-date definition of a “bank", chose to avoid 
the use of the term altogether” (Review Committee on Banking Services Law, 
p. 6, chapter 2.03).
In 1998, the Bank of England Act was passed, paving the way for Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), which was established on 1 June 1998, four years 
before Germany set up a similar supervisory authority. Following the 1998 
Bank of England Act, the FSA took over the responsibility for the supervision 
of the banking system and wholesale money markets and for enforcing the 
relevant legislation from the Bank of England (Howells & Bain, 2000).
In 2003 the FSA, HM Treasury and the Bank of England produced a joint 
consultation paper, which provided the basis for a “Financial Groups 
Directive”. This paper addressed the “bancassurance” issue and introduced 
the legal term of a “financial conglomerate” which were implemented in the 
FSA Handbook and HM Treasury Regulations (HM Treasury & Financial 
Services Authority, 2003). This consultation paper demonstrated once again 
that the UK is clearly the country which sets the standards and thus leads the 
way in financial regulatory matters in the EU. Although national financial 
regulatory issues are nowadays determined largely at EU level, the country
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with the most advanced and up-to-date regulatory framework should be best 
positioned to shape the relevant EU legislation.
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2.4.4. Legal definition of a bank in Germany
By contrast to the British common law system, the German tradition of statute 
law produced a detailed Banking Act, the Gesetz uber das Kreditwesen 
(KWG). This provides a precise legal definition of a bank and comprehensive 
rules about the activities of a bank. Bank supervision in Germany dates back 
to 1931 when it was institutionalised after the collapse of Danatbank, which 
triggered a banking crisis (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, p. 342).
The present German Banking Act has been revised and amended six times 
since it came into force in 1962. With the exception of the EU’s First Banking 
Directive on Coordination of Regulations Governing Credit Institutions of 1977, 
which did not require any legal changes, most of these amendments aligned 
German banking law to EU legislation. The third review of the German 
Banking Act in 1984 transformed the EU Directive on the Supervision of Credit 
Institutions on a Consolidated Basis of 1983 into German law. The fourth 
review in 1992 incorporated the EU’s Own Funds Directive (1989) and the 
Second Banking Coordination Directive (1989). The fifth review of 1995 took 
into account the EU’s Large Exposures Directive (1992), while the sixth review 
in 1998 dealt with the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) of 1993.
Following the sixth review, the definition of banking business in Germany 
comprises “(1) the acceptance of funds from others as deposits or of other 
repayable funds from the public unless the claim to repayment is securitised in 
the form of bearer or order debt certificates, irrespective of whether or not 
interest is paid (deposit business), (2) the granting of money loans and 
acceptance credits (lending business), (3) the purchase of bills of exchange 
and cheques (discount business), (4) the purchase and sale of financial 
instruments in the credit institution's own name for the account of others 
(principal broking services), (5) the safe custody and administration of 
securities for the account of others (safe custody business), (6) the business 
specified in section 1 of the Act on Investment Companies (Gesetz uber 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften) (investment fund business), (7) the incurrence of 
the obligation to acquire claims in respect of loans prior to their maturity, (8) 
the assumption of guarantees and other warranties on behalf of others 
(guarantee business), (9) the execution of cashless payment and clearing 
operations (giro business), (10) the purchase of financial instruments at the
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credit institution’s own risk for placing in the market or the assumption of 
equivalent guarantees (underwriting business), (11) the issuance and 
administration of electronic money (e-money business)” (§1, Paragraph. 1, 
Sentence 2, KWG).
Until May 2002 the Office for Banking Supervision (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur 
das Kreditwesen, abbreviated to BAKred) was the principal regulatory 
authority (supported by the Bundesbank). It monitored the banks’ compliance 
with banking law (KWG). Partly as a result of the acquisition of Dresdner Bank 
by Allianz, the insurance group, in 2001 a new single state regulator for the 
financial services industry was set up in May 2002, four years after Britain had 
set up the FSA. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt 
fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) was established, in order to reflect 
the closer cooperation between banks and insurance companies. At both 
national and European level, the emergence of bancassurance concepts 
challenges the legal definition of a bank and, with it, banking regulation. 
According to Germany’s BaFin “the trend towards integrated bancassurance 
groups is expected to continue.”30 Moreover, a growing number of companies 
in Germany and Britain with core businesses outside the financial services 
industry offer traditional banking and insurance services (White, 1998, p. 12).31
The new German Financial Regulatory Authority (BaFin) mirrors the structure 
of its British counterpart, the FSA. The functions of the former offices for 
banking supervision (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen, BAKred), 
insurance supervision (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Versicherungswesen, 
BAV) and securities supervision (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den 
Wertpapierhandel, BAWe) have been combined in BaFin, which now covers 
all key aspects of consumer protection and solvency supervision in the 
financial services sector. It can be expected that an EU-wide financial services 
authority will be set up in the near future, modelled on the basis of the FSA 
and BaFin. Presumably, this new supra-national regulatory body will draw 
substantially on the more experienced FSA, rather than on its four-year 
younger counterpart, BaFin. Consequently, the UK will probably have a 
greater say in devising this pan-European regulatory authority.
30 BaFin - Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; Available from: http://www.bafin.de/index_e.htm. 
[Accessed 15 November 2003].
For example, around 15% of Volkswagen’s 2002 operating profit originated from financial services 
(Volkswagen AG, Annual Accounts 2002, p. 99).
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Comparing the evolution of British and German financial regulation, it may be 
concluded that Britain has overtaken Germany as the leader in EU financial 
regulatory issues. While in the 1970s Britain still had to catch up with 
developments in EU financial regulation, namely the First Banking Directive, 
which was implemented through the 1979 Banking Act, it has been 
spearheading EU financial regulation since the mid 1980s. This is best 
illustrated by Britain’s Banking Act of 1987, which anticipated the EU’s Second 
Banking Directive of 1989, and the early establishment of the Financial 
Services Authority, which recognised the functional integration of financial 
services firms.
By contrast, Germany seems to have fallen behind since 1980s, occupying the 
position of a follower rather than a leader in the formulation of financial 
regulatory policies at EU level. Along with the continuous decline in German 
banks’ profitability, the country does not seem to anticipate regulatory 
developments and thereby lacks clout in formulating EU policies. While it did 
not have to amend its law following the EU’s First Banking Directive it took the 
German authorities three years to implement the Second Banking Directive - 
five years longer than its British counterparts.
It could be conjectured that a clear legal definition of a bank and other 
financial terms as found in German law could impede the flexibility which 
appears necessary in the face of the ever faster changes in economic reality. 
Therefore, the much deplored absence of a clear definition of a bank in the UK 
and the tradition of common law (see previous remarks by the Review 
Committee on Banking Services Law) may have contributed significantly to the 
faster adaptability of the British authorities. Whichever legal system seems to 
better adjust to the fast changing economic reality, either tends to react to 
economic reality, although its reactions may in return have repercussions for 
that economic reality. Thus, an economic definition of a bank should be 
applicable across borders. The next section outlines the widely accepted 
microeconomic definition of a bank.
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2.4.5. Microeconomic definition of a bank
The preceding sections showed that the varying banking traditions in Britain 
and Germany prompted different organisational structures in the banking 
sector. While in the UK a dual structure with clearing banks (deposit-taking 
institutions) and merchant banks (non-deposit-taking institutions) prevailed for 
many years, banks in Germany have traditionally been organised as universal 
banks. One important issue which emerges from these different organisational 
forms are the capital adequacy requirements for investment banks and retail 
banks. The different capital requirements for different types of banks pinpoint 
the most prominent aspect of banking business, namely dealing with risk, 
which is defined as the deviation from the expected, i.e. the variance of 
possible outcomes (Black, 1997, pp. 406-409).32
Investment banks assist third parties in the management of risk. The bulk of 
an investment bank’s revenues comprise non-interest income, such as 
commission fees and trading results, which are not determined by its balance 
sheet structure. In contrast, a retail bank takes risk on its own books, by 
granting loans, accepting deposits and settling payments. Thus, a retail bank’s 
balance sheet varies with the scope of its operating business. Loans provided 
by a bank are shown on the asset side of the balance sheet, while deposits 
are shown on the liability side. A retail bank’s principal revenue comes from 
charging more interest on its loans than it pays for deposits, leaving it with net 
interest income.
Building on the arguments put forward by Stucken (1957), Buschgen proposes 
that a microeconomic definition of a bank should follow a functional approach, 
in other words, that a bank should be categorised according to the services it 
provides to its clients. Therefore, a bank’s assets, liabilities, and income 
statement33 provide the structure for a microeconomic definition of a bank 
(Buschgen, 1998, pp. 33). This view is shared by Hartmann-Wendels et al., 
who maintain that a functional approach facilitates the analysis of a bank in its 
competitive environment (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, p. 2). For this 
reason, the analysis of a bank’s balance sheet and profit and loss account
32 Risk assessment is conditioned by the quality and quantity of information available at a time.
33 Throughout this research the terms “profit and loss account” and “income statement” are used 
interchangeably.
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represents one important method of evaluating banking strategies in this 
research.
For the purpose of this research, the microeconomic definition of a bank 
comprises the institution’s balance sheet and income statement. This is of 
importance insofar as it facilitates the analysis of the pre-eminent strategic 
question as to whether and if so how a bank should offer advice on transaction 
services, or whether it should merely focus on intermediary functions. The 
strategic considerations are discussed at great length in chapter three. 
However, it is necessary to address the underlying concepts of intermediation 
at this stage to ensure a better understanding of disintermediation. Broadly 
speaking there are two explanations put forward why banks exist as financial 
intermediaries (Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 747). One approach emphasises 
the asset side of the balance sheet, while the other emphasises the liability 
side.
The explanatory models which focus on the asset side (“loans”) regard 
“delegated monitoring” (Diamond, 1984) as a bank’s primary function, i.e. a 
bank monitors an investment project on behalf of investors. According to 
Diamond, a bank takes on the role of a financial intermediary as it can deal 
more efficiently with information asymmetry than an investor/lender that 
provides capital directly to the borrower (Diamond, 1984, pp.393-414; 
Diamond, 1996, pp.51-66). Benefiting from the “law of large numbers”, 
diversification and certain incentives allow a bank, as a financial intermediary, 
to better monitor and thus minimise the risk of loan losses than a single lender 
could do. Moreover Bhattacharya et al. explain that alternatively, depositors, 
that is to say investors, could only invest in large and undiversified stakes 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984; Boyd & 
Prescott; 1986; Allen, 1990; Bhattacharya et al., 1998). Consequently, 
lenders, i.e. depositors, accept a lower return on capital in return for the risk- 
sharing service provided by the intermediary (Diamond, 1984, pp.393-414; 
Diamond, 1996, pp.51-66).
The models which explain the existence of banks by focusing on the liability 
side of the bank’s balance sheet (“deposits”) argue that there are investors, 
i.e. depositors, who are risk averse, uncertain about their future consumption 
plans and require a safekeeping place for cash (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983;
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Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 747). Bhattacharya et al. concisely summarise 
the “liability-side” paradigm: “[...] Investors can invest their date 0 endowments 
in illiquid technologies that will pay off at date 2. Without an intermediary, all 
investors are locked into illiquid long-term investments that yield high payoffs 
only to those who consume late (date 2); those who consume early (date 1) 
get very low payoffs because early consumption requires premature 
liquidation of long-term investments. Improved risk sharing and thus ex ante 
welfare are attained by an intermediary that promises investors a higher payoff 
for early consumption and a lower payoff for late consumption, relative to the 
non-intermediated case” (Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 747).
Both explanatory paradigms have in common that banks are undeniably 
subject to macroeconomic developments. As highlighted in the introductory 
remarks to this chapter, banks represent an important link between 
microeconomic and macroeconomic development of an economy. Following 
this logic, the macroeconomic definition of a bank cannot be entirely 
disconnected from the microeconomic understanding (Buschgen, 1998, pp. 
34). The concept of risk-sharing links a bank’s balance sheet with the macro- 
economy. According to Buschgen, only those financial intermediaries who also 
take some risks themselves and transform such risks should be classified as 
“banks” in a macroeconomic context (Buschgen, 1998, pp. 34-41). An 
inadvertent result of the banks’ transformation activities is that they also fulfil 
the important function of liquidity providers to the economy.
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2.4.6. Macroeconomic definition of a bank
The macroeconomic definition of a bank is derived from the macroeconomic 
consequences of the workings of a bank’s balance sheet and the aggregate 
balance sheets of the banking sector in a defined region. Merely performing 
the function of a financial intermediary by facilitating transactions is therefore a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a macroeconomic definition of a 
bank (Biischgen, 1998, pp. 34-38).
The transaction process deals with the asymmetric information available to 
market participants. Benefiting from economies of scale and scope, banks can 
reduce information-related costs and match demand and supply for capital 
(Buschgen, 1998, pp. 36-38). By channelling funds from economic actors who 
have a surplus to their current needs to those who have a deficit, banks 
increase market efficiency and facilitate the allocation process.
However, financial intermediation in the narrow sense comprises 
transformation functions in addition to transaction functions. The 
transformation process performed by banks means that banks themselves 
enter into contractual agreements with other market participants and change 
the size, maturity and risk structure of the underlying financial contracts. Only 
by providing transaction and transformation services does a financial 
intermediary meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
macroeconomic definition of a bank (Buschgen, 1998, p. 39).
Under this (“narrow”) macroeconomic definition an investment bank would not 
be classed as a “bank” since it usually only carries out transactions but not 
transformation. The transactions carried out by an investment bank are not 
reflected on its balance sheet, so such deals also do not have any 
repercussions for the economy’s money supply. By contrast, money supply is 
a function of banks’ lending and deposit policies. By transforming deposits into 
loans these institutions are intrinsically linked to an economy’s monetary 
mechanism.
As noted by Buschgen, this narrow macroeconomic definition of a bank is 
challenged by ongoing disintermediation, whereby those market participants 
that demand capital make direct arrangements with providers of capital
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(Buschgen, 1998, pp. 41). The process of disintermediation has been 
facilitated by improved information technology, greater corporate transparency 
and more differentiated risk-analysis tools. Consequently, transaction 
services, as provided by “investment banks”, gradually substitute 
transformation services.
Although the trend towards disintermediation might continue, financial 
intermediation in the sense of transformation services is likely to dominate the 
banking activities for the near future. Because of banks’ asset-liability 
mismatch, which results from their transformation tasks, they are relatively 
more sensitive to the business cycle than other firms. Thus, competition 
policies for this sector should reflect the greater sensitivity of banks and their 
pivotal position in the economy (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002).
According to economic theory, profitability declines as competition increases. 
This leads to the question of how competitive the (“vulnerable”) banking sector 
could become without weakening the actors to such an extent that the overall 
stability of the banking system is put at risk. Extremely tough competition 
could, for example, encourage banks to take high risks on inappropriate 
(wrongly priced) conditions, which would eventually have a detrimental effect 
on profitability.34
Despite ample research into the linkage between banking competition and 
systemic stability, it appears that there is no prevailing academic view on how 
the dynamics of competition and banking stability might work. A 
comprehensive literature review of the theoretical and empirical research on 
the links between banking competition and the stability of the financial system 
by Carletti and Hartmann cautiously concludes: “the idea that competition is 
something dangerous in the banking sector, since it generally causes 
instability, can be dismissed” (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 32).
Carletti and Hartmann also point out that competition policies generally refer to 
three different types of business practices: cartels, abuse of a dominant 
position and mergers, whereby mergers are only of concern if the newly 
formed entity would have a dominant position (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 
9). Further they note that the fragmented banking market in most countries
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suggests, that “cartels” and “mergers” play a greater role in Europe than 
“abuses of dominant position” (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 9). Mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) among banks/financial institutions as part of their corporate 
strategy are discussed in chapter three of this thesis. At this stage, the 
analysis of banks’ M&A activities is only of relevance insofar as it touches 
upon the issues of competition and antitrust policies35 and therefore 
contributes to a macroeconomic definition of a bank.
34 High risk -provisioning burdens the bank’s profit and loss account.
35 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which protect competition in the European market, should have 
been applied to the banking industry right from the outset of the European project. However, in practice the 
European Commission considered the banking sector as a national icon which remained somehow “special” 
until a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 1981 also applied Article 85 to the banking sector 
(European Court of Justice, Gerhard Zuchner vs. Bayrische Vereinsbank AG; Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 
38). Although Germany was among the first Western European countries to adopt a full-scale competition 
law in 1958 (Gesetz gegen WettbewerbsbeschrSnkungen, GWB), it still explicitly stated that the banking 
and insurance sectors were subject to “special” rules (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 38).
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2.4.7. Mergers & acquisitions in banking -  a macro-force
In the late 1960s and 1970s governments were still identified as the powers 
impeding the formation of an integrated European banking market. As noted 
by Kirschen in 1969, the governments of the Community “are reluctant to lose 
control over their nationally chartered, revenue-producing corporations. 
Consequently, international mergers have not been encouraged” (Kirschen, 
1969, p. xii). In the same vein, Butt Philip argued in 1978 that “the integration 
of financial practices has not been matched by integration of financial 
institutions, both because of the very substantial historic institutional 
differences that still thrive in the financial world, and because governments 
and the institutions themselves have not been in any great hurry to bring down 
the barriers” (Butt Philip, 1978, p. 319).
With the commitment to create a Single European Market the focus shifted 
towards the underlying structural challenges of integrating the European 
banking market. Yet, it has been remarked that even the 1989 Second 
Banking Directive “preserves a relatively large degree of discretion to national 
supervisory authorities in the EU to block bank mergers” (Carletti & Hartmann, 
2002, p. 30). National authorities can express their concern, for example, 
about possible conflicts of interest, capital adequacy, organisational structure 
and the commercial rationale of a transaction (Carletti & Hartmann, 2002, p. 
39).
Hurst, Peree, and Fischbach point out that the scope for possible cross-border 
banking consolidation in Europe had been limited as long as the EU member 
states maintained their monetary sovereignty since exposure to different 
currency areas represents a risk factor36 for banks (Hurst, Peree & Fischbach, 
1999, p. 85). It was expected that the consolidation process among banks 
would gain momentum following the introduction of the euro. Schmidt, among 
others, has suggested that the number of banks in Europe will decline due to 
mergers and acquisitions (Schmidt, 2001, p. 16). Eijffinger and de Haan also 
contend that “take-overs associated with the transition to the monetary union 
indicates that the restructuring of the European banking sector is far from 
finished” (Eijffinger, & de Haan, 2000, p. 160-162).
36 Banks can insure against this currency risk with hedges, which however reduce the profit margin.
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One way of addressing the European consolidation process among banks is 
to analyse the changing balance sheet structures following EMU. The asset 
side of a bank’s balance sheet, i.e. essentially its loan portfolio, could be 
further diversified as it seems plausible that a bank improves its risk 
management by identifying countries which demonstrate a low degree of 
correlation with their domestic portfolio. However, broadening the liabilities 
side of the bank sheet depends on successful pan-European expansion of its 
retail banking activities.
According to Buch and Heinrich there are two reasons for changes in the ratio 
of the banks’ foreign assets and liabilities to GDP: (a) the openness of the 
financial system and (b) the importance of the banking system relative to GDP 
(Buch & Heinrich, 2002, pp. 6-7). Given that the EU financial market is legally 
“open”, the absence of major cross-border mergers among banks could be 
seen as a separate and therefore third reason for the prevailing national asset 
and liability structures.
Buch and Lapp’s research (Buch & Lapp, 2000; Lapp, 2001) on the 
diversification of European banks’ asset holdings concludes: “diversification 
within Europe is not necessarily an optimal strategy” (Buch & Heinrich, 2002, 
pp. 6-7). Building their argument on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
they argue that the similarity of EU economies and the further convergence of 
these economies as result of monetary integration do not significantly increase 
diversification opportunities.37
The analysis by Buch and Heinrich suggests that the limited diversification 
opportunities across Europe are one reason for the few cross-border 
takeovers or mergers among European banks, although Hurst, Perree and 
Fischbach point out that risk management is one of the reasons cited least by 
management for a merger (Hurst, Peree & Fischbach, 1999, p. 96). A survey 
by the IMF, BIS and OECD supports this argument as it identifies cost savings 
and revenue growth as the primary motives for financial consolidation, while 
nowhere is there mention of improved risk management (Group of Ten, 2001).
37 It is worth noting that their analysis also revealed that German banks were insufficiently diversified (Buch 
& Heinrich, 2002, pp. 6-7).
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Another way of addressing the European M&A process among banks is to 
question the impact of consolidation on their aggregated income statements. 
Given the high fixed costs in banking and the information and distribution­
intensive nature of the financial services industry, consolidation among banks 
may also be motivated by economies of scale and scope (Eijffinger, & de 
Haan, 2000, p. 160-162). However, as highlighted by Eijffinger and de Haan 
and corroborated by research from Walter (1999), Berger, Demsetz, and 
Strahan (1999) and Vander Vennet (1998), there is some evidence that 
mergers of banks can also lead to diseconomies of scale. This may result, for 
example, from the difficulty to manage the newly emerged complexity and a 
disproportionate increase in administrative fix-costs, which cannot be 
sufficiently fast reduced (Walter, 1999).
Eijffinger and de Haan subscribe to the theory that the acquiring bank targets 
a bank with low profitability and relative inefficiency, which will then be turned 
around and “upgraded” (Eijffinger, & de Haan, 2000, p. 162). This argument 
might hold true for acquisition targets, which are significantly smaller than the 
buyer, but they would only offer limited opportunities to benefit from 
economies of scale. Yet, if the acquisition target is of significant size relative to 
the acquirer, then the acquisition can raise concerns among the owners of the 
acquiring bank about the feasibility of the turnaround strategy.
Chapter three discusses the various considerations for and against mergers 
and acquisitions as part of a bank’s corporate strategy. Whether a bank 
pursues a “make” or “buy” strategy depends largely on the opportunities 
available and prevailing circumstances, thus also on the existing market 
structure. Although little can be said about the link between competition and 
banking stability, it should be highlighted that all the policy measures which 
opened up the European financial markets leave the decision on whether or 
not to merge with the banks themselves, widening their strategic spectrum. 
Therefore, it may be postulated that this greater choice is one obvious benefit 
of an integrating European financial system. The next section concludes this 
chapter by considering some of the benefits, disadvantages and challenges of 
financial integration.
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2.5. Expectations at the outset of the European Common 
Market and concluding remarks on the benefits of 
integrating financial systems
According to the preceding analysis, a financial system is a subsystem of an 
economy consisting of various financial markets and institutions. Therefore, 
the integration of financial systems is often part of a wider economic 
integration process, comprising the removal of barriers to the free movement 
of goods, services, factors of production and money (Swann, 1995, p. 103). 
The removal of these barriers can have mutually reinforcing effects, so that, 
for example, financial integration may also promote integration in other 
economic areas. Consequently, a larger degree of financial integration also 
facilitates trade between the integrating partners, while more trade requires a 
more highly integrated financial system.
Tinbergen differentiates between positive and negative integration (Tinbergen, 
1954), whereby “negative integration” refers to policy measures which imply 
the removal of laws and rules that maintain discrimination on national grounds. 
Thus, negative integration calls for a joint policy by nation states to gradually 
curtail the national dominance of policies and laws. If additionally, common 
market institutions with exclusive powers are set up, then the term “positive 
integration” is used (Tinbergen, 1954). Accordingly, positive integration stands 
for the devolution of power to jointly established institutions that apply policies 
equally to all member states.
In economic theory the principal rationale for economic integration is to 
increase economic welfare through trade. It is argued that economic 
integration enhances an economy’s welfare if it leads to more “trade creation” 
than “trade diversion”, i.e. if it increases net trade creation (Viner, 1950). Trade 
creation is defined as a “shift from domestic to partner country sources of 
supply” (Balassa, 1991, p. 177), whereby domestic high-cost sources are 
substituted by low-cost imports from associated countries.
By contrast, trade diversion takes place if low-cost imports from non-member 
countries are replaced by high-cost imports from the member states in a free 
trade area. This would result in a welfare cost which is either borne by
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exporters in third countries or by consumers within the free trade area. Due to 
these possible welfare costs, it is a primary concern of the European 
Commission that the Common Market should lead to more trade creation than 
trade diversion which would be reflected in price declines (Viner, 1950; Lipsey, 
1957; Lipsey, 1960; Balassa, 1991). Furthermore, economic integration may 
lead to economies of scale and scope and spur efficiency through greater 
competition.
In accordance with this reasoning, the economic benefits of a European 
Common Market are essentially threefold: first, an increase in net trade 
creation, thus optimising the allocation of resources within the European 
Union; second, economies of scale leading to increased competition and 
therefore to greater efficiency across the Common Market; third, higher 
investments within and outside the European Union (Howells & Bain, 2002, 
pp. 442).38
In order to quantify the economic benefits of an integrated European market, 
several research projects were initiated by the European Commission, three of 
which are reviewed briefly in the following paragraphs. The first and most 
widely discussed is a study carried out under the auspices of Paolo Cecchini 
entitled the “Cost of Non-Europe” (Cecchini, 1988). The “Cecchini Report” 
concluded that the single-market programme would have a major 
macroeconomic impact, increasing the EU’s (at the time EC’s) GDP by 
approximately 4.5% and reducing consumer prices by 6.1%, while boosting 
employment by 1.5% by creating 1.8 million new jobs in the medium term 
(Cecchini, 1988, p. 97). Of this potential increment to GDP, 1.5% was 
attributed to the liberalisation of financial services (Cecchini, 1988, p. 98).
The report analysed the financial services sector in eight39 member states, 
among them the UK and Germany, and distinguished between banking, 
insurance and securities. Europe’s consumers, in particular, were expected to 
benefit from a 10% fall of prices for retail financial services (Cecchini, 1988, p. 
42; Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 447). Cecchini forecasted significant price 
declines in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain and identified the largest price
38 For a literature review on economic integration see for example Balassa (Balassa, 1991) or Pelkmans 
(Pelkmans, 2001).
The countries are Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, UK and the Netherlands.
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differences in motor vehicle insurance, home loans, consumer credit, foreign 
exchange drafts and securities operations (Cecchini, 1988, pp. 38-39).
Four economic effects of liberalising the financial services market are 
highlighted in the Cecchini Report: 1. lower prices for financial services; 2. 
more efficient allocation of capital and therefore lower cost of capital; 3. 
access to a wider range of markets, instruments and services; 4. overall 
greater economic efficiency since financial services are a major input factor 
into the industry (Cecchini, 1988, p. 95; Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 447).
The Cecchini Report has been severely criticised for its questionable 
methodology, which suggests a precise quantification of potential benefits 
based on price differentials between member states (Llewellyn, 1992, p. 138). 
Concerning the financial services industry, the critiques argue that the 
measurement of price differences between countries, which unrealistically 
assumed standardised products, ignored regional risk differences. Moreover, 
the Cecchini Report concluded that different prices principally originate from 
the absence of competition, without taking into account systemic inefficiencies 
caused by varying national tax, regulatory and legal conditions (Howells & 
Bain, 2002, pp. 447-448).
As noted by Howells and Bain (Howells & Bain, 2002, pp. 448), the report also 
presumed that the European Common Market would trigger competitive forces 
in financial systems. However, more than a decade after the creation of the 
European Common Market it seems that the embeddedness of financial 
services may have impeded the adaptation process (Hackethal & Tyrell, 1998; 
Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt 2001). High entry costs, the difficulty of 
realising transnational economies of scale and imperfect information tend to 
further cement the fragmented structures and leave markets, at least, retail 
banking markets, nationally segmented.
In the 1996 Single Market Review, the European Commission presented a 
series of 39 studies, which assessed the progress made in implementing the 
Single Market Programme. Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Internal 
Market & Services at the time, conceded that the Single Market project did not 
lead to “a sharp downward convergence of the prices of corporate, retail and 
mortgage loans across the EU, as had been hoped for” (Monti, 1996, p. 62).
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The findings of the 1996 Single Market Review show that only in the cases of 
credit cards and mortgages has the price spread narrowed since the Cecchini 
Report was published in 1987 (Monti, 1996, p. 63).
However, the European Commission emphasised in its sobering assessment 
that the European Common Market has enabled European banks to develop a 
stronger capital base through the Own Funds Directive (89/299/EEC), the 
Solvency Ratio Directive (89/647/EEC) and the Directive on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes (94/19/EEC) (Monti, 1996, pp. 62-63; European 
Commission, 1997, p. 6). These directives followed the international 
requirements of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord.
Furthermore, the Single Market Review holds that banks “preferred not to 
compete on the price of lending” (Monti, 1996, p. 66) but rather competed on 
the range of products and quality of service. It is also pointed out by the 
European Commission that banks have become more competitive and 
international in their operations and alliances, with the universal banking 
model emerging as the “norm” across EU markets (Monti, 1996, pp. 62-63; 
European Commission, 1997, pp. 6-7).
Mario Monti concluded that “the single market’s impact on banking has been 
positive but not startling” (Monti, 1996, p. 67). He recognised that different tax 
regimes are the principal barrier to further integration and pinned his hopes on 
the European monetary union, which appeared necessary for the integration 
process to gain momentum and for banks to realise further economies of scale 
and scope (Monti, 1996, p. 67).
Two more research projects prepared for the European Commission are the 
report by London Economics (London Economics et al., 2002) and the 
analysis by two German think tanks, the Zentrum fur Europaische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim (ZEW), and the Institut fur Europaische 
Politik, Berlin (IEP). The report by London Economics estimates that European 
financial integration has reduced the cost of capital, thus increasing the EU’s 
GDP by 1.1% (“in the long-run”). According to London Economics, the single 
most important factor in this 1.1% increase in European GDP is the reduced 
cost of equity finance, which accounts for 0.5%. Moreover, the study
84
2. The playing field for banking strategies - E U  financial integration
forecasted that total employment will rise by 0.5% as a result from greater 
market liberalisation (London Economics et al., 2002).
The study by the ZEW and the IEP, better known as the Gyllenhammar40 
Report, focuses on the European retail market for financial services. Among 
the benefits of further financial integration, the report highlights the greater 
product choice for consumers, particularly in smaller countries, and falling 
prices for financial retail products. Furthermore, the research expects a more 
integrated financial retail market to result in substantially lower interest rates 
for private borrowers (Heinemann & Jopp, 2002).
Regarding the macroeconomic effects the Gyllenhammar Report draws on 
worldwide cross-country samples which suggest that greater financial 
integration between countries can increase the annual economic growth rate 
by 0.5% - 0.7% per year (Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, pp. 40-41). In contrast, to 
London Economics, this analysis cautions about quantifiying the potential EU- 
wide effects on employment associated with more financial integration as 
national labour market conditions are a highly relevant and highly 
heterogeneous variable (Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, p. 42; Beckmann, et al. 
2002a).
The Gyllenhammar Report also notes that “a number of obstacles impedes the 
development of unified financial retail markets in Europe”. Examples are 
differences in tax regimes and national consumer protection legislation 
(Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, p. 13). In addition to these aforementioned policy- 
induced obstacles the study notes that the numerous natural obstacles “like 
differences in language and culture can not realistically be addressed by 
national or European policymakers” (Heinemann & Jopp, 2002, p. 13, 
Beckmann, et al. 2002a, p. 11).
All three reports appear to essentially serve as policy tools or “ammunition” for 
politicians. The Cecchini Report clearly aimed at paving the way for the Single 
Market Project, while the reports by Gyllenhammar and London Economics 
should be seen in the context of the Financial Services Action Plan. In 
particular, the overly ambitious Cecchini Report, which covers a wide range of
40 The report was prepared for the European Financial Services Round Table, chaired by Pehr G. 
Gyllenhammar, Chairman of CGNU (now Aviva, the UK insurance group).
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industries, is a prime example of a large-scale research project which attempts 
too much and ultimately achieves very little. The experience with the Cecchini 
Report seems to have taught the European Commission to be less outspoken 
about quantifying the potential gains of economic integration.
Consequently, the statements and projections of the European Commission 
have become more general. The European Commission, for example, merely 
notes in the 2002 report by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 
EU financial integration that integrating financial systems enhances 
competition among financial services providers, promoting financial innovation 
and diversification (European Commission, 2002a, p. 10). Along with the 
increased liquidity and greater depth of capital markets, which allow better risk 
sharing, this should reduce the cost of capital while improving the rate of 
return for investors (European Commission, 2002a, p. 10).
These views by the European Commission are corroborated by research on 
financial integration and economic development that is not EU-specific. There 
is a broad range of academic literature arguing that financial development 
spurs investment and economic growth. For example, the works by Goldsmith 
(1969), King and Levine (1993a), King and Levine (1993b), Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000a 
and 2000b), and a report by the World Bank (2001) offer some evidence that 
there is a positive correlation between aggregate economic growth and the 
level of development of financial intermediaries, stock market liquidity and the 
depth of financial markets. Essentially, these studies conclude that financial 
development promotes economic growth by reducing the costs of financial 
intermediation and that due to improved allocation of resources, the social 
marginal productivity of capital should rise and affect households’ savings rate 
(Pagano, 1993; European Commission, 2002b, p. 7).
Building on these arguments the European Commission maintains that 
financial integration enhances financial development as it increases the 
competition among the financial intermediaries, thus improving the 
participants’ efficiency (European Commission, 2002a, p. 12; Beckmann, et al. 
2002a, p. 10). Furthermore, the pressure on national authorities to improve 
regulation (accounting standards, securities law, banking supervision, 
corporate governance) in order to align it with best-practice standards in the
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integrating area illustrates how financial integration can advance financial 
systems via policy measures (European Commission, 2002a, p. 12; 
Beckmann, et al. 2002a, p. 10).
More specifically, the European Commission argues that “the tendency 
towards a “level playing field” in regulation is an essential pre-requisite of an 
integrated market, and it is reasonable to expect this convergence in 
regulatory standards to result in an improvement in the regulatory standards of 
less developed financial markets. This improvement may help promote their 
development, by reducing adverse selection and agency costs as well as the 
distortions induced by inadequate regulation” (European Commission, 2002b, 
P- 13).
Despite these benefits from European financial integration, it should be 
recalled that this integration process implies the transformation of formerly 
coherent financial systems, featuring national idiosyncrasies. As elaborated in 
this chapter, a financial system can be described as a configuration of several 
elements that complement each other (Hackethal & Tyrell, 1998; Hackethal & 
Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt 2001). This coherence, which contributes to the 
stability of a financial system, also poses a challenge for integrating national 
financial systems (Hackethal & Tyrell, 1998; Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; 
Schmidt 2001).
Accordingly, the gradual convergence of different financial systems becomes 
a cumbersome undertaking since the similarity of only a few elements is not 
sufficient to transform the fundamental structure of a financial system 
(Schmidt, 2001, p. 21). Schmidt, who puts forward this idea, takes his 
argument even further by suggesting that a financial system might need to be 
“sufficiently destabilised” in order to change its structure (Schmidt, 2001, p. 
21).
In the same vein, it is noted in the report by London Economics that financial 
integration is not necessarily synonymous with “frictionless financial markets”, 
(London Economics et al., 2002, pp. 12-13) although greater integration may 
lead to reduced friction in some areas. The report concluded that the friction in 
financial markets is inherent to the financial industry structure, and may not
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disappear even if financial integration is fully achieved, thus affecting the 
functioning of financial markets (London Economics et al., 2002, pp. 12-13).
This transformation process primarily challenges the institutional pillars of the 
financial system, namely the banks. Banks as individual corporate entities 
need to adjust their strategic positioning sufficiently to enable them to benefit 
from this rapidly changing environment. In fact, one predominant strategic 
challenge comes with the widening and deepening of Europe’s capital markets 
- that is the development towards more financial disintermediation, facilitated 
not least by rapid technological innovation. Additionally, banks need to 
respond to the dramatic demographic changes in most European countries. 
They should seize these and related challenges as strategic opportunities to 
increase stability and profitability.
As remarked by Cecchini in his report “the benefits expected from market 
integration will not appear at the wave of a wand. To bring them about many 
changes are needed, not least the gearing up of business strategies to meet 
the new market’s greater challenges” (Cecchini, 1988, p. 86). Since banks are 
the pivotal institutions of financial systems, their corporate strategies mirror the 
interface between the micro and macroeconomic dynamics of financial 
integration. Therefore, the next chapter reviews strategic theories/concepts 
and discusses their applicability for banks in the context of European financial 
integration.
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3. Corporate strategy analysis and applicability to 
the banking sector
3.1. Introduction
While the previous chapter outlined EU financial integration as the “playing 
field for banking strategies”, this chapter deals with the different schools of 
thought in strategic management and their applicability for the analysis of 
realised banking strategies in the context of European financial integration.
At the outset of this third chapter, the political and military roots of 
contemporary strategic thinking are elaborated. The relevance of literature on 
military-diplomatic strategy for modern corporate management is recognised 
by various contemporary management academics from different schools of 
thought (Quinn, 1980; Whittington, 1993; Mintzberg et al., 1998; Porter, 1998; 
Grant, 2002). Therefore, a concise tour historique should facilitate an 
understanding of what Whittington calls the “classical school” of strategic 
management (Whittington, 1993).1
After reviewing the concept of “strategy” in its historical context, the different 
understandings of the contemporary term “strategy” in management studies 
are discussed. For this purpose, Mintzberg’s heuristic distinction between five 
definitions of “strategy” -  as plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective -  
should help to structure the debate about the implicitly different usages of 
“strategy” (Mintzberg, 1987,1998).
Since the origins of modern management strategy in the 1950s, publications 
by academics and practitioners have fuelled and constantly broadened the 
debate about strategic management -  not least because of the field’s 
proximity to business reality. Numerous approaches to the study of strategic 
management, such as the cultural school, which sees strategy as a collective 
process glued together and driven by culture, or the cognitive school, which 
considers strategy to be a mental process, are not directly considered
1 The early “classical school" of management strategy was essentially established by the writings of 
Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965, 1985), Sloan (1963), and was then refined by the work of Porter (1980,
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(Mintzberg et al., 1998). Neither does this research take into account the vast 
leadership literature and the uncountable anecdotal evidence of successful 
businesses.
In order to deal with the voluminous literature2 about strategic management 
and organisational theories3 (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 7), this research 
centres on two prominent schools of thought and assesses their theories in 
the context of the banking industry. First, it is considered how the structure of 
the banking industry drives banks’ competitive behaviour and determines their 
profitability. This approach is rooted in industrial organisation economics and 
is closely associated with the works of Porter (Porter, 1979, 1980, 1985, 
1998).
A critical discussion of Porter’s five forces framework in the context of the 
banking industry then paves the way for an assessment of the resource-based 
view and the ideas put forward by Hamel and Prahalad (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1989, 1990, 1993). According to Mintzberg (Mintzberg et al., 1998) the 
resource-based view should be seen in the tradition of policy analysis and the 
“learning school” (Lindblom, 1959, 1968, 1979; Cyert & March, 1963; Weick, 
1969; Quinn, 1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1989). Brandenburger and Nalebuffs 
concept of co-opetition takes into account that buyers, suppliers, and 
producers of complementary products do not only interact as competitors, but 
may also work cooperatively with each other. A discussion of this game 
theoretical approach complements the review (Brandenburger & Nalebuff,
1996).
In comparison to the writings about general strategic management and 
finance/capital market theory, the literature on the management of banks is 
relatively scant (Suchting, 1992; Buschgen, 1993, 1998; Koch, 1995; Betge, 
1996; Saunders, 1997; Freixas & Rochet, 1997; Hartmann-Wendels et al., 
2000; Buschgen & Borner, 2003) and few authors combine the analysis of 
strategic management with the banking business (Canals, 1993, 1997, 1999; 
Grant 1992; Gardener & Molyneux, 1993; Walter, 1999; Borner, 2000; Smith &
1985) and to some extent also Ohmae (1983), all of whom were influenced by the military tradition of 
strategic thinking.
2 Mintzberg suggests that in fact anything written about “collective systems of all kinds” could be the subject 
of a literature review on organisations and the strategic management process (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 7).
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Walter, 2000, 2003; Gardener & Versluijs (eds.), 2001; Hackethal, 2001; 
Buschgen & Borner, 2003).
Some studies apply Porter’s competitive framework to the banking industry 
(Ballarin, 1986; Gardener, 1990; Canals, 1993; Chan & Wong, 1999). On a 
theoretical level, Borner (Borner, 2000) derives an integrated concept that 
combines the positioning school and the resource-based view. Yet, there are 
various publications (e.g. Channon, 1988; Carmoy, 1990; Dixon, 1993)4 on 
changes in the banking landscape which use the term “strategy” merely as a 
catchword and do not elaborate on it, let alone, engage in a discussion that 
could somehow be embedded into the vibrant academic debate about 
strategic management.
One possible explanation for the exiguous literature on bank management is 
put forward by Buschgen and Borner (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 1-3). They 
argue that finance and capital market theory purportedly provides sufficient 
explanation of banking operations, whereas general management concepts 
are considered adequate to account for the business/management aspects of 
a bank, leaving the intersection of these two fields under-researched. An 
additional reason could be that deductive methodologies dominate the largely 
quantitative approaches to finance and capital market theory, whereas the 
more qualitative studies of business management often apply inductive 
methodologies.5 Due to these different approaches and the broad range of 
academic fields, bank management in general and bank strategies in 
particular do not seem to be widely researched (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 
230).
Studying different aspects of the complex strategy process has led to the 
emergence of numerous strategic management theories, as illustrated by the 
different angles taken by Porter and by Hamel and Prahalad. According to 
Mintzberg, a strategy process comprises a number of aspects6 which are
3 According to Mintzberg, he and two colleagues reviewed some 2,000 books and articles on strategic 
management over the years, which only represent the prominent academic literature (Mintzberg et al., 1998, 
pp. 7-8).
Often these authors have an implicit understanding of “strategy”, which is in the tradition of the “classical 
school” (Whittington, 1993), i.e. the design/planning/positioning schools.
5 It seems that the tradition of quantitative approaches to the study of business economics 
(Betriebswirtschaftslehre) at German universities has fostered a climate in which research on banking 
(Bankbetriebslehre) is more common than at Anglo-Saxon academic institutions.
Such as learning, power, the environment, leadership skills, vision, corporate culture, tactics, planning and 
various mental and social aspects (Mintzberg et al., 1998).
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analysed by different schools (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 367). This research 
recognises that most of these contributions do not appear to be mutually 
exclusive. In fact, most paradigms should be regarded as complementary 
concepts (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Borner, 2000). Acknowledging that strategy 
is more than just the outcome of planning and positioning, in other words that 
it is the result of a multitude of ingredients, does not obviate the need for 
rational analysis of realised strategies. According to Grant there can be little 
doubt as to the importance of systematic analysis as a vital input into the 
strategy process - regardless whether strategy formulation is formal or 
informal and whether strategies are deliberate or emergent (Grant, 2002, p. 
27).
Following the terminological clarification of strategy, this chapter discusses 
Porter’s strategic management theory as well as Hamel and Prahalad’s 
resource-based views in the context of the banking industry. However, as 
none of these strategic management theories is grounded in the banking 
sector, a straightforward application to banking remains hampered. Therefore, 
a theory that is grounded in the banking industry through empirical research 
may provide a better basis for understanding the strategic issues of specific 
relevance to banks. The final part of this chapter refers back to the underlying 
question of the banks’ position between micro and macro structure and paves 
the way for the next chapter, which looks at the methodology used in this 
research.
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3.2. Strategy analysis in its historical context
Contemporary strategic management gradually emerged as a management 
discipline in its own right during the late 1950s and early 1960s and is closely 
associated with the names of Alfred Chandler, Igor Ansoff and Peter Drucker. 
Yet, the documented beginnings of strategic thinking can be found in the 
tradition of military analysis, which dates back some 2,500 years (Evered, 
1983; Liddell Hart, 1991; Whittington, 1993). Whittington observes that “even 
today, when business strategy can claim a substantial and independent body 
of experience, military imagery continues to influence contemporary strategy 
analysis [...]" (Whittington, 1993, p. 15).
Military strategy differs in essence from management strategy only insofar as 
it is less restricted in applying specific means to achieve certain ends. In both 
cases, strategy revolves around realising conditions which are perceived as 
preferable to the status quo. Appraising the long-standing tradition of military 
strategy analysis could serve two purposes in the analysis of banking 
strategies in the context of European financial integration.
First, military strategy appears to have developed a more distinct 
understanding of what actually constitutes strategy, in contrast to tactics and 
stratagems, than contemporary management strategy -  a distinction which 
may also assist in identifying what is strategy as opposed to what is not 
strategy in the corporate world. If there are companies with strategies, logically 
there must also be companies without strategies, regardless whether the 
companies with strategies succeed or not.
Second, the previous chapter should have adequately illustrated how banks 
contribute to the functioning of national economies and consequently also 
serve as political instruments - not least, as elaborated, these institutions can 
pose a major threat to economic and political stability. When, some two 
hundred years ago, the Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780- 
1831) formulated his dictum that war is nothing but a continuation of political 
activity by other means, he also remarked that next to military power economic 
conflicts can resemble wars (Clausewitz, 1997, book III, chapter I, 4, p. 148). 
Therefore, it may be postulated that commercial conflicts are a continuation of
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politics by other means, which puts contemporary strategic management into 
the light of contributions made by military strategists.
The first documented strategic treatise is the “Art of War”, written around 500 
B.C. by Sun Zi Bingfa, better known as Sun Tzu (Master Sun) (Sun Tzu, 1963; 
Senger, 2002, p. 46). Sun Tzu developed thirteen basic principles7 about the 
art of war, which laid the foundations for the professional science of warfare 
(Sun Tzu, 1963). Sun Tzu’s text was well known by Chinese emperors and 
military leaders for many centuries and arrived in Europe in the late 18th 
century through a French missionary who translated it into French, so 
Napoleon Bonaparte possibly knew the text as “L’Art de la Guerre” (Stahel, 
2003, p. 221).
Around hundred years after Sun Tzu, the Greek author Aeneas Tacticus (4th 
century B.C.) wrote also a book on strategy (Stahel, 2003). The word 
“strategy” is derived from the Greek word “strategia”, meaning “generalship”8 
(Duden Band 7, 1963; Grant, 2002, p. 16). At the time, the strategoi were the 
ten highest military officers in Athens (Stahel, 2003, p. 37). Several other 
Greek statesmen, officers and philosophers dealt extensively with strategic 
questions during this period. For a review of the early Greek military strategy 
tradition see Goldschmidt (I960).9
Sun Tzu and various Greek strategists put forward the idea of what 
contemporary Swiss military strategist10 Stahel calls “indirect strategy” (Stahel, 
2003). Indirect strategy is defined as achieving victory without military 
violence, which enables the winning party to capture everything in “one piece” 
(Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 77; Stahel, 2003, pp. 19-35). Therefore, indirect strategies 
are largely based on deception and stratagems. In contrast, direct strategies 
essentially employ the power of armed forces (Stahel, 2003, p. 19) and aim at 
the complete annihilation of the enemy.
7 These thirteen basic principles are: 1. Estimates; 2. Waging War; 3. Offensive Strategy; 4. Dispositions; 5. 
Energy; 6. Weaknesses and Strengths; 7. Manoeuvre; 8. The Nine Variables; 9. Marches; 10. Terrain; 11. 
The Nine Varieties of Ground; 12. Attack by Fire; 13. Employment of Secret Agents (Sun Tzu, 1963, 
translated by Griffith, S.B.).
8 “Stratos” is the Greek word for “army” and “£gein” means “to lead” (Duden Band 7, 1963; Grant, 2002, p. 
16).
Among these Greek writers were Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.), Polybios (philosopher and historian, 
210-125 B.C) and Onasander (author of “strategos”, ca. 50 A.D) (Goldschmidt, 1960).
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The distinction between indirect and direct strategies has become a 
widespread one. However, the sinologist Harro von Senger objects to the use 
of these terms (Senger, 2002, pp. 46-51). Senger points out that in the original 
Chinese text Sun Tzu used the words “zheng” and “qi” which are central even 
in today’s military language of the Chinese army. According to Senger, it is 
more appropriate to translate “qi” with “extraordinary”, “exceptional” or 
“unorthodox” rather than “indirect”. Accordingly, he suggests that “ordinary”, 
“normal” or “orthodox” capture the meaning of “zheng” better than “direct” 
(Senger, 2002, pp. 46-51).
Highlighting unorthodox approaches as the more promising strategies also 
seems consistent with the views put forward by representatives of the 
positioning school of modern management science. As outlined in the next 
section, for instance, Porter (1996) emphasises the importance of 
“uniqueness” for a successful strategy and Henderson (1989) derives an 
approach from ecology which considers that survival is only possible in a 
niche. In both cases, these modern management strategists call for an 
unprecedented, unorthodox approach that requires imagination and creativity. 
Insofar, a link can clearly be made between Sun Tzu’s ancient ideas and 
contemporary strategic management.
During the Medieval period, the study of strategy stagnated in Europe and it 
only received a new impetus towards the end of the Medieval period following 
the decline of Byzantine Empire which led to the spread of ancient Greek 
writings. At the beginning of the Renaissance the strategic concepts of Greek 
philosophers and political leaders again came to the forefront. Among the 
best-known strategic thinkers of the time was Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
whose writings feature remarkable parallels to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” (Stahel, 
2003, p. 71). Machiavelli pays great tribute to indirect strategies and 
recognises that without preparation for war there would not be lasting peace 
(Stahel, 2003, p. 71).
At the start of the Renaissance period, innovations and rapid technological 
developments revolutionised military equipment and gradually started to 
influence Western military strategists. Stahel concludes that most indirect
10 Professor Stahel teaches at the Swiss military academy, Ml LAX, where various Swiss bankers received 
their training. Dr Josef Ackermann, who joined Deutsche Bank in 1996, after 19 years at Credit Suisse, and
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strategic considerations lost prominence when Frederick the Great’s reign 
came to an end (Stahel, 2003, p. 93). The focus of military strategists shifted 
to the use of armed forces for the total destruction of the enemy through 
massed concentration of force.11 The British military strategist and journalist 
Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895-1970) holds Clausewitz partly responsible for 
this development by expounding a theory too abstract for concrete-minded 
soldiers. Yet, according to Liddell Hart, Clausewitz’s disciples hold a greater 
share of the responsibility for the ill-effects of Clausewitz’s wildly 
misinterpreted oeuvre “On War” (Liddell Hart’s foreword in Sun Tzu, 1963, pp. 
V-VII).
Clausewitz defines strategy as a knowledge of the use of military 
engagements for the object of war, whereas tactics comprise a knowledge of 
the use of armed forces in combat (Clausewitz, 1997, book II, chapter I, p. 75). 
“Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must 
therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in 
accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan 
of the war; and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead 
to the final decision, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate 
campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each” (Clausewitz, 
1997, book III, chapter I, p. 141).
Clausewitz understood war as an extreme, albeit natural, extension of political 
policy and diplomacy, which led to his famous dictum: “[...] war is not merely a 
political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political 
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (Clausewitz, 1997, 
book I, chapter I, 24, p. 22). Clausewitz dismisses the parallel between war 
and art and points out that it could be more accurately compared to 
commerce, which he also sees as a conflict of human interests and activities 
(Clausewitz, 1997, book III, chapter I, 4, p. 148).
It is noteworthy that in fact Clausewitz understands strategy as a process, 
whereby the strategist cannot be detached from the implementation of 
strategy. As is shown in the following section, in this respect Mintzberg’s 
writings on management strategy demonstrate remarkable parallels to
was appointed Deutsche Bank’s CEO in 2002 is also a Swiss army officer.
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Clausewitz’s ideas. For example, Clausewitz remarks that the difficulty with 
strategic planning is the involvement of “things which to a great extent can 
only be determined on conjectures some of which turn out incorrect, while a 
number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all 
beforehand, it follows, as a matter of course, that strategy must go with the 
army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to make the 
modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in war. 
Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment” 
(Clausewitz, 1997, book III, chapter I, p. 142).
While Clausewitz is largely understood, rightly or wrongly, as having paved the 
way for direct and confrontational strategies, the Swiss military strategist 
Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) is regarded as having promoted the cause 
of indirect approaches in the tradition of Sun Tzu (Stahel, 2003, p. 170). Prior 
to joining the French army in 1798 to serve Napoleon, Jomini worked as a 
banker in Basle and Paris. In 1813, he defected from Napoleon’s army and 
was subsequently employed on occasional basis by the Russian Tsars as a 
military consultant (Stahel, 2003, pp. 127-171).
According to Stahel, Jomini recognised the benefits of “the indirect approach 
of the direct strategy” as it had been formulated by Sun Tzu.12 The indirect 
approach of the direct strategy first aims at weakening and misleading the 
enemy through subversion, deceit and sabotage. If these initial measures do 
not suffice to cause the enemy’s collapse, the second step should be a direct 
attack by a concentrated and superior force on the enemy’s weakest flank 
(Stahel, 2003, pp. 29-32, p. 168).
Jomini distinguishes between strategy, grand tactics (“la grande tactique”), 
logistics, engineering and detailed tactics. For him strategy is a top-down 
approach, in contrast to tactics that follow a bottom-up approach. Jomini also 
recognises that a precise demarcation of strategy, high tactics and logistics is 
nearly impossible and that they are closely interrelated (Stahel, 2003, pp. ISO- 
ISO). According to Stahel, Jomini wrote a strategic handbook whereas
11 This development culminated in Erich Ludendorffs (1865-1937) concept of “total war”, whereby all areas 
of the state and society are harnessed for the purposes of war.
12 Given the absence of any major wars in Switzerland for the past several hundred years -  with the 
exception of Napoleon’s short intermezzo -  this small country in the heart of Europe could focus on its 
commercial strengths, while maintaining political neutrality in international affairs. Thus, Switzerland's 
military strategy and foreign policy may be considered to have been highly successful.
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Clausewitz’s writings essentially comprise hypotheses about the origins and 
causes of wars. In Stahel’s view it is deplorable that German generals of the 
19th century and most Western military leaders of the 20th century derived their 
strategies from Clausewitz’s “war philosophy” and not from Jomini’s 
considerations about the “indirect approach” (Stahel, 2003, pp. 170).
Liddell Hart goes even further in his criticism of Clausewitz by contrasting his 
ideas with those of Sun Tzu: “Civilization might have been spared much of the 
damage suffered in the world wars of this century if the influence of 
Clausewitz’s monumental tomes On War, which moulded European military 
thought in the era preceding the First World War, had been blended with and 
balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s exposition on the Art of War” (Liddell 
Hart’s foreword in Sun Tzu, 1963, p. V). During the early 20th century, it was 
primarily Liddell Hart who recognised the power of indirect strategies and 
therefore built on Sun Tzu’s original ideas.
Throughout history, from Sun Tzu to modern management strategists, four key 
factors appear to contribute to a successful strategy (Grant, 2002, pp. 11-13). 
First, there should be a long-term, simple and consistent objective. Second, a 
profound understanding of the competitive environment appears an essential 
ingredient. Third, the availability of resources should be appraised as 
objectively as possible. Fourth, effective implementation is the final hurdle for 
the strategy to become successful (Sun Tzu, 1963; Grant, 2002, pp. 11-13).
As the implementation of most strategies can be broken down into incremental 
decisions (Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980), it may be argued that at some point 
strategy implementation turns into a mere opportunistic, adaptive muddling- 
through process, possibly described as tactics. As noted by Jomini, tactics is a 
bottom-up approach to strategy implementation, thus tactics and strategy are 
interdependent developments which need to be orchestrated by the strategist, 
who is aware of the overarching thrust and the interaction of strategy and 
tactics. If, however, a strategy leads to unsuccessful tactics, then the overall 
strategy needs to be questioned and reviewed, as no war can be won, if all 
battles are lost.
One risk emerges when a strategy, which should provide orientation, is 
frequently and fundamentally changed so that it gradually degenerates into a
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mere chain of tactics, lacking any coherence. Equally dangerous is the 
assumption that a sequence of successful tactics represents a strategy. 
Senger points out that tactics need to be analysed in their strategic context, as 
minor events can eventually have overwhelmingly large strategic 
consequences. Despite his warning that tactics can backfire at the overall 
strategy, Senger concludes that not too much attention should be paid to the 
differences between strategies and tactics, although these terms should not 
be used interchangeably (Senger, 2002, pp. 20-24).
In addition to enhancing understanding of strategy vis-a-vis tactics, the 
proximity between military/political and corporate strategies needs to be 
considered in the context of this historical review. The link between 
military/political and corporate strategies is of particular importance for 
politically sensitive industries such as the banking sector. Moreover, an 
analysis of the competitive advantages of different countries demonstrates 
various similarities to a corporate analysis, as put forward by Porter (1990).
In this respect, the example of Switzerland is worth highlighting. Despite 
having few natural resources, no colonial past and no seacoast, Switzerland 
has become one of the world’s richest countries, owing most of this success to 
its political and military stability. It may be assumed that this stable 
military/political and economic environment has contributed to the emergence 
of Switzerland as a leading global financial centre, home to two of the world’s 
largest banks (UBS and Credit Suisse Group), the world’s largest reinsurance 
company (Swiss Re) and various other financial institutions.
The case of Switzerland illustrates the relationship between sustainable 
military and political stability on one hand, and a country’s prosperity on the 
other. Indirect strategies, i.e. unorthodox strategies which offer a unique 
solution, avoid immediate confrontation as they focus on “positions” which 
have not yet taken been by competitors. So, for example, until recently 
Switzerland could claim to be more or less the only significant “off-shore” 
banking centre in the world. Thus, such indirect approaches seem to enhance 
the stability of an organisation or a country. A stable organisation is 
understood as one with low strategic and operational volatility. Low 
operational volatility implies that the system’s input and output factors do not
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fluctuate to a great extent and that the system maintains its key functions even 
under exogenous shocks.
Stability is a key factor for operational progress and an organisation’s 
profitability can be enhanced by managing volatility. Thus, managing volatility 
should constitute a primary strategic task. Strategic management therefore 
becomes the managing of risks. As risk emerges in dealing with external 
conditions, a company needs to be analysed in its environment. Thus, risk 
analysis and strategy analysis deal with complexity by concentrating on the 
essential structural factors which determine the sensitivities of the system. 
Studying the organisation in its environment over a substantial period 
becomes a principal necessity for managing risk, thus managing volatility and 
ultimately for managing an organisation. This leads to the discussion of the 
various understandings of “strategy” in contemporary business studies and 
how that term is used throughout this thesis.
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3.3. A multifaceted term: “strategy” as it is used in this 
research
The term “strategy” enjoys great popularity among managers, politicians and 
policy-makers. According to conventional management textbooks, strategic 
reasoning is aimed at guiding the decision-making process, whereby strategy 
itself represents an overall “plan for deploying resources to establish a 
favourable position” (Grant, 2002, pp. 16-17).
Quinn defines management strategy as “the pattern or plan that integrates an 
organisation’s major goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive 
whole. A well-formulated strategy helps marshal and allocates an 
organization’s resources into a unique and viable posture based upon its 
relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated in the 
environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents” (Quinn, 1980, p. 
7).
Research about management strategies comprises a wide range of 
organisational studies (Starbuck, 1965, p. 468; Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp. 7- 
9), most of which address the underlying questions about the different sources 
of a company’s profitability.13 Various attempts have been made to categorise 
the different approaches to the study of organisations (Grant, 2002; Mintzberg 
et al., 1998; Whittington, 1993) and to clarify the somehow inflationary use of 
the term “strategy”.
Whittington identifies four different schools: the Classic school14 which sees 
strategy as a formally planned approach aimed at profit maximization; the 
Processual school15 is described by him as inward-looking which recognises 
the importance of internal political bargaining processes and the development 
of skills and core competences; the Evolutionary school16 understands 
strategy as a means to survival in a hostile environment, with markets
13 For the purpose of this research it is assumed that a company intends to create value and to enhance its 
profitability.
4 Key authors: Chandler, Ansoff, Porter (Whittington, 1993, pp. 10-41).
15 Key authors: Cyert & March, Mintzberg, Pettigrew (Whittington, 1993, pp. 10-41).
16 Key authors: Hannan & Freeman, Williamson (Whittington, 1993, pp. 10-41).
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determining the natural selection process; the Systemic concept17 emphasises 
the social context of strategy-making (Whittington, 1993, pp. 10-41).
Mintzberg distinguishes between five different understandings of strategy. The 
implicitly different usages of the term strategy should, according to Mintzberg, 
be explicitly recognised and strategy can be categorised as plan, pattern, 
perspective, position, and ploy (Mintzberg, 1987b; 1998). The following 
discussion builds on Mintzberg’s five categories.
17 Key authors: Granovetter, Marris (Whittington, 1993, pp. 10-41).
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3.3.1. Strategy as plan
The most common and ad-hoc definition of strategy would interpret strategy 
as a plan, i.e. as “some sort of consciously intended course of action, a 
guideline [...] to deal with a situation” (Mintzberg, 1987b, p. 11). Such an 
understanding views strategy as a direction or a “path to get from here to 
there” (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 9). In the same vein, Drucker talks about 
strategy as “purposeful action” (Drucker, 1974, p. 104), while the fathers of 
modern game theory make it clear that strategy is “a complete plan: a plan 
which specifies what choices [the player] will make in every possible situation” 
(Morgenstern & Newmann, 1944, p. 79).
Moore points out one difficulty with the view of strategy as a plan when he 
remarks that such an understanding is far too static as strategies serve the 
purpose of achieving certain ends among people (Moore quoted in Mintzberg, 
1987b, p. 21). Moore’s objection assumes a linear concept of a plan, whereby 
a plan describes a detailed path that leads from point A directly to point B. In 
contrast, planning can also comprise scenario analysis, which enables the 
strategic planner to “predict and prepare” (Ackoff, 1983, p. 59).
Ackoff notes that “the more accurately we can predict, the less effectively we 
can prepare; and the more effectively we can prepare, the less we need to 
predict” (Ackoff, 1983, p. 60). Thus, the paradigm of “predict and prepare” 
suffers from interdeterminacy in an indeterministic world. As a way out of this 
dilemma, Ackoff suggests controlling the causes and effects, which determine 
the working of the system thereby reducing the exposure to the risk of the 
unexpected (Ackoff, 1983).
Mintzberg goes even further by arguing that strategic planning may actually 
impede strategic thinking (Mintzberg, 1994). He dismisses the assumption that 
strategists can be detached from their strategies and that strategy making can 
be formalised -  a view that can already be found in Clausewitz’ writings 
(Clausewitz, 1997, book III, chapter I, p. 142). According to Mintzberg, 
strategic planning should merely supply the formal analyses that strategic 
thinking requires (Mintzberg, 1994). Thus, Mintzberg still acknowledges the 
significance of planning as part of the all-encompassing strategy process 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). He views strategic planning essentially as analytical,
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based on decomposition, while strategy creation is a process of synthesis 
(Mintzberg, 1987a).
Although this research dismisses any deterministic understanding of history, it 
recognises that existing structures condition the actions of humans. 
Individuals, groups and organisations develop structures with varying 
interdependences over time. However, these structures do not simply 
constrain humans; they also enable them to act and interact (Giddens, 1976, 
1 98 4 ,1988).18 On the basis of these discerned patterns and interdependences 
it is possible to derive some guidance for the formulation of forward-looking 
decision-making processes. In fact, building on the experience of certain 
patterns and structures is a prerequisite for any learning process and lies at 
the heart of any socio-economic progress.
While this research acknowledges that such tentative structures facilitate the 
decision-making process, it also emphasises the preliminary status of these 
premises, which ultimately cannot be verified. This reasoning is based on 
Popper’s critical rationalism, which holds that a hypothesis cannot be verified 
but only tested until it is ultimately proven to be wrong (“falsified”) and 
subsequently replaced by a modified hypothesis (Popper, 1979, 1989). In the 
context of strategic management, the understanding of planning is therefore 
not entirely dismissed, but the conceptual pitfalls are taken into account. The 
understanding of strategy as an intended plan of action is forward-looking, 
whereas the understanding of strategy as a pattern focuses on realised past 
behaviour (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 9).
18 Giddens’ structuration theory is further elaborated in chapter four on methodology.
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3.3.2. Strategy as pattern and structure
Patterns are the result of consistency of behaviour over time (Mintzberg et al., 
1998, p. 9). Mintzberg offers a definition of strategy as pattern, whereby 
strategy “is consistency in behaviour, whether or not intended” (Mintzberg, 
1987b, p. 12). According to Mintzberg, there is a difference between intended 
and realised strategies, which raises the pressing question as to how 
strategies emerge.
Identifying the difference between intended and realised strategies, Mintzberg 
actually also pays tribute to strategy formulation: “Purely deliberate strategy 
precludes learning once the strategy is formulated; emergent strategy fosters 
it. [...] In practice, of course, all strategy making walks on two feet, one 
deliberate, the other emergent. For just as purely deliberate strategy making 
precludes learning, so purely emergent strategy making precludes control. 
Pushed to the limit, neither approach makes much sense. Learning must be 
coupled with control” (Mintzberg, 1987a, p. 70).
Behaviour is an incremental evolutionary process, which constantly adapts to 
a changing environment. Unless a specific behaviour can be measured 
against an intended strategy (that is an announced behaviour), behaviour itself 
is always consistent. It can only become inconsistent if contrasted with a 
preceding statement or a declaration of intent that differs from actual 
behaviour.19 However, even then, the external observer cannot know if these 
statements were not deliberately false, making them appear inconsistent only 
from the observer’s point of view, and not from the strategist’s perspective. 
Therefore, it can be argued that without a benchmark, only statements, but not 
behaviour itself, can be inconsistent.20 This pinpoints the dilemma that, with 
hindsight, all successful behaviour becomes strategic.21
19 The term “consistent” stems from the Latin word “consistere” which originally meant “to stand still”.
20 The benchmark for statements is a common language with clear meanings attached to each word. A 
statement like: “water is dry”, is only perceived as inconsistent because there is a clear meaning attached to 
each word which describes different and mutually exclusive conditions.
21 This research recognises the risk of tautological concepts in strategic management that, just like Freudian 
psychoanalysis, always offer an explanation for everything within the field of human behaviour. This 
reasoning draws on Karl R. Popper’s “problem of demarcation”, which he introduces in his book 
“Conjectures and Refutations’ . Popper dismisses the “theories” by Alfred Adler, Sigmund Freud and Karl 
Marx as scientific, since their ideas “appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened 
within the fields to which they referred” (Popper, 1989, pp. 33-39).
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3.3.3. Strategy as perspective
Strategy as perspective is an inward-looking concept, representing a certain 
perception of the world according to Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 16). 
Therefore, this understanding of strategy is holistic, whereby strategy “is to the 
organization what personality is to the individual” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 16). 
Thus, strategy as perspective is often referred to as “corporate culture”. For 
example, a “culture of success” is ascribed to the US investment bank 
Goldman Sachs (Endlich, 1999), whereas the small German merchant bank 
Metzler regards its independent, entrepreneurial spirit with a human touch as 
the key values that determine its culture.22
Strategy as perspective emphasises the abstract nature of strategies, which 
essentially seem to exist in the minds of the interested parties (Mintzberg, 
1987, p. 16). Mintzberg rightly notes that strategy as perspective can unfold its 
psychological power once the members of an organisation share this 
perspective and a collective mind emerges. As strategies are not tangible, 
these are effectively concepts which convey certain ideas, values, and 
possibly even ideologies.23
Campbell and Yeung distinguish between “mission” as a strategic tool, which 
defines the commercial rationale of a company, and “mission” as the cultural 
glue which facilitates the working of the organisation as a collective entity 
(Campbell & Yeung, 1990, 1991). Mission as a cultural glue aims at creating a 
common mindset through shared values and standards of behaviour, but it 
also attempts to capture emotional aspects which may influence the work 
atmosphere (Campbell & Yeung, 1990,1991).
Research which comprehends strategy as perspective would, for example, 
analyse how to read the “collective mind” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 17) and how 
messages and stated intentions are diffused throughout the organisation and 
how actions are subsequently implemented with the necessary degree of 
consistency. Eccles and Nohria (Eccles & Nohria, 1992) put language at the
22 Available from: http://www.metzler.com [Accessed 23 June 2004].
23 Anecdotal evidence is provided by Ahmass Fakahany, Merrill Lynch’s Chief Financial Officer. He sees the 
reasons for the bank’s relative underperformance during the 1990s in a “tolerance of mediocrity” and a 
“family culture”. Ultimately, this was replaced by a “performance culture”, which then paved the way for 
success (FT, 2 July 2004).
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forefront of their analysis of management, as language and rhetoric are 
powerful forces within organisations. For them, strategy should be best 
analysed through the prism of rhetoric, action, and identity, as this allows a 
manager to design strategy most effectively (Eccles & Nohria, 1992).
An understanding of strategy as perspective opens up important aspects of 
research, not least as the morale of a company’s employees contributes to the 
quality and efficiency of work done in an organisation. It is a frequently used 
argument against creating multi-business companies that the different cultures 
are difficult to reconcile (Grant, 1992, pp. 226-227). Even within the relatively 
homogenous financial services sector one observation is that, for example, the 
mindsets of an investment banker and a retail banker, both working for the 
same institution, differ so much from each other that their communication 
might be impeded.24
Although strategy as perspective offers valuable contributions for the study of 
strategic management, this understanding is too inward-oriented for the 
purpose of this research, which aims at understanding the interdependence of 
micro- and macrostructure in the banking industry. Yet, it is worth highlighting 
that, for instance, an in-depth case study about the different work ethos at 
British and German banks or about the changing values of investment bankers 
throughout the 1990s would constitute highly useful and complementary 
research projects.25
24 The international environment in which investment bankers work makes them more likely to use English 
terms in their everyday language than may be the case with retail bankers whose environment is usually 
local.
25 For example, Baethge, Kitay and Regini studied the changing nature of employment relations in retail 
banking in nine countries, among them the UK and Germany (Baethge, Kitay & Regini (eds.), 1999).
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3.3.4. Strategic positioning
In addition to the distinction between strategy as plan, pattern and 
perspective, Mintzberg recognises that strategy is about positioning. Strategy 
as position refers to an understanding of strategy as a “means of locating an 
organization in what organization theorists like to call an “environment.” By this 
definition, strategy becomes the mediating force [...] between organization 
and environment, that is, between the internal and the external context” 
(Mintzberg, 1987, p. 15). Mintzberg also notes that this definition of strategy 
can be compatible with the definition of strategy as plan.
Understanding strategy as position is at the heart of Porter’s analysis of 
companies’ competitive advantage (Porter, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1998). 
Therefore Porter first clarifies the notion of “positioning” prior to answering the 
question in his essay “What is Strategy?” (Porter, 1996). According to Porter, 
positioning can be either based on producing a subset of an industry’s 
products or services or by serving the needs of a particular group of 
customers. Alternatively positioning can be achieved by segmenting 
customers who can be reached in different ways (Porter, 1996). Whether 
these three approaches are applied separately or combined with each other, 
positioning is a function of differences on the supply side, thus differences in 
activities, according to Porter (Porter, 1996).
Porter argues, “strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, 
involving a different set of activities” (Porter, 1996, p. 68). He remarks that a 
sustainable strategic position requires trade-offs, i.e. activities which are 
incompatible. Thus he notes that the “essence of strategy is choosing what not 
to do” (Porter, 1996, p. 70). The final aspect of strategy put forward by Porter 
is that positioning also determines how the individual activities of a company 
represent an array of interlocked activities. Porter understands competitive 
strategy as being different and as “deliberately choosing a different set of 
activities to deliver a unique mix of value” (Porter, 1996, p. 64). Therefore, he 
emphasises that operational effectiveness, albeit a necessary condition for 
achieving superior profitability, should not be confused with strategy, as it 
usually lacks sustainability.26
28 Porter explains that strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade or more, not of a single 
planning cycle. He suggests that this leads to continuity which “fosters improvements in individual activities
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The view that strategy is in essence about positioning as, for example, 
propagated by Porter complements the understanding of strategy as plan 
insofar as it focuses more on the content of strategies. For this reason, Porter 
is believed to have added substance to the planning school (Mintzberg et al., 
1998, pp. 82-122). Yet, Mintzberg criticises Porter for a too narrow 
understanding of the term strategy which largely focuses on the quantifiable 
economic aspects -  Mintzberg tries to corroborate his criticism by pointing out 
that neither the word “political” nor “politics” appears in the table of contents, 
or the index of Porter’s main book “Competitive Strategy” (Mintzberg et al., 
1998, p. 113).
Porter’s understanding of strategy does not seem to sufficiently recognise the 
potential influence of political factors. Porter’s neoclassical understanding of 
economics limits its applicability in such a highly politicised industry 
environment as the banking sector in general and the German banking sector 
in particular. The limitations of Porter’s model for analysing the banking sector 
are discussed in section five of this chapter.
Despite these limitations, an understanding of strategy as position facilitates 
the analysis of firms within their industry. The positioning school maintains that 
industry structure conditions corporate strategy and thus also shapes 
corporate structure. Consequently, Porter’s writings stand in the tradition of 
Chandler’s dictum that “structure follows strategy” (Chandler, 1962). Chandler 
defines strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out those goals” (Chandler, 
1962, p. 13).
This view has been challenged by researchers who focus on the 
organisation’s capacity (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989, 1990). By arguing that a 
company’s resources and capabilities ultimately determine the feasibility of the 
strategy considered, this view suggests that “strategy follows structure”. As 
this research concentrates on realised corporate strategies in a changing 
macroeconomic environment, the discussion as to whether strategy follows
and the fit across activities, allowing an organisation to build unique capabilities and skills tailored to its 
strategy. Continuity also reinforces a company's identity” (Porter, 1996, p. 74).
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structure, or the other way around, or whether, as advanced by Peters, 
strategy is structure (Grant, 2002, p. 189) is elaborated in chapter four in the 
context of the methodology used in this research.
Understanding strategy as position implies another weakness: “position” is 
always defined by two coordinates on a map, or by three coordinates in space. 
Therefore obtaining a clear position entails a relatively static understanding of 
strategy. Moreover occupying a clearly defined position also opens it up to 
precise attack. As noted by Mintzberg, “Porter’s basic model indicates what 
writers of military strategy call a ‘come as you are’ approach to strategy” 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 120), whereby you can only change your position 
before or after the confrontation. For a strategic process to be successful, 
what is important is the organisation’s ability to learn and to swiftly move from 
one place to another, without disclosing the new direction it is intending to 
take.
Strategy as positioning, particularly in a niche, is also the understanding of 
Henderson, founder of the Boston Consulting Group, a management 
consultancy company. Henderson derives his view of strategy as position from 
Gause’s “Principle of Competitive Exclusion”, whereby “no two species can 
coexist that make their living in the identical way” (Henderson, 1989, p. 139). 
Henderson argues that competitors must be sufficiently different to sustain 
their advantages, which have to be mutually exclusive. However, unlike 
Porter’s understanding, Henderson offers a narrower interpretation of strategy, 
which he essentially regards as “a deliberate search for a plan of action that 
will develop a business’s competitive advantage and compound it” 
(Henderson, 1989, p. 139).
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3.3.5. Strategy as ploy and tactic
Strategy as ploy is Mintzberg’s fifth understanding of strategy. He considers a 
ploy to be “a specific manoeuvre intended to outwit an opponent or 
competitor” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 12). His use of ploy refers to tactics and 
stratagems as part of the strategy process. Grant argues that a tactic is more 
of a singular action, which is relatively independent of time, leading to 
immediate results, whereas strategy unfolds over time and indicates a clear 
thrust. Therefore, he considers tactics as subordinated to the strategic 
concept. A tactic or a stratagem comprises methods for specific actions which 
should be consistent with the overarching strategy (Grant, 2002, p. 17).
Tactics and stratagems serve an immediate objective and, unlike strategies, 
are more easily reversible as they involve fewer resources. As discussed in 
the section about strategy in its historical context, tactics hold a particularly 
prominent position within the tradition of military strategic thinking. Grant 
succinctly describes tactics as measures to win battles, while strategies are 
aimed at winning the war (Grant, 2002, p. 17).
Game theorists Brandenburger and Nalebuff describe tactics as moves that 
shape the way players perceive the game and hence how they play. 
Therefore, some tactics reduce misperceptions and others are designed to 
create or maintain uncertainty (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995, 1996; Dixit & 
Nalebuff, 1991). One aspect of tactics can take the form of the signals a 
company sends to the market. “The term signaling is used to describe the 
selective communication of information to competitors designed to influence 
their perception and hence to provoke or avoid certain types of reaction” 
(Grant, 2002, p. 110).
Porter emphasises the importance of analysing firms’ signals for developing 
competitive strategies (Porter, 1998, pp. 75-87). He suggests that market 
participants can use “signals” to directly or indirectly indicate intentions, 
motives, goals, or internal situations (Porter, 1998, p. 75). Porter distinguishes 
between market signals, which are earnest indications, and other which are 
bluffs aimed at misleading competing firms. In either case, signals need to be 
credible to be effective (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Heil & Robertson, 1991).
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This section on the different understandings of strategy concludes by 
emphasising the multifaceted nature of the term “strategy”. The author of this 
thesis subscribes to Mintzberg’s understanding that “strategy” is in fact a 
“strategy process” which comprises planning, positioning, and the use of ploy 
and perspective, which in retrospect may feature some pattern.
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3.3.6. Between micro and macrostructure: “strategy” in this 
research
Recognising the complexity of the strategy process and acknowledging the 
different methods used to study the strategy process does not imply that a 
research project about strategic management has to comprise all of these 
approaches. On the contrary, it appears perfectly appropriate to focus on just 
one aspect of this strategy process, as long as this does not deny the 
significance of all the other coexisting concepts and methods. This research 
emphasises the understanding of strategy as pattern, which results from 
changing corporate strategic positions over a substantial length of time.
Yet, there is still the need to clarify the level on which the strategy analysis 
used in this research is carried out; that is to ask: The “positioning” of what? 
Strategic management literature distinguishes between corporate strategy and 
business strategy (Grant, 2002).27 Corporate strategy is concerned with the 
scope of a firm in terms of industries, markets, diversification, allocation of 
equity and corporate resources, etc. whereas business strategy deals with 
establishing a competitive advantage for a defined product/client matrix.28 
Consistent with the aforementioned view that strategy is a process, it cannot 
be upheld that there is a clear distinction between corporate and business 
strategy.29
Corporate strategy is the efficient and stable use of a firm’s limited resources 
and capabilities in order to add value, whilst yielding a profit that adequately 
accounts for the operational risks. Consequently, corporate strategy is the 
interface between a firm’s resources and capabilities and its environment 
(Grant, 2002, p. 132). A successful corporate strategy is the outcome of 
successfully implemented business strategies, which can be realised by 
drawing on a set of benign corporate and environmental conditions.
27 Obviously, a review of the literature about business strategies in banking can swiftly drift into any 
operational banking literature which uses the term “strategy” as a buzzword. For example, books like 
“Alternative Risk Strategies” by Lane (2002) or “Bond Markets: analysis and strategies” by Fabozzi (2000) 
are clearly geared to the operational level and have little to do with corporate strategy.
28 A product/client matrix defines the range of products and services offered to certain client groups (e.g. 
housing mortgages for UK clients).
29 “Corporate strategy” refers to decisions on group level (i.e. at the level of the holding company).
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Corporate strategy is concerned with decisions that involve the allocation of 
resources and capital to such an extent that it implies a structural shift for the 
organisation, which cannot be easily reversed - put simply, corporate strategy 
refers to decisions which have to be approved by the board of directors. Since 
corporate strategies can imply substantial structural, financial and legal 
consequences, the owner of the firm ought to be informed. Thus, the 
management of publicly listed companies has to inform shareholders about 
the firm’s corporate strategy.30
In order to illustrate the difference between corporate and business strategies 
in the context of banking, consider the following example: The decision to 
scale back the bank’s risk-weighted assets (RWA)31 can be described as 
corporate strategy since it profoundly alters the bank’s risk profile and 
earnings structure, whereas the specific measures for reducing the risk- 
weighted assets, e.g. through securitisation, tightening of credit policy, setting 
up of special purpose vehicle, etc., is subject to the bank’s business 
strategies.
So far, this third chapter has elaborated the term strategy and the conceptual 
roots of strategy in the military/political tradition, complementing the review in 
chapter two of the importance of banks as part of the financial system. 
Subsequently, this research discusses strategic management theories. At the 
heart of the remaining sections of this chapter, Porter’s strategic management 
theory (the five forces framework) is analysed in the context of the banking 
industry. Porter’s framework for competition analysis is contrasted with Hamel 
and Prahalad’s theory about a company’s core competence and reviewed 
critically in the light of Brandenburger and Nalebuffs use of game theory for 
competition analysis and strategic management.
30 A change of corporate strategy may contain information that could influence the share price and which 
must therefore be disclosed as an ad-hoc statement in order to comply with the regulations for securities 
trading.
31 Risk-weighted assets are assets shown on a balance sheet of a bank which are calculated on a risk- 
adjusted basis as defined by the regulatory agency (Golin, 2001).
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3.4. Economic structures revisited -  competitive forces 
in the banking industry
Dealing with competition is central to strategic management. Competition 
exists because of the scarcity of goods and services. The level of competition 
is determined by demand and supply for a good or service. Economists 
distinguish between perfect and imperfect competition. In an economist’s 
model of perfect competition, the number of buyers and sellers for a particular 
good (or service32) is so large that none of them believes their actions have a 
noticeable effect on the equilibrium price (Stiglitz, 1993, p. 395).
In a market where competition is “imperfect”, the individual firm assumes that 
its sales depend on the price it charges and other measures, such as 
marketing (Stiglitz, 1993, p. 397). Imperfect competition can take the extreme 
form of a monopoly whereby there is effectively only one supplier of a good or 
service in the industry (Varian, 1990, p. 396). The price charged by a 
monopolist is a function of the demand curve for the good (service) and the 
threat of losing its monopoly. If the monopolist’s profit margin seems 
attractively high, providers of capital would attempt to enter the same market, 
breaking the monopoly. Moreover, monopolists face possible sanctions from 
regulatory authorities, mainly spurred by consumer protection groups.
A less extreme form of imperfect competition can be found in an oligopolistic 
market structure, where there a number of competitors in the market, whose 
pricing policy has an impact on the market price and consequently on the 
sales of the other firms in the market. Thus, there exists a strategic 
interdependence between such firms (Varian, 1990, pp. 439-460).
Grant notes that “business is about the creation of value for the customer” 
(Grant, 2002, p. 67). Value can either be created through production, i.e. the 
transformation of inputs into outputs or through arbitrage, that is, the transfer 
of products across time and space (Grant, 2002, p. 67). It is accepted for this 
research that corporate strategies are aimed at increasing or at least
32 Throughout this research, the terms “product”, “goods” and “services” are used interchangeably, unless a 
more specific definition is necessary. All three terms refer to the output of a company or industry. Although it 
is not always easy to clearly distinguish between “production” and “sales” in the financial services sector, 
such a distinction facilitates an understanding of the workings of a financial services organisation and is 
widely accepted by managers in the financial services industry.
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maintaining the company’s profitability (Grant, 2002, p. 67). Profitability is 
defined as the return for the owner of the company, i.e. the return on equity 
(ROE). A firm’s profitability is determined by the split of value creation 
between consumer and producer. Conventional microeconomic theory 
propounds that the distribution between consumer surplus and producer 
surplus is a result of the level of competition, i.e. the number and relative 
bargaining power of buyers and sellers (Grant, 2002, p. 68).
Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between what the buyer would 
be willing to pay for a good/service and what he/she actually has to pay. Thus, 
the consumer surplus is a function of the consumer’s utility derived from the 
product or service and the price charged for it. Producer surplus is the 
difference between the price charged by the seller for a product/service and 
the minimum price for which the firm would be willing to sell, usually the 
average cost (Varian, 1990, pp. 240-255; Katz & Rosen, 1994, p. 141).
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3.4.1. A fram ework for com petition analysis
The amount and distribution of the value created, i.e. the consumer and 
producer surplus, is determined by the underlying economic structure of the 
industry (Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998). Porter argues that an analysis of these 
underlying structural features is essential to understand the competitive forces 
in the relevant industry (Porter, 1998, p. 3). Subsequently, he suggests that 
the nature and degree of an industry’s competition, thus an industry’s 
profitability, is influenced by five competing currents. These five forces are 
identified as the threats of new entrants, substitution, bargaining power of 
buyers, bargaining power of suppliers and rivalry among existing competitors 
(Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998).
Porter’s five forces framework is the most widely used strategic concept 
applied to the banking industry (Ballarin, 1986; Gardener, 1990; Canals, 1993; 
Chan & Wong, 1999; Borner, 2000; Hackethal, 2001; Biischgen & Borner, 
2003; Smith & Walter, 2003). Ballarin applies Porter’s model to an analysis of 
the US banking market. A strategy analysis of financial conglomerates by 
Gardener also uses Porter’s five forces model (Gardener, 1990). Chan and 
Wong find evidence for Porter’s theory through an empirical cluster analysis of 
Hong Kong, which is a highly international banking centre. Their research also 
shows that well-resourced banks with a multi-strategic approach outperform 
“strategically monotonous” rivals, thus corroborating the resource-based view 
(Chan & Wong, 1999). Borner develops an integrated concept that combines 







Porter’s "Five Forces Framework" (Porter, 1998)
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Canals uses Porter’s five forces model for his analysis of the changing 
structure of European banking at the beginning of the 1990s (Canals, 1993, 
pp. 185-196). He concludes that increased competition results from 
deregulation, globalisation and the sector’s attractiveness (Canals, 1993, p. 
195). Canals holds that deregulation, along with financial disintermediation, 
“have considerably diminished the competitive position of banks [...]” (Canals, 
1993, p. 196) and changed the structure of the banking system to such an 
















Porter’s model adapted to the banking sector
In order to better comprehend Porter’s model, it should be recalled that in 
economic theory an industry that generates a return above its risk-adjusted 
cost of capital attracts new entrants. These new entrants can be firms which 
are active in similar or other industries, or mere financial investors seeking 
attractive yields. In a perfectly efficient market economy, excess returns are 
unlikely to be upheld for long. Rates of return that exceed the cost of capital 
attract funds into this industry, thus increasing competition. As a result, 
competition drives down profit margins and the return on capital declines to 
the cost of capital. Similarly, competitors exit an industry if the return on capital 
falls below the cost of capital. Yet, perfect markets exist only in imperfect 
economic textbooks and reality is perfectly complex. Therefore, barriers to 
entry are much more diverse and cannot be reduced to a mere financial cost 
of capital versus return of capital analysis.
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Consequently, this research takes a critical view of models that attempt to 
explain the varying profitabilities of British and German banks by the 
difference between a shareholder value approach and a stakeholder value 
approach (Llewellyn, 2005). The shareholder value concept is an approach to 
business planning that places the maximisation of the value of shareholders’ 
equity above other business objectives (Dictionary of Finance and Banking,
1997).
Proponents of the shareholder value approach generally regard the 
stakeholder value concept as the competing paradigm for managing firms. 
The stakeholder value concept recognises the multiple interests of a broad 
range of groups affected by the actions of a firm, including its owners, i.e. the 
shareholders (Freeman, 1983). It follows that the stakeholder concept is an 
extension of the narrower shareholder value concept and thus does not stand 
in contradiction to it.
The large number of state-owned savings banks and mutual cooperative 
banks in Germany nourished the argument that the German banking system is 
essentially a stakeholder value oriented system, whereas the UK is 
predominantly a shareholder value oriented system, and that this difference 
largely explains the different levels of profitability (Llewellyn, 2005). Llewellyn 
holds that “[...] British banks have been highly profitable partly because they 
have chosen to be profitable in that, compared with banks in some European 
countries, they set the ROE as the central and uncompromising business 
objective” (Llewellyn, 2005, p. 309).
There is certainly some truth in the fact that the more capital market-oriented 
British system has made the management of banks more aware of 
shareholders’ expectations than their German counterparts. However, a model 
that attempts to explain higher returns on equity from management’s greater 
adherence to the shareholder value concept does not sufficiently consider 
other structural components that determine competitiveness.
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3.4.2. Barriers to entry in banking
Porter offers a rather differentiated picture of barriers to entry. In his definition 
of barriers to entry, he also includes economies of scale (Porter, 1998, pp. 7- 
23). Economies of scale refer to a decline in long-term average costs as 
output rises.33 Thus, the unit costs of a product fall as volume per period 
increases (Porter, 1998, p. 7; Katz & Rosen, 1994, p. 291). High economies of 
scale “deter entry by forcing the entrant to come in at large scale and risk 
strong reaction from existing firms or come in at a small scale and accept a 
cost disadvantage [...]" (Porter, 1998, p. 7).
Although it is usually argued that economies of scale apply particularly to 
capital-intensive industries, the case of the banking industry appears 
somewhat ambiguous. Most studies about efficiency in banking indicate that 
economies of scale are hard to find at group level (Benston et al., 1982; 
Gilligan et al., 1984; Molyneux et al., 1996; Berger, 2000; Berger et al., 2000). 
These studies show that a bank’s size does not seem to have a major effect 
on its performance. A review of empirical studies shows that on average scale 
economies and diseconomies account for only 5% of the difference in unit 
costs between financial services firms (Smith & Walter, 2003, p. 378). On the 
basis of European banking data Walter concludes that “for most banks and 
non-bank financial firms in the euro-zone, except the very smallest among 
them, scale economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on 
competitive performance” (Walter, 1999, p. 152).
However, scalability varies significantly between the different banking 
businesses, depending on the standardisation of products and distribution 
structures. Walter therefore remarks that it would be wrong to concentrate 
solely on corporate (group-level) scale economies when there is obvious 
potential for efficiency gains through size at the level of individual financial 
services, such as global custody, processing of mass-market credit card 
transactions and institutional asset management (Walter, 1999, p. 153; Smith 
& Walter, 2003, p. 379). In contrast, M&A advisory services and private 
banking are very service-intensive and require detailed product specification,
33 Porter notes that if the proportion of costs for outside inputs is high, i.e. if the relative value added is low, 
then high fixed costs can turn into a problem if demand declines. Thus, the decisive ratio is fixed costs 
relative to value added rather than as a proportion of total costs (Porter, 1998, p. 18).
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leading to high fixed costs and thus limited economies of scale (Walter, 1999, 
p. 153; Smith & Walter, 2003, p. 379). Other research findings suggest that 
economies of scale are particularly limited in commercial banking (Hackethal, 
2001, p. 23). Overall, the limited efficiency gains for banking groups (at 
corporate level) and the evident scalability of certain banking businesses 
support Canals’ critical view of universal banking and strengthens the case for 
specialisation in banking (Canals, 1999).
Despite these reservations about efficiency gains resulting from size at group 
level in the banking sector, Walter concludes: “It seems reasonable that a 
scale-driven pan-European strategy may make a great deal of sense in 
specific areas of financial activity even in the absence of evidence that there is 
very much to be gained at the firm-wide level” (Walter, 1999, p. 153). Schmidt 
estimates that the growing significance of information technology increases 
the minimum efficient firm size in the banking industry (Schmidt, 2001, p. 11). 
The rapid developments in information technology should have a bigger 
impact on retail banking than on any other banking business, providing a 
rationale for mergers and acquisitions to reduce superfluous retail capacity. 
According to Schmidt, consolidation should be mainly national as this allows 
for the greatest cost-savings, for example, by closing down bank branches 
(Schmidt, 2001, p. 11).
The rationale for mergers or acquisitions in banking is diverse. Among the 
principal motifs for M&A cited by senior bank managers are cost synergies in 
the form of economies of scale and scope (Dermine, 1999). Focarelli and his 
colleagues find that expanding revenues is the major strategic objective for 
mergers (Focarelli, Panetta & Salleo, 2002). Other explanations for mergers 
and acquisitions in the banking industry comprise gaining access to new 
markets and to information and proprietary technologies (Goddard, Molyneux 
& Wilson, 2001).
Furthermore management’s ambition to increase market power and improve 
the group’s risk profile by broadening the loan base34 are also put forward as 
reasons (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001). Additional arguments for M&A 
activities in banking (as in other industries) are hubris and management’s own
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personal (e.g. financial) interests to work for a larger bank (Eijffinger & de 
Haan, 2000, pp. 163-164; Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001; International 
Labour Organization, 2001). Molyneux et al. remark that there “may also be an 
element of herd behaviour among banks [...] during periods when merger 
activity is considered fashionable” (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, p. 88).
Overcapitalised banks are faced with demands by their shareholders to grow 
organically (for example by granting more loans), to grow through value- 
enhancing acquisitions or simply to pay out the excess capital to shareholders 
in form of dividends.35 Various analyses show that stronger, i.e. larger and 
better capitalised, banks tend to take over weaker ones (Berger & Humphrey, 
1992; Peristiani, 1993; Vander Vennet, 1998; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000), 
based on the assumption that the acquired bank’s efficiency can be improved.
A study by Buch and DeLong is particularly interesting in the context of this 
Anglo-German comparative research as it suggests that banks operating in 
more regulated environments are less likely to be the targets of international 
bank mergers. Thus, the lifting of regulations could stimulate cross-border 
bank mergers (Buch & DeLong, 2001).
Dyer et al. argue that there is always an alternative to acquisitions, namely 
alliances (Dyer, Kale & Singh, 2004). According to Dyer et al. the decision on 
whether a firm should acquire or form an alliance with another firm depends 
on five key factors. Management should carefully consider the different kind of 
synergies between the two firms (modular, sequential, reciprocal), the nature 
of resources (soft versus hard; i.e. human resources versus machines), the 
extent of redundant resources (potential for cost-cutting), the degree of market 
uncertainty and the level of competition.
By illustrating their argument with an example from the banking industry, Dyer 
et al. advise companies that have to generate synergies by combining human 
resources to avoid acquisitions (Dyer, Kale & Singh, 2004, p. 112). From their 
line of reasoning it can be inferred that the more industrialised parts of the
34 On the contrary, “cluster risks” are often the result of mergers and acquisitions. Subsequently, the two 
banks have to gradually adjust their loan portfolios not to be too exposed to one specific industry or 
company.
35 Alternatively, the bank could buy back its own shares.
122
3. Corporate strategy analysis and applicability to the banking sector
banking business36 are relatively more suitable for acquisition-driven growth 
strategies than banking operations that are more dependent on a set of 
specialised individuals (e.g. investment banking).
While size may be useful for realising economies of scale, some companies 
also enjoy absolute cost advantages which are independent of size. According 
to Porter (Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998), this is the case in industries where the 
learning and experience curves are pivotal. It also applies to companies with 
proprietary technology or a location which enables them to access raw 
materials.
The emergence of so-called “financial centres” in the banking industry results, 
among other things, from the importance of a pool of people with particular 
expertise. The role of London as the dominant banking centre in Europe can 
be partly attributed to the availability of skilled labour. In contrast, the more 
dispersed financial services industry in Germany37 could be identified as one 
reason why Frankfurt seems to remain a second-tier financial city. In addition 
to an efficient and experienced financial community, a financial centre has to 
provide economic and political stability, good communications and 
infrastructure and a regulatory environment that successfully protects 
investors’ rights without excessive capital market restrictions (Dufey & Giddy, 
1978; Gardener & Molyneux, 1993; Falzon, 2001; Schmidt & Grote, 2005).
Access to a pool of well-educated specialists with professional experience can 
therefore pose an important entry barrier in a service industry such as banking 
(Schmidt & Grote, 2005). Canals remarks that the experience curve could lead 
to noticeable cost advantages for some banks (Canals, 1993, p. 189). 
Production efficiency in banking is often expressed in form of the cost income 
ratio38 (CIR). The CIR is derived by dividing the non-interest expenses 
(excluding loan loss provisions) by the sum of net interest income and non­
interest income (Golin, 2001, p. 133).
A comparison of cost income ratios shows disparities of up to 30% between 
Europe’s large banks (Flemings Research, 2000). Smith and Walter hold that
36 For example, retail banking and the credit card business.
37 Cologne/Dusseldorf (e.g. HSBC, Sal. Oppenheim, WestLB, ERGO), Hamburg (e.g. M.M. Warburg, 
Berenberg), Munich (e.g. HVB Group, Munich Re, Allianz).
38 Also known as the “cost-to-income ratio” or “efficiency ratio”.
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the most important factor for differences in cost income ratios are not related 
to economies of scale or scope but due to operating efficiency. Put simply, 
they consider the differences in efficiency to be largely the result of better 
management (Smith & Walter, 2003, pp. 380-381). Other research 
corroborates these findings (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Wagenvoort & 
Schure, 1999; Vander Vennet, 2002).39
Another barrier to entry is product differentiation according to Porter (Porter, 
1979, 1980, 1998). An established company may enjoy an immaculate 
reputation or have a recognised brand, which is associated by customers with 
a specific service, quality or image. So, for a new entrant to overcome existing 
customer loyalties carries a price. In addition, there can be significant 
switching costs, i.e. the financial cost to a customer of changing supplier. As 
remarked by Porter “new entrants must offer a major improvement in cost or 
performance in order for the buyer to switch from an incumbent” (Porter, 1998, 
P -10).
For retail clients, changing their bank accounts is a time-consuming and 
inconvenient undertaking, which is not done quickly. Besides, a new entrant to 
the retail banking market would have to build trust and attract customers by 
offering better conditions as most retail clients have a personal relationship 
with the bank staff in their local branches and are concerned about their 
savings and the reliability of their financial transactions. To some extent the 
same holds true for wholesale banking, particularly the M&A advisory 
business, where it is common for new entrants without a track record to 
significantly undercut market prices to attract “deals”.
Despite these considerations, it is argued that overall there is little product 
differentiation within the banking industry (Canals, 1993, p. 191). Product 
differentiation in retail banking may take the form of an extensive and 
sophisticated distribution network. Operating a large branch network implies 
additional fixed costs, but it may also be perceived as an important barrier to 
entry for potential competitors. As branches are also points of sale for banks, 
this leads to the fourth barrier to entry, namely access to distribution channels 
(Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998). Prior to entering a new market, a firm needs to
39 For a review of approaches to measuring banks’ productive efficiency see Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson 
(Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, pp. 99-140).
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consider ways of distributing its product. Thus, the costs of accessing an 
adequate distribution network can pose such a financial burden on the 
company that it would have a competitive disadvantage. This argument could 
partly explain the reluctance of most European banks to enter the large 
German retail banking market.
Another important entry barrier in banking may originate from government 
policies and regulation. Governmental intervention can take many forms, of 
which government subsidies, regulatory requirements and product standards 
are just a few. Chapter two analysed at length how EU-wide policies for the 
banking sector have helped create a level playing field for competitors in this 
industry. However, the structural differences and the favourable refinancing 
conditions enjoyed by some banks (e.g. the German savings banks) make it 
clear that government policies can be pivotal for an industry’s competitive 
environment.
One specific form of government policy which is identified as a distinct barrier 
to entry in banking comprises capital requirements (Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998; 
Canals, 1993). Capital requirements in the banking sector have a legal and a 
microeconomic dimension (Canals, 1993, p. 198). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the minimum level of legally required banking capital is set 
out in the Basle Capital Accords. The microeconomic dimension originates 
from a bank’s need to constantly invest, especially in the latest information 
technology and the training of its staff to remain competitive.
Although entry barriers tend to improve an industry’s profitability (Bain, 1956; 
Mann, 1966), some research suggests that barriers to entry do no deter new 
entrants and that there are usually always firms that manage to enter an 
industry by overcoming these hurdles (Yip, 1982). Moreover, Yip claims that 
there are actually advantages in lateness. He argues that lateness enables 
new entrants to enjoy greater flexibility about their positioning. Therefore, they 
may be able to attack the incumbents’ weaknesses and their lateness enables 
them to use the latest technological equipment, possibly negotiate better 
terms and conditions with suppliers, customers and employees (Yip, 1982).
An example from the banking industry is the entry of ING Direct, the online 
banking arm of the Dutch bancassurance firm ING, into various European
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retail markets. Supported by large marketing campaigns and attractive 
conditions for new clients ING Direct grew its deposits40 to EUR 197 billion 
with 15 million customers worldwide within a decade of its establishment in 
1997. By avoiding any brick and mortar bank branches ING Direct has been 
able to keep its cost income ratio below that of most banks in the nine 
countries in which it has a presence (ING Group, 2006).
40 ING calls its client deposits “funds entrusted”.
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3.4.3. Analysis of competition among established players in a 
banking market
Closely related to an analysis of new entrants is an assessment of the level of 
competition among the existing players. Some industries are characterised by 
such intense competition that returns do not cover the cost of capital. The 
more competitive an industry is, the less attractive it is as its profitability 
declines (Canals, 1993, p. 195).
Porter distinguishes between eight factors that essentially determine the level 
of competition among established players in an industry: concentration, 
industry growth, cost structure, product differentiation, diversity of competitors, 
discrete capacity increases, exit barriers and high strategic stakes (Porter, 
1979, 1980, 1998). Applied to the banking industry Canals sees the rivalry 
within the industry to be specifically driven by a low overall level of product 
differentiation. Furthermore, he considers a weakening of demand for bank 
products as detrimental for banks with relatively high fixed costs (Canals, 
1993, pp. 194-195).
Industries with few competitors fulfil the criteria of an oligopolistic structure as 
discussed in the introduction to this section. A high degree of concentration, 
measured by the market-share of the largest players, also represents a barrier 
to entry and is usually accompanied by relatively attractive returns on capital.41 
This is, for example, the case in British retail banking which is dominated by 
HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds TSB, HBOS, RBOS. In contrast, the fragmented 
German retail banking market suffers from excess capacities and political exit 
barriers. Buschgen and Borner regard the weak profitability of German banks 
as a sign of a more competitive spirit in the country’s financial services 
industry, which has abandoned “gentlemanly capitalism” (Buschgen & Borner, 
2003, p. 238).
For the politically sensitive banking sector exit barriers can be as important as 
entry barriers. Exit barriers entail costs such as severance payments and 
possibly losses from the sale of business units. Moreover, management’s
41 The most common measure of concentration, and the one used by many regulators, is the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all banks in the market 
(Cetorelli, 1999, p. 2). For a review of approaches to measuring concentration in the banking sector see 
Cetorelli (1999) or Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson (2001).
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initial decision to enter the business may be perceived as a sign of 
incompetence or misjudgement and affect its willingness to withdraw from a 
market. Exit barriers can also be politically motivated, if, for example, the 
industry plays an important infrastructural role or employs a large number of 
people, who form part of the electorate.
For example, cutting down the number of savings banks is a politically 
sensitive task as it implies high redundancies among the around 370,000 
(2003) employees who work for Germany’s savings banks and 
“Landesbanks”. Moreover, German savings banks are an important source of 
financing for many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are the 
backbone of the German economy. Many of these firms, which are known as 
the German Mittelstand, are highly geared. Thus, a sudden credit shortage 
could possibly push hundreds of companies to the brink of insolvency 
(Janssen, 2003).
The level of competition among established players is also conditioned by the 
degree of homogeneity in the industry. As noted earlier, the banking sector is 
a relatively homogenous industry in terms of management styles and the 
products/services offered. The seemingly limited scope for product 
differentiation therefore poses an additional challenge for incumbents. 
According to Canals, the intensive price competition in banking is a result of 
this homogeneity (Canals, 1993, p. 195).
Among the eight factors identified by Porter that determine competition within 
an industry are the prevailing cost structure and the industry’s growth 
potential. “Slow industry growth turns competition into a market share game 
for firms seeking expansion. Market share competition is a great deal more 
volatile than is the situation in which rapid industry growth insures that firms 
can improve results just by keeping up with the industry [...]” (Porter, 1998, p. 
18).
As banks are operationally dependent on the macroeconomic environment in 
which they operate, their overall performance is a function of economic 
growth. The aforementioned threat of a sudden weakening of demand for 
banking products is likely to be of particular concern for banks with relatively 
high cost income ratios. The reverse holds true for an economic upswing,
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which should translate into a noticeable earnings boost for banks with a high 
proportion of fixed costs relative to variable costs. In that respect Porter’s final 
point about large capacity jumps, which can have disruptive effects on the 
industry’s supply/demand balance could hold true for the banking industry 
(Porter, 1998, p. 19).
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3.4.4. The substitution problem for banking products and services
As described in the preceding paragraphs, companies which operate in 
industries with attractive returns face the threat of new competitors entering, or 
at least trying to enter, the same industry. If the new entrants succeed, supply 
increases relative to demand, so overall profitability should decline. On the 
other hand, an industry’s profitability can also come under pressure if demand 
declines relative to supply. This is the case when a specific industry’s 
customers discover an alternative source of supply, i.e. if their current needs 
can be satisfied through a substitute product or service. Porter suggests that 
pressure from substitute products constitutes a distinct threat for an industry 
(Porter, 1979, 1980, 1998).
The probability of customers seeking alternative solutions increases if the 
price/quality relation is perceived as disproportionate. In other words, “the 
price customers are willing to pay for a product depends, in part, on the 
availability of substitute products” (Grant, 2002, p. 72). Price elasticity of 
demand is the relative change in quantity divided by the relative change in 
price (Varian, 1990, p. 262). Thus demand for a product for which there is a 
close substitute, can be expected to be very responsive to price changes 
(Varian, 1990, pp. 262-265).
Banking Structure




Products Asset-Liability Management (treasury), Capital Markets & Corporate Finance Expertise
■ Asset management (pension funds)
■ Transaction banking (cash 
management, foreign exchange)
■ Financing (equity, bond, debt)
■ Insurance (derivatives)
■ Transaction advisory (M&A)
■ Savings products (mutual funds, 
insurance products)
■ Transactions, payments (credit cards, 
cheques)
■ Loans (mortgages, credits)
Sales Marketing (brand), Network (distribution)
■ Product-line
■ Industry-line (relationship banking)






■ Corportaions / JVs
■ IFAs
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Demand for the broad range of products and services provided by the banking 
sector should be subject to different price elasticities due to the varying 
availability of substitutes. As illustrated in the diagram above, a bank can add 
value through “production” or through “sales” (advisory services). “Production” 
refers to the transformation services provided by a bank whereas “sales” 
comprises essentially non-interest-yielding transaction services.
Substitutability in banking, i.e. in the financial services sector, is characterised 
by at least two structural shifts (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 235). First, the 
shift from commercial banking to investment banking, that is the replacement 
of transformation services by transaction services (disintermediation). Second, 
it is maintained that there is a shift from bank saving to insurance saving, 
largely driven by demographic changes in Western countries (Buschgen & 
Borner, 2003, p. 235). In addition to these two shifts, it is possible to consider 
a third, which originates from the aforementioned unbundling of “production” of 
standardised bank products from the “sales/distribution” of these products.
According to Bryan, non-branch-based distribution channels should gain 
significance for retail banks (Bryan, 1993). While telephone and online 
banking are services that can be offered by traditional retail banks, it is more 
difficult for them to credibly sell third-party products if substitute products are 
also available from the same group. Nevertheless, many banks operate this 
type of “open architecture” as they feel obliged to offer their clients a wider 
choice of products.
The limited credibility of these open-architecture approaches helps 
independent financial advisors (IFAs) to compete with the advisory and sales 
service of retail banks. IFAs usually cooperate with various product partners 
(banks, asset managers and life insurers) and are paid on commission basis. 
Cooperation with IFAs reduces a bank’s fixed costs as demand for branch 
staff declines, while the profit margin per product sold normally decreases by 
the amount of commission paid to the I FA.42
42 Another substitution threat in retail banking may come from transfer payments, which are carried out 
through the use of credit cards issued by non-banks rather than as remittances (less common in Europe 
than in the USA). However in many cases banks themselves are issuing credit cards, thus this possible 
threat of substitution has been internalised.
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On the product side, a retail bank faces a threat of substitution from 
investment alternatives which are not managed outside its scope. These may 
be, for example, mutual funds managed by non-bank financial institutions (e.g. 
Fidelity Investments). If, however, these third-party funds are sold through the 
bank, then the bank receives commission from the asset manager.43
Effectively, any investment (including deposit or savings accounts) that is not 
managed by a bank can be regarded as a potential substitute. This may range 
from such obvious investments as life insurance products or real estate to 
expenses (investments) for education and training 44 The product group least 
at risk of substitution in retail banking is the loan and mortgage business as 
this requires the capacity (size for risk diversification) and technology for 
asset-liability management.
In wholesale banking, companies' direct access to capital markets is the most 
obvious substitute. As described in the previous chapter, disintermediation, i.e. 
the substitution of bank loans and deposits through direct interaction with 
other market participants, poses a threat to banks which only offer 
transformation services and no transaction services. However, Bryan remarks 
that there are limits to securitisation, which should ultimately allow banks to 
concentrate on a kind of “residual transformation business” (Bryan, 1993). 
This core business is likely to comprise only transformation services for 
individual households and small and medium-sized enterprises where the 
costs of securitisation exceed their value (Bryan, 1993).
Customers’ interest in substituting bank financing by capital market financing 
have caused many banks to expand their service spectrum to include capital 
market services. In some countries, like the USA, this strategic shift had to be 
preceded by some legal changes, notably the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933.
If a bank offers transaction services in addition to transformation services, its 
core competence stretches from mere asset-liability management skills to 
corporate finance and capital markets expertise. The concept of a company’s
43 For example, if HSBC sells a retail fund managed by US asset manager Fidelity via one of its branches, 
HSBC will receive a fee from Fidelity, which will be shown in its “commission income”.
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“core competence” is at the heart of Hamel and Prahalad’s resource-based 
views (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990), which are discussed in section five.
Banks’ wholesale clients could also consider using insurance companies for 
certain services. Most importantly, insurance companies in the field of asset 
management and corporate pension schemes could replace banks. The 
imminent pressure on most European governments to promote funded 
pension schemes requires companies to offer their employees retirement 
savings plans. The structural change in European demographics entails 
altered financing of provision for old age. This trend has contributed to the 
creation of bancassurance conglomerates, with Allianz/Dresdner Bank and 
Lloyds TSB being the two most prominent cases in Germany and Britain.
On the sales side, the scope for substitution of distribution to 
wholesale/corporate clients appears limited as the corresponding banking 
products are far more customer-specific than retail banking products, which 
tend to be relatively standardised. However, some large consultancy 
companies have made inroads on the strategic consulting of the M&A advisory 
business, monitoring the transaction process for their clients.
44 “Consumption” and “cash holdings" could even be considered substitutes for banking services.
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3.4.5. The bargaining power behind a bank’s asset-liability 
management
An industry’s profitability is also determined by the relative bargaining power of 
buyers on one hand and sellers on the other (Porter, 1998, pp. 24-29). Porter 
holds that a buyer enjoys a relatively strong negotiating position if few 
concentrated buyers purchase large volumes of the sellers’ output (Porter, 
1998, p. 24). Purchasers’ readiness to negotiate better conditions is even 
greater if the products procured represent a significant proportion of their total 
costs. Moreover, it is argued that purchasers in low-margin businesses are 
more price-sensitive than those with lucrative margins, who are more willing to 
pass on a proportion of their profits to suppliers (Porter, 1998, pp. 24-26).
Related to the argument about product substitution is the view that the relative 
bargaining power of buyers is stronger if the products procured are fairly 
homogenous. This is especially true if a buyer can swiftly change from one 
supplier to another, without high switching costs. In an extreme scenario, the 
buyer considers replacing the supplier with its own production, i.e. through 
“insourcing”, or as Porter calls it “backward integration” (Porter, 1998, p. 25). 
However, what holds true for buyers, may as well apply to sellers if the 
reverse circumstances prevail - that is, if sellers are in a better negotiating 
position for the same reasons.
Applying Porter’s analytical five forces framework to the banking sector 
requires some modifications with respect to the assumptions about the 
interdependence of buyers and suppliers. Contrary to the situation for 
industrial firms, there is no clear understanding of what constitutes a bank’s 
input and output. It is agreed that there is no coherent theory that explains the 
“production” process of a bank (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000; Goddard, 
Molyneux & Wilson, 2001; Buschgen & Borner, 2003). However, there are two 
auxiliary models that can be of use for the analysis of competitive forces in the 
banking industry (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, pp. 77-79).
The production approach (Gilligan, Smirlock & Marshall, 1984; Hartmann- 
Wendels et al., 2000; Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001) considers deposits 
and loans as outputs. Output is measured by the number of accounts and 
transactions, yet without taking into account business volumes. This method
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counts only the operating costs as inputs and not the interest expenses of a 
bank (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, p. 714). As the transformation services 
of a bank are not captured by this method, it is at best suitable for transaction 
banks, i.e. investment banks.
The intermediation approach is more applicable for explaining the input/output 
relation of a bank’s transformation services (Sealey & Lindiey, 1977; 
Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000; Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001 ).45 It is 
suggested that a bank’s deposits are the input and its loans are the output 
(Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, pp. 77-79). Although this approach intuitively 
appears reasonable and is accepted in a modified version as a proxy for the 
following analysis about competitive forces in the banking sector, it is not 
entirely unproblematic.
One difficulty of the intermediation approach is that it does not take into 
account the different sizes and maturities of loans and deposits, thus it ignores 
two principal transformation characteristics (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, 
pp. 77-79). Other authors criticise the fact that banks cannot “procure” 
deposits and that the value chain from deposits to loans cannot be easily 
established (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, pp. 29-32). The latter objection does 
not seem to assume that the number and volume of deposits should rise if the 
interest rates for these deposits are relatively more attractive compared to 
alternative investments.46 Berger and Humphrey criticise the intermediation 
approach and show that deposits and loans are outputs if they add value for a 
bank. This is the case if the returns on an asset exceed the opportunity costs, 
or if the costs of a liability are less than the opportunity costs (Berger & 
Humphrey, 1992).47
Despite these reservations about the intermediation approach, both Buschgen 
and Borner (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 39) and Canals (Canals, 1993, pp. 
198-199) adapt Porter’s value-chain model (Porter, 1985) for the banking 
sector, thus implicitly accepting the premises of the intermediation approach. 
The principal difference between Porter’s model (as depicted the diagram 
below) and the bank-specific version is the integration of “procurement” as
45 The intermediation approach is of little, if not no use for transaction banks.
48 This also comprises interest rates paid by competing banks.
47 For a detailed literature review on efficiency measurement in banking see e.g. Goddard, Molyneux & 
Wilson (2001).
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part of a bank’s basic activities. Procurement is understood as the raising of 
capital, which constitutes an integral element of a bank’s asset-liability 
management (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 39; Canals, 1993, pp. 198-199).




































The intermediation and production approaches are both derived from a bank’s 
balance sheet, thereby missing or inadequately reflecting several value-adding 
activities of a bank. Instead, a bank’s output could also be defined as its total 
operating income, while its inputs are total operating expenses and risk 
provisions. Consequently, a bank’s profit is the most condensed efficiency 
indicator, which offers comparable efficiency ratios in relation to the bank’s 
equity (ROE) or assets (ROA).
Assuming a knowledge of the price sensitivity of deposits, it could be argued 
that banks can (and should!) actively manage the volume of deposits.
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Moreover, in the following paragraphs it is argued that a bank’s total equity 
and liabilities (i.e. shareholders’ equity, debt/bonds and deposits) -  not just 
deposits -  need to be taken into account for a competitive input/output 
analysis.
Although the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet finances its assets, which 
largely comprises loans, it should not be assumed that deposits “cause” loans 
(Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 33). “It is not the case that banks receive large 
numbers of small short-term deposits which they then convert into loans of a 
different scale and maturity” (Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 33). Rather, banks 
respond to a demand from clients for financing by offering loans. As Howells 
and Bain rightly note, “customers simply do not go into a bank ‘demanding’ 
deposits” (Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 33). Given that demand for deposits 
originates from a bank’s need to diversify its financing structure, one may link 
the liabilities side of the balance to the “supplier” and the asset side to the 
“buyer”.
For banks that provide transformation services, i.e. deposit-taking institutions, 
clients are “suppliers” and “buyers”. In wholesale and retail banking, a client 
can either be reflected on the asset, the liability or both sides of the bank’s 
balance sheet, depending on whether the client is a debtor (asset side), a 
creditor (liability side), or both. A bank that offers transformation services has 
essentially three different means of financing its assets. First, the owners of a 
bank provide equity (shareholders’ equity). Second, the bank attracts 
customers’ deposits. Third, the bank can raise debt through issuing various 
kinds of bonds. All three means of financing are subject to different terms and 
conditions, with varying maturities and claims (liabilities). These differences 
are reflected in different “prices” (interest) a bank has to pay for those funds.
Thus, a bank’s refinancing costs are a function of its liabilities and equity 
structure. Differences in the refinancing structure imply different interest rate 
sensitivities, as, for example, bond prices may react faster to interest rate 
changes than deposits. The different refinancing strategies are essential for a 
bank’s profitability and show in the bank’s net interest margin. At the four 
German banks researched for this thesis, net interest income contributed on 
average 53% to operating income between 1993 and 2003. In the case of the
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four British banks analysed, net interest income comprised on average 55% of 
operating income for the same time span.
A bank’s bond and equity refinancing conditions are essentially a function of 
the interest rate environment but also of its risk profile and overall financial 
strength. Established credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, 
Moody's and Fitch assess a bank’s financial strength. A bank can strengthen 
its capital basis by raising equity. Perpetual or subordinated bonds are 
occasionally referred to as “hybrids” and may be recognised as equity by the 
credit rating agencies. Subsequently this could lead to a better “financial 
strength rating” and improve the bank’s refinancing conditions.
The costs, i.e. the interest a bank has to pay to its depositors is largely 
dependent on the liquidity and the returns of comparable asset classes (given 
a specific risk and liquidity), which should be ultimately also a function of the 
interest rate environment. Retail clients may to some extent accept relatively 
less favourable conditions for their deposits and savings in return for an 
attractive network of services.
Retail clients’ relative bargaining power, regardless whether they are “sellers” 
or “buyers”, is limited due to the high concentration of banks on one side and 
the disproportionately large number of retail clients on the other. Moreover, 
retail clients face relatively high switching costs (measured in terms of 
opportunity costs) when they change their bank, as it affects a wide range of 
existing contracts (Klemperer, 1987; Vives, 1991). Still, a retail client’s relative 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the bank increases with personal wealth. For this 
reason, banks distinguish between different wealth categories among retail 
clients, with the few high-net-worth individuals enjoying better conditions than 
some companies.
Analogously to the arguments put forward regarding substitution, the relative 
bargaining power of wholesale clients increases along with their ability to raise 
finance directly on the capital markets, for example, by issuing bonds. To what 
extent a firm can achieve better financing conditions on the capital markets 
than from a bank depends largely on its size, businesses, diversification, 
profitability and overall financial strength, expressed by its credit ratings.
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Advising firms on their optimal financial structure is a service provided by a 
bank’s corporate finance team. With the exception of very large multinational 
corporations, most firms do not have their own corporate finance team. Thus 
firms which prefer to finance their operations directly through the issuance of 
debt or equity still require external capital markets expertise, a service offered 
by banks in return for commission fees. Although disintermediation is an 
option for wholesale clients, the choice between bank and capital market 
financing does not necessarily strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis 
the banking sector, given that most banks offer both transformation (loans) 
and transaction (capital market) services.
Although wholesale buyers do not have the option of completely circumventing 
the banking sector, they still enjoy a relatively strong negotiating position for 
standard products, for example, ordinary bank loans. Since such plain 
products do not leave much room for differentiation, they can be easily 
compared and essentially differ only with regard to price. The limited scope for 
product differentiation of many standard bank products makes the personal 
relationship between the bank’s employees and its clients a decisive business 
factor. It is in the context of a bank’s differentiation strategy that relationship 
banking is of increasing significance. Traditionally, relationship banking was 
an integral part of the transformation process and served the purpose of 
monitoring the borrower. Due to the growing significance of disintermediation, 
relationship bankers are likely to become increasingly sales-oriented key 
account managers, offering the bank’s transaction and transformation services 
(Leahy, 1997; Boot, 2000).
If the client does not demand a standardised product but is confronted with a 
problem and seeks a solution, then the bank should be in a position to offer 
differentiated, sophisticated, thus distinct financial concepts. By offering 
solutions as opposed to specific products, the price becomes a subordinated 
competitive criterion - not least, because complex solutions are difficult to 
compare. Given that transaction-related services allow for much product 
differentiation, numerous relatively small and specialised corporate finance 
houses48 can maintain a competitive edge without necessarily having to be the 
cost-leader among their peers.
40 For example, the small German M&A boutique Drueker & Co advised Procter & Gamble on the EUR 6.6 
billion acquisition of Wella AG, a producer of hair-care products, in 2003.
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Product differentiation is among the three potentially successful generic 
strategies for coping with the five competitive forces identified by Porter. In 
addition to product differentiation, Porter considers “cost leadership” and 
“focus” as the other two viable means of establishing a strategic advantage 
(Porter, 1998, p. 35). For a firm and its products to be perceived as unique, it 
can employ several means. Among the key drivers recognized in the 
academic literature are: product features and product performance, 
complementary services, intensity of marketing activities, technology 
embodied in design and manufacture, quality of purchased inputs, procedures 
influencing the conduct of each activity, skill and experience of employees, 
location and the degree of vertical integration (Porter, 1985, pp. 124-125; 
Grant, 2002, pp. 288-289).
Buschgen and Borner argue that differentiation strategies are not particularly 
prominent among banks, albeit they seem to be more viable than cost- 
leadership approaches (Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 240). The homogenous 
and standardised character of many financial products challenges banks to 
differentiate their products to such an extent that their clients perceive them as 
unique.
Product differentiation comprises every aspect that relates to the client, 
including the client’s perception. Consequently, product differentiation should 
enable a firm to obtain a price premium that exceeds the additional costs of 
providing the differentiation (Porter, 1985, p. 120; Grant, 2002, p. 277; 
Buschgen & Borner, 2003, p. 240), thereby establishing a competitive 
advantage. Ultimately, product differentiation needs to create value for which 
the client is willing to pay.
Particularly in retail banking, a bank’s image and reputation is thus of great 
importance as clients cannot easily assess the varying qualities of banks, 
other than on the basis of the product price and service quality (Neven, 1990; 
Grant, 2002, p. 293). In addition to the aforementioned relatively high 
switching costs, a bank’s good reputation could hence prevent retail-banking 
clients from changing to a new bank with an unrecognised brand-name.
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A firm’s uniqueness is also determined by its set of resources and assets, 
which it should combine to create something that is valued by the customer 
and which only this constellation of assets can provide. Section five “A bank’s 
resources determine its core competence” elaborates these ideas in detail. 
The uniqueness of each firm should facilitate its goal of occupying an 
exclusive niche. Therefore, a company that is sufficiently different should 
always have 100% of its market-share according to Henderson (Henderson,
1989).
Cost leadership is identified as an alternative strategic approach in 
successfully dealing with the aforementioned competitive forces. In this way, a 
firm aims to produce and market identical or similar products more efficiently 
than its competitors. A stringent cost-leadership strategy that entails achieving 
a low cost relative to competitors becomes the dominant theme for the entire 
firm (Porter, 1998, p. 35). Ultimately, the cost leader of an industry should 
deliver the highest profits and can therefore invest more to further enhance its 
efficiency. Cost leadership can be established through economies of scale and 
scope, technological superiority, a more advanced learning curve, high market 
share and privileged access to input factors (Porter, 1998, pp. 35-37).
In the context of the banking industry, the cost leadership strategy could gain 
significance for banking businesses that are increasingly dominated by 
information technology (see e.g. Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, pp. 141- 
165). The more standardised retail banking sector should benefit most - with 
the development of online-banking pointing in this direction. However, for parts 
of the banking business that rely on a personal client relationship, such low- 
cost strategies are likely to remain the exception.
By concentrating on a specific market segment (e.g. customer, location, 
product) a firm pursues a strategy that should ultimately result in a 
differentiation or low-cost strategy. Porter regards the “focus-strategy” as the 
third viable option in coping with competition (Porter, 1998, pp. 38-40). “The 
strategy rests on the premise that the firm is thus able to serve its narrow 
strategic target more effectively or efficiently than competitors who are 
competing more broadly. As a result, the firm achieves either differentiation 
from better meeting the needs of the particular target, or lower costs in serving 
this target, or both" (Porter, 1998, p. 38).
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Applied to the banking industry there a various examples where such an 
approach seems to have paid off. Many Swiss banks have for many years 
pursued a strategy whereby they have focused on serving the world’s 
wealthiest individuals with exclusive personal financial advice. The Swiss 
banking sector developed an expertise in dealing with this clientele and 
advanced processes geared specifically to the private banking sector. Despite 
high personnel costs and international pressure to curtail offshore banking, 
Swiss banks have remained highly competitive overall. Focused strategies are 
also in place where a bank segments its clients according to client groups and 
geography. In wholesale banking, this leads often to matrix structures as part 
of a relationship-banking approach.
It is noted that transactions usually involve a combination of products 
(“hardware”) and services (“software”), which can be separately differentiated 
(Mathur, 1984; Kenyon & Mathur, 1997). In mature markets, products 
gradually turn into commodities and services are increasingly provided by 
specialised companies. Therefore, mature markets facilitate the unbundling of 
“hardware” from “software” (Mathur, 1984; Kenyon & Mathur, 1997; Grant, 
2002, p. 289).
In the financial services industry certain players also focus on just one part of 
the value chain. This can be illustrated by the emergence of firms that 
exclusively concentrate on the distribution of financial products (financial 
planners) or pure asset managers, which do not operate their own distribution 
network (e.g. most hedge funds). Deutsche Bank’s board member Lamberti 
argues that the continuous industrialisation of banking requires banks to 
concentrate on only few specialised core businesses from a financial services 
firm’s value chain. He considers, for example, that commodity-type back-office 
services and the maintenance of a bank’s information technology could be 
outsourced. The usual size of these operations is too small (i.e. too expensive) 
to remain an integrated part of the in-house value chain (Lamberti, 2004).
In accordance with Lamberti’s argument, Canals considers specialised banks 
as strategically superior to universal banks (Canals, 1999). Canals’ line of 
reasoning effectively follows a “resource based view” as he emphasises that 
increased “competition in each segment of the financial market will lead each
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bank to focus on those activities where it has the right resources and 
capabilities and where it can develop sustainable competitive advantages” 
(Canals, 1999, p. 569). Among other things, he considers the withdrawal of 
British banks from investment banking in the mid-1990s as evidence of the 
trend towards specialisation (Canals, 1999, p. 569).
Canals points out that an important force driving the banking industry towards 
specialisation originates from investors’ demand to reveal the allocation of 
capital for each business unit within a banking group. A bank’s different 
business units compete for the group’s capital on the grounds of varying 
economic performances. Shareholders expect management to allocate capital 
among business units according to their efficiency. Consequently, each 
business unit is autonomously responsible for the capital it receives (Canals, 
1999, p. 569).49
In practice this idea led to the development of the increasingly popular concept 
of “economic value added" (EVA). EVA is a tool for measuring financial 
performance, by subtracting an appropriate charge for the opportunity cost of 
all capital invested in an enterprise from the net operating profit (Stewart, 
1999).50 As a result of this opportunity cost approach to a company’s 
profitability, it is difficult for management to justify cross-subsidies between 
business units for a substantial length of time. Canals argues that “as a result, 
cross-subsidies between business units that currently exist in many universal 
banks will tend to disappear, since senior managers in each unit will not want 
to be responsible for capital not allocated specifically to them or which is 
devoted to financing other, less profitable activities within the banking group” 
(Canals, 1999, p. 569).
Canals’ third reason for arguing that specialisation could become more 
prominent among banks in a financially integrated Europe is that “the growth 
in the size of the market accompanying the euro will allow for scale economies 
specific to each business” (Canals, 1999, p. 569). This argument is consistent 
with Walter and Smith’s observation that economies of scale may exist in 
certain business lines, such as asset management, but are more difficult to
49 The author of this doctoral research would strongly agree that increasing pressure from investors (e.g. 
shareholders) for management to reveal the shareholders’ equity allocation to different business units can 
be observed. The telephone conferences between investors and Allianz’ management regarding the group’s 
capital allocation for Dresdner Bank in 2002 and 2003 may suffice as anecdotal evidence.
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realise for a group of different business units (Walter & Smith, 2003, pp. 377- 
379).
It should, however, be borne in mind that the term “specialisation” is a 
potentially misleading one as the degree of specialisation remains a relative 
concept. At the heart of the specialisation debate is the measurement of 
economies of scope and the question whether the combination of two 
business activities can be more efficiently carried out than if they existed as 
stand-alone units. “Economies of scope are cost savings arising when a bank 
produces two or more outputs using the same set of resources, which result in 
the costs for the group of goods or services being less than the sum of the 
costs if they were produced separately” (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, 
p. 85). Therefore, the underlying issue is the composition of a financial 
services firm’s value chain.
The bancassurance model can illustrate the notional difficulty of 
“specialisation”: if a retail bank acquires an insurance company, does that 
bank broaden or simply deepen its retail financial services? One may as well 
ask whether a retail bank is already too diversified if it operates its own 
branches and sells its own mutual funds (retail funds). Another example is the 
intersection of investment banks and reinsurance companies in the field of risk 
transfer and integrated risk management (i.e. what is known as insurance- 
based investment banking). Investment bankers and reinsurance managers 
share an interest in sophisticated risk-management solutions and have a 
cultural affinity with one another. A convergence, in the form of cooperation 
and competition between investment banks and reinsurance companies can 
already be observed (Franzetti, 2002). For example, several US investment 
banks have moved into the reinsurance business.51
These examples demonstrate that specialisation should be analysed with 
regard to the efficient use of resources within a value chain and not 
necessarily in the context of diversification. However, the feasibility of 
unbundling products and services also facilitates the repackaging of 
“hardware” and “software” -  not least to satisfy the demands of more 
sophisticated customers who seek differentiation advantages. A case in point
50 EVA = Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) -  [capital x cost of capital] (Stewart, 1999).
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from the financial services sector is unit-linked life insurance, which combines 
term life insurance with an investment fund chosen by the client -  
alternatively, the client could also buy both products separately.
Grant points out that the relatively modest success of many “one-stop- 
shopping” strategies of financial services companies questions to what extent 
bundling creates customer value (Grant, 2002, p. 289). Yet bundling of 
transformation and transaction services seems to be a viable strategy for 
banks to address the substitution threat from disintermediation, while 
balancing the earnings volatility of investment banking.
Applying Porter’s analytical tools to buyers’ and suppliers’ relative bargaining 
power in the banking sector illustrates that a bank can strengthen its 
competitive position vis-a-vis its wholesale clients by offering transformation 
and transaction services. While transaction services allow for greater product 
differentiation, the more standardised transformation services are more price- 
sensitive and need to be embedded in a network of banking services.
In order to better understand a bank’s relative bargaining power, this research 
assumes that a bank’s liabilities are its inputs and that its assets are its 
outputs, despite the previously elaborated conceptual difficulties of the 
intermediation approach. Although this modified intermediation approach 
serves the purpose of comprehending the competitive forces in the banking 
industry, it must not be overlooked that the profitability of a bank’s 
transformation services results from managing the interdependence between 
a bank’s assets and liabilities.
The significance of a bank’s asset-liability and risk management is illustrated 
by considering how its refinancing conditions deteriorate if its loan portfolio is, 
for example, burdened by non-performing loans. Thus, a bank’s refinancing 
conditions are not just determined by the structure of the liabilities side of its 
balance sheet, but also by the quality of its assets. Similarly, a bank cannot 
offer competitive conditions for loans if its refinancing costs are too high. For 
this reason, the profitability of a bank’s transformation services is often
51 Goldman Sachs owns Arrow Reinsurance Company, Lehman Brothers has set up Lehman Re and 
Morgan Stanley has a stake in Enterprise Re.
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expressed by the net interest margin.52 Since the profitability of a bank’s 
transformation services is greatly determined by its risk and asset-liability 
management, the capability of optimising the interaction of a bank’s balance 
sheet should be understood as one of its core competence.
52 Net interest income is the difference between gross interest income (from the bank’s assets) and interest 
expense (from its liabilities), i.e. the cost of funds. The net interest margin is the return on average earning 
assets, calculated by dividing net interest income by average earning assets (Golin, 2001, p. 703).
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3.5. A bank’s resources determine its core competence
The importance of a firm’s core competence for its competitive strategy is put 
forward by Hamel and Prahalad (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990). According to 
Hamel and Prahalad, core competence is about collective learning in the 
organisation and “should make a significant contribution to the perceived 
customer benefits of the end product” (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990, p. 84). 
Subsequently, the emergence of core competencies should enable the firm to 
access a wide variety of markets as the focus is on capabilities rather than 
products (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990).
The writings of Hamel and Prahalad (1989, 1990, 1993) can be understood in 
the tradition of what Mintzberg describes as the “learning school of strategic” 
management (Mintzberg et al. 1998). The learning school traces its roots to 
policy analysis and is closely related to the work of Charles Lindblom on the 
incremental nature of the policy process (Lindblom, 1959,1979).
As the title of his article “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’” (Lindblom, 1959, 
1979) suggests, Lindblom believes that successful policy-making simply aims 
at ‘muddling through’ more effectively and that there is no clear distinction 
between means and ends. In the Popperian tradition of ‘piecemeal social 
engineering’ (Popper, 1960, 1985), Lindblom argues that policies are directed 
at a problem and that any implementation reveals the policy’s weaknesses. 
Consequently, “the policy” has to be modified and a successive 
implementation brings further flaws to light. An ongoing process of trial and 
alteration should eventually resolve the problem.
Lindblom describes incrementalism as a process that is more concerned with 
solving a problem than with seizing certain opportunities (Mintzberg, et al. 
1998). The lack of a deliberate direction or a collective perspective (Mintzberg, 
et al. 1998) is addressed by Quinn, who proposes the modified concept of 
“logical incrementalism" (Quinn, 1978,1980a, 1980b, 1989).
Essentially, Quinn argues that “managed or ‘logical’ incrementalism is not the 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ of Lindblom, or the ‘garbage can’ approach of 
Cohen et al., or the ‘muddling’ of Wrapp and others. It demands conscious
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process management. It often involves a clear, thoroughly analyzed vision and 
set of purposes. But it also recognizes that the vision could be achieved by 
multiple means and that it may be politically unwise, motivationally 
counterproductive, or pragmatically misleading and wasteful to specify a 
particular set of means too early in the strategic process. It also recognizes 
that both the strategic program and the vision itself may be improved by 
incremental changes as new information becomes available. To believe or act 
otherwise is to deny the value of new information” (Quinn, 1989, p. 56).
As remarked by Mintzberg et al., Quinn’s logical incrementalism complements 
Lindlom’s original thoughts on aspects taken from the design school and 
emphasises the role of conscious learning (Mintzberg, et al. 1998, pp. 180- 
182). Thus, Quinn paves the way for the prominent concepts of Hamel and 
Prahalad, which maintain that strategy is a function of learning and learning 
essentially depends on capabilities. Hamel and Prahalad consider a firm’s 
competitive advantage to be largely determined by its core competence which 
is again dependent upon its resources and capabilities (Hamel & Prahalad,
1990).
An organisational structure that fosters communication and cooperation 
across divisional boundaries promotes the development of the company’s core 
competence as intangible resources and capabilities are enhanced as they 
are applied and shared. Hamel and Prahalad consider core competence to be 
the glue that binds existing businesses and the engine for new business 
development. Moreover, it provides the patterns of diversification and market 
entry (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990). Since each firm has a unique set of 
resources and capabilities this constellation of intangible assets should form 
the basis for a firm’s strategy, making it difficult for competitors to imitate 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1989,1990, 1993).
In order to leverage an organisation’s core competence Hamel and Prahalad 
also introduce the concept of “strategic intent” which encapsulates the firm’s 
general direction, providing orientation and an objective for the entire 
organisation. Strategic intent is about consistently focusing on essentials, 
motivating staff and leveraging limited resources.
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Hamel and Prahalad challenge the conventional concept of “fit”. Originating 
from the contingency approaches to organisation theory, the concept of fit in 
strategic management usually refers to the consistency of a company’s 
organisational structure with the industry environment for its strategy to be 
successful (Lawrence, & Lorsch, 1967; Grant, 2002, p. 316). According to 
Hamel and Prahalad, strategic intent creates an extreme misfit between 
resources and ambitions, implying a noticeable stretch for the organisation. 
They suggest that leveraging resources is as important as allocating them, 
thus they claim that their proposed concept of ‘stretch’ supplements the idea 
o f‘fit’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993).
This view is shared by Senge (1990) who holds that “leadership in a learning 
organization starts with the principle of creative tension” (Senge, 1990, p. 9), 
whereby creative tension emerges as the gap between where the organisation 
wants to be and the realistic assessment of where it currently stands. Hamel 
and Prahalad postulate that a critical component of resource leverage is 
determined by a firm’s ability to maximise the insights gained from everyday 
experience with clients, competitors and products. They conclude that some 
companies are better than others at extracting knowledge from those 
experiences (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993, p. 80). Hamel and Prahalad go one 
step further than Senge by arguing that it is not sufficient to be a learning 
organisation, but that a company must also be capable of learning more 
efficiently than its competitors (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993).
The results of learning are translated by an organisation into innovation, 
thereby bringing their resources and capabilities to the market. It is argued 
that banks are relatively averse to innovation (Buschgen & Borner, 2003; 
Borner, 2000), which could be a sign of their learning difficulties. Buschgen 
and Borner suggest that banks’ risk aversion seems to impede their 
willingness to innovate (Buschgen & Borner, 2003; Borner, 2000). Moreover, 
financial products are easily copied, as reflected by their high degree of 
homogeneity. Thus, innovative banks cannot maintain their competitive edge 
for long on the basis of mere product differentiation, which does not incentivise 
banks to innovate.
However, innovative approaches in banking based on the bank’s resources 
and capabilities offer a viable strategy to cope with the homogenous nature of
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most banking products. Therefore innovation has not only to anticipate the 
needs of clients and to be the first to offer solutions for these problems 
(Canals. 1999, p. 573), but more importantly to differentiate the means of 
bringing the product to the client. Banks can best protect themselves against 
imitators by developing a unique set of resources, with a constellation of 
employees and technologies that cannot be replicated easily.
For Shaw, competition among banks is essentially a technology battle (Shaw, 
2001, pp. 1-18), which only a few can survive. Technological superiority is of 
particular significance for transformation services. It is argued that the speed 
and accuracy of transformation services can be unique features of banks that 
are not effortlessly copied (Borner, 2000; Shaw, 2001; Buschgen & Borner, 
2003). For transaction services technological leadership is less relevant and 
can be compensated by specific market expertise (e.g. product or 
geographical) that is perceived by clients who are willing to pay for it as adding 
value.
The proponents of this so-called resource-based view53 of strategic 
management focus on an organisation’s resources and capabilities and 
internal structure for establishing a competitive advantage. It is argued that 
“[...] in a world where customer preferences are volatile and the identity of 
customers and the technologies for serving them are changing, a market- 
focused strategy may not provide the stability and constancy of direction 
needed as a foundation for long-term strategy. When the external environment 
is in a state of flux, the firm itself, in terms of its bundle of resources and 
capabilities, may be a much more stable basis on which to define its identity. 
Hence, a definition of the firm in terms of what it is capable of doing may offer 
a more durable basis for strategy than a definition based on the needs that the 
business seeks to satisfy” (Grant, 2002, p. 133).
Furthermore it is put forward that, due to the increasing internationalisation 
and deregulation, competitive pressure has intensified within most sectors, 
leaving only a few industries protected from severe competition (Grant, 2002, 
pp. 136-137). Hamel notes that according to a MCI/Gallup poll a majority of 
CEOs consider the strategies of their competitors to have converged during 
the 1990s (Hamel, 1997). This however calls for more unique strategies and
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differentiated approaches. Subsequently it pinpoints the necessity for more 
managers to go against the current, withstanding the collective pressure to do 
the conventional - or as put by Hamel: “It takes leaders who question 
conventional wisdom” (Hamel, 1997, p. 70).
In contrast to the arguments presented by the resource-based view, the 
positioning school emphasises the industry structure and considers resources 
merely as one input factor which is subject to the same competitive forces as 
any other input factor. Porter encounters the criticism of the resource-based 
school by acknowledging that the value of resources and capabilities is 
inextricably bound to strategy (Porter, 1998, p. xv). However, he also rightly 
points out that “resources, capabilities and other attributes related to input 
markets have a place in understanding the dynamics of competition, 
attempting to disconnect them from industry competition and the unique 
positions that firms occupy vis-a-vis rivals is fraught with danger” (Porter, 
1998, p. xv).
From the few academics who publish research on banking strategies, it is 
mainly Borner who extensively discusses the diverse strategic management 
concepts in the context of banking (Borner, 2000). Borner contrasts the 
understanding of strategy derived from industrial organisation economics 
(Porter) with the resource-based view (Hamel & Prahalad) and concludes, in 
agreement with Mintzberg, that these two schools should be regarded as 
complementary. He considers the market positioning approach and the 
resource-based view as compatible and proposes a “client group / resource 
matrix” for the strategic analysis of banks (Borner, 2000).
Recognising the market for “resources and capabilities” as an important 
component of the competitive environment is most evident in the banking 
industry. For example, in investment banking London enjoys a relative 
competitive advantage over other European cities as it is home to a large pool 
of experienced and specialised investment bankers which in turn enables it to 
attract young and well-educated graduates from all over the world. Therefore, 
in addition to the aforementioned competitive forces, which determine the 
relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers, labour should be highlighted
53 Occasionally also referred to as the learning school (Mintzberg et al., 1998).
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as a distinct input factor, not least to also emphasise the service character of 
the banking business.
Unlike proponents of the resource-based view, Porter’s focus on industry 
structure and products assumes clearly defined markets and industries (Grant, 
2002, pp. 86-87). Grant notes that a “market’s boundaries are defined by 
substitutability, both on the demand side and supply side” (Grant, 2002, p. 86). 
Porter responds to his critics by conceding that there can be ambiguity about 
where to draw industry boundaries, but that “one of the five forces always 
captures the essential issues in the division of value” (Porter, 1998, p. xv). It is 
argued that Porter’s model “defines an industry “box” within which industry 
rivals compete, but because competitive forces outside the industry box are 
included -  entrants and substitutes -  the precise boundaries of the industry 
box are not greatly important” (Grant, 2002, p. 87). Moreover, Kenyon and 
Mathur argue that a specific product can serve different needs, thus the 
market is effectively defined in a bottom-up approach by the customer 
(Kenyon & Mathur, 1997; Grant, 2002).
This can be illustrated by examples from banking. Assume a bank’s 
commercial client may be interested in insuring the value of its exports to 
another country (e.g. the USA). If the firm expects the US dollar to fall, it would 
buy US dollar put options against its domestic currency (e.g. against euros), 
thereby safeguarding the right to sell its US dollars in return for euros at an 
agreed rate. The same firm could also buy euro call options to achieve the 
same result. Another client considers buying the same product, i.e. US dollar 
put options as part of an investment portfolio in anticipation of negative US 
budget deficit numbers. Alternatively, the same investor could express a 
bearish view of the US economy by short selling the Dow Jones, i.e. all shares 
on this index. An infinite number of examples could be provided, showing that 
customers do not choose markets but solutions to problems -  thus a top-down 
definition of a market seems of limited use for the analysis of strategic 
management.
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3.6. Banking: the link between micro- and
macrostructures
Criticism about how the relevant industry, thus the relevant market, is defined 
is further enriched by a lively academic debate about the significance of 
industry structure for a firm’s performance. In Porter’s model, which emerged 
from the industrial organisation school, industry structure is central to a firm’s 
profitability. This assumption is challenged by proponents of the resource- 
based view, who argue that a company’s performance is largely influenced by 
unique organisational processes. Although the question of the extent to which 
industry matters is pivotal for the analysis of strategic management, the few 
existing empirical studies seem to offer different answers (Schmalensee, 
1985; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Hawawini, Subramanian, 
Verdin, 2000).
Empirical research by Rumelt suggests that “stable industry effects account 
for only 8 per cent of the variance in business-unit returns” (Rumelt, 1998, p. 
105). A study by McGahan and Porter (McGahan & Porter, 1997) indicates 
that industry effects account for 19 percent of the aggregate variance in 
profitability. Research by Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin (Hawawini, 
Subramanian & Verdin, 2000) confirm the mixed picture as the totality of its 
sample shows that the industry effect is very small on firms’ economic value 
added, whereas if the least and most profitable companies are excluded from 
the sample, then the overall industry effect significantly increases. Porter 
remarks on the debate about the significance of the industry structure for 
competitive strategies that “it is hard to concoct a logic in which the nature of 
the arena in which firms compete would not be important to performance 
outcomes” (Porter, 1998, p. xv).
By comparing British and German banking strategies over a decade this 
research also attempts to understand whether there are national patterns 
which could be attributed to profoundly different industry structures. The 
prevailing cooperative and savings bank landscape in Germany, which 
contrasts sharply to the market structure in Britain, calls for such an 
investigation. Moreover, this research addresses the significance of the 
changing European financial system as the bank’s principal playing field, i.e.
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the relevance of European financial integration as an environmental factor. 
Yet, unlike the quantitative empirical works of Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt 
(1991), McGahan and Porter (1997) and Hawawini et al. (2000), this thesis 
pursues a multiple longitudinal case study approach to understanding the 
realised corporate strategies of banks. A balanced qualitative and quantitative 
approach to researching patterns over a substantial length of time should 
deliver less ambiguous data than a mere quantitative analysis based on 
incommensurable data. The following chapter on methodology deals with 
these issues in detail.
The significance of industry structure for competitive analysis is also illustrated 
by the varying sensitivities of competitors to decisions of their peers. As Porter 
notes, the structure determines the basic parameters within which competitive 
moves are made (Porter, 1998, p. 91) and he adds that “a company may have 
to change its strategy if there are major structural changes in its industry” 
(Porter, 1996, p. 78).
For obvious reasons Porter needs to concede that structure does not entirely 
determine the workings of a market and that there is still room for different 
strategic moves (Porter, 1998, p. 91). Unfortunately, it remains unclear with 
Porter how much strategy matters and to what extent strategies are somehow 
“pre-determined”. Unlike this thesis, which is informed by Guldens’ concept of 
structuration (see introduction and chapter on methodology), Porter does not 
sufficiently address the interrelatedness of a system with its principal entities 
which through their interaction constitute the system and determine the 
structure.
However, Porter maintains that “in most industries, competitive moves by one 
firm have noticeable effects on its competitors and thus may incite retaliation 
or efforts to counter the move; that is, firms are mutually dependent" (Porter, 
1998, p. 17). Consequently, Porter introduces an oligopolistic market structure 
of the type elaborated in section four of this chapter. Despite elaborating 
different offensive and defensive competitive moves he subscribes to Sun 
Tzu’s (Sun Tzu, 1963) dictum that the best strategy is to prevent the battle in 
the first place and that “ideally, a battle of retaliation never begins at all” 
(Porter, 1998, p. 92). Subsequently, he favours strategic approaches that do 
not threaten competitors’ goals.
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An important contribution to the analysis of a firm’s competitive environment, 
which recognises the co-existence and cooperation of competing parties, is 
put forward by game theorists Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995, 1996). 
Their concept of co-opetition is widely accepted as complementing Porter’s 
five forces model (Grant, 2002, pp. 90-91). Co-opetition takes into account 
that buyers, suppliers, and producers of complementary products do not only 
interact as competitors, but may also work cooperatively with each other. Even 
Porter acknowledges Brandenburger and Nalebuffs concept as "the most 
important single contribution” (Porter, 1998, p. xiii).
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995, 1996) point out that in addition to the 
widely recognised interdependencies between customers, suppliers and 
competitors a company needs to consider complementers as a distinct group 
among the players of a “business game”.54 As most businesses have to 
compete as well as to cooperate, the authors suggest using the term co- 
opetition. Co-opetition emphasises to perceive the interdependencies of these 
players from an allocentric as opposed to an egocentric viewpoint. This should 
allow players to better recognise win-win as well as win-lose opportunities.
An egocentric framework measures a point in space with respect to an object, 
ego, i.e. the company’s own position. In contrast, allocentric, also referred to 
as geocentric, is a concept of locating points within a framework external to 
the holder of the representation and is independent of his or her position 
(Klatzky, 1997). By introducing cooperation into the competitive analysis 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff add another dimension to Porter’s framework. 
Moreover their emphasis on an allocentric framework links classic game 
theory to complexity theory (for a review of complexity theory in management 
studies, see e.g. Anderson, 1999).
The notion of co-opetition is closely related to the term “collective strategy” 
introduced by Astley and Fombrun in an earlier work about automatic teller 
machine networks in the financial services industry (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). 
As a result of strategic alliance building, strategic outsourcing and the growing
54 “A player is your complementor if customers value your product more when they have the other player’s 
product than when they have your product alone. A player is your competitor if customers value your 
product less when they have the other player’s product than when they have your product alone” (Nalebuff, 
1996).
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significance of networks (see e.g. Lamberti, 2004), clearly discernable 
organisational boundaries seem to gradually disappear, while new 
complexities are emerging.
Game theory can help explain competitive interactions among firms. 
According to Grant, these theoretical constructs allow the framing of strategic 
decisions and provide a structure for analysis (Grant, 2002). Hence, game 
theory facilitates predicting the outcome of competitive situations which 
depend on the choices made by other players (Black, 1997; Varian, 1990), 
using probability calculus.
The essential strength of game theory for everyday strategic management lies 
in the need to identify the true interests of the other players before “playing the 
game”. In order to apply game theory the decision-maker needs to identify the 
hidden agendas of the other relevant participants, assess their capabilities and 
recognize their priorities. Thus, game theory can be a powerful tool, as it 
requires decision-makers to analyse their competitors (Porter, 1998, p. 91). 
Once the decision-maker has made the right assumptions by adequately 
assessing the underlying interests and capabilities of its competitors, the 
viable options can be better identified and predictions can be made more 
accurately.
In a market with few players, i.e. in an oligopolistic market structure, game 
theory seems to be of greater use and its concepts can be applied in a more 
straightforward way. For the analysis of the relatively consolidated British 
banking industry game theory could offer more insights than for the 
fragmented German market, in which the decision of one player is unlikely to 
have the same impact on its competitors than would be the case in Britain. 
Consequently, as consolidation of the European banking market proceeds, the 
application of game theories could become more prominent.
The importance of precisely identifying competitors’ true interests is also at the 
heart of what Mintzberg calls the “power school” of strategic management 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). The “power school” considers strategic management 
as “an overt process of influence, emphasising the use of power and politics to 
negotiate strategies favourable to particular interests” (Mintzberg et al., 1998,
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p. 234). Mintzberg distinguishes between micro and macro power, as power 
relations surround and infuse organisations.
The micro power school investigates the play of politics as part of the strategy 
process within an organisation (Pettigrew, 1973, 1977; Macmillan, 1978; 
Majone & Wildavsky, 1978; Cressey et al., 1985; Macmillan & Guth, 1985). An 
organisation’s capability to learn and to react to change is, among other 
things, determined by its efficiency in finding an internal consensus. These 
vital issues for a firm are addressed by the micro power school. An example of 
micro power research from the banking industry is a study by Boeker and 
Hayward on conflicts of interest in investment banking. Boeker and Hayward 
conclude that banks’ corporate finance teams have power over equity analysts 
and influence their ratings (Boeker & Hayward, 1998).
In contrast, the macro power school focuses on the use of power by an 
organisation, which is recognised as a unitary actor (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Porter, 1979, 1980; Astley & Fombrun, 1983; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
1995, 1996). Hence, the macro power school deals with the organisation and 
its environment and is related to the positioning school. From a macro power 
perspective corporate strategy deals with the demands and requirements of 
suppliers, buyers, interest groups, competitors, regulators and other external 
groups which influence or can potentially influence the workings and the 
profitability of a firm (Mintzberg et al., 1998, p. 248). Notwithstanding the great 
importance of the micro power school, this research concentrates on decisions 
taken by an organisation within its environmental context and thus stands in 
the tradition of the macro power school.
The relevant environment for banks is the financial system, as discussed in 
chapter two. It is recognised that financial markets and the banking sector 
mutually determine their structures and jointly constitute the overall structure 
of the financial system. In order to understand how industry structures affect 
competition, Grant suggests studying past developments, which possibly allow 
the discernment of patterns of corporate strategy, competition and profitability 
(Grant, 2002, p. 83).
Pfeffer and Salancik (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) argue that an organisation can 
either adapt to the prevailing environment, so that its resources and
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capabilities fit the conditions, or it can attempt to change the environment 
according to its resources and capabilities. Their reasoning seems in 
accordance with Schmidt’s argument that a financial system is a configuration 
of its subsystems, which features a coherent structure (Schmidt, 2001).
As elaborated in the second chapter, Schmidt considers such a coherent 
system as relatively resistant to structural change (Schmidt, 2001, p. 21). 
Therefore he proposes that a financial system might need to be “sufficiently 
destabilised” in order to change its structure (Schmidt, 2001, p. 21). This leads 
to the question of which forces and which agents are sufficiently powerful to 
initiate and to handle such structural changes, which would possibly induce 
systemic instability. Ultimately, Schmidt’s argument evolves into a relative 
macro power game of banks trying to drastically alter their corporate strategy 
in order to attain a better competitive position, whilst contributing to the 
transformation of the financial system.
Linking Schmidt’s ideas (Schmidt, 2001) with those of Pfeffer and Salancik 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) paves the way for the following chapter on 
methodology and the conduct of long-term corporate level case studies. 
Informed by Giddens’ concept of structuration (Giddens, 1984) the next 
chapter elaborates the interrelatedness of the macro- and micro-structure and 
critically discusses the structure-conduct performance paradigm. Effectively, it 
ties together the macro-level approach from the second chapter with the 
micro-level findings of this chapter, which hence should be recapitulated 
before turning to the next chapter on methodology.
This chapter has served two purposes: first, it has clarified the notion of 
strategy and, second, discussed prominent strategic management theories in 
the context of the banking industry. Strategy in this research is understood as 
a pattern of realised corporate decisions that have structural implications for 
the organisation. Porter’s strategic management theory about competitive 
forces has been discussed in the context of the banking industry and 
contrasted with the strategic management theory of Hamel and Prahalad 
about a company’s core competence. Brandenburger and Nalebuffs game 
theoretical concept of co-opetition has complemented the review.
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4. Research philosophy and methodology
4.1. Introduction
Chapter two of this research reviewed the integration process of Europe’s 
financial systems and offered a macro perspective to bank-specific issues. In 
contrast, chapter three provided a micro view by applying concepts of strategic 
management to the banking sector. In order to overcome the micro/macro 
divide, this research subscribes to an ontology described by Giddens as 
structuration. Structuration recognises that there is an intrinsic 
interdependence between the micro and the macro level, which should be 
recognised in the methodology of social science research. This 
interdependence shows in the function of banks (representing micro 
structures) as institutions that determine the macro structure of a financial 
system.
This research assumes that corporate strategy is a reality that can be 
observed. Despite its inductive methodology, which is often ascribed to a 
constructionist perspective (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 30), this research 
pursues an empirical approach in the tradition of the positivist paradigm. As 
remarked by Easterby-Smith et al. it is rare for researchers to uphold a pure 
epistemological approach; often a mixture of different viewpoints is used. In 
fact, the ontological concept of structuration implicitly recognises the danger of 
methodological dogmatism and calls for “methodological anarchy” 
(Feyerabend, 1975) by bridging the micro and macro perspectives.
Consequently, this research neither pursues a mere micro approach, in the 
form of a single in-depth case study, nor a macro approach with a large 
aggregate data set. The empirical investigation is a longitudinal comparative 
case study and the period analysed stretches from the beginning of the Single 
European Market in 1993 until the end of 2003.
For two reasons it appears pertinent to analyse this period. First, in 1993 the 
European Common Market was launched, entailing wide-ranging changes for 
the financial services industry in the following years. Banks had to adapt to 
this changing legal and macroeconomic environment. Strategic adjustments at
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large financial institutions require several years to be implemented and to 
show results. Second, the time between 1993 and 2003 spans one full 
business cycle in Britain and Germany. The business cycle, measured as real 
GDP growth (year-on-year), is an important indicator of the macroeconomic 













Longitudinal and cross-country comparison
The purpose of this research is to empirically show why banking integration 
during the first decade of the Single European Market remained slow. More 
specifically, it seeks to explain
A) how and why British and German banking strategies differed in an 
increasingly integrated European economic system and
B) why market liberalisation seems to have provoked two fundamentally 
different strategic reactions among banks, neither of which appears to 
have significantly promoted European banking integration.
Given the framework of this research, the answer to the interesting, but 
separate question as to why certain strategies prevailed over others will 
inevitably remain somewhat tentative. It is argued that an understanding of 
why one specific strategy was pursued and others not would require a detailed 
knowledge of each bank’s decision-making processes and organisational 
structure for the time between 1993 and 2003, which would entail an entirely 
different, albeit equally valid and interesting approach. However, the focus of 
this research is not decision-making processes and issues of organisational 
behaviour, but rather to comprehend the British and German banking
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landscape through the changed positioning of four of the largest players in 
each market.
In order to strengthen the validity of this research, different methods are used 
to study the realised strategies of banks. Triangulation is achieved through two 
qualitative methods with two different data sources and one quantitative 
method using a third set of data. The two qualitative methods are archival 
research and a three-stage survey of the LexisNexis database. As a bank’s 
principal commodity is money, its activities are discernible from its income 
statements and balance sheets. Thus, this research considers the banks’ 
income statements and balance sheets as important sources of information 
about the banks’ realised strategies. Comparable ratios from the banks’ 
income statements and balance sheets provide the basic quantitative data. 
Combining these methods and sources should also help to overcome the 
institutional memory problem, which is typical of longitudinal case studies.
The qualitative information used in this research includes strategies 
announced by management. However, this research is cautious about 
assuming that announced strategies are identical to management’s truly 
intended strategies. It is understood that “signalling” constitutes an important 
strategic tool, which banks with “market power”, in particular, may use for their 
own interests.
Interviews fulfil only a supplementary function where the other sources do not 
present a clear picture. The subordinated role of interviews results from the 
decision to analyse the realised corporate strategies of publicly listed banks as 
opposed to emerging business strategies of non-listed institutions. As 
previously elaborated, corporate strategy is concerned with the scope of a firm 
in terms of industries, markets, diversification, allocation of equity and 
corporate resources, etc. whereas business strategy deals with establishing a 
competitive advantage for a defined product/client matrix.
Corporate strategy involves the allocation of resources and capital to such an 
extent that it implies a structural shift for the organisation, which cannot be 
easily reversed - put simply, corporate strategy refers to decisions which have 
to be approved by the board of directors. Since corporate strategies can imply 
substantial structural, financial and legal consequences, the owner of the firm
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ought to be informed. Thus, management of publicly listed companies has to 
inform shareholders about the firm’s corporate strategy. Insofar, all relevant 
strategic decisions are publicly known and an interviewee can only provide 
limited additional information.
This chapter is organised as follows: In the next section, the ontological 
concept of this research is elaborated. This is necessary to understand the 
multi case study methodology chosen. Section three elaborates the 
epistemological difference between strategy and strategic management. This 
is followed by a review of case studies as a means of building theory. The 
three different methods that comprise the triangulation approach used in this 
research are set out in the fifth section. The chapter concludes with a note on 
the author’s professional background and a summary.
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4.2. The ontological perspective -  bridging the 
micro/macro divide
This research acknowledges the interdependence of an agent with its 
structure (environment). Consequently, it is also recognised that any unit 
consists of subunits and that this unit itself forms part of a larger entity, i.e. a 
system. Reality is thus the linkage of systems with each other. In order to 
come to terms with the complexity of reality the researcher must focus on only 
a few levels of reality and their interconnectedness. This approach assumes 
that the analysed system is not further disaggregated, while the other, the 
“higher” system is not subsumed into another system, i.e. further aggregated.
In the case of this research, banks are not broken down into organisational 
units (business segments), or individual decision-makers. Instead, each bank 
is considered as a “unitary actor” within the European financial system. 
Moreover, the European banking system is neither studied in the context of 
the global financial system, nor subsumed into the world economy. In order to 
demonstrate the interaction between actors and their environment it has to be 
accepted that the actors analysed are not further disaggregated, hence the 
decision to concentrate on corporate level strategies. These systemic 
boundaries are a premise of this research.
In order to come to terms with the interdependence between actors and 
structure, the sociologist Giddens puts forward the concept of structuration 
(Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984). Giddens offers an ontological approach that 
encapsulates the interrelatedness of actors and structure. He argues that the 
relationship between actors and structure results from repetitive action, 
reproducing the structure (Giddens, 1976, 1979,1984).
Giddens distinguishes between systems and structures. For him systems are 
the actualised patterns over time and space, understood as reproduced 
practices. Structures are sets of rules and resources implicated in the 
institutional articulation of social systems (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). “Analysing 
the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such 
systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw 
upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, are produced and
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reproduced in interaction [...] The constitution of agents and structures are not 
two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a 
duality” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25).
According to Giddens, any social structure constrains and enables the actors. 
He recognises that social action requires structure and that structure is the 
result of social action. Thus, individual actors can change the prevailing 
structure by deviating from existing paths. For him, structure and action are an 
integral part of social reality. He emphasises that the duality of structure and 
action constitute reality and that any social study should acknowledge this 
interdependence.
Giddens’ structuration theory addresses his concern that most studies of 
social interaction either focus on the micro- or the macro-level, thereby 
insufficiently taking into account the unintended consequences of one level for 
the other. “The opposition between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ is best 
reconceptualized as concerning how interaction in contexts of co-presence is 
structurally implicated in systems of broad time-spaced distanciation -  in other 
words, how such systems span large sectors of time-space. And this in turn is 
best investigated as a problem of the connection of social with system 
integration [...]” (Giddens, 1984, p. xxvi).
For Giddens time and power are both reflected by jointly understanding action 
and structure, as they presuppose each other (Giddens, 1979). “The existence 
of power presumes structures of domination whereby power that “flows 
smoothly” in processes of social reproduction [...] operates” (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 257). Giddens defines power as the capacity to achieve outcomes 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 257). He does not view power as an obstacle to freedom or 
emancipation but as its medium, although he concedes, “it would be foolish to 
entirely ignore the constraining properties of power” (Giddens, 1984, p. 257).
Giddens’ theory of structuration offers an ontological perspective that appears 
pertinent for understanding the process of European integration as well as 
corporate strategy. Giddens argues that “social integration has to do with 
interaction in contexts of co-presence. The connections between social and 
system integration can be traced by examining the modes of regionalization 
which channel, and are channelled by, the time-space paths that the members
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of a community or society follow in their day-to-day activities. Such paths are 
strongly influenced by, and also reproduce, basic institutional parameters of 
the social systems in which they are implicated” (Giddens, 1984, pp. 142-143).
Applied to the realm of corporate strategy Giddens’ concept of structuration is 
in accordance with the dictum that “strategy is structure” occasionally ascribed 
to Tom Peters (Peters, 1984; Grant, 2002, p. 189) and in contrast to 
Chandler’s statement that “structure follows strategy” (Chandler, 1962). The 
theory of structuration thus strengthens the argument that strategy cannot be 
separated from its environment and that strategy formulation and 
implementation are closely intertwined, hence it follows an understanding of 
strategy as process (Clausewitz, 1997; Mintzberg et al., 1998).
The importance of power in Giddens’ concept of structuration also 
complements the understanding of strategy as a process. The relative power 
of actors becomes pivotal for the interdependence between agent and 
structure. An actor’s ability to alter the prevailing structure depends upon its 
resources and positioning, thus its power within the structure. This reasoning 
appears consistent with Schmidt’s previously elaborated argument that a 
financial system is a configuration of its subsystems, which complement each 
other and that the coherence of such a system renders it resistant to structural 
change (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2001). In order to overcome 
systemic rigidity, a few actors need to become sufficiently powerful to change 
the structure according to their interests.
In economic theory, Giddens’ concept of structuration finds its parallels in the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP). The SCP paradigm 
originates from “industrial organisation” research which is primarily associated 
with the works of Mason and Bain (Mason, 1939, 1949; Bain, 1951, 1956, 
1959). Unlike traditional microeconomists, Mason and Bain followed an 
inductive approach to theory building about the interaction of firms and 
industries, which led to the SCP paradigm (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 
2001, pp. 34-39).
The SCP paradigm recognises the link between industry structure and the 
conduct of the firms that comprise an industry. An industry’s structure is 
determined by the number and size of firms, the degree of product
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differentiation, the extent of vertical integration and the type of entry and exit 
barriers (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, pp. 34-39). Pricing policies, 
advertising, research and development are among the firms’ conduct as well 
as the decision to cooperate or collude with each other. The early versions of 
the SCP paradigm assumed that firms’ conduct was conditioned by the 
industry structure and that conduct would not affect market structure 
(Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 2001, pp. 34-39).
The modified SCP paradigm which recognises that conduct may also change 
structure (Phillips, 1976; Scherer & Ross, 1990) paves the way for strategic 
considerations, as demonstrated by Porter’s five forces framework (Porter, 
1980). Porter applies the SCP paradigm to understand industry-level factors 
that influence the performance of firms. In fact, Porter’s claim to fame rests 
upon modifying findings from industrial organisation for the analysis of 
corporate strategy and introducing it to managers. With the help of this 
analytical tool, strategies can be developed to take advantage of the prevailing 
industry forces.
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4.3. Strategy and strategic management: an
epistemological distinction
The previous chapter discussed Porter’s five forces framework and Hamel and 
Prahalad’s notion of core competence as well as other established strategic 
concepts in the context of the banking industry. It was argued that the banking 
industry, overall, can be analysed with the same strategic management tools 
as other industries. However, none of these strategic management theories is 
grounded in the banking sector, so theories may possibly be of limited 
suitability to explain the particular embeddedness of large banks as 
institutional pillars within such a politically sensitive environment as a financial 
system. A theory that is grounded in the banking industry through empirical 
research may be better suited to understanding the specific strategic issues 
facing banks.
The empirical nature of this research, which entailed collecting data about 
British and German banks, links it to the positivist school of epistemology. It 
shares with positivism the belief that these developments can be measured 
and mapped and that the facts gathered are objective knowledge, regardless 
of the perspective or interaction of the observer. Easterby-Smith et al. note 
that the principal assumption of positivism is “that the social world exists 
externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective 
methods [...]” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 28).1
It is also positivistic insofar as it provides an abstraction from the world of 
everyday experience (Crotty, 1998, p. 9). The condensed analysis of eight 
banks over a decade allows identification of the “big picture”, which is 
necessary to correctly evaluate long-term trends. A longitudinal study of this 
type also smoothes particular developments which could be the result of mere 
luck rather than good strategic management. It is assumed that a company’s 
success or failure would be the result of smarter management over a certain 
period. As noted by Grant, “central to the rational approach to strategy 
analysis is the idea that we can systematically analyze the reasons for
1 To illustrate this argument, consider Deutsche Bank’s acquisition of Bankers’ Trust. This takeover is a 
documented transaction which can be quantified, e.g. through the acquisition price, the volume of assets, 
the number of employees and the altered structure of assets. Thus, the actual transaction leaves little room 
for interpretation, whereas the question of the extent to which this deal was value-enhancing is a subject for 
discussion.
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business success and failure and apply this learning to formulating business 
strategies” (Grant, 2002, p. 27).
A principal assumption of positivism is that the observer is independent from 
what is being observed. In contrast to the positivist paradigm, constructionism 
represents an epistemological view that denies that there is objective truth 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966). Constructionists believe that truth and meaning 
emerge only in interaction with the realities. As Crotty puts it, “meaning is not 
discovered, but constructed”, (Crotty, 1998, p. 9). For a social constructionist, 
reality is determined by people rather than by objective and external factors 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 30).
Given the positivist character of this research there needs to be clarity about 
the meaning of strategy and strategic management as theories. Strategies 
have to be unique, whereas strategic management provides a general 
framework for specific strategies to be developed. Strategic management is 
about how to manage the strategy process. For example, Porter developed a 
theory about strategic management which concentrates on a company’s 
understanding of its competitive environment. Others, like Hamel and 
Prahalad, have presented a theory about the significance of an organisation’s 
resources and capabilities for gaining a competitive advantage. Both are 
theories about strategic management from which concrete strategies can be 
derived.
Consequently, one may conclude that it is possible to develop theories about 
strategic management, whereas strategies themselves cannot be theories. 
Strategies are not theories on the grounds that a strategy can only be tested in 
a particular situation for which it was conceived, hence any repetition is 
impossible. The understanding of strategy as a concrete process and the 
implicit lack of testability dismisses the idea that strategies are theories. It is 
rather suggested that strategies use analytical concepts to adequately 
evaluate current circumstances in order to optimally advance specific 
interests.
Distinguishing between strategic management and strategies may also offer a 
solution to the aforementioned problem of how to differentiate a “strategy” 
from a “non-strategy”, given that strategies cannot be falsified. The answer
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may be that strategies can only be assessed by the realised outcome. The 
success, respectively the failure of a strategy can be ultimately established by 
evaluating the outcome and identifying the principal decision-maker.
The realised outcome does not reveal much about a specific strategy as it 
cannot be repeated, but it does indicate something about the quality of the 
decision-maker (“strategist”). A successful outcome proves that the strategist 
was right in evaluating the circumstances and launching, implementing and 
monitoring the appropriate measures to meet his/her interests. The decision­
maker’s interests have to be aligned with those of the owners through 
contractual agreements (principal-agent problem). This view assumes that 
even the most incremental strategy process allows some discrete 
developments to be identified and decision-makers to be held responsible - it 
is not all about “muddling through”.
Therefore, the issue is not about “strategy” or “non-strategy”, but about good 
or bad strategic management, whereby the understanding of good and bad is 
defined by the owners and creditors of a firm. Segal-Horn concludes that 
“analysis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for strategic thinking. 
Strategic thinking is about making judgements which are then translated into 
decisions. Judgements are not context-free and neither is strategic decision­
making. Ultimately it depends on exercising judgement” (Segal-Horn, 1998 p. 
13).
This pinpoints another crux of strategic management, namely to what extent 
should strategies be formulated and communicated outside the mind of the 
manager or the board room? It is a valid strategic move not to communicate 
strategies if this serves the purpose of achieving an objective. Besides, the 
analysis of a strategy communique does not reveal whether the communique 
is an essential part of the strategy (for example, the announcement of price 
cuts, sends a clear message to competitors and to clients) or whether it is 
merely intended to inform (or misinform). Yet, even an inadvertent message 
can cause competitors to react. This strengthens the argument that the 
answer to the question why certain strategies are pursued by management 
and others will remain somewhat tentative. It also illustrates that the 
researcher should carefully question strategic statements made by 
management.
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For the strategy analyst ignorance about the true meaning of corporate 
communication can lead to the wrong conclusions about what was intended. 
The intended strategy cannot be known for certain, whereas the realised 
corporate strategy is observable. It should be considered that the 
communication of corporate strategy is subordinated to the overall strategy, as 
communication itself constitutes a powerful strategic tool. Possibly, strategy is 
only communicated to such an extent as it actually serves the ultimate 
objectives identified by management. In a similar vein, Porter recognises the 
importance of strategic signalling as a strategic means (Porter, 1980).
While it is argued that only 10-30 percent of intended strategies get realised 
(Grant, 2002, p. 26), it may still be assumed that the principal corporate 
decisions are the result of “strategic deliberations” by management. However, 
this premise bears a certain danger. A potential pitfall of this research is that 
some measures that altered the course of one of the banks analysed had not 
been intended as a major strategic leap forward. Developments which in 
retrospect appear as strategic may in fact be the outcome of mere 
coincidences or the combination of various fortunate and unfortunate 
circumstances. If these outcomes are perceived as successful, then they are 
afterwards considered “strategic”; if not they were usually the mistakes of the 
previous management.
Despite the awareness of possible misinterpretation of outcomes as strategic, 
this research focuses on realised “strategies”, assuming that any corporate 
decision that implies structural shifts in a bank’s organisation, earnings, assets 
or liabilities is strategic in nature. For example, Deutsche Bank’s decision to 
buy Bankers’ Trust in 1998 is an observable fact, which had repercussions for 
the bank’s assets and income structure and can be unambiguously 
understood as a measure to expand into the US investment banking market. 
While a single decision and its implications can be recorded, it does not yet 
say much about the quality or soundness of such a strategic move. Ultimately, 
it is the level of profitability and earnings stability that indicates the quality of a 
corporate strategy. Put simply, if an established firm is not profitable, its 
strategy has been wrong.2
2 As it is impossible to demonstrate the absence of a strategy, the only plausible conclusion is that the 
strategy must have been incorrect.
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4.4. Case studies -  a means of theory building
Longitudinal case studies can serve to develop new theories about strategic 
management. It is argued that case studies are ideal for theory building as 
they are a prime source of large and rich data sets (McCutcheon & Meredith, 
1993; Voss et al. 2002). Eisenhardt holds that theory building from case study 
research is particularly suitable for new areas of research (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 532), such as the strategic management of banks.
Literature on theory building presents a broad range of approaches to case 
study research. With their work on grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and Strauss (1987) paved the way for an inductive methodology of 
theory building. However, their pivotal understanding of “fieldwork” is of limited 
use when it comes to the study of realised corporate strategies in the banking 
sector due to the difficulty of establishing a clear input/output relation and the 
rather abstract nature of most services provided by banks.3
More applicable is the guidance offered by Yin about how to design and 
conduct case study research (Yin, 1994). Yin defines a case study as an 
“empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Yin’s structure is 
complementary to Miles and Huberman’s (1984) approach. They describe 
techniques for analysing qualitative data through coding and thus provide 
methods for dealing with the complexity of rich data.
The structure of this research draws on the approaches presented by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Voss et al. (2002) who set out a sequential approach 
for conducting case research. Eisenhardt points out that a well-defined 
research question is necessary for systematically collecting data. She 
remarks, “a priori specification of constructs can also help to shape the initial 
design of theory building research” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536).
3 Most bank activities are uncountable and therefore not observable through fieldwork. For example, it is 
difficult to observe the trading activities of a proprietary trader who might significantly contribute to the 
bank’s revenues. Although specific trading techniques can be discussed, the two relevant dimensions of 
trading, namely risk exposure and profit, can be measured but not observed in the sense of “fieldwork 
activity”.
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The question underlying this research is: why did market liberalisation provoke 
two fundamentally different strategic reactions among banks, neither of which 
appears to have promoted banking integration. In order to develop a theory 
that may answer this question, a longitudinal comparative case study method 
is pursued. As noted by Pettigrew, “the longitudinal comparative case method 
provides the opportunity to examine continuous processes in context and to 
draw in the significance of various interconnected levels of analysis” 
(Pettigrew, 1990, p. 271).
This research looks at eight of the largest publicly listed banks in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. The banks analysed are HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds 
TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank 
and HVB Group. The fact that these banks are publicly listed is of great 
relevance as it facilitates the availability of information on their corporate 
strategies. The choice of British and German banks represents two relatively 
extreme positions within the European banking landscape. However, as 
remarked by Pettigrew if only a limited number of cases are analysed then it is 
preferable to select extreme situations (Pettigrew, 1990). The theory derived 
from studying British and German banks could subsequently be tested against 
other European banks.
What follows is a two-phase case analysis as described by Eisenhardt (1989). 
The first step is a within-case analysis, which facilitates handling enormous 
volumes of data. The aim of within-case analysis “is to become intimately 
familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity. This process allows the unique 
patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to generalise 
patterns across cases” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540). The resulting structure of 
the research in the form of stand-alone case studies also helps readers make 
their own assessment of the theory. The second step ties together all eight 
cases in order to identify cross-case patterns through the construction of an 
array (Voss et al., 2002).
The aim of this research is to develop a theory about strategic management in 
banking which has to be testable and logically coherent. In the tradition of 
replication logic, the theory is tested against evidence from each case study 
(Yin, 1994). Replication logic, that is “the logic of treating a series of cases as 
a series of experiments with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm the
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hypotheses” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 542), strengthens the validity of the 
relationships.
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4.5. Triangulation
Within the concept of validity, a further distinction can be drawn between 
“construct validity”, “external validity” and “internal validity” (Voss et al., 2002). 
Construct validity is “the extent to which we establish correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied” (Voss et al., 2002, p. 211). Internal 
validity is the extent to which a causal relationship can be established, 
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions. External 
validity is used to describe whether the findings of a study can also be 
generalised beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 1994, pp. 32-37).
Voss et al. hold that the use of multiple case studies may reduce the depth of 
studies when resources are constrained, but can augment external validity 
(Voss et al., 2002, p. 202). Construct validity can be achieved through 
triangulation. Triangulation refers to the analysis of at least three different 
sources of data, which can be cross-checked, using varying methods. “The 
aim of the triangulated approach is to draw on the particular and different 
strengths of various data collection methods” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 277). In 
addition, the longitudinal character of the investigation should also strengthen 
the validity of the theory.













Although the findings of this research do not rely upon interviews, interviews 
nevertheless play a role in corroborating certain arguments and cross-
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checking specific information and developments. The subordinated role of 
interviews results from the decision to analyse the realised corporate 
strategies of publicly listed banks as opposed to emerging business strategies 
of non-listed institutions. Interviews with current and former board members 
and other leading bank managers were formal and structured. Informal and 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with a large number of people 
within the context of the author’s job.
As this research combines three different methods, other than interviews, the 
institutional memory issue is not a major problem for this research. The 
absence of an institutional memory is a particular challenge for longitudinal 
research that needs to heavily rely on interviews as the prime source of 
information. In a BIS working paper, Berger and Udell address the issue of 
institutional memory in the case of bank management with respect to the 
banks’ lending policies (Berger & Udell, 2003). They find evidence that a weak 
institutional memory contributes to banks’ loan procyclicality.4 Berger and 
Udell do not simply demonstrate that there is an institutional memory problem 
with banks, but also show that this has even a negative effect on a bank’s 
operations. One way to overcome the institutional memory problem from a 
researcher’s point of view is triangulation, by combining a qualitative database 
survey, archival research and a quantitative accounting analysis. In the 
following section, the three different methods of triangulation are presented in 
detail.
4 They argue that “institutional memory problems may drive a pattern of business lending that is associated 
with a deterioration in the ability of a bank to recognise potential loan problems and an easing of credit 
standards over its own loan cycle. Specifically, lending institutions may tend to forget the lessons they 
learned from their problem loans as time passes since their last loan “bust”” (Berger & Udell, 2003, p. 1).
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4.5.1. Accounting analysis
For the analysis of realised strategies, three different sets of data from three 
different sources are used. The first data for the quantitative analysis of the 
banks’ strategic management are from Bankscope, a database owned by 
Bureau van Dijk. Bankscope contains information on 11,000 public and private 
banks, which integrates the highly regarded Fitch Ratings (Fitch-IBCA) 
database. The system provides standardised data formats, which facilitates 
peer group analysis. Bankscope provides a detailed breakdown of the banks’ 
balance sheets, income statements and key ratios. The analysis of a bank’s 
balance sheets and income statements makes it possible to identify structural 
changes which reflect its realised strategy.
Montanaro et al. (2001) point out that an international comparison of banking 
data requires a cautionary note. Differences in fiscal regimes, particularly the 
fiscal treatment of financial instruments, accounting rules, reserve 
requirements and inflation rates, do not make banks’ balance sheets and 
income statements fully comparable (Montanaro et al., 2001, p. 124). Valid as 
these objections are, they are the premises on which any international 
comparative study rests and have to be accepted in such research projects. It 
could even be argued that theses differences render a comparison of banks in 
the context of increasing integration of the European financial systems 
particularly interesting.
Moreover, there is little a researcher can do about creative or even fraudulent 
accounting. The data used by Bankscope originates from Fitch Ratings (Fitch- 
IBCA) and the audited annual accounts of the banks. The remaining 
uncertainty about the accuracy of the audited results and the aforementioned 
difficulty that there is room for interpretation in accounting methods strengthen 
the case for triangulation and a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. In order to minimise the risk of flawed data and to deal with the 
changeover to different accounting standards, this research primarily 
considers relative intra-period data.
The longitudinal nature of this study also facilitates consistency tests. If ratios 
are not consistent over time, then qualitative data may explain these shifts. 
One friction that had to be taken into account results from accounting
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changeovers. The impact of these changes is considered in each case when 
they occurred. Despite these cautionary remarks, the reliability of audited 
accounts has to be accepted5 as a premise of this research.
The quantitative accounting analysis is broken down into four different 
sections. The analysis starts with the bank’s income components, followed by 
a section on cost and risk management. The third section discusses the 
bank’s asset-liability structure, while the final section considers overall 
profitability. This order also serves as the structure for the case studies. 
Consequently, the chapter containing the case studies is divided into nine 
sections, one for each bank, preceded by an introduction about the British and 
German banking landscape. All sections are structured the same way, which 
facilitates comparison of the findings.
5 The pragmatic limits to scepticism need to be recognised. If, for example, the annual reports of any of 
these banks were incorrect in 1993, even the banks’ accountants and auditors could do very little about it 
today.
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4.5.1.1. Income structure
The changing structure of a bank’s earnings composition is subject of the first 
part of each case study, after the introduction, which assesses the bank’s 
status quo in 1993. The analysis of each bank’s income structure concentrates 
on the relative significance of the different components of operating income. A 
bank’s operating income consists of interest income, commission income, 
trading income and an item comprising various other income, which could be 
insurance premiums, if it also operates an insurance arm. Regarding these 
four sources of income, this research always refers to net figures, i.e. after the 
respective expenses, unless otherwise specified.
For example, in the case of interest income, a bank that is active in the lending 
business receives interest income on its loans. These loans are shown as 
assets on the bank’s balance sheet. The bank finances these loans largely 
through deposits and a broad range of capital market instruments, such as 
bonds, for which it has to pay interest. Therefore, deposits, loans and other 
sources of funding can be found on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance 
sheet. The difference between a bank’s interest income and interest expenses 
is net interest income, which contributes to its total operating income.
Studying the income structure of each bank over a decade could reveal, for 
example, a shift from net interest income to commission income. Behind this 
changed earnings structure lies an increase in the proportion of transaction 
services relative to transformation activities. This could result from the general 
trend towards disintermediation or from the bank’s growing investment 
banking operations.
Additional aspects considered in the section on the income structure are the 
banks’ geographical breakdown of revenues, the development of absolute 
operating income versus non-operating income and the bank’s net interest 
margin. Net interest margin refers to the return on average earning assets, 
calculated by dividing net interest income by average earning assets (Golin, 
2001, p. 703).
This general overview of income structure is followed by a detailed analysis of 
three core segments, Corporate and Investment Banking, Asset Management, 
and Retail Banking. It is argued that all eight banks researched were active in
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one way or another in these three business fields, whereby retail banking also 
subsumes their private banking and insurance activities.
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4.5.1.2. Cost and risk management
A second set of ratios, elaborated in section three of each case study, aims to 
shed light on the bank’s cost and risk management. This is done through an 
analysis of loan loss provisions, the cost income ratio, the NPL coverage ratio 
(non-performing loans coverage ratio) and a comparison of revenues and 
costs per employee. In the sections on cost and risk management, credit risk 
is considered the main risk factor. A survey of risk management showed that 
more than 50% of banks view credit risk as their greatest risk (The Boston 
Consulting Group, 2000). Market risks are only indirectly considered in the 
analysis of the banks’ trading results. Operating risks are at the heart of each 
case study as corporate strategic management comprises by nature 
operational risk management.
While the development of the bank’s loan loss provisions says much about 
risk management as well as its pricing power in the lending market, the cost 
income ratio provides insights into operational efficiency. The volatility of loan 
loss provisions is also considered an important indicator of the quality of risk 
management. This is because a bank’s management is expected to correctly 
assess the risks of its loan book and should be able to control the level of loan 
losses over several years within a narrow range. Substantial over and under­
provisioning causes net profits to fluctuate considerably. This, in turn, could 
lead to rising cost of equity assumptions. Moreover, highly volatile risk 
provisions raise the question of whether management really understands the 
risks on its loan book.
The changes in and level of a bank’s NPL coverage offer supplementary 
information about its risk management skills. NPL coverage, which is mainly 
used by credit analysts, shows loan loss reserves relative to impaired loans 
(gross) and is therefore part of the Bankscope/Fitch database. The NPL 
coverage indicates the degree to which problem loans are covered by loan 
loss reserves (Golin, 2001, p. 637). According to Golin, if the ratio exceeds 
100% coverage is “ample”, 75-100% is “good”, 50-75% is “fair”, less than 50% 
is “problematic” and below 25% is “weak” (Golin, 2001, p. 637).
Personnel expenses per employee and revenues per employee show, for 
example, whether reducing staff actually raises efficiency. It often also reflects 
a decision to enter or exit investment banking, where revenues and costs are
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high per employee. These ratios are supplemented by figures about general 
growth in the number of employees, an analysis of management’s cost-cutting 
measures and a review of lending strategies. A final aspect that is examined in 
the context of risk management is the bank’s goodwill exposure.
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4.5.1.3. Asset-liability structure
This section studies the asset and liability structure of the banks under review. 
The analysis of asset structure concentrates on the split of loans, deposits 
held at other banks (interbank market), non-earning assets such as goodwill, 
fixed assets and other earning assets. Other earning assets are often related 
to trading assets. Moreover, case-specific issues relating to the bank’s loan 
portfolio are discussed in this part of the case study. These range from 
diversification issues to the securitisation of loans.
Besides the asset and loan portfolio structure, the actual balance sheet growth 
is elaborated and serves as the analytical linkage between the asset and 
liabilities side of a bank’s balance sheet. Financial regulators require that a 
bank’s loan portfolio must be backed by shareholders’ equity. A bank’s tier 1 
ratio expresses the relative size of its risk-weighted assets and tier 1 capital 
which is roughly the equivalent to shareholders’ equity according the 1988 
Basel Accord.6
Regulatory requirements specify that to be well capitalised a bank’s tier 1 ratio 
has to be at least 4%. Consequently, a bank with a strong capital base should 
find it easy to expand its loan portfolio, thereby maintaining its tier 1 ratio at a 
level that management deems reasonable. If the tier 1 ratio is too high, the 
bank should either grow its loan portfolio, or reduce its capital base, either 
through higher dividend payout ratios, or through share buybacks.
On the liabilities side, the focus is on the relationship of shareholders’ equity to 
outstanding bonds (including hybrids) and deposits (retail). This section also 
takes into account the bank’s capital measures, first and foremost capital 
increases and share buybacks. Discussing a bank’s capitalisation in general 
and equity base in particular paves the way for the final section in each case 
study before the conclusion, namely profitability.
6 Tier 1 capital is defined as core capital and its constituents are generally the following: paid-up common 
(ordinary) share capital, perpetual non-cumulative preferred shares, disclosed reserves, minority interest, 
and current profit/loss but excluding goodwill and intangible assets (Golin, 2001, p. 726).
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4.5.1.4. Profitability
The most prominent ratio for measuring bank profitability is the return on 
equity (ROE). ROE generally refers to the return on average equity, as equity 
may change during the period in which the return is generated. Although the 
ROE is an important profitability ratio for all companies as it represents the 
return for the company’s owners, it is of particular significance for banks.
This particular role is due to the aforementioned regulatory capital 
requirements for banks that provide loans and the possibility of raising ROE by 
lowering the equity base. Unless otherwise stated, this research focuses on 
the after-tax return on equity and uses the figures obtained from the 
Bankscope/Fitch database. Nevertheless, pre-tax profits and the pre-tax ROE 
are also considered where appropriate.
Overall, the purpose of this section is to gain an understanding of the nature of 
a bank’s profitability. More specifically, it examines which are the driving 
factors behind the bank’s profits or losses. Especially for German banks, it is 
relevant to look at non-operating income as a means of boosting net profit. 
Consequently, adjusted pre-tax ROE figures offer a more balanced view of 
underlying, and thus sustainable, profitability.
Notwithstanding the adjustments for non-operating income from disposal 
gains, this research avoids making too many adjustments. For example, a 
particularly low tax rate would not be adjusted, but accepted as clever tax 
management and considered as a strategic achievement. Similarly, this 
section does not refer to the valuation of the banks analysed, i.e. the 
development of their value during the period analysed. However, for 
information, a chart showing the relative share price performance of all eight 
banks is included in chapter six.
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4.5.2. Archival research
The second approach to studying banks’ strategic management is based on 
archival research. Essentially this comprises a survey of the banks’ own 
publications, such as annual reports, presentations, press releases and, 
where available internal memos. This is the least structured method as it is 
dependent on randomly available information. Access to these materials was 
gained through the banks themselves and through libraries, research 
institutions and central banks.
Jimerson describes archival material as an attempt to codify memory 
(Jimerson, 2003). He argues that the human need for impartial evidence of 
interactions, from legal agreements to financial transactions has led to the 
concept of archives as repositories of memory (Jimerson, 2003, p. 90). It is 
argued that archival data is a by-product of human activity and that such 
records provide a reliable and authentic source (Jenkinson, 1922; Duranti, 
1994). Archival documents result from activity itself, and are not conscious or 
deliberate efforts to influence thought (Jimerson, 2003, p. 90).
This positivist understanding of archival material is challenged by post­
modernist writers (Brothman, 1991; Nesmith, 1999; Kaplan, 2000; Cook, 
2001), who argue that the choice of which developments are recorded and 
how they are recorded is determined by individuals and organisations with 
vested interests (Kaplan, 2000). Kaplan rightly concludes that archival material 
is thus certainly not politically and culturally neutral (Kaplan, 2000).
Insofar, this research acknowledges the reservations of the post-modernist 
critiques. Yet, it should also be borne in mind that the pursuit of clearly 
identified interests is what strategy is all about. Despite prudent reporting 
practices, it is assumed that any official information published by the banks 
would attempt to sketch a positive picture of their strategy. Therefore, archival 
material used for this research is not considered to offer an “objective” account 
of what happened; it is understood as part of a bank’s communication policy 
and as such as part of its strategy.
Although most banks employ their own historians and archivists, who can help 
in finding the relevant information, it has proven difficult to gather information
184
4. Research philosophy and methodology
about the years before 1997/1998. Even publicly available information could 
not be as easily accessed as had been initially expected. For example, most 
banks only archive a few reference copies of their annual reports. Besides, 
there are not many presentations left from the first half of the period analysed. 
Overall, it required interpersonal skills to encourage staff to copy the relevant 
material and send it to the researcher. The researcher’s profession as an 
equity analyst also undoubtedly helped him approach the right people within 
the institutions. The difficulty of gaining access to this material is in 
accordance with the aforementioned institutional memory problem of banks. 
For the period after 1998, the internet has proven a helpful archival source.
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4.5.3. LexisNexis database survey
The main qualitative source used is the LexisNexis database. This has proven 
useful in previous research projects on the temporal development of 
strategies, for example in the British insurance industry (Pettigrew & Webb,
1999). The LexisNexis database provides news and business articles from 
major international newspapers, journals and periodicals dating back beyond 
1993. In total, it comprises 32,000 sources, including such quality publications 
as The Economist, Businessweek, The Banker, Financial Times, The Times, 
The Guardian, The Independent, Wall Street Journal (abstracts), Bloomberg 
News, Borsen-Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 
Capital and Der Spiegel.
A three-stage search modus is applied. The first approach searches the 
aforementioned sources. Articles are extracted using the bank’s name as the 
search term for the period analysed (1 January 1993 until 31 December 2003). 
Following this automatic search, in a second step the available data is 
downloaded, scanned, read and analysed. After having identified 
developments that appear to have had structural implications for the bank, the 
third stage extracts data using more narrowly defined search terms for a 
shorter period while broadening the number of sources to the whole of the 
LexisNexis database. Finally, the data is interpreted, classified and entered 
into a time/event matrix.
Denscombe (2003) considers that good quality news media, such as The 
Economist and the Financial Times are a valuable source of information for 
business researchers, allowing them to draw on the expertise of specialised 
journalists. A comparison of several of these newspapers is conducive to 
receiving a more complete picture. Moreover, any action taken by a bank’s top 
management that had structural implications was probed at the time by numerous 
journalists using different information sources. Articles published in these quality 
newspapers and journals are usually reviewed thoroughly, questioned and edited 
before they go to print. Given the politically sensitive nature of the banking 
industry, financial journalists who write on the sector tend to pay particular 
attention to detail. Nevertheless, the researcher needs to distinguish carefully 
between journalists’ interpretations and the presentation of facts.
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4.6. A note on the author’s background and concluding 
remarks
Peter Reason’s concept of “critical subjectivity” suggests that it is essential to 
elaborate the context and the background of the researcher (Reason, 1988). 
Therefore, it should be pointed out that the researcher has professionally 
analysed European financial services firms in his capacity as an equity analyst 
since 2000. During the period of this dissertation, the author was employed by 
a family-owned German investment bank. Prior to this, he had worked in the 
City of London for an independent corporate finance advisory firm and for a 
privately owned British merchant bank.
With the exception of Dresdner Bank, after it had been taken over by Allianz, 
the author has not covered any of the eight banks analysed in his capacity as 
an equity analyst. The author has not received any direct or indirect 
compensation for this research. All expenses related to this research were 
financed from his own personal savings. Neither any of the analysed banks, 
nor his employer nor the School of Management of the University of Bath have 
influenced or tried to influence the research approach, the samples or the 
methodology.
Although this research is free from any conflict of interest, it nevertheless 
reflects the author’s professional background in two ways. First, Britain and 
Germany are chosen not only because they are two of Europe’s largest 
economies with different financial and banking systems, but admittedly also 
because of the author’s academic and professional background. Despite this 
personal bias, it can be still maintained that the size of the economies and the 
contrasting developments of banking in both countries render a comparison of 
banks from these two countries a viable choice.
Second, in accordance with the view propounded by Strauss (Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1994), the researcher concedes that preconceptions about 
strategic management in banking exist in his mind as a result of his 
professional exposure to that industry. Yet, this is still consistent with the 
Straussian understanding of grounded theory (Strauss, 1987; Strauss &
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Corbin, 1994) as any research project requires some basic understanding of 
or interest in the subject.
This chapter outlined and justified the methodology and methods of this 
research. Drawing on an ontology that comprehends the micro level to be 
interdependent with the macro level, this thesis applies an inductive 
methodology. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods applied 
to data from three different sources aims to generate knowledge about 
strategic management in banking. Starting from a longitudinal comparative 
case study of British and German banking strategies, the objective is to build a 
theory about the corporate strategic decisions taken by banks in a changing 
macroeconomic and political environment. More specifically, it seeks to 
understand how and why, in the period analysed, British and German banking 
strategies differed in an increasingly integrated European financial system.
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5. British and German banking: case studies
5.1. Introduction
While this research argues that the Single Market opened up new prospects 
for banks to operate within an enlarged “playing field”, it also recognises that 
national financial systems remained the predominant operating environment 
for banks. Following a brief review of the characteristics of the banking 
landscape in the UK and Germany, this chapter presents eight case studies 
on British and German banks. British and German banks are discussed in 
alternating order, beginning with the success story of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland, and ending with the dismal tale of Dresdner Bank. The case studies 
form the heart of this empirical research and the findings are cross-analysed, 
compared and put into the context of European integration in the concluding 
chapter.
Real GDP-growth (1985-2005): United Kingdom and Germany
in %




1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data
At the beginning of the 1990s, the home markets in which British and German 
banks operated had entirely different structures. The economic and political 
situations in those two countries differed significantly at the time. British 
economic growth fell sharply in the late 1980s and the country plunged into
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recession in 1991. During this period, most British banks suffered from high 
loan loss provisions and profits were severely battered as a result of this.
In contrast, German reunification in October 1990, the end of communism and 
the first signs of globalisation brought about a sense in Germany that a new 
era was beginning. These circumstances, helped by substantial government 
spending, boosted Germany’s economic growth to 5.3% in 1990, the highest 
rate achieved between 1985 and 2005. Yet, in the next three years German 
GDP growth decelerated and in 1993 the country was also hit by recession. 
After the recession in Britain and Germany, their business cycles converged in 
shape and pattern. Notwithstanding this structural convergence, British GDP 
growth rates were on average 1.7% higher than German rates between 1993 
and 2003.
Inflation rates (1985-2005): UK and Germany
in %
United Kingdom inflation rate
4 -
Germany inflation rate
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data
This markedly higher economic growth rate provided an important tailwind for 
British banks as they continued to focus their business models on the UK 
market while reining in costs through branch closures and greater use of new 
technologies. The positive economic climate in the UK was also reflected in a 
decline in British unemployment rates. Moreover, British inflation rates fell 
sharply in the early 1990s and became much more stable. Certainly, the 
decision to make the Bank of England independent from the Treasury as from
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1997, was instrumental in the establishment of a monetary policy that was 
committed to meeting an inflation target of 2.5% (now 2%).
Declining unemployment, low and stable inflation rates, along with the strong 
economic growth stimulated consumer spending, and led to rising property 
prices and fewer bankruptcies. All of these developments contributed to an 
increase in profits of most UK banks. During the period analysed, the 
macroeconomic environment in Britain was clearly much more benign for 
banks than the situation in Germany.
The impact of German reunification was essentially an exogenous shock for 
the country’s economy. Initial enthusiasm about the prospect of an enlarged 
German market was quickly overshadowed by the realisation that the costs 
would outweigh the benefits in the short term. German banks were 
instrumental in the rapid transformation of East Germany’s planned economy 
into a market economy. German monetary union on 1 July 1990 meant that all 
banks operating in East Germany came within the remit of the Bundesbank's 
monetary policy and thus became an integral part of its monetary transmission 
function.
All four German banks analysed for this research rapidly expanded into 
Eastern Germany and, along with the savings and cooperative banks, divided 
up the market among themselves. “Since 1990 the attention of the major 
commercial banks has been deflected towards German unification” 
(Henderson, 1993, p. 189). Demand for loans clearly exceeded the amount of 
deposits in Eastern Germany during the first years after reunification. Thus, 
inevitably an asset-liability mismatch arouse, mirroring the significantly 
different economic levels of Eastern and Western Germany. Besides providing 
funds for investments in the five new federal states, Western German banks 
played an important role as educators of the 16 million inhabitants of Eastern 
Germany who had to come to terms with the changeover from a state planned 
economy to a market economy (Birkefeld, 1997).
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data
In addition to this economic and political turbulence, for which none of the 
German banks could prepare, it is often pointed out that the German banking 
market suffers from distorting competitive forces. One characteristic of the 
German banking market is the dominant position of what have been termed 
“not strictly profit-oriented” banks (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005), i.e. 
cooperative and savings banks. Cooperative banks, savings banks and 
commercial banks, i.e. private-sector institutions such as the four German 
banks analysed for this research, are usually referred to as the three pillars of 
German banking.
Cooperative banks have their roots in a self-aid effort initiated by German 
craftsmen and farmers in the 19th century (Butt Philip, 1978). As mutual 
organisations, cooperative banks are owned by their members, who are 
usually also clients. At the beginning of 1993, the cooperative banking sector 
comprised 2,918 local cooperative banks (Volksbanken and 
Raiffeisenbanken), five regional central clearing institutions, and a central 
body, the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank, Germany’s seventh largest bank 
(Henderson, 1993). A large number of mergers in this sector during the 1990s 
brought down the number substantially. At the end of 2003, the number of 
cooperative banks had fallen to 1,393, owned by 15 million members 
(Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
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By end-2003, only two central clearing institutions remained: the WGZ Bank 
and the DZ Bank (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005). These offer a broad range of 
services to the primary credit cooperative banks. Besides acting as clearing 
institutions, they provide access to the financial markets and a wide array of 
other support and back-office functions (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005). With a 
large number of retail clients and two central institutions providing a full range 
of capital market services, the cooperative banking group is a universal bank 
that competes in many areas with the commercial banks. It enjoys a relative 
competitive advantage as it can draw on a large retail client base for funding. 
The small size of the primary institutions (i.e. local branches) is also 
considered a competitive advantage as it facilitates quick decision-making and 
proximity to clients (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
Like the cooperative banking group the savings bank group also has a two- 
level structure: the local retail savings banks and the regional wholesale and 
girobanks, the so-called Landesbanks. Savings banks came into existence in 
the 18th century as a result of private initiatives driven by philanthropic 
considerations and the need to fight poverty (Mura, ed., 1996). Their purpose 
was to finance regional infrastructure projects and make loans to 
disadvantaged groups in the community, financed by small deposits made by 
households and local companies (Howells & Bain, 2002). Over the years, they 
have remained focused on the needs of employees, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and certain public authorities (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
While there are many structural and organisational similarities between 
cooperative and savings banks (Henderson, 1993; Edwards & Fischer, 1994; 
Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005), the savings banks’ greatest competitive 
advantage came from state guarantees.1 In return for their public-spirited 
lending policy, the solvency of each savings bank was guaranteed by the 
public authority that owned them until 18 July 2005, when an EU ruling from 
July 2001 became effective. These state guarantees enabled them to obtain 
better refinancing conditions on the capital market. It is estimated that state 
backing helped savings banks and Landesbanks pay around 20 basis points
1 More specifically, the guarantees comprise two aspects “Anstaltslast” and “GewShrtragerhaftung”. 
Anstaltslast is a term used in German public law, meaning that the public sector is responsible for the 
viability of companies it owns. GewShrtrSgerhaftung refers to the liability that would take effect if and when a
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(0.20%) less than their private-sector peers when raising funds through bond 
issues. The EU Commission assumed the benefit to be even higher - in the 
range of 25 to 50 basis points (0.25-0.50%) (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
Abolishing state guarantees has probably increased competition in German 
banking, but has not changed ownership structures. Savings banks are still 
public-sector institutions and the state remains the largest provider of banking 
services to retail and SME clients in Germany. State ownership limits the 
scope for savings banks to raise fresh equity as municipalities are rarely in a 
position to inject additional equity. Thus, savings banks have to be profitable in 
order to grow their lending business, although profit maximisation is neither 
their only, nor their primary business objective (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
At the start of the Single European Market, 36% of the combined balance 
sheet of the entire German banking sector was in the hands of the savings 
banks and Landesbanks. With 320,000 people employed in more than 20,000 
branches of 723 legally separate savings banks, this banking group 
constituted the largest part of the German banking sector at the end of 1992 
(Mura, ed., 1996). The number of savings banks dropped to 491 at the end of 
2003, largely due to mergers and acquisitions within the group. Despite the fall 
in the number of savings banks, the German savings bank group as a whole 
was the world’s largest financial institution at the end of 2003 with assets of 
EUR 3,300 billion and 393,000 employees (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
Across all three pillars there were in total 4,038 banks in Germany in 1993. 
During the decade that followed this fell to 2,465, a decline of 39%. At the 
same time, the total number of bank branches was cut by 31% from 53,156 
(1993) to 36,599 (2003).2 In 1993 the number of banks in Germany was 50 per 
million inhabitants, compared to 9 per million in the UK. The respective figures 
for branches were 655 per million inhabitants in Germany and 222 per million 
in the UK, suggesting a less competitive environment in the UK banking 
market at the beginning of the Common Market.
savings bank's or Landesbank’s debts exceeded its assets and the creditors’ claims could therefore not be 
satisfied even after liquidation of its assets (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, 2000).
2 This is without the German post offices as part of Postbank AG.
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Although capacity in Germany was reduced substantially between 1993 and 
2003, bank and branch density was still high compared to the UK at the end of 
the period analysed. Overall, on a per capita basis there were more than twice 
as many bank branches and five times as many banks in Germany as in 
Britain in 2003. More specifically, there were 30 banks and 444 branches per 
million inhabitants in Germany. The density was significantly lower in the UK, 
with 6 banks and 196 branches per million inhabitants.
The difference in bank and branch density is also mirrored in the higher 
number of people working in banking in Germany, regardless of London’s 
strong position as a financial centre. However, it is striking that during the 
decade analysed the UK gained 54,000 new employees in banking and 
Germany shed 51,000 jobs in this sector. Notwithstanding this shift, in 2003 
there were still 722,000 people working for banks in Germany compared to 
432,800 in the UK.
The much more fragmented German banking market is a reflection of the 
prevailing three-pillar structure. Even in a European context, concentration is 
low in the German banking sector. A report by Deutsche Bank remarked in 
2004 that the market share of the country’s five largest banks was just 20%, 
only half the European average of 39% (Deutsche Bank Research, 2004).
The three-pillar structure is certainly the pre-eminent characteristic of the 
German banking sector as it means that around half of the country’s banks are 
not strictly profit-oriented. This raises the question of the extent to which 
German banking is embedded in a stakeholder value-oriented system, making 
it difficult to achieve returns on equity close to those of banks operating in a 
shareholder value-oriented system. This research contests the argument that 
a model which distinguishes primarily between shareholder value-oriented 
financial systems and stakeholder value systems can sufficiently explain the 
different levels of profitability of banks (Llewellyn, 2005).
In addition to the prominent role played by banks that are not strictly profit- 
oriented, German banking has been influenced by a business model 
described as “universal banking”. A universal bank provides a broad range of 
banking and other services “that elsewhere would be called financial rather 
than banking services” (Howells & Bain, 2002, p. 113). Universal banks offer
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retail, wholesale and investment banking services. Of the roughly 2,500 
German banks that existed at the end of 2003, 90% were categorised by 
BaFin as universal banks (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005).
The savings bank group, including the Landesbanks, and the cooperative 
bank group offer such a broad range of financial services to retail and 
wholesale clients that they can undoubtedly be categorised as universal 
banks. Notwithstanding their universal banking character, both of these groups 
refrained from overly extensive international lending and capital market related 
business in the 1990s (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2005). This strategic focus on 
local retail and SME clients helped ensure that their profitability3 was relatively 
higher than that of private-sector banks.
The big four German banks analysed for this research are commercial banks, 
which have had universal banking features since their inception (Howells & 
Bain, 2002). These big four banks, which originate from the beginnings of the 
unified German state in the 1870s, have offered retail banking services from 
an early stage, although their business has been traditionally concentrated on 
the financing of firms and international trade. Retail banking was initially only 
developed as a cheap source of funding for their corporate lending activities.
The commercial banks’ direct involvement in the rise of German industry 
created close relationships between the banks and their corporate clients. This 
form of relationship banking was intensified by a shortage of venture capital. 
Subsequently, the big commercial banks became active investors in those 
companies to which they lent money, with a seat on the companies’ 
supervisory boards to represent their interests (Butt Philip, 1978). The bank’s 
presence on the supervisory boards normally predisposed companies to use 
that bank as their main bank (Butt Philip, 1978). The intricate relationship 
between Germany’s commercial banks and their clients is referred to as the 
housebank principle (Hausbanken-Prinzip). Effectively, the banks’ combined 
equity and debt financing approach also served the purpose of overcoming the 
principal-agent problem and was thus a means of risk monitoring.
3 Between 1993 and 2002 the average return on equity of commercial (“private-sector”) banks was 2.7 
percentage points lower than that of the public-sector and cooperative banks (Weber, 2003).
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The housebank relationships are symptomatic of the bank-dominated financial 
system found in Germany for most of the twentieth century. As 
disintermediation gained significance and international competition increased, 
these traditional relationships declined and lost their binding force. This 
process was accelerated by the fact that some of the large commercial banks 
had to make substantial impairment write-downs on equity investments. In 
fact, the German financial system became slightly less bank-dominated 
throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, banks remained important financial 
intermediaries for the German industry until the turn of the century (Schmidt, 
2001).
And yet, disintermediation from retail clients gained such magnitude in 
Germany that at the end of 2003 only about one quarter of new savings were 
deposited with banks. By contast, in the early 1980s around two-thirds of 
private households’ monetary wealth was still held in the form of bank deposits 
(Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 2004). As observed by the Association of 
German Banks, (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken) which represents the 
interests of commercial banks, the relative decline in low-cost deposits from 
private households required banks to turn to the more expensive money and 
capital markets for refinancing purposes, thus reducing their net interest 
margins (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 2004).
The Association of German Banks concedes that most financial institutions 
have been slow to react to the disintermediation trend and that banks in other 
European countries delivered much higher and faster growing profits than 
German banks, despite working under similar overall economic conditions 
(Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 2004). It concludes that non-German 
European banks were “more successful in adapting to changed market 
conditions and have better exploited their earnings potential” (Bundesverband 
Deutscher Banken, 2004, p. 11).
The Association of German Banks therefore maintains that the reasons for the 
poor profitability of German banks must be country-specific. It argues that the 
distorted competitive structure and state guarantees are responsible for this 
plight. In its analysis, the Association of German Banks does not consider that 
bad risk-management tools, lack of service orientation, inadequate sales skills
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and simply poor management could have been the decisive factors in this 
development.
In its Financial System Stability Assessment of Germany4 in 2003, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts forward arguments similar to those 
used by the Association of German Banks: “A reduction in existing legal and 
other barriers to restructuring, within or across pillars, would expand the scope 
of possible market-oriented solutions” (International Monetary Fund, 2003b, 
pp. 4-5).
The IMF report also takes the view that, although “the institutional protection 
schemes in the public and cooperative pillars have provided an important 
element of stability”, changes that would facilitate the exit of banks and the 
reduction of excess capacity should be introduced in Germany, in order to 
better handle any possible systemic problems (International Monetary Fund, 
2003b, p. 5).
However, for legal and political reasons, the three-pillar structure of the 
German banking system has remained in place. As a result of this structural 
rigidity, mergers across the three pillars have not taken place. Therefore, 
commercial banks had less scope for consolidation than, for example, their 
British counterparts. The scope for consolidation in Britain’s financial services 
industry increased significantly after the 1986 Building Societies Act.
Building societies in the UK originate from the 18th century. Like the German 
cooperative banks, British building societies were originally mutual societies 
with a local focus. However, their focus was much narrower than that of the 
cooperative banks as members’ payments initially served only to finance the 
building of houses. The focus on housing construction was so exclusive in the 
early days that building societies were dissolved once their housebuilding 
programme was completed (Howells & Bain, 2002).
4 The Financial System Stability Assessment report was based on work for the Financial Sector Assessment 




Aggregate data on the British and German banking sector
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of banks UK 508 486 481 478 466 468 449 420 409 385 380
Germany* 4,038 3,872 3,784 3,674 3,577 3,403 3,167 2,911 2,696 2,591 2,465
Number of branches UK 12,800 12,400 12,000 11,700 13,400 13,000 12,650 12,450 12,280 12,140 11,624
Germany* 53,156 52,593 52,009 51,416 50,663 48,630 47,610 43,307 41,139 38,201 36,599
Number of employees in 
banking
UK 378,700 367,700 364,300 357,000 420,300 437,200 447,800 442,100 436,400 435,700 432,800
Germany* 773,050 779,450 778,250 769,800 768,150 769,350 771,650 774,550 769,300 751,200 722,000
Total assets UK (in EUR million) 1,926,700 1,989,500 2,085,800 2,497,300 3,659,400 3,687,700 4,216,110 5,112,400 5,508,710 5,921,810 6,785,710
Germany (in EUR million) 3,370,500 3,554,900 3,854,600 4,239,800 4,657,800 5,157,700 5,740,700 6,148,300 6,386,100 6,452,300 6,470,900
Deposits (from non-banks) UK (in EUR million) 1,371,600 1,406,200 1,487,900 1,715,600 2,454,400 2,494,200 2,790,110 2,405,220 2,722,580 2,897,820 3,493,210
Germany (in EUR million) 1,508,800 1,563,100 1,659,400 1,797,200 1,879,400 1,999,500 2,189,700 2,260,700 2,384,600 2,405,100 2,447,600
Loans (from non-banks) UK (in EUR million) 1,322,500 1,358,000 1,421,100 1,670,600 2,428,500 2,429,700 2,780,060 2,473,740 2,717,740 2,977,160 3,283,330
Germany (in EUR million) 1,799,800 1,902,800 2,065,500 2,235,900 2,408,800 2,575,600 2,812,400 2,950,500 3,051,400 3,021,700 3,025,500
Deposits / Total assets UK 71% 71% 71% 69% 67% 68% 66% 47% 49% 49% 51%
Germany 45% 44% 43% 42% 40% 39% 38% 37% 37% 37% 38%
Loans / Total assets UK 69% 68% 68% 67% 66% 66% 66% 48% 49% 50% 48%
Germany 53% 54% 54% 53% 52% 50% 49% 48% 48% 47% 47%
Number of banks per million 
inhabitants
UK 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 6
Germany 50 48 46 45 44 41 39 35 33 31 30
Number of branches per 
million inhabitants
UK 222 214 207 201 230 223 216 212 208 205 196
Germany 655 646 637 629 618 592 581 527 500 464 444
* Figures for number of banks, branch offices and employees do not include Postbank AG 
Sources: British Bankers'Association; Financial Services Authority; Deutsche 
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Building societies have always effectively been deposit-taking institutions. The 
Building Societies Act of 1986 permitted building societies to issue cheque 
guarantee cards and grant unsecured loans as well. Thus, the formal 
distinction between banks and building societies was removed (Howells & 
Bain, 2002). Subsequently building societies could demutualise and become 
publicly limited banks, subject to a vote of approval by their members. The first 
building society to demutualise and become a publicly listed bank was Abbey 
National Building Society in 1989, followed by a wave of demutualisations and 
subsequent flotation in 1996 and 1997 (Howells & Bain, 2002).
During the 1970s and 1980s, several building societies gained significant 
market shares in the market for personal deposits. Governmental policies that 
supported home ownership and the desire to invest in real assets that act as 
an inflation hedge contributed to the success of building societies (Henderson, 
1993). In 1980, building societies accounted for 54% of personal deposits 
while retail banks accounted for 30%. Depriving retail banks of their personal 
deposit base prompted them to engage in greater liability management to find 
alternative sources of funding. Retail banks had to offset the declining deposit 
base largely through more expensive wholesale deposits and bonds, thus 
raising funding costs.
In October 1988, Lloyds Bank became the first bank to offer all customers 
interest-bearing current accounts. Its peers followed suit, putting pressure on 
net interest margins (Plender, FT, 29 October 1988). While funding costs rose, 
bringing down margins, competition in lending caused banks to target low- 
margin mortgage and large corporate business (Henderson, 1993). The 
repercussions of this improvident growth-driven lending were felt in rising loan 
loss provisions in the following years.
As retail banks lost ground as personal deposit taking institutions during the 
1980s, largely due to increased competition from building societies, their 
market share fell from 30% in 1980 to 25% in 1990 (Henderson, 1993). As a 
reaction to the changed competitive landscape, British retail banks entered the 
mortgage market in the early 1980s. Building societies responded by 
introducing new types of deposits, cheque book facilities and automated teller 
machines (ATMs). They also attempted to gain market share in client
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segments where they were not strong such as young adults, women and 
savers in lower socioeconomic groups (Henderson, 1993).
The 1986 Building Societies Act was one of several policy measures 
introduced in 1986/87 to liberalise the British financial services industry. These 
fundamental structural changes, along with the opening up of membership of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) to limited liability companies are often 
referred to as the Big Bang in Britain’s financial services industry (Howells & 
Bain, 2000). The policy package was aimed at bringing about deregulation 
and stimulating competition in the financial services industry.5
At the heart of Big Bang were the 1986 Financial Services Act, the 1987 
Banking Act and regulatory changes relating to the LSE, which allowed firms 
to operate as both brokers and market-makers (“dual capacity”). Prior to Big 
Bang, brokers were only able to advise clients and deal on their behalf, 
whereas jobbers did the actual buying and selling of shares (Steffens, 1990; 
Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 1997).
As a result of Big Bang, various British clearers, i.e. high-street banks, took 
over brokers and market-makers. For example, Barclays created BZW, 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd, by merging the brokers de Zoete and Bevan and 
jobber Wedd Durlacher. During the 1980s, several large British banks 
branched out into the securities market while internationalising, and granting 
inadequately priced loans as part of a general expansion policy. They also 
stepped up lending on the domestic wholesale market, that is, to commercial 
clients, where they encountered fierce competition from international banks.
The 1980s was a difficult decade for British retail banks. In many ways, British 
banks underwent the developments that German banks would experience 
during the 1990s -  with the same results, namely accruing high losses. The 
effects of deregulation starting in 1986/87, the stock market crash in October 
1987, international competition on the British wholesale market and eventually 
the onset of a recession at the end of the 1980s came as quite a shock for the 
management of some banks, resulting in severe cost cuts. Subsequent 
restructuring curtailed their international activities and led them to withdraw
5 In the UK, the first real phase of deregulation occurred in 1971 with the abolition of credit controls and the 
interest rate cartel under the Competition and Credit Control Act (Henderson, 1993).
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from investment banking and refocus on the domestic market. What followed 
was the rapid adoption of new technologies accompanied by substantial 
branch closures in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
The deregulation brought about by Big Bang facilitated a process of 
consolidation and cost-cutting measures. This mainly took the form of branch 
closures and the introduction of ATMs. During the period analysed, banking in 
the UK became increasingly automated, with the number of ATMs rising from 
19,100 in 1993 to 46,461 in 2003 (ESRC Society Today).6 The greater use of 
technology was accompanied by a reduction in the number of bank branches 
in the UK from over 20,000 in 1989 to 11,000 by 2004 (British Banker’s 
Association).7
These profound restructuring measures, which streamlined many of the 
processes in banking, and the scale efficiencies from consolidation in the 
sector made British banks among the most efficient and profitable financial 
institutions in the world at the turn of the millennium. In a speech given in 
November 1999 Howard Davies, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) argued that the competitive environment for British banks had 
led to substantial cost reductions which, in combination with the strong 
economic growth in the UK, were important factors for the high levels of 
profitability in UK banking in the 1990s. He considered the British banking 
market to be one of the most competitive markets in the world (Davies, 1999).
Shortly after these upbeat remarks by Howard Davies of the FSA, Don 
Cruickshank, chairman of the Chancellor’s review into competition and UK 
banking, presented the results of a study.8 The Cruickshank Report concluded 
that the banks in the UK had “unnecessary market power which they have 
been able to use - particularly over the last four or five years - to earn super 
normal profits” (Cruickshank, 2000, p. 3). The report held the British 
government, regulator and banks together responsible for the excessive 
returns of banks, resulting from not subjecting the sector to “proper
6 Available from:
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/facts/UK/index44.aspx?Componentld=12646&SourceP 
ageld=18129#footnote. [Accessed 19 May 2007].
7 British Banker’s Association. Available from: http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=469&a=5524 
[Accessed 19 May 2007].
Don Cruickshank studied the UK banking markets and not the banks as institutions. Thus, the banks’ 
international and non-banking activities were not a subject of the analysis. The cycle considered was from 
1986 to 1998 and market concentration was measured using the Herfindhal Hirsch Index.
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competition scrutiny and letting banks too often write the rules” (Cruickshank, 
2000, p. 4).
The Cruickshank Report argued that a pre-tax return on equity of 30% over 
the cycle is in excess of the cost of equity (assumed to be 17%) and 
concluded that this meant high prices for consumers (Cruickshank, 2000, p. 
4). The report estimated that consumers would pay some GBP 3-5 billion p.a. 
less if there were more effective competition in British banking. Furthermore, 
the Cruickshank Report pointed out that “[...] there are real problems with the 
way banks control the networks which allow money to flow around the 
economy [...] and there are real problems with the way banks serve small 
businesses” (Review of Banking Services in the UK, 2000). This led to a 
discussion of social exclusion as some three million people in the UK were 
without access to banking services (Review of Banking Services in the UK, 
2000).
Criticism of competition in UK banking did not lead to any pathbreaking 
regulatory changes and the banks have continued to ride the wave of Britain’s 
sound economy, rising property prices and brisk consumer spending. In 2003 
the IMF’s Financial System Stability Assessment of the UK concluded that the 
country’s “large and sophisticated financial sector features fundamentally 
sound and highly developed financial institutions, markets and infrastructure” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003a). The IMF report considered that the 
largest domestic risk for UK banks stemmed from high household and 
corporate debt levels, which are particular sensitive to a deterioration of 
domestic economic conditions (International Monetary Fund, 2003a).
The markedly different structural and economic developments in the UK and 
Germany must be given sufficient consideration when reading the following 
analysis of four British and four German banks. Each of the eight analyses 
that follow can be considered as a stand-alone case study and yet they share 
the same structure, research approach and largely draw on the same 
database. The findings from the case studies are cross-analysed, compared 
and put into the context of European integration in the last chapter of this 
thesis.
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5.2.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
Without the failure of Scotland’s overseas trading company, the Company of 
Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies (“Company of Scotland”), The Royal 
Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) probably would not have come into existence. As 
part of the 1707 Acts of Union, which united England and Scotland, investors 
in the Company of Scotland received compensation, which became the initial 
capital for The Royal Bank of Scotland. In 1727 the bank was formed by Royal 
Charter from the British government (Checkland, 1975; Savile, 1996; Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 1998; Munn, undated).
The foundation of The Royal Bank of Scotland ended the monopoly of the 
Bank of Scotland which had been set up in 1695 to promote Scottish trade 
and commerce.1 Right from the beginning, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
pursued an aggressive strategy towards the Bank of Scotland. RBS built up 
large holdings of Bank of Scotland notes, which it then presented to the Bank 
of Scotland for payment in 1728. Subsequently, the Bank of Scotland had to 
call in its loans. The fierce competition between the two banks continued until 
around 1740 when they agreed a kind of truce from which both parties would 
benefit during the following 260 years (Checkland, 1975; Savile, 1996; Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 1998). In 1999/2000 open competition broke out again 
during the battle over NatWest, which the Bank of Scotland had initially 
intended to take over, but which was eventually acquired by RBS (The 
Economist, 5 February 2000; Treanor, The Guardian, 10 February 2000; The 
Economist, 12 February 2000).
The Royal Bank of Scotland realised from its inception that innovation is a 
means to fight competition. It was the first bank in the world to offer a “cash 
credit” or “overdraught” in 1728. This “overdraught” facility was effectively the 
forerunner of modern consumer credit, which became one of RBS’ key areas 
of expertise and main sources of income in the 1990s when it began to 
refocus on retail banking. During the 18th and 19th centuries the bank 
expanded its operations throughout Scotland, but hardly beyond the Scottish
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border. It did not even have an office in London until 1874, and certainly did 
not seek to expand overseas. During the 1920s it acquired various small 
English banks (Checkland, 1975; Savile, 1996; Royal Bank of Scotland, 
1998).2 The bank’s first major international move came with the USD 440 
million acquisition of the US retail and corporate bank Citizens Financial 
Group (“Citizens”) in 1988 (Thomson, The Times, 29 April 1988).
In the same year The Royal Bank of Scotland linked up with Banco Santander, 
Spain’s fourth largest bank at the time. Both banks agreed to build up cross- 
shareholdings of 2.5%.3 Moreover, cross-directorships would support this 
wide-ranging commercial cooperation. This cooperation agreement was meant 
to help RBS break into continental European markets where it had few 
business activities. The two banks also agreed to look for joint acquisitions on 
the European continent (Thomson, The Times, 4 October 1988).4 Despite this 
cooperation, RBS conceded in 1993 that the purpose of its presence on the 
European continent was merely to serve its UK banking customer base. 
Management then clearly considered the UK as its core market and regarded 
the US activities solely as a means of diversifying earnings (RBS, Annual 
Report 1993).
During the period analysed three board members shaped the development of 
The Royal Bank of Scotland. George Mathewson was appointed to the board 
in 1987 and served as the bank’s group Chief Executive from 1992 to 2000. 
George Mathewson’s successor as group Chief Executive was Fred Goodwin, 
who has held that position since then. In March 2000, George Mathewson was 
appointed Executive Deputy Chairman. He subsequently succeeded George 
Younger (Viscount Younger of Leckie) as group Chairman. In this function, 
Younger had presided over The Royal Bank of Scotland from 1991 until 2001. 
The rise of The Royal Bank of Scotland from a provincial Scottish bank in the 
early 1990s to one of the world’s ten largest banks by the end of 2003 owes 
much to the pathbreaking takeover of the much larger NatWest in 2000, which 
was jointly masterminded by George Mathewson and Fred Goodwin. In
1 The Bank of Scotland supported the Jacobites, who wanted to restore the Stuart kings to the thrones of 
England and Scotland. Following the Jacobite Rising of 1715, the bank’s monopoly was terminated in 1716.
2 The various small English banks formed Williams Deacons Bank, which later merged with Glyn Mills & Co. 
and was renamed Williams and Glyn’s Bank (Royal Bank of Scotland, 1998).
3 In the following years, Santander raised its stake to 9.9%.
4 Both banks sold their cross-shareholdings, terminated their cross-directorships and formally ended the 
cooperation after Banco Santander’s acquisition of Abbey National in 2004 (Keers, The Daily Telegraph, 13 
November 2004; interview with Shane Glynn, 24 April 2006).
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particular, the swift integration of NatWest under the auspices of Fred 
Goodwin, along with his selective growth strategy and tight cost control, 
contributed to the rise of the bank. How this small Scottish bank rose to 
become one of the world’s leading financial institutions is analysed in the 
following sections, starting with its income structure.
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5.2.2. Income Structure
5.2.2.1. Structural Overview
Until the acquisition of NatWest in March 2000, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
could be best described as a provincial Scottish bank with a successful, but 
relatively autonomous US subsidiary. By the early 1990s it was already clear 
that the bank would want to grow beyond Scotland, expanding across the 
whole of the UK. In the 1993 annual report management said “Our overriding 
objective is to become the best-performing financial services group in the UK 
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The takeover of NatWest for GBP 21 billion in March 2000 led to a quantum 
leap in revenues. While RBS’ total operating income was still only GBP 4.1 
billion in 1999, it jumped to GBP 12.1 billion during the following 15 months as 
the bank aligned its reporting with the calendar year. However, The Royal 
Bank of Scotland also demonstrated remarkable and mainly organic growth 
between 1993 and 1999, i.e. before the NatWest deal. During these six years, 
the bank grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 18% p.a. The 
CAGR figure rose to 29% for the whole period (i.e. 1993-2003), reflecting the 
revenue boost from the takeover of NatWest.
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In 1993 51% of operating profit before loan loss provisions came from branch 
banking, 27% came from corporate banking, 8.6% from insurance and 9.4%  
from the group’s US business, Citizens Financial Group Inc.. The most visible 
structural change that occurred over the period analysed was the growing 
importance of the group’s “other operating income”. During the period 
analysed “other operating income” rose particularly strongly at a CAGR of 
45% p.a. due to growth of the bank’s insurance operations.
In 1993 net premium income was GBP 410 million and this rose to GBP 3.1 
billion in 2003. The insurance activities of RBS mainly involve the direct 
insurer Direct Line, which was the UK’s largest motor insurer in 2003. In June 
2003 the bank further expanded its UK insurance business through the GBP 
1.1 billion takeover of Churchill Insurance Group. The group’s insurance 
activities will be discussed in detail in the section on retail banking.
The strong growth in The Royal Bank of Scotland’s insurance operations was 
not matched by any of the other three types of income. Trading income shows 
the second strongest rise between 1993 and 2003, as its CAGR was 35% for 
the period 1993 until 2003. Trading income gained importance after the 
acquisition of NatWest, which had a greater investment banking exposure 
than The Royal Bank of Scotland. From 1993 until 1999 trading contributed on 
average 5.4% of total operating income, but this increased to 9% after the 
acquisition of NatWest so that for the whole period an average of 6.7% of total 
operating income originated from trading.
Net interest income rose on average by 26% p.a. and amounted to GBP 8.4 
billion at the end of 2003. The impact of the NatWest deal on the group’s net 
interest income was around GBP 3.6 billion in the first year. Besides this 
NatWest boost, the group’s interest income increased faster than its interest 
expenses. However, as total earning assets rose even more strongly, namely 
by 28.2% p.a., the net interest margin deteriorated slightly over time and stood 
at 2.26% in 2003, compared to 2.65% in 1993. Without the NatWest 
acquisition the group’s net interest margin would have declined further as 
NatWest’s net interest margin was 0.2 percentage points higher than The 
Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS, Annual Report 2000; NatWest, Annual Report
2000). On average, net interest income contributed 50% to the group’s total 
operating income, although it fell from 56% in 1993 to 43% in 2003.
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Commission income at The Royal Bank of Scotland accounted for some 27% 
on average during the period analysed. Commission income was mainly 
driven by fees from lending-related products such as interest rate protection 
schemes and mortgage securitisation. Moreover, some of the commission 
income originated from credit card-related fees and third-party transactions on 
the capital markets. Management explained in the 1993 annual report that it 
welcomed a high proportion of commission income as it would reduce the 
group’s earnings volatility. It was argued that less interest income implied 
fewer risk-weighted assets and therefore reduced exposure to provisions for 
bad debts (RBS, Annual Report 1993). This line of reasoning is not plausible if 
one assumes that a bank should be in a position to price its loans 
appropriately and correctly estimate the probability of loan losses.
Throughout the period analysed the bank’s profit predominantly originated 
from the UK market. In 1993, 78% of RBS’ pre-tax profit came from the UK 
and 13% from the USA. At the time, only 6% stemmed from Europe. While the 
share of profit from the UK remained pretty stable and only fell to 74% in 2003, 
continental Europe gained significance and was contributing 19% of RBS’ pre­
tax profit in 2003, compared to just 6% in 1993. Yet these geographical shifts 
did not have a substantial impact on the group’s income structure as such,
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primarily because the US and European arms operated the same business 
areas as the British parent company and stayed clear of investment banking.
The bank’s position as a player on the British market was consolidated by the 
takeover of NatWest in 2000. The deal helped it expand into the UK retail and 
SME market and facilitated the bank’s internationalisation in the following 
years. In particular, RBS’ corporate banking operations pursued an organic 
international growth strategy. As with the other case studies, the following 
sections will discuss the bank’s investment/corporate banking, asset 
management and retail banking operations.
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S.2.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
In 1993, when The Royal Bank of Scotland sold 90% of its shareholding in the 
merchant bank Charterhouse to a Franco-German banking partnership (CCF 
of France and BHF of Germany), it became clear that the management did not 
want to pursue a traditional investment banking strategy (Millar, The 
Scotsman, 30 January 1993). Instead of offering equity-related products and 
services, such as M&A consulting, RBS expanded into debt and treasury 
products for mid-sized and large corporate customers, mainly in the UK (RBS, 
Annual Report 1993). Gradually, the bank also began to offer more 
sophisticated debt products, for example, structured finance, trade finance, 
leasing and factoring. To complement its traditional treasury services it offered 
a wide range of foreign exchange, currency options, money markets and 
interest rate derivative products.
In corporate banking, The Royal Bank of Scotland pursued a relationship 
management approach in which it offered its customers a co-ordinated 
combination of these banking services. The bank’s strong client orientation 
within a clearly defined product range allowed it to achieve high penetration of 
its customer base, which considerably boosted sales growth (RBS, Annual 
Reports 1993 & 1999; interview Achim Kluber). Corporate banking was key to 
RBS’ strategy and was an important profit contributor throughout the period 
analysed. Between 1993 and 2003, the segment’s contribution to the group’s 
profit before loan loss provisions remained stable and stood at 51% in both 
1993 and 2003. In absolute figures the division’s profit before loan loss 
provisions soared from GBP 307 million in 1993 to GBP 4.4 billion in 2003.
Although the acquisition of NatWest accounted for a substantial part of this 
strong rise, the bank’s consistent focus on these few product groups certainly 
helped it to excel (interview Achim Kluber). Achim Kluber, Managing Director 
and “Country Head Germany, Austria, Switzerland”, pointed out that RBS 
does not try to be everything to everybody and therefore pursues a rather 
selective approach (interview Achim Kluber). The takeover of NatWest also 
raised RBS’ its international profile. Prior to the NatWest deal, RBS’ only 
substantial international corporate business was done through its US 
subsidiary, Citizens Financial Group Inc., which it had bought for USD 440 
million in 1988 (Associated Press, 1988; Lascelles, FT, 4 December 1990).
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Although Citizens grew organically, its primary source of growth was a large 
number of acquisitions. The bank continuously extended its network 
throughout the New England states of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and New Hampshire and expanded into the Mid-Atlantic states. 
The December 2001 acquisition of the regional retail and commercial banking 
businesses of Mellon Financial Corporation5 for USD 2.1 billion extended the 
group’s reach to the whole of Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania and 
created the 13th largest commercial bank in the US. Several additional small 
acquisitions followed in 2003 (Royal Bank of Scotland - Announcement 2001; 
Fitch Ratings, 2005).6
RBS’ US operations were its only significant international activity until 1998 
when it moved into Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. At the heart of the 
bank’s market entry strategy was the strategic use of leveraged finance and 
risk management solutions for large cap corporate clients (interview Achim 
Kluber). In these markets the bank predominantly worked with local teams and 
applied the same client relationship approach as it did in its UK home market. 
Unlike its US expansion strategy, which was acquisition-led, The Royal Bank 
of Scotland primarily relied on organic growth for its European strategy.
The bank’s European strategy received new momentum from the acquisition 
of NatWest. Subsequently, the bank expanded into Spain (2001), France 
(2001), and Italy (2002).7 The Royal Bank of Scotland decided to set up 
branches for its European operations rather than subsidiaries as these would 
be regulated by its home regulator, i.e. Britain’s FSA. This helped it benefit 
from scale efficiencies due to its size in the UK. In Germany, for example, it 
used the same IT systems it had in place in the UK and did not have to modify 
them to meet the requirements of Germany’s Bafin as it was regulated by the 
FSA (interview Achim Kluber). Scale efficiencies were also the driving force 
behind the bank’s custody business which will be discussed in the next 
section.
5 The acquisition added USD 13.4 billion of assets, 345 branches and 4,135 employees in Pennsylvania, 
Delaware and New Jersey. The transaction increased Citizens’ deposit base by 54%, the number of 
personal customers by 50%, and business customers by 48%. Following this deal Citizens Group had USD 
47 billion assets, around 11,400 employees and 770 branches across seven states (Royal Bank of Scotland 
- Announcement 2001).
6 In August 2004 Citizens bought Charter One Financial Group, thereby expanding the group into another 
six US states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Vermont) (Fitch Ratings, 2005).
7 RBS has been present in Greece since 1973. The bank has become the world's leading lending institution 
to the Greek shipping market. Available from: http://www.rbs.com/about01.asp?id=ABOUT_US (Royal Bank 
of Scotland, undated) [Accessed 17 June 2006].
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5.2.2.3. Asset Management
Between 1993 and 2003 asset management, i.e. mutual funds (retail funds) 
and institutional asset management, did not play a significant role for RBS’ 
strategy. The bank initially offered administration services for PEPs (personal 
equity plans), unit trusts, investment trusts and investment trust savings 
schemes through a unit known as Securities Service. Following the acquisition 
of the custody business of S.G. Warburg in 1997, the RBS Trust Bank was 
formed to bring the group’s securities services and global custody services 
under the same roof (RBS, Annual Report 1997). As a result of this deal the 
RBS Trust Bank became one of the leading UK custodian banks with GBP 
250 billion assets under custody and an estimated UK market share of 20- 
25% (Denton, FT, 2 August 1996; Turpin, The Scotsman, 22 February 1999). 
The Royal Bank of Scotland also gained Warburg’s main custody client, 
Mercury Asset Management, which was at the time UK’s largest fund manager 
(Denton, FT, 2 August 1996).
Yet it appears that, despite these attempts to grow, RBS could not achieve the 
necessary size to operate its custody business profitably. In 1996, the Investor 
Service segment ran up a loss of GBP 17 million followed by a further loss of 
GBP 12 million in 1997 and finally a small profit of GBP 5 million in 1998. 
During the 1990s the custody business became highly commoditised and 
economies of scale became the decisive competitive factor. Management 
concluded after less than two years that the RBS Trust Bank would not gain 
the size required to compete successfully on a global scale and without much 
ado the bank’s custody business was sold in spring 1999 to the Bank of New 
York for GBP 500 million (AFX News, 23 March 1999).
Through the takeover of NatWest The Royal Bank of Scotland gained control 
over Gartmore, the asset management arm of NatWest. This time, 
management was even quicker to decide what to do with the business and 
Gartmore was sold to US-based Nationwide Mutual Insurance for GBP 1.03 
billion in March 2000. RBS exercised its option to purchase Royal Bank of 
Scotland Portfolio Management and Royal Bank of Scotland Unit Trust 
Management from Newton Management Limited8 equally quickly in December
8 The Royal Bank of Scotland sold its 33% stake in Newton Management to Mellon Bank of the US for GBP 
56 million in 1998 after it had bought it in 1994 for GBP 25 million following the merger between Newton 
Management and RBS' investment subsidiary Capitol House (Powell, The Herald, 25 July 1998; Willcock, 
The Independent, 17 September 1994).
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2002. Only two months later, 49% of RBS’ Unit Trust Management was sold 
on to the British insurer Aviva, with which RBS already had a retail distribution 
agreement (RBS, Annual Reports 2002 & 2003). The bank’s multi-brand 
strategy and the different distribution channels used for its retail operations will 
be at the heart of the next section of this case study.
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5.2.2.4. Retail Banking
While asset management, apart from brief custody intermezzo, did not have 
any real bearing on the group’s strategy, retail banking ranked alongside 
corporate banking as one of RBS’ two main business areas. In fact, retail 
banking was of such significance that management drew a distinction between 
direct retail and traditional retail banking. For the purpose of this research and 
consistent with the other case studies, the section on retail banking also 
includes wealth management and the bank’s insurance operations. 
Subsuming all of these segments under retail banking means that in 1993 
43% of pre-tax profit after loan losses (excluding Citizens9) came from 
business with private clients. The bank’s private clients contributed 69% of 
pre-tax profit in 2003, reflecting the improved efficiency, which was mainly due 
to greater use of technology, and the improved loan loss situation in the UK.
The Royal Bank of Scotland recognised that the quality of service and 
innovation are often the differentiating factors in the financial services industry. 
Thus, management gave high priority to investment in staff, training and 
development to guarantee customer satisfaction (RBS, Annual Report 1995). 
In retail financial services, The Royal Bank of Scotland grew its business by 
offering banking and insurance products through different channels and under 
different brands. This enabled it to appeal to various customer groups.
In its 1993 annual report management stated that its objective was to become 
the best retail bank in Britain by 1997. This upbeat outlook was based on the 
somewhat equivocal definition that the best bank is the one with the highest 
aggregate rating from everyone involved in the business, i.e. customers, staff 
and shareholders (RBS, Annual Report 1995). Nevertheless, it still illustrates 
that management was clearly committed to its retail banking operations. In 
1992 RBS had launched the “Columbus” project, which comprised 
reorganising almost every aspect of branch banking to better meet the needs 
of customers.
In early 1993, The Royal Bank of Scotland reviewed its delivery channels and 
subsequently launched Direct Banking, a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week 
telephone banking service. This more differentiated distribution structure
B Citizens operated retail and corporate banking but no split between these two business areas was 
disclosed in RBS’ annual reports.
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eventually led to the bank’s Retail Direct segment.10 Retail Direct, initially 
known as New Retail Financial Services Businesses, was set up as a 
separate segment in 1997, the year when RBS launched a joint venture in 
financial services with Tesco, at the time the UK’s leading supermarket 
group.11
Through the joint venture with Tesco alone, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
gained more than 4 million new retail clients between 1997 and 2003. 
According to management, Tesco Personal Finance became one of the UK’s 
fastest growing financial services operations due to the combination of in-store 
facilities and high-quality direct service (RBS, Annual Report 2003). RBS’ US 
arm had already opened a series of in-store full-service retail branches in 
1995 at Shaw’s Supermarkets, a New England grocery chain owned by 
Sainsbury (RBS, Annual Report 1995).12
Using existing retail structures as a means of selling financial products was 
also at the heart of the bank’s partnership with the German coffee retailer 
Tchibo. This cooperation, launched in autumn 2003, spearheaded its entry 
into the continental European consumer finance market. Initially, The Royal 
Bank of Scotland sold fixed-term loans and stand-alone alternatives to bank 
overdrafts through Tchibo’s 870 stores. According to CEO Fred Goodwin, the 
German banking landscape was so fragmented that a market entry strategy 
should not focus on large acquisitions. Instead, the bank relied on distribution 
agreements like the one with Tchibo, which had previously been unheard of in 
the German retail sector (Borsen-Zeitung, 1 October 2003; Schmid, FT, 25 
June 2004; interview Achim Kluber).
The Royal Bank of Scotland further expanded its German retail operations 
through smaller acquisitions such as the German credit card and personal 
loan portfolios of Frankfurt-based Santander Direkt in 2003. At the time
10 By 2003 Retail Direct offered financial services and banking products directly to consumers through a 
range of channels, which included well-known brands such as Tesco Personal Finance, The One accounts, 
Direct Line Financial Services, Lombard Direct and in Europe, Comfort Cards. It also offered a 
comprehensive range of credit and charge cards (RBS, Annual Report 2003).
11 In 2003 Retail Direct also comprised Direct Line Financial Services, offering mortgages, life assurance, 
savings accounts, a PEP unit trust and pensions, RBS Advanta, the bank’s credit card business, and Direct 
Line Accident Management (RBS, Annual Report 2003).
12 The bank’s US retail operations grew as Citizens continuously expanded throughout the New England 
states and the Mid-Atlantic region of the US primarily through acquisitions. In 1993 Citizens operated more 
than 125 bank branches in Rhode Island and the neighbouring states of Connecticut and Massachusetts, 
with a strong presence in Boston, as well as 28 mortgage banking branches in the eastern USA (RBS,
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Santander Direkt was the third-largest credit card provider in Germany with
490,000 customer accounts and its credit card and loans portfolio was valued 
at EUR 486 million (Croft & Levitt, FT, 15 May 2003).
Alongside its differentiated retail banking approach, the bank has also offered 
insurance solutions to its retail clients since 1985. Unlike many other banks, 
RBS did not buy an insurance company but entered insurance as a venture 
capitalist. It funded13 Peter Wood’s idea that motor insurance could be 
underwritten profitably using computer-based technology and sold directly to 
the public over the phone. Operating as Direct Line, the group’s insurance arm 
gained quickly market share in the UK motor insurance business by cutting out 
the traditional intermediary, namely the insurance agent (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2005). In October 1988, Direct Line also launched home insurance, 
based on the same model as its original motor insurance product.
During the 1990s, Direct Line continued to broaden its focus, developing new 
products and expanding its operations to other financial services (Royal Bank 
of Scotland, 2005).14 By 1993 Direct Line had become the UK’s largest private 
motor insurance company with 1.25 million insured vehicles (RBS, Annual 
Report 1993). At the end of 2003, it was still the number one motor insurance 
company with over 8 million UK motor policies in force and had emerged as 
the number two for UK household insurance, following the GBP 1.1 billion 
takeover of Churchill Insurance Group (RBS, Annual Report 2003). In 1993 
Direct Line’s pre-tax profit was GBP 50 million and thus contributed some 17% 
to RBS’ pre-tax profit in that year. By the end of 2003 the group’s insurance 
operations generated a pre-tax profit of GBP 438 million but had lost ground in 
relative terms as their contribution to pre-tax profit was down to 6.5%.
As Direct Line did not have any bricks-and-mortar branches, it had to rely 
heavily on advertising and marketing. In 1990, the company introduced the 
logo of a red telephone with wheels to establish a cheerful and friendly 
corporate identity. According to the company’s founder Peter Wood, who left 
the company in 1997 (Graham, FT, 26 June 1997), the great success of Direct 
Line came from a good computer system, well-motivated, well-trained staff
Annual Report 1993). By 2003, Citizens had 2.4 million personal customers and was the fourth largest 
supermarket bank in the US (RBS, Annual Report 2003).
13 The initial funding was GBP 20 million.
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and good marketing (The Scotsman, 6 October 1992). Moreover, Direct Line 
had a conservative investment approach, keeping premium money mainly 
invested in cash and gilts. Wood was quoted as saying: “I’m already in the risk 
business - 1 don’t have to be in it twice. I’d rather get 8 per cent year-on-year, 
than do 30 per cent one year and go bust the next” (The Scotsman, 6 October 
1992).
Direct Line was also used to spearhead expansion into other European 
countries. First, it expanded into the Spanish insurance market through a 
motor insurance joint venture with Linea Directa in 1995, which applied the 
same strategy as in its domestic market. In June 2001, Direct Line acquired 
the Italian and German motor insurance operations of the US insurer Allstate. 
This, combined with the purchase of Royal & Sun Alliance’s direct motor 
operations in Italy in the following year, made it Italy’s largest direct motor 
insurer. By the end of 2003, Direct Line was the largest direct insurer in Spain 
and Italy and had made inroads into the German market (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2005).
Through the acquisition of NatWest The Royal Bank of Scotland gained 
control over a substantially larger private banking business, principally through 
Coutts & Co. Subsequently, a separate Wealth Management segment was 
established. This comprised Coutts, Adam & Company and the offshore 
banking businesses of The Royal Bank of Scotland and NatWest. Adam & 
Company is a private bank operating primarily in Scotland which RBS 
acquired in 1993. Coutts is one of the UK’s leading private banks, providing 
services to around 20% of the country’s wealthiest individuals. In 2003, Coutts 
purchased the Swiss private bank Bank von Ernst from Credit Suisse.15
The bank’s traditional, mainly UK-based high street branch banking received 
the largest earnings boost from the NatWest acquisition. The NatWest deal 
was to a great extent a domestic retail banking expansion, with a 
complementary branch structure. While The Royal Bank of Scotland enjoyed a 
strong foothold in the Scottish market, its home market, NatWest was 
particularly strong in England. Due to the complementary branch structure and
14 Direct Line began to offer non-insurance products, such as loans, mortgages, savings accounts, a PEP 
unit trust, pensions and life insurances.
15 At the end of the same year, Coutts had 36 offices worldwide and GBP 35 billion assets under 
management on behalf of 70,000 clients (RBS, Annual Report 2003).
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RBS’ multi-branding strategy -  i.e. keeping the NatWest branches alongside 
those of RBS -  the number of branch closures was limited and did not 
encounter major political resistance. In fact, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
increased the number of staff in NatWest branches as it realised that customer 
satisfaction was low due to understaffing (Croft, FT, 4 January 2003).
The Royal Bank of Scotland stopped NatWest’s closure programme and 
undertook measures to regain the confidence of staff and customers. Across 
the NatWest branch network 1,000 customer advisers were appointed, to 
implement RBS’ sales and service approach (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2000b; 
RBS, Annual Report 2002). Although the acquisition of NatWest did not entail 
a reduction in the number of branches, the deal still allowed the group to 
realise substantial cost-savings and cumulative benefits of GBP 5.5 billion 
(Croft, FT, 8 October 2004). The group’s cost and risk management, 
particularly in the light of the NatWest deal, will be discussed in the following 
section.
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5.2.3. Cost and Risk Management
Given that NatWest was about twice the size of The Royal Bank of Scotland in 
terms of total assets, it is clear that the takeover had substantial implications 
for the group’s cost and risk structure. The integration process entailed 18,000 
job cuts over a period of about two years. Drastic as these measures appear, 
NatWest explained in its defence document that as a stand-alone unit it had 
also laid off some 15,000 employees (Jamieson & Flanagan, The Scotsman, 1 
March 2002). The majority of job cuts were in the back office and the group’s 
treasury department, thus in areas where scale efficiencies could be achieved 
by eliminating overlaps. According to Fred Goodwin16, none of these 18,000 
job cuts were compulsory redundancies (Croft, FT, 4 January 2003).
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The proportion of personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total operating 
expenses before risk provisions declined from 55% in 1993 to 40% in 2003. In 
2003 RBS employed an average of 116,350 staff, compared to 23,708 in
1993. Obviously, the largest boost came from the NatWest acquisition, which 
added some 55,800 employees to the group (NatWest, Annual Report 2000). 
While RBS’ total personnel costs per employee rose at a compound annual
16 Fred Goodwin who oversaw the deal as CEO of The Royal Bank of Scotland had already earned the nick­
name “Fred The Shred” for his cost-cutting exercises while at Clydesdale Bank (part of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group) (Croft, FT, 4 January 2003).
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growth rate of 6.0% during the period analysed, average revenues per 
employee rose by a remarkable 9.9% p.a. This explains the strong average 
growth in pre-tax profit per employee during the period analysed. In 1993 pre­
tax profit per employee was GBP 10,882. This rose to GBP 52,222 in 2003 - a 
CAGR of 17%.
RBS: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
in % 
75 n
in GBP million 
r  1500
70 - -  1200
- 900
60 - - 600
55 - - 300
50
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Loan loss provisions Cost to income ratio
As previously discussed, the complementary location of RBS and NatWest 
branches did not lead to any major closures. Another reason why the closure 
of bank branches could be avoided following the acquisition was the 
“Columbus” efficiency improvement project which RBS had launched in 1992. 
This was a five-year restructuring plan for the bank’s 780 retail branches 
(figures relate to 1992). The initiative comprised major IT investments and 
cutting 3,500 jobs, i.e. 27% of the 13,000 people working in branches at the 
time (Gapper, FT, 20 November 1992). Because of these measures, 
management expected the cost income ratio to fall from 68% to 53% (Gapper, 
FT, 20 November 1992). However, according to the standardised Fitch data 
used for this research, the cost income ratio consistently stayed above 62% 
until 2003 and was on average 64% between 1993 and 2003.17
17 In contrast to the data used for this research, the cost income ratio published by RBS continuously 
improved over the years, with a widening gap between the standardised calculation and the one stated by 
the company. In 1993, the discrepancy was still just 5.6% but increased to 18.9% in 2003. The Royal Bank 
of Scotland’s calculation of its cost income ratio represents operating expenses excluding goodwill
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Besides reducing the number of employees, the NatWest deal also brought 
additional cost savings as a result of the integration of IT systems. Effectively, 
NatWest’s 446 IT systems were migrated into those of RBS which were a 
quarter of the size and were considered simpler and cheaper (Croft, FT, 4 
January 2003). The Royal Bank of Scotland’s IT integration was completed in 
October 2002, several months ahead of schedule. In recognition of this 
management paid a 5% integration bonus to all employees whose business 
units were involved in the process (RBS, Annual Report 2002).
The Royal Bank of Scotland also took a close look at the sales and service 
approach of Natwest. The sales process was streamlined by appointing over
1,000 customer advisers across the NatWest branch network. Moreover, all 
back offices were removed from NatWest branches and the bank’s branches 
underwent a GBP 150 million refurbishment. Finally, in 2002 The Royal Bank 
of Scotland announced that the cumulative benefits of the NatWest integration 
programme were GBP 5.5 billion, which was GBP 1.4 billion more than 
originally planned (Croft, FT, 4 January 2003). Management’s ability to exceed 
its own targets had also been helped by the fortunate circumstance that 
NatWest’s pension fund carried a higher than expected undeclared surplus.18
The acquisition of NatWest certainly represented the largest single risk RBS’ 
management took during the period analysed. A takeover on such a scale 
bears, for example, the risk of buying a loan portfolio that is not sufficiently 
provisioned for, or that is not adequately diversified and simply wrongly priced. 
Moreover, a hostile takeover of this sort involves multiple integration risks. 
These range from “soft factors” such as the compatibility of two distinct 
corporate cultures to the aforementioned integration of IT systems. During a 
phase of uncertainty, employees could also feel inclined not to act in the 
interest of the company. For instance, traders could try to take riskier positions 
than they would otherwise do.19
amortisation and integration costs, and after netting operating lease depreciation against rental income, thus 
providing a distorted picture.
It was reported that The Royal Bank of Scotland uncovered an undeclared surplus of up to GBP 2 billion 
in the pension fund of the National Westminster Bank (Garfield, The Independent, 22 May 2000).
19 Martin Taylor, Barclays’ former CEO, pointed out during the interview for this research that he was very 
wary of the changed risk attitude of the bank’s traders when it became public that the group’s investment 
banking arm was up for sale.
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Compared to the risks that the acquisition of NatWest entailed, the bank’s 
other operational risks appeared relatively exiguous. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s decision to build its own insurance operations did not simply 
require the bank to pursue a strategy that clearly distinguished it from other 
established insurers. It meant it also had to have control over the structure and 
price of the risks underwritten. Organic growth through Direct Line allowed 
RBS to underwrite mainly retail insurance and thus avoid large commercial 
risks.
The Royal Bank of Scotland’s management avoided aggressive expansion 
into traditional investment banking during the hype of the late 1990s. It did not 
endeavour to build a track record of transactions by granting inadequately 
priced loans in return for investment banking mandates. The bank’s disciplined 
strategy of remaining focused on debt capital market products and structured 
finance almost certainly contributed to the good quality of its loan portfolio. 
Consequently, the pricing of loans seemed to adequately reflect the underlying 
risk, justifying the group’s moderate coverage ratio.
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Possibly management’s confidence in its risk management can be considered 
as an explanation for a coverage ratio that remained below 100% throughout 
this period. Only in 2000/2001 did it nearly reach 100% but thereafter it fell
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back to its previous level, with a long-term average (1993-2003) of 64%. 
Rather than taking a critical view of the weak coverage ratio, one may argue 
that the group’s strong profitability justified the moderate level of the bank’s 
loan loss reserves. RBS has a rigorous “checks and balances” system in place 
with regards to granting loans. The bank’s client relationship managers are 
questioned by the loan officers in front of a management panel, which then 
decides whether a loan should be granted or not (interview Achim Kluber).20
Further anecdotal evidence about the group’s good credit quality is provided 
by its US subsidiary. According to the 1993 annual report, Citizens had the 
best credit quality of any major bank in New England, with the lowest bad 
debts and the lowest ratio of non-performing assets to performing assets 
(RBS, Annual Report 1993). Citizens’ CEO pursued a prudent lending policy 
which he summarised as “if you can’t drive to it, don’t lend to it” (Jamieson & 
Flanagan, The Scotsman, 1 March 2002). In fact, there is evidence that the 
distance between lender and creditor matters for the quality of the loan. It is 
argued that the probability of the loan turning bad increases with the distance 
between lender and creditor (Marquez & Hauswald, 2004; Degryse & Ongena, 
2005; Liberti & Mian, 2006). Thus RBS’ cautious and regional US expansion 
contributed to the group’s asset quality.
The Royal Bank of Scotland also put in place a “Specialised Lending Service” 
after it had found that its traditional approach to bad debts had been much too 
passive. Management argued that relationships with customers in trouble can 
best be handled by individually assessing each business and by developing a 
strategy with the customer that involves restructuring the customer’s financial 
arrangements and the customer’s business. According to management, this 
approach made a major contribution to dealing with problem loans and 
enabled businesses which were fundamentally sound to survive and prosper 
(RBS, Annual Report 1993). Effectively this approach is an asset-liability 
approach to managing clients.
20 These discussions are usually international video conferences with changing members of the 
management panel.
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5.2.4. Asset-Liability Structure
From 1993 until 2003 RBS’ total assets grew at a compound annual growth 
rate of 28% p.a. This figure is slightly misleading as the acquisition of NatWest 
meant that the group’s balance sheet total increased to GBP 309 billion in 
2000, compared with just GBP 87 billion in the previous year. Despite this 
quantum leap in terms of balance sheet size, the takeover of NatWest did not 
substantially alter the asset structure.
Net loans as a proportion of total assets declined from 63.5% in 1999 to 
57.3% in 2000. The average was 56% in this period. Notwithstanding the 
takeover of NatWest, The Royal Bank of Scotland grew its loan portfolio on 
average by 13.8% p.a. between 1993 and 1999. The most striking structural 
shift on the asset side was the relative decline in deposits with banks, which 
fell from 20% of total assets (1993) to 10% (2003). This development was 
mirrored by the growing significance of total other earning assets, which rose 
from 7% (1993) to 19% (2003). These other earning assets mainly resulted 
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The bank’s non-earning assets as a percentage of total assets remained 
relatively stable at around 10% until 2000 when the goodwill from the NatWest
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takeover had to be disclosed in the balance sheet. RBS reported goodwill of 
GBP 11.4 billion from the NatWest deal. Goodwill refers to the difference 
between the fair value of the price paid for a business and the fair value of its 
net assets (Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 1997). The different 
accounting treatments of “goodwill” illustrate how a company’s cost and risk 
management is interconnected with its balance sheet structure.
Prior to the NatWest deal, The Royal Bank of Scotland would write-down any 
goodwill in the year of acquisition, effectively leaving no goodwill on the 
balance sheet. Following the NatWest deal, management and the auditors 
agreed that the goodwill of GBP 11.4 billion would be amortised over its 
estimated useful life of 20 years, resulting in an annual charge of GBP 570 
million as of 2000 (RBS, Annual Report 2000). In addition, the auditors had to 
test the level of goodwill annually to see if it reflected a value that could be 
justified as an intangible or if it was identified as being impaired. Impairment 
would entail a value adjustment and therefore a write-down in excess of the 
annual amortisation charge, thus reducing profitability.
--------------------------------  — -—I  -------------     I-------- I-----










■ ■ tv '
I I  V -  rfC--; - U o  T
o - P
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Customer deposits ■ Banks deposits
■ Money market funding ■ Long-term-debt, sub-debt and hybrids
Non-interest bearing n Equity
Due to the bank’s expansive lending policy, its tier 1 ratio did not rise 
significantly and was just 7% on average (1993-2003). The relatively low tier 1 
ratio also resulted from an average payout ratio of 40% and the use of hybrid,
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subordinated debt and other long-term debt instruments that provided 5.6% of 
the group’s funding on average. On the liabilities and equity side of the 
balance sheet, the most remarkable structural change was the continuous 
decline in customer deposits relative to total liabilities and equity. In 1993, 
69.7% of the bank’s funding still came from customer deposits. This declined 
over the following decade and was 49.2% in 2003. During this period it was 
primarily replaced by bank deposits21 and money market instruments.
While more banks deposited money with RBS (shown as liabilities), RBS itself 
deposited less money with other banks (shown as assets). Deposits from 
other banks rose from 7.6% in 1993 to 17.1% in 2003, thus on average 9.7% 
of total liabilities were deposits from banks. This pattern is rather unusual and 
does not reflect the common trend towards disintermediation. A more active 
role on the debt capital markets and the resulting larger trading positions 
contributed to this development, which also reflects its services to other 
financial institutions, i.e. its role as a bank to other banks.
21 This refers to funding provided by other banks.
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5.2.5. Profitability
Net profit at The Royal Bank of Scotland underwent two major hikes between 
1993 and 2003. The 1993 and 1994 results show clear signs of the improved 
macroeconomic environment in the UK. Loan loss provisions fell from GBP 
396 million in 1992 to GBP 293 million in 1993 and to GBP 182 million in
1994. Thus, net profit soared during 1993 and 1994 compared to 1992 when it 
was just GBP 21 million, giving a return on equity of 1.3%. The second major 
earnings boost came from the takeover of NatWest in 2000, which lifted the 
group’s net profit to GBP 2.2 billion in 2000 (for 15 months) from GBP 850 
million in 1999, although ROE fell from 33% (1999) to 20% (2000).
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During the period analysed, RBS’ net profit grew on average by 37.1% p.a., 
while its total operating income increased at a compound annual growth rate 
of 28.9%. In absolute figures the group’s net profit rose from GBP 178 million 
in 1993 to GBP 4.8 billion in 2003. While the bank’s revenues and profits rose 
strongly in absolute terms, its return on equity actually weakened after the 
takeover of NatWest. From 1993 until 1999 the group’s post-tax ROE was on 
average 26%, whereas it fell to just 16% in the years immediately after the 
NatWest deal. However, the average ROE figure for the period between 1993 
until 2003 was a remarkable 22% after tax.
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The reduced return on equity after the acquisition of NatWest was also a 
reflection of a the bank’s higher capitalisation, as the tier 1 ratio was on 
average 7.2% between 2000 and 2003 in contrast to 6.8% for the years prior 
to the NatWest deal. Shareholders’ equity became a more important source of 
funding for the group, possibly in order to maintain the rating awarded by the 
international rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch). The proportion of common 
equity relative to total assets rose on average from 3.3% before the acquisition 
of NatWest to 6.2% after the takeover, supporting the argument that the 
weakened profitability in terms of ROE was also due to higher equity 
capitalisation. The rising tier 1 ratio also resulted from the fact that the group’s 
risk-weighted assets grew more slowly than its shareholders’ equity.
The group’s high profitability and strong profit growth were fuelled by a 
management approach that pooled resources and realised scale efficiencies 
through the use of a common group-wide platform and common standards 
wherever feasible. Moreover, management pursued a stringent cost control 
policy, while maintaining sufficient entrepreneurial flexibility to develop 
attractive new businesses (interview Achim Kluber). If the bank had slavishly 
sought to meet a profitability target, management might have forgone some of 
the group’s most interesting business opportunities. For example, in contrast 
to Lloyds TSB, RBS could diversify into other business lines, internationalise 
its operations and act as a venture capitalist, as in the case of Direct Line. 
Ultimately, this contributed to its profit growth.
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5.2.6. Conclusion
RBS did well in striking the balance between managing its costs and risks 
while granting its key staff sufficient entrepreneurial freedom.22 This 
entrepreneurial freedom fuelled the development of innovative solutions and 
enabled the bank to go unprecedented ways. Therefore, the strategy adopted 
by RBS shows a relatively unique and original pattern as it did not try to be 
everything to everybody. Instead, management appeared to have a clear 
awareness of which businesses it wanted to avoid. Management’s selective 
strategic approach may therefore be described as opportunistic and does not 
make it particularly easy to identify an over-arching corporate strategy.
It could be concluded that RBS’ corporate strategy was the successful 
management of business portfolios with distinct business strategies that did 
not follow a common rule. However, on an operational level, in order to realise 
scale efficiencies management tried to use a common platform, standardise 
procedures and use a joint purchasing approach for as many operations as 
possible. The bank’s incessant quest for efficiency improvements and its 
stringent cost control were also driven by the idea that size matters.
Throughout the period analysed, the bank’s profit predominantly originated 
from the UK and RBS’ management did not express any global aspirations. In 
1993, the purpose of RBS’ European operations was merely to serve its UK 
banking customer base and management regarded the US activities solely as 
a means of diversifying earnings (RBS, Annual Report 1993). Despite RBS’ 
1988 agreement to cooperate with the Spanish banking group Santander, its 
US operations were the only relevant international activity until 1998 when it 
finally expanded into Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.
Unlike its US operations, which grew through many regional acquisitions, 
RBS’ European expansion was primarily organic23 and followed a focused 
niche strategy. The bank’s European strategy received new momentum 
following the acquisition of NatWest. Subsequently, it expanded into Spain
22 While at the end of 1993 The Royal Bank of Scotland was still a provincial bank, which employed some 
23,700 people, and operated with GBP 37.2 billion of assets, a decade later 116,350 people worked for 
RBS, which by then had grown its assets to GBP 451 billion.
23 In Germany RBS explicitly ruled out any major takeovers. CEO Fred Goodwin considered the German 
banking market to be too fragmented for any takeover to provide a substantial market share.
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(2001), France (2001), and Italy (2002) and the share of profit from Europe 
gained significance, contributing 19% of RBS’ pre-tax profit in 2003, compared 
to just 6% in 1993.
As explained in RBS’ 1993 annual report, management wanted the group to 
become “the best-performing financial services firm in the UK by 1997” (RBS, 
Annual Report 1993). This rather broad statement provided some indication of 
what was to come in the following years. It was already clear at the time that 
management wanted to concentrate on the domestic market and actively 
participate in consolidation in order to grow.24 Yet, it hardly did so, until 1997 -  
and maybe therefore felt even greater pressure to win the battle for NatWest 
in 2000.
Clearly, the hostile takeover of the much bigger NatWest was the strategic 
masterpiece of RBS’ management during the period analysed. Besides the 
actual deal, the relatively smooth integration and the subsequent creation of a 
multi-brand powerhouse required managerial vigour and a clear understanding 
of power structures within the organisation.
24 Moreover, the term “financial services" suggested that it would want to pursue a balanced business model 
with retail and corporate banking as well as insurance operations.
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5.3, Deutsche Bank AO
5.3.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
When it was founded in 1870, Deutsche Bank’s primary goal was to challenge 
the hegemony of British banks, which dominated the financing of German 
foreign trade1 (Gall et al., 1995; Pohl & Burk, 1998). Deutsche Bank’s statute 
emphasised its future role in foreign trade and explicitly stated that “the object 
of the company is to transact banking business of all kinds, in particular to 
promote and facilitate trade relations between Germany, other European 
countries and overseas markets” (Gall et al., 1995).
Deutsche Bank’s founding fathers were the first in Germany to recognise that 
the savings of domestic depositors are an attractive source of financing.2 With 
this understanding of asset-liability management Deutsche Bank expanded 
from financing international trade to financing domestic industrial investment.3
Like many other large German banks, its international operations had come 
apart during the Nazi era and in particular during the Second World War. As 
an important financier to Germany’s export-oriented industry, Deutsche Bank 
gradually regained its international position during the 1950s and 1960s as the 
country’s economy was being rebuilt. During that post-war period, the country 
also moved from being a debtor to being a creditor nation.4
Although the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundations for Deutsche Bank’s role 
as a global financial powerhouse, its main period of international expansion 
was in the 1970s. Between 1976 and 1979 it opened branches in London, 
Tokyo, Paris, Brussels, Antwerp, New York, Hong Kong, Milan and Madrid.5 
This renewed internationalisation was followed by an effort to branch out into
1 Available from: http://www.deutsche-bank.de/geschichte/en/html/index_m.htm (Deutsche Bank AG, 
undated) [Accessed 17 December 2004],
2 In 1929, Deutsche Bank merged with its competitor Disconto-Gesellschaft, founded in 1851. Both 
institutions were of comparable size and the merger has been described as merger of equals. Available 
from: http://www.bankgeschichte.de/index_04.html (Deutsche Bank AG, undated) [Accessed 17 January 
2007].
3 Since its early days, Deutsche Bank has been characterised as a “universal bank”. Although there is no 
unequivocal definition of a universal bank in the academic literature, this term is generally used to describe 
banks which provide a large variety of financial services to a broad range of clients (Canals, 1996), with a 
high proportion of earnings coming from transformation activities (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2000, p. 29).
4 Available from: http://www.deutsche-bank.de/csr/en/history/7605_7631.html# (Deutsche Bank AG, 
undated) [Accessed 15 January 2005].
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other retail markets in an attempt to build a pan-European retail network 
throughout the 1980s.
Most prominent was the bank’s early engagement in Italy through the USD 
600 million (DM 1.2 billion) acquisition of Banca d'America e d'ltalia in 1986. 
Following several transactions, including the 1989 takeover of UK merchant 
bank Morgan Grenfell and the takeover of Banco de Madrid in 1993, Deutsche 
Bank earned around 26% of its operating profit in 1993 through its foreign 
subsidiaries. At the time 16,271 employees, that was 22% of the group’s staff, 
worked in 697 international branches outside Germany (Deutsche Bank, 
Annual Report 1993).6
Towards the end of the 20th century when new information technologies, 
deregulation and disintermediation profoundly changed the global economic 
structure, Deutsche Bank’s diverse activities as a universal bank posed a 
major strategic challenge for management. The introduction of the Single 
European Market in 1993 was a prime example of market liberalisation and 
marked the decline of national borders as obstacles to economic activity.
Following the launch of the European Single Market, Deutsche Bank’s 
corporate strategy was torn between its universal banking roots and its 
ambition to obtain more capital-market oriented transaction expertise to 
complement its existing services. Throughout the 1990s, Deutsche Bank 
expanded into the Anglo-American investment banking world, while facing 
challenges from domestic risks, which appeared highly clustered in a global 
context.
During the period analysed, three different CEOs headed the bank. Hilmar Kopper 
became Deutsche Bank’s CEO following the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen in 
1989 and remained at the top of the bank until 1997.7 In the German management 
tradition, Kopper was thereafter appointed chairman of the bank’s supervisory 
board. Rolf-Emst Breuer presided over the bank’s management board from 1997 
until 2002, when Swiss-bom Josef Ackermann took over.
5 Available from: http://www.deutsche-bank.de/csr/en/history/7605_7631 .html# (Deutsche Bank AG, 
undated) [Accessed 15 January 2005].
6 In 1993, the total number of branches was 2,431 with an all time high of 1,734 branches in Germany.
7 Former Deutsche Bank management board member F. Wilhelm Christians chaired the supervisory board 
from 1990 until 1997.
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5.3.2. Incom e Structure
5.3.2.1. Structural Overview
Under the leadership of these three CEOs there was a significant shift in the 
bank’s income from net interest income to commission income and trading 
income. This altered income structure reflects the trend towards 
disintermediation in general and the bank’s greater exposure to investment 
banking in particular.
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The group’s interest income declined faster than its interest expenses. Net 
interest income dropped on average by 0.2% p.a. and amounted to EUR 5.8 
billion at the end of 2003. Deutsche Bank’s fall in net interest income was 
accompanied by a drop in its net interest margin. As total loans rose from EUR 
170 billion in 1993 to EUR 365 billion in 2000, but therefater declined sharply 
to EUR 145 billion, the net interest margin deteriorated and stood at 0.92% in 
2003, compared to 2.21% in 1993.8
8 Deutsche Bank changed its accounting standards two times: for 1993 on the basis of HGB (German 
accounting law), for 1994 until 1999 on the basis of IFRS (IAS) and for 2001, 2002 and 2003 on the basis of 
US GAAP.
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While Deutsche Bank still generated 60% of its total operating income from 
net interest income9 in 1993, this figure had declined to 28% by 2003. During 
the same period the proportion of commission income rose from 30% to 44%. 
The income contribution from trading increased from 10% in 1993 to 27% in
2003. In absolute terms, Deutsche Bank’s total operating income more than 
doubled from EUR 10.0 billion in 1993 to EUR 21.1 billion in 2003. This 
implies a compound annual growth rate of 7.8%.
Besides operating income, Deutsche Bank’s non-operating income played a 
major role during the period analysed. The group’s non-operating income 
primarily resulted from the continuous sale of its large industrial holdings, 
which it had built up over a century. According to Deutsche Bank’s 1993 
annual report, the bank held stakes of at least 10% in 25 listed German 
companies. The total market value of these investments was EUR 13 billion 
(Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1993). At the end of 2003, the group’s 
industrial holdings amounted to EUR 10 billion (Deutsche Bank, Annual 
Report 2003, p. 39).
Deutsche Bank boosted its net profit through average non-operating income of 
EUR 1 billion p.a. (net income from investments). The positive effect of the
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divestment of its stakes in German industrial companies on pre-tax ROE was 
on average 4.7 percentage points. Selling the German investments 
contributed to a diversification of its asset base and bolstered the turbulent 
transition process the bank was undergoing during the decade analysed.
The strategic measures that led to an expansion of the group’s investment 
banking business will be reviewed first as they were behind the general shift 
from transformation to transaction services (interview Hilmar Kopper). 
Subsequently, this case study will concentrate on Deutsche Bank’s asset 
management activities, which also contributed to that shift. The different types 
of asset management clients, i.e. retail and institutional clients, make this 
business a point of intersection between investment banking and retail 
banking. The consequences of Deutsche Bank’s corporate strategy for its 
retail banking operations will complete the analysis of the bank’s income 
structure.
9 Net interest income is the difference between gross interest income (from the bank’s assets) and interest 
expense (from the bank’s liabilities), i.e. the cost of funds.
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5.3.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
This research uses the term investment banking in its broad sense and not 
just as a synonym for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory activities. 
According to Deutsche Bank’s glossary, investment banking is a generic term 
for capital market-oriented business. This includes primarily the issuing and 
trading of securities and their derivatives, interest and currency management, 
corporate finance, M&A advisory, structured finance and private equity 
(Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 257).
When Germany’s largest bank expanded into international investment 
banking, it had to come to terms with an industry-wide trend towards 
disintermediation, its low market share in domestic retail banking, and an 
internationally active corporate client base (interview Hilmar Kopper). Two 
major acquisitions determined Deutsche Bank’s strategic positioning within the 
Anglo-American investment banking world.
The first leap forward was the bank’s GBP 950 million acquisition of UK 
merchant bank Morgan Grenfell in 1989 (completed in 1990). Notwithstanding 
the acquisition of Morgan Grenfell, Kopper considered that Deutsche Bank 
was still underrepresented in shares and derivative products (Simonian, FT, 
16 September 1993). He remarked in 1993 that Deutsche Bank did not enjoy 
the same international clout in equities as in bonds (Simonian, FT, 16 
September 1993). Following this statement, Deutsche Bank boosted its equity 
business in the City of London and Kopper explicitly recognised London, not 
Frankfurt, as the bank’s base for European equities business (Denton, Cohen 
& Parkes, FT, 26 September 1994).
For the first five years after its acquisition, Morgan Grenfell enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy and operated as a separate business unit. Finally, in 
1995 Deutsche Bank brought all of its international investment banking 
activities together in London under the umbrella of Morgan Grenfell which it 
renamed Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1995, pp. 
19-25). This new group division comprised seven businesses10 and employed
7,000 people in 40 countries (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1995, pp. 19- 
25). Between 1994 and 1996 Deutsche Bank stepped up its investment
10 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell’s seven businesses were: Global Markets, Equities, Investment Banking, 
Structured Finance, Emerging Markets, Asset Management, Development Capital.
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banking operations, spending in total an estimated DM 2.8 billion (Fisher & 
Denton, FT, 29 March 1996).
While Morgan Grenfell helped improve Deutsche Bank’s standing in London, 
the deal had little bearing on its US exposure. For most of the 1990s, 
Deutsche Bank pursued an organic growth strategy in the US. This relied 
heavily on poaching staff from other investment banks.11 An exception to the 
organic growth strategy in the US was the acquisition of ITT’s commercial 
finance unit for USD 2.6 billion in 1995, which became the heart of the 
commercial inventory financing businesses, Deutsche Financial Services.12 
Deutsche Financial Services was sold in October 2002 for USD 2.9 billion, as 
part of Ackermann’s overhaul of the bank’s core competences.
By acquiring the US investment bank Bankers Trust for USD 10.1 billion in 
November 1998 (completed in 1999), Deutsche Bank abandoned its organic 
growth strategy in the US investment banking sector (Lewis & Corrigan, FT, 
23 November 1998 & Barber, FT, 1 December 1998). The acquisition of 
Bankers Trust with its 20,000 employees enabled Deutsche Bank to expand 
its presence in the US investment banking market while reducing costs by 
eliminating duplication of work. As a result some 5,500 jobs were cut, mostly 
in London and New York (Andrews, New York Times, 1 December 1998).
During the 1990s, Bankers Trust had built up expertise as an originator of 
high-yield bonds and a derivatives house. Bankers Trust’s trading exposure 
showed up in a rise in Deutsche Bank’s trading income in 1999. Shortly before 
Bankers Trust was taken over it had itself acquired three firms, namely the 
securities broker Alex. Brown, M&A boutique James D. Wolfensohn, and 
parts13 of NatWest Markets (Dries, Borsen-Zeitung, 24 November 1998; 
Peterson & Silverman, Business Week, 7 December 1998; Ewing et al., 
Business Week, 19 July 1999).
Not least through James D. Wolfensohn, Bankers Trust initially helped boost 
Deutsche Bank’s expertise in the M&A advisory business for MBOs
11 Deutsche Bank’s aggressive hiring spree led to tension with other banks and even prompted ING’s CEO 
Hessel Lindenbergh to make a formal complaint to Hilmar Kopper. Ultimately, a case was filed with the New 
York Supreme Court (Denton, FT, 6 June 1996 & Denton, FT, 8 June 1996).
12 This business was located in Saint Louis, Missouri, USA.
13 Equities research, institutional sales and trading, and primary markets origination business in the UK and 
Europe.
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(management buy-outs) and LBOs (leverage buy-outs). The Bankers Trust 
acquisition strengthened Deutsche Bank’s product expertise (Deutsche Bank, 
Annual Report 1998), but did not provide a significant distribution network. 
This view is also shared by a former aide14 of Deutsche Bank’s CEO Breuer, 
who said that the deal was aimed at attaining US capital market expertise, but 
not distribution (interview Alexander Hiller).
The acquisition of Bankers Trust illustrates how actual strategy may deviate 
from the previously communicated strategy. Only few months before the deal, 
Frank Newman, CEO of Bankers Trust, made clear in an interview that 
“Bankers Trust is not for sale” (Lewis, FT, 30 December 1997). However, 
altered circumstances15 changed his mind. Moreover, the Bankers Trust deal 
did not simply contrast with what Newman had said, it was also inconsistent 
with Kopper’s previous statements on Deutsche Bank’s US strategy.
Shortly before Kopper stepped down as CEO in May 1997 to assume the 
chairmanship of the supervisory board, he unambiguously ruled out a major 
acquisition in the USA and was quoted as saying “there is no question at all of 
us doing that. That would be the stupidest thing we could do today. We are 
trying to [expand] in America from our own resources. The stupidest thing we 
could do at this time would be to pay a lot of money when the market is in a 
growth phase” (Fisher, FT, 13 May 1997). Just a few weeks later Kopper’s 
organic growth strategy for the US was reiterated by the bank’s new CEO 
Breuer (FAZ, 24 July 1997).
However, in the interview for this case study Hilmar Kopper pointed out that by 
the end of 1998 it had become clear that the Glass-Steagall Act would soon 
be repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (November 1999), allowing 
commercial and investment banks to merge. In fact, throughout the 1990s the 
interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act had been softened and some US 
financial institutions even anticipated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The most 
famous instance was the creation of Citigroup in April 1998. Deutsche Bank’s 
management realised that these legal and regulatory changes opened up 
unprecedented opportunities and that they should swiftly try to break into the 
US investment banking market. According to Hilmar Kopper it is not possible
14 Conversation with Alexander Hiller, Deutsche Bank, Thursday, 24 March 2005.
15 The 1998 financial crises in Asia and Russia reduced Bankers Trust’s profitability.
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to become a leading investment bank without being global and being global 
inevitably means being strong on the US capital markets (interview Hilmar 
Kopper).
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S.3.2.3. Asset Management
Deutsche Bank’s expansion into investment banking also contributed to the 
growth in its asset management activities. The acquisition of Morgan Grenfell 
and Bankers Trust boosted assets under management and helped Deutsche 
Bank gain expertise in dealing with equities (interview Hilmar Kopper).16 
Although Morgan Grenfell was acquired back in 1989, the developments at 
Morgan Grenfell Asset Management (MGAM) had far-reaching implications for 
Deutsche Bank’s corporate strategy in the 1990s.
The most prominent of these were the fraudulent investments by a fund 
manager, which became public in September 1996 when three Morgan 
Grenfell investment funds (unit trusts) had to be suspended. Deutsche Bank 
indicated in March of the following year that the failure of its UK fund 
management arm could cost up to DM 1.2 billion (GBP 450 million) (Fischer, 
FT, 27 March 1997). In its annual report for 1996, Deutsche Bank explained 
that this fund affair had led to a “major review of the division’s management 
structure and control system" (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1996, p. 30).
It is only possible to speculate whether these fraudulent activities would have 
been of the same magnitude if Deutsche Bank had fully integrated Morgan 
Grenfell at an earlier stage, rather than some five years after its acquisition. 
However, it appears that Deutsche Bank’s management emphasised rapid 
integration of Bankers Trust because of its UK experience. On the day on 
which the Bankers Trust deal was announced, Breuer explained at a news 
conference “We don’t believe in autonomy as an instrument of management 
and leadership [...] As far as it goes, we want a centralized management of 
the business” (Andrews, New York Times, 1 December 1998). This statement 
suggests that Deutsche Bank’s management was determined to integrate 
Bankers Trust into the bank’s existing business quickly and completely.17
Bankers Trust, which at the time of the deal was the eighth largest bank in the 
United States, increased assets under management at Deutsche Bank by 
EUR 250 billion. Although most of these were low-margin passive 
management accounts, Deutsche Bank emerged as the world’s fourth largest
16 Morgan Grenfell brought GBP 43 billion of assets under management to Deutsche Bank, which had had a 
total assets under management of DM 73 billion (approx. GBP 25 billion) before the deal (Lascelles, FT, 28 
November 1989).
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asset manager (up from number fourteen) as a result of the Bankers Trust 
acquisition (Roth, FAZ, 31 October 2000). Subsequently, Deutsche Bank 
decided to group its asset management operations in a single worldwide 
business known as Deutsche Asset Management.
The growth in Deutsche Bank’s asset management business also made it one 
of the largest players in the custody18 business. In 2002, Deutsche Bank had 
assets under custody of EUR 2.2 trillion worldwide and 3,200 employees in 
this division. However, the stable but low-margin custody business was 
identified as a non-core operation by Ackermann and put up for sale in 2002. 
The bank announced the divestment of its custody business for USD 1.5 
billion in November 2002. Only three months later Ackermann also sold most 
of Deutsche Bank’s global passive asset management business to Northern 
Trust Corporation (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 40; Borsen- 
Zeitung, 4 February 2003).19
In its 2002 annual report, Deutsche Bank made it clear that its focus in asset 
management would be on “active institutional, retail and alternative 
investments” (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 40). The acquisition of 
Scudder Investment from Zurich Financial Services Group (ZFS) in 2001 thus 
appeared consistent with its strategy. The deal added USD 250 billion of 
actively managed assets to Deutsche Bank’s assets under management. As 
part of the USD 2.5 billion deal, Deutsche Bank essentially exited its life 
insurance operations as ZFS received 76% of the life insurance company 
Deutscher Herold. Deutsche Bank and ZFS signed a mutual distribution 
agreement under which Deutsche Bank would continue to distribute life 
assurance products for Zurich’s enlarged German operations, while ZFS 
would continue to sell Scudder products across Europe (Clow & Wine, FT, 26 
September 2001; Borsen-Zeitung, 6 April 2002).
17 Further evidence of the intended rapid integration can be found in the group’s 1998 annual report 
(Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1998, p. 27).
8 Custodians serve as a sort of safe house for securities bought by investment managers. A custodian 
arranges to take possession of bonds, equities, currency or other securities when their clients trade in such 
instruments. Other services offered by custodians to institutional investors comprise compiling and reporting 
data on the investment’s price, value and progress. Custody business is a low-margin business that benefits 
from economies of scale. During the 1990s the global custody business underwent rapid consolidation 
(Bowe, FT, 14 July 2000).
The price ranged between USD 144 million and USD 161 million (Bdrsen-Zeitung, 4 February 2003).
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5.3.2.4. Retail Banking
The disposal of Deutscher Herold brought Deutsche Bank’s own retail 
insurance activities to an end. The bank’s foray into the insurance sector had 
started in 1989 when it began selling its own life insurance policies through its 
branches. The bank’s insurance operations were advanced in 1992 by 
acquiring a 30% stake in industrial insurer Gerling Insurance for an estimated 
DM 1.5-2.0 billion (Waller, FT, 11 July 1992) and a stake in the Deutscher 
Herold insurance group.
In 1998, Breuer publicly reviewed the bank’s strategic insurance options in an 
interview (Fisher & Clay, FT, 9 February 1998). He considered Deutsche 
Bank’s insurance arm to be unsatisfactory and suggested that the options 
were either to increase it to a reasonable size or “to get rid of it” (Fisher & 
Clay, FT, 9 February 1998). He also pointed out that if Deutsche Bank were to 
remain in the insurance business these operations would have to be 
expanded to European level (Fisher & Clay, FT, 9 February 1998). A few 
months later Breuer explained that there had been a shift in Deutsche Bank’s 
strategy regarding insurance. Deutsche Bank had concluded it did not need its 
own insurance group and would not be interested in acquiring an insurance 
company. He was quoted as saying, “we are now convinced that it is not 
necessary for a universal bank to produce insurance products itself, but that it 
needs to distribute them” (Bowley, FT, 28 July 1998).
Although it announced its intention of withdrawing from insurance in 1998, 
Deutsche Bank had not entirely abandoned its insurance business even after 
the aforementioned “swap" with ZFS in 2001. Deutsche Bank still owned the 
30% stake in industrial insurer Gerling. Following the terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001, Gerling’s reinsurance subsidiary accrued a loss of EUR 500 
million in 2001. This necessitated a EUR 300 million capital injection in March 
2002. As a result, Deutsche Bank’s investment actually increased to 34.5% 
(Fromme, FT, 15 March 2002). Subsequently, Deutsche Bank had to write 
down EUR 500 million related to Gerling in April 2003 (Jenkins, FT, 25 April 
2003) and eventually returned its stake to majority shareholder Rolf Gerling for 
free (Fromme & Jenkins, FT, 30 April 2003).
While Deutsche Bank’s excursion into bancassurance was a cornerstone of its 
retail banking strategy during the first half of the period analysed, in the
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second half the focus shifted towards the use of new technologies and the 
bank’s European businesses (interview Hilmar Kopper). At the hub of the 
group’s pan-European retail banking strategy was Deutsche Bank 24, which 
was set up in September 1999 when Deutsche Bank hived off most of its 
German retail banking operations following a review of its retail client 
segmentation (Grant, FT, 1 September 1999). Equipped with a new logo, 
Deutsche Bank 24 was promoted as a separate brand for the mass retail 
banking market. This re-branding sharpened the distinction between Deutsche 
Bank’s remaining clients, who were defined as high-net-worth private banking 
clients, and the second-tier Deutsche Bank 24 clients.
As part of the Deutsche Bank 24 strategy a European-wide retail banking 
platform and online brokerage service were launched in August 2000. This 
targeted seven European countries: Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, 
Belgium and Poland. Deutsche Bank expected Deutsche Bank 24’s operating 
profits to rise from EUR 400 million in 2000 to EUR 1 billion by 2004 (Roth, 
FAZ, 4 August 2000). However, this profit target never materialised, not least 
because shortly after his appointment as the group’s CEO in 2002, Josef 
Ackermann instituted an organisational shake-up of the private client business 
that included the reintegration of Deutsche Bank 24 into Deutsche Bank.
Deutsche Bank’s grand European retail banking strategy was meant to be built 
on its established retail operations in Italy and Spain, which had already 
reached a substantial size by the late 1980s. Deutsche Bank began to expand 
in Italy through the USD 600 million (DM 1.2 billion) acquisition of Banca 
d'America e d'ltalia in 1986. Three years later Deutsche Bank bought a 
majority stake in Spain’s Banco Comercial Transatlantico (BCT) and advanced 
its Spanish operations through the takeover of Banco de Madrid for ESP 42 
billion (USD 357 million) in 1993. Following this transaction Deutsche Bank 
had assets of DM 16 billion20 (USD 9.6 billion), 318 branches and 3,000 
employees in Spain (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1994).
In 1993 Deutsche Bank’s CEO Kopper said that the bank was content with its 
European retail banking network and that there were no acquisition plans for 
France and the UK. However, he did consider expanding further into Italy by 
acquiring small regional banks (Simonian, 1993, FT, 16 September 1993). In
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November of the same year, Deutsche Bank acquired 58% of Banca Popolare 
di Lecco (BPL), for ITL 470 billion (USD 277 million; DM 470 million). This 
small northern regional bank had 1,200 employees and 100 branches in 
Lombardy (FAZ, 25 November 1993).
While Deutsche Bank made inroads into the Spanish and Italian retail banking 
markets, its attempts to enter the French market were less successful. Breuer, 
who speaks fluent French, seemed much more committed to entering the 
French market than his predecessor Kopper. In July 1997 Breuer expressed 
his interest in boosting Deutsche Bank’s distribution network in the French 
market (FAZ, 24 July 1997).
However, he saw his plans to buy a large French bank thwarted when German 
insurer Allianz took a majority stake in the French insurer AGF in 1998. At the 
time Breuer explained that “the feeling in France, if I’m not totally mistaken, is 
that it is now the turn of a French institution to [take over] a German one,” and 
he added: “Reciprocity is what they call it, and as long as that is the name of 
the game, I think Deutsche Bank does not have much of a chance for a major 
acquisition in France” (Fisher & Harris, FT, 9 February 1998).
Breuer said Deutsche Bank would always go for a friendly takeover as the 
bank would need the support of the local management and they needed the 
support of the French authorities (Fisher & Harris, FT, 9 February 1998). In 
fact, Hilmar Kopper conceded in the interview for this case study that he would 
have liked to enter the French banking market but had to acknowledge that 
the role of the state in the banking market was too strong (interview Hilmar 
Kopper).
Subsequently, Deutsche Bank tried to expand organically in France and built a 
multi-channel distribution network targeting affluent clients. In 2000, Deutsche 
Bank sold its products through around ten branches and via the internet with 
additional support from call centres (FAZ, 2 August 2000). In early 2001, 
Deutsche Bank acquired the core activities of Banque Worms from AXA 
(Borsen-Zeitung, 20 March 2001). Only few months later, in December 2002, 
Deutsche Bank sold its French retail operations with its 11,000 clients to the
20 DM 3.1 billion were added by acquiring Banco de Madrid (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 1993, p. 46).
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Dutch bancassurance group ING and therefore effectively withdrew from the 
French retail banking market.21
Other major European retail banking acquisitions were the 1998 expansion 
into the Belgian market through the DM 1 billion (USD 596 million) takeover of 
the Belgium business of Credit Lyonnais. In the same year, Deutsche Bank 
acquired 9.3% of Greece’s third largest bank, EFG Eurobank Ergasias, which 
it sold again in November 2003.
During the period analysed Deutsche Bank only undertook two substantial 
strategic transactions in retail banking outside Europe. In 1997 it sold its 
Argentinean retail banking operations with some 100,000 clients to 
BankBoston for USD 250 million (Borsen-Zeitung, 30 September 1997) and in 
2000, at the height of the dotcom boom, it bought National Discount Brokers, a 
US market maker and online broker, for about USD 1 billion22 (Borsen-Zeitung, 
13 October 2000). Less than a year later, in July 2001, Deutsche Bank sold 
National Discount Brokers Corp., but it kept the market maker arm.
With the exception of its Italian and Spanish businesses, Deutsche Bank did 
not successfully build an international retail organisation that could match the 
growth of its other operations. Imbalanced international expansion of different 
business areas has substantial implications for the risk structure of a universal 
bank. The relative decline of Deutsche Bank’s retail banking activities deprived 
it of a stable earnings component and a predictable source of funding. 
Effectively, Deutsche Bank failed to reproduce its universal banking model on 
an international scale.
21 Deutsche Bank kept its Paris branch and Banque Worms (Borsen-Zeitung, 10. January 2002). Banque 
Worms was liquidated by Deutsche Bank in 2004 (Borsen-Zeitung, 4 June 2004).
22 At the time of this deal, the online brokerage arm had some 268,900 customer accounts and USD 11.2 
billion in customer assets (Borsen-Zeitung, 13 October 2000).
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5.3.3. Cost and Risk Management
Deutsche Bank’s character as a universal bank is also reflected in the group’s 
expenses. Throughout the period analysed, two issues dominated cost and 
risk management at the bank. First, its internationalisation was primarily driven 
by expansion into investment banking, which is shown by the rise in personnel 
expenses per employee. Second, its exposure to German industry was 
increasingly perceived as a cluster risk, especially given the liberalisation of 
the European market and the group’s increasing internationalisation.
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Deutsche Bank’s investment banking strategy entailed internationalisation of 
its operations, giving it a greater presence in the capital market hubs, London 
and New York (interview Hilmar Kopper). The competitive investment banking 
environment contributed to a continuous rise in personnel expenses between 
1993 and 2003. In particular, the entry into the US investment banking market 
increased personnel expenses per employee by 40% (year-on-year) in 1999, 
and a further rise of 20% in the following year. However, total operating 
income per employee only increased by 33% (year-on-year) in 1999 and 16% 
in 2000 (year-on-year), implying an erosion of the group’s profitability. This 
pattern also holds true for the whole period between 1993 and 2003. While the 
costs per employee increased by an average of 10.7% p.a., i.e. from EUR
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52,505 in 1993 to EUR 144,635 in 2003, total operating income per employee 
increased by an average of just 8% p.a.
Although Deutsche Bank grew its total operating income at an annual rate of 
7.8% (CAGR 1993-2003), it employed nearly 5,500 fewer people at the end of 
2003 than in 1993. This development was not only due to rapid technological 
progress and improved efficiency, it also mirrors Deutsche Bank’s changed 
business mix. Effectively, the bank’s move into investment banking 
represented a shift from employees who generate low revenues to employees 
whose work leads to high revenues. However, since personnel costs rose 
faster than revenues per employee and there were few scale efficiencies, 
Deutsche Bank’s cost income ratio deteriorated during the period analysed. In 
1998, Breuer expressed concern at the bank’s high cost levels, saying that the 
group’s cost income ratio of 76% was unsatisfactory. He said the bank aimed 
to cut its cost income ratio to 65% in four years (Fisher, FT, 3 April 1998). In 
2002 it stood at 86%.
Deutsche Bank: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
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Another decisive cost/risk factor is a bank’s loan loss provisioning, which is not 
included in the cost income ratio. Deutsche Bank’s loan loss provisions 
declined between 1993 and 2003 as it reduced its loan portfolio. However, 
problem loans did not decline by the same amount, as reflected in a reduction
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in Deutsche Bank’s coverage ratio (loan loss reserves relative to problem 
loans; see diagram). The decline was particularly sharp after Deutsche Bank’s 
switch to US accounting standards (US GAAP), which was necessary for its 
listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 2001. Moreover, even without the 
change to US GAAP, the group’s coverage ratio had deteriorated steadily 
between 199523 and 2000.
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The relatively high asset exposure in Germany was exacerbated by Deutsche 
Bank’s industrial holdings, which had been built up over a century as the main 
banking partner (“Hausbank”) to many large German companies. In 1993, 
Deutsche Bank disclosed its industrial holdings for the first time. These 
included a 28% stake in Daimler Benz (DM 11 billion on 31 December 1993). 
According to Deutsche Bank’s 1993 annual report, the bank held stakes of at 
least 10% in 25 listed German companies.24 The total market value of these 
investments was DM 25 billion (EUR 13 billion) at the end of 1993 (Deutsche 
Bank, Annual Report 1993). Given the geographic concentration of these 
holdings and their value, which exceeded Deutsche Bank’s shareholders’ 
equity of DM 21 billion at the time, they represented a cluster risk.
23 Deutsche Bank did not disclose its “problem loans” before 1995.
24 The three largest unlisted companies included the aforementioned 30% investment in Gerling insurance.
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The more international Deutsche Bank’s operating business became, the 
greater the cluster risks associated with its exposure to German industry 
appeared to be. The internationalisation of the bank’s revenues was not 
accompanied by corresponding international diversification of its assets. While 
Deutsche Bank could use the gradual disposal of its investments to boost its 
earnings, write-downs and rescue packages for some of these holdings also 
held back profitability. Among the more prominent rescue operations in which 
Deutsche Bank played a leading role were, for example, Metallgesellschaft, 
Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz and Holzmann.
Metallgesellschaft (now renamed in MG Technologies), a metals, mining and 
industrial group, was Germany’s fourteenth largest industrial company when it 
faced severe liquidity problems at the end of 1993. As a result of its oil trading 
activities in the United States, it suddenly found itself on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Metallgesellschaft turned to its largest creditor, Deutsche Bank, 
for help. Deutsche Bank, which also owned 10% of the company, provided an 
undisclosed liquidity injection and subsequently headed the consortium of 
creditors. The rescue package comprised DM 2.5 billion of fresh equity and 
DM 700 million25 of additional debt (FAZ, 5 December 1994).
Further examples were Deutsche Bank’s DM 550 million bailout of the 
Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz industrial group26 in June 1995 and the near­
bankruptcy of the construction group Holzmann in 1999. Due to some property 
deals, Holzmann was on the brink of collapse with an expected loss of DM 2.4 
billion (Major, FT, 19 November 1999; FAZ, 19 November 1999). Again, 
Deutsche Bank, as Holzmann’s “Hausbank” did not merely own 15% of the 
company; it was also one of its largest creditors, with outstanding loans of 
almost DM 2.2 billion (Major, FT, 19 November 1999; FAZ, 19 November 
1999). Despite a DM 3 billion reorganisation plan, including a DM 250 million27 
government subsidy, Holzmann filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and was gradually 
liquidated (FAZ, 9 May 2001; Hargreaves, FT, 9 May 2001; Borsen-Zeitung, 
30 September 2004).
25 Of the DM 700 million debt, DM 300 million was provided jointly by Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank.
26 Due to these capital measures Deutsche Bank's investment in the company increased to around 47%, up 
from 31% beforehand.
27 This DM 250 million government subsidy consisted of a DM 150 million loan from a state bank and DM 
100 million of deficiency suretyship from the government.
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A capital gains tax of 50% did not provide any real incentive for Deutsche 
Bank to dispose of its industrial holdings in Germany. Breuer expressed his 
dissatisfaction about Deutsche Bank’s industrial holdings in an interview in 
1998. He was quoted as saying that the bank’s industrial holdings were wholly 
German and that the pace of disposals was limited by the tax rate on capital 
gains (Fischer & Clay, FT, 11 February 1998). However, in anticipation of the 
abolition of the capital gains tax, Deutsche Bank found a way of arranging the 
disposals so that the profits could be booked later and would not incur capital 
gains tax. Therefore, Deutsche Bank had already sold off some of its stakes 
by 2000 when the German government decided to abolish capital gains tax 
with effect from 1 January 2002.
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5.3.4. Asset-Liability Structure
The relatively high concentration of assets in Germany in the form of loans 
and direct investments was reduced somewhat by the acquisition of Bankers 
Trust. Deutsche Bank’s expansion into investment banking also left its mark 
on the structure of the group’s funding (i.e. liabilities and equity). Throughout 
the period analysed, the proportion of deposits (from customers and other 
banks) declined relative to total liabilities.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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■ Deposits ■ Money market funds and other negotiable instruments ■ Other liabilities ■ Equity
While the equity ratio remained stable 3-4% of total liabilities, other liabilities 
increased strongly from 5% in 1993 to 29% in 2003. These “other liabilities” 
largely comprised trading liabilities such as the negative market values of 
derivative financial instruments. In the same vein, Deutsche Bank’s trading 
assets tied up 36% of its total assets at the end of 2003, in contrast to just 4% 
in 1994. Trading liabilities and trading assets rose due to increased trading in 
capital market instruments.
The bank’s shift towards transaction services also reduced the ratio of net 
loans to deposits from 87% (1993) to 45% (2003). This ratio measures the 
group’s overall liquidity as it indicates the extent to which depositors’ funds are
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tied up in lending (Golin, 2001, p. 328). Deutsche Bank’s increased capital 
market exposure effectively led to an improved liquidity profile.
Deutsche Bank: asset structure





An additional consequence of the bank’s reduced loan portfolio is reflected in 
its rising tier 1 ratio. At the end of 2001, the tier 1 ratio exceeded the group’s 
target core capital ratio of 8%. Scaling back risk-weighted assets relative to 
shareholders’ equity left Deutsche Bank so well capitalised that Ackermann 
launched a share buy-back programme in 2002. Deutsche Bank’s 
management decided to fund this out of capital gains from the sale of the 
bank’s industrial holdings. The main purpose28 of the share buy-back 
programme was to reduce shareholders’ equity and therefore enhance the 
return on equity and earnings per share.
28 Ackermann also tried to use this to support Deutsche Bank’s share price. He was quoted as saying: 
“Given our current share price level we are convinced that buying back our own stock is an attractive 
alternative to other investments” (Deutsche Bank, Press Release, 26 June 2002).
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5.3.5. Profitability
Transaction services, as typically provided by investment banks, require less 
regulatory capital than transformation activities. Thus, investment banks 
should generally have higher ROEs than commercial and retail banks. Yet, 
Deutsche Bank’s expansion into investment banking did not lead to a 
substantial rise in the group’s ROE. Although Deutsche Bank’s profitability 
benefited from the disposal of its industrial holdings, in most years its ROE 
before tax was oniy 14% on average.
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Deutsche Bank’s after tax ROE averaged 7.4% between 1993 and 2003, 
which probably did not cover its undisclosed cost of equity. As outlined in the 
chapter on European Financial Markets a bank’s cost of equity can be derived 
from the capital-asset pricing model (CAPM), which uses a beta factor. Since 
the beta factor measures share price movements relative to a market index, 
the volatility of a bank’s profitability, insofar as it is reflected in the share price, 
should also influence its refinancing costs. Consequently, it may be concluded 
that the degree of profit volatility affects the level of profitability.29
29 Deutsche Bank’s profit volatility mainly increased during the second half of the period analysed, which 
coincides with its expansion into investment banking. The bank’s changed income structure was probably 
responsible for the higher earnings volatility. Deutsche Bank’s relative annual change in earnings was more 
volatile than the relative change in total operating income. In quantitative terms, this can be expressed using 
standard deviation. The standard deviation of the group’s earnings is 74 as opposed to 18 for operating
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One reason for Deutsche Bank’s mediocre profitability, in spite of its revenue 
growth, can be found in the previously highlighted erosion of its net interest 
margin. This deprived it of a stable source of income. There may be multiple 
reasons why a bank’s net interest margin declines, including fiercer 
competition in the wake of deregulation, technological and financial innovation 
and management’s difficulty in correctly anticipating changes in the yield 
curve.30
An additional reason for Deutsche Bank’s weak profitability can be ascribed to 
the fact that it went through a transition phase during which it reinvented itself 
as an investment bank. When Deutsche Bank abandoned its familiar home 
turf for the highly competitive global investment banking world, it embarked on 
a steep learning curve for which it had to pay its due.
For example, it faced such challenges as having to pay a premium for 
successful investment bankers to join Deutsche Bank from one of the US 
“bulge bracket” banks. Moreover, the group’s profitability may have also 
suffered from a sense of disorientation among its employees during the phase 
of organisational realignment. Consequently, Deutsche Bank’s moderate 
results should also be considered in the context of the transformation of its 
business model.
income. The greater earnings volatility could not be offset by a more flexible cost structure, which also 
explains the rise in the group’s cost income ratio.
30 The Bank for International Settlement also points out that changes in net interest margins can be a major 
uncertainty as regards the profitability of banks. Therefore, a bank should manage its exposure to volatility 
in the yield curve in ways that limit the effects on its net interest margin (Bank for International Settlement 
Quarterly Review, December 2002).
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5.3.6. Conclusion
Deutsche Bank’s management recognised towards the end of the 1980s that 
the greatest threat to the group was its exposure to the German economy 
(interview Hilmar Kopper). On the one hand, it had to deal with a cluster risk 
comprising large German companies, in which the bank owned significant 
stakes and to which it was a major lender. On the other hand, the fragmented 
German retail banking landscape, which was dominated by savings and 
cooperative banks, left, at least from Deutsche Bank’s point of view, little room 
to improve the profitability of business with German retail and SME clients. 
The group’s CEOs during the period analysed - Kopper, Breuer and 
Ackermann - believed that Deutsche Bank could not change the structure of 
the German retail banking market on its own and therefore had to make the 
best of this unfortunate state of affairs (interview Hilmar Kopper).
Against the background of this analysis and the threat of increased 
disintermediation coming from export-oriented German, corporate clients, 
management decided to transform Deutsche Bank into an international 
investment banking group (interview Hilmar Kopper). They took the view, and 
possibly still do, that investment banking requires international presence. 
Deutsche Bank focused on gaining expertise in transaction services, as a 
result of which the proportion of non-interest income rose over time. The 
changed income structure, which includes a relative decline in net interest 
income and an accompanying rise in commission and trading income, is as 
much evidence of this process of transformation as the bank’s greater 
international profile.31
Retail banking played only a subordinate role, notwithstanding all the efforts 
during the 1990s to build a pan-European retail network and the frequently 
changing focus on the domestic market. All of that was mere strategic noise, 
according to Hilmar Kopper. The transformation from a domestic commercial 
bank with a weak retail client base and the implicit need to refinance via an 
ever more efficient capital market made the majority of Deutsche Bank’s
31 In 1993, around two-thirds of Deutsche Bank’s business still came from its domestic market. At the end of 
2003, it generated merely 29% of its net revenues (net of provisions for loan losses) in Germany, where it 
had 24% of its assets and employed 44% of its 67,682 employees (compared with 78% of the workforce in 
1993). By 2003, two-thirds of the bank’s revenues came from corporate and investment banking (Deutsche 
Bank, Annual Reports 1993 & 2003).
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management believe that it should alter its business model fundamentally. All 
activities that did not aim at building an international investment bank were just 
“trials and tribulations" (interview Hilmar Kopper).
Deutsche Bank’s metamorphosis bore the risk of getting stuck halfway, 
without it achieving the status of an international investment bank, while losing 
ground with retail and SME clients in its home market. As conceded by 
Kopper, Deutsche Bank was lucky to have changed its business model at a 
time when the capital markets were relatively benign, otherwise the institution 
might not have mastered this transformation (interview Hilmar Kopper). 
Moreover, the bank’s continuous bolstering of profits through the sale of 
industrial holdings smoothed the process.
The bank’s three CEOs during this period also mirrored the transformation. 
First, there was the hands-on, non-academic and far-sighted Hilmar Kopper 
(1989-1997), who came from Deutsche Bank’s traditional corporate banking 
side. His successor, Rolf-Ernst Breuer (1997-2002), who had been in charge 
of the bank’s capital market activities in the 1980s, was something of an 
interim CEO. During Breuer’s time as CEO, Kopper remained at the helm of 
the supervisory board. Then, in 2000, it was announced that Josef Ackermann 
would succeed Rolf-Ernst Breuer in two years’ time. Finally, Ackermann, an 
archetypical investment banker, took over as CEO in 2002. Under the 
leadership of its first non-German CEO, the bank made a great leap forward in 
investment banking. Ackermann’s active capital management and consistent 
focus on transaction services led to a pre-tax ROE close to his target of 25% 
in 2005.32
The developments at Deutsche Bank during the period analysed show a clear 
pattern, which suggests that the group pursued a coherent and consistent 
strategy. The bank’s strategy was based on management’s belief that it could 
not change the structure of its domestic playing field and that it effectively had 
to reduce its exposure to the German market. This strategic insight paired with 
the growing significance of disintermediation and the prospect of leveraging
32 The published pre-tax return on average equity was 24.3% in 2005 (Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 
2005).
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Deutsche Bank’s longstanding relationship with large industrial firms paved 
the way for its shift towards investment banking.
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5.4. HSBC Holdings pic
5.4.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
HSBC, whose name is derived from The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, only became a “British” bank in January 1993 after the 
acquisition of Midland Bank1 in the previous year. As a condition for the 
approval of the takeover, the Bank of England asked HSBC’s management to 
transfer the group’s head office2 from Hong Kong to London. This also showed 
HSBC’s management a way to leave Hong Kong ahead of the handover of the 
colony to the communist People’s Republic of China in July 1997. Although 
the Bank of England became the principal regulator for HSBC Holdings in 
1993, all of its banking subsidiaries outside the UK continued to be regulated 
locally in their country of operation (HSBC Holding, 2003b).
The bank was founded in 1865 by Thomas Sutherland, a Scottish 
businessman in Hong Kong, to serve the growing demand for more 
sophisticated trade finance in the Asia Pacific3 region. According to the bank’s 
IPO prospectus, it would operate on “sound Scottish banking principles” but be 
rooted in the local community (King, et al 1987-91). The bank agreed with the 
British Treasury that it would not need a London head office and could still 
enjoy the privilege of issuing banknotes and holding government funds. Right 
from the beginning the bank’s commitment to local ownership and 
management allowed it to gain a competitive advantage in the region -  a 
strategic characteristic that was taken up in its advertising tagline as the 
“world’s local bank” in 2002 (King, et al 1987-91; HSBC Holding, 2003b).
The bank was able to expand rapidly throughout the Asia-Pacific region and 
did not come up against serious competition until the early 20th century when 
Dutch and French banks became more dominant players in that part of the 
world. Achievements in government finance contributed to The Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation’s growing international reputation. The bank’s 
internationalisation received new impetus after the Second World War when it
1 Midland Bank’s first full year as a fully consolidated member of the HSBC group was in 1993 (HSBC, 
Annual Report 1993).
2 HSBC Holdings was created in 1991 and its shares were listed in London and Hong Kong.
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embarked on an acquisition-led growth strategy to reduce its focus on Hong 
Kong. Subsequently HSBC expanded further throughout Asia, into the Middle 
East and into America. For example, it bought the British Bank of the Middle 
East in 1959 and in 1980 it acquired a 51% stake in the US American Marine 
Midland Banks, which led to full ownership in 1987 (HSBC Holding, 2003b).
While HSBC has been present in Europe since it opened a London office in 
1865, it did not generate substantial revenues anywhere in Europe until it 
acquired Midland Bank in 19924 (HSBC Holding, 2003b). HSBC’s first attempt 
to revive its European connection came in 1981 when it made a bid for the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, which was rebuffed by the UK Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission. Six years later HSBC bought a 14.9% interest5 in 
troubled Midland Bank, which it finally took over entirely in 1992, valuing 
Midland at GBP 3.9 billion (Marckus & Goddway, The Observer, 10 March 
1991; King, et al 1987-91; HSBC Holding, 2003b). The acquisition of Midland 
Bank transformed HSBC’s representation in Europe and paved the way for the 
bank’s rapid internationalisation during the 1990s.
When HSBC bought Midland, Midland was in the midst of a rescue operation, 
which had started in 1987. The bank was founded in Birmingham in 1836 by 
Charles Geach, a former employee of the Bank of England. He set up the 
bank to serve merchants and manufacturers in the Birmingham area (the 
Midlands) during the vibrant period of the Industrial Revolution (Holmes & 
Green, 1986). The bank specialised in discounting bills of exchange and 
rapidly expanded at the turn of the century under the leadership of Edward 
Holden.
Holden6 acquired several banks in England and pursued an acquisition-led 
growth strategy on a national level similar to the international growth strategy 
adopted by HSBC a few decades later. As a result, Midland Bank was the 
world’s largest bank for some years during the 1920s (Holmes & Green, 
1986). Despite this rapid growth, it remained deeply rooted in the Midlands 
and the countryside and remained relatively provincial (Holmes & Green,
3 Another contemporary large Western financial institution that was founded in China by non-Chinese is 
American International Group (AIG). AIG is one of the largest insurance companies in the world and was 
established in Shanghai in 1919 (BusinessWeek -  online, 15 September 2003).
4 Midland Bank’s first full year as a member of the HSBC group was in 1993.
5 HSBC paid GBP 383 million for this investment (Marckus & Goddway, The Observer, 10 March 1991).
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1986). Midland Bank had high exposure to the traditional heavy industries in 
the north-west of England (Holmes & Green, 1986; Rogers, 1999) and lost 
momentum with the Great Depression in the 1930s. The bank continuously 
lost ground after the Second World War.
Unlike its British competitors, Midland remained rather coy about international 
expansion throughout the 1970s (Holmes & Green, 1986; Rogers, 1999). 
However, at the beginning of the 1980s it launched a frenetic 
internationalisation strategy.7 First it bought a controlling interest in the 
German private bank Trinkaus & Burkhardt in 1980. This is still the nucleus of 
HSBC’s German operations (HSBC Holding, 2003b). In 1981 Midland 
acquired a majority stake in Crocker National of California. It turned out that 
Crocker’s loan portfolio was burdened with more problem loans8 than initially 
expected. Although Midland was able to sell Crocker to Wells Fargo in 1986, 
an estimated USD 3.7 billion of Crocker’s bad loans remained with Midland 
Bank, further depressing the bank’s profitability in the following years (Rogers, 
1999; Taylor, 1993).
The Crocker episode depleted the bank’s capital to such an extent that the 
Bank of England had to intervene and appointed its Deputy Governor, Kit 
McMahon, to restore Midland in 1987. Under McMahon new technologies 
were introduced and Midland launched the UK’s first 24-hour telephone bank, 
First Direct, in 1989 (Rogers, 1999). McMahon developed a relationship with 
HSBC, which bought a 14.9% stake in Midland during his time as Midland’s 
CEO.
Despite all his efforts to restore Midland, his former employer, the Bank of 
England, effectively ousted McMahon in 1991 (Rogers, 1999). The Bank of 
England summoned Barclays’ CFO Brian Pearse and according to his own 
account he was advised to accept the post as Midland Bank’s CEO (Willcock, 
The Guardian, 25 March 1991; Rogers, 1999). Only some two years later, in 
November 1993, Pearse resigned from Midland Bank as he could not pursue 
his strategy and did not deliver the cost cuts expected by HSBC. So, the new
6 Edward Holden was Managing Director from 1B98 to 1908 and Chairman and Managing Director from 
1908 until 1919.
7 In 1984 Midland also hired a team of continental Europeans to expand internationally. Herve de Carmoy 
who joined Midland from Chase headed the team.
6 These problem loans were mainly to LDC countries and to commercial real estate developers.
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owner put its own management in place and the bank became an integral part 
of HSBC group (FT, 6 April 1994).
In January 1993 John Bond, HSBC’s new CEO arrived in London (AFX News, 
2 November 1992). He had joined the bank in 1961 and succeeded William 
Purves, who can be credited with having initiated HSBC’s international 
diversification strategy. Purves remained at the bank as Chairman until 1998. 
When Bond stepped down as chief executive in 1998, he took over the 
chairmanship from Purves. John Bond was succeeded as the group’s CEO by 
Keith Whitson, who had been previously in charge of Midland Bank. The 
rather uninspiring Whitson (Retail Banker International, 1996) served as the 
bank’s CEO until May 2003, when Stephen Green, a former executive director 
at the bank’s corporate/investment banking and markets division succeeded 
him. In the period analysed, John Bond played the most dominant role, first in 
his capacity as group chief executive and then as chairman of HSBC.
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5.4.2. Income Structure
5.4.2.1. Structural Overview
Prior to its pivotal decision to buy Midland Bank, the majority of HSBC’s 
earnings9 came from the Asia-Pacific region. The takeover of Midland Bank 
increased HSBC’s total assets from GBP 86 billion in 1991 to over GBP 170 
billion in the following year. As a result of this deal, HSBC’s management was 
able to broaden the business away from its home base in Hong Kong. 
Following the purchase of Midland Bank, 45% of HSBC’s revenues came from 
the UK (1993) and 4% from the rest of Europe (mainly Germany and 
Switzerland). In 1993, Hong Kong still contributed 28% to the group’s 
revenues, while 11% came from other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. At 
the time 12% of revenues already stemmed from the Americas, with the 
majority coming from Marine Midland Bank in the USA (acquired in 1987) and 
HSBC’s Canadian operations10 (HSBC, Annual Report 1993).
Between 1993 and 2003, HSBC continued its internationalisation strategy 
through acquisitions, thereby reducing its dependence on the Hong Kong and 
British banking markets. During these ten years HSBC’s most substantial 
acquisitions were Republic National Bank of New York for USD 9.9 billion in
1999, the EUR 11.1 billion takeover of Credit Commercial de France (CCF) in
2000, and the USD 14.2 billion Household International deal in 2003. In 2003, 
HSBC spent an additional USD 1.4 billion on the acquisition of Bank of 
Bermuda. Through numerous small and medium-sized acquisitions, HSBC 
could as well expand its Latin American operations during the 1990s. For 
example, it bought Banco Roberts in Argentina for USD 600 million in 1997. 
HSBC’s largest deal in South America was the USD 1 billion acquisition of 
Banco Bamerindus do Brasil in 1997. In 2002, HSBC took over the failing 
Mexican bank Grupo Financiero Bital and injected fresh capital at a total cost 
of USD 1.9 billion.
This series of large acquisitions accompanied by several smaller ones 
increased the international diversification of operating income. In 2003, after
9 61% of operating income and 100% of profit before taxation in 1991 (HSBC, Annual Report 1992).
10 HSBC expanded its Canadian business by taking over the Canadian operations of three UK retail banks. 
In 1990, it bought Lloyds Bank Canada, in 1996 Barclays Bank of Canada, and in 1998 National 
Westminster Bank of Canada. Midland Bank of Canada already transferred its business to Hongkong Bank 
of Canada (part of HSBC group) in 1988 (HSBC Holding, 2003b).
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ten years of expansion, HSBC generated 41% of its operating income from the 
American continent (North & South) compared to just 12% in 1993. The 
stronger US and Latin American exposure was responsible for the relative 
decline of income originated in Hong Kong, which fell to 15% in 2003 from 
28% ten years previously. Europe, including the UK, also lost significance as it 
only contributed 15% of the group’s operating income in 2003, down from 49% 
in 1993. As a result of the improved performance of HSBC’s UK operations 
and the profitable growth on the American continent, the geographical split of 
pre-tax profit was more balanced in 2003 than it had been in 1993. While 59% 
of the group’s profit before tax still came from Hong Kong in 1993, the profit 
contribution from the former British colony declined to 29% in 2003.
-------------------------------------------
HSBC Holdings: income structure
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Net interest income ■ Net commission income ■ Trading income *  Other operating income
Despite HSBC’s growth through strategic acquisitions in both the developed 
and emerging markets, its income structure remained stable during the years 
from 1993 until 2003. On average HSBC’s operating income grew by 13% per 
annum during the period analysed. In absolute numbers, the bank’s total 
operating income more than tripled to USD 41.6 billion in 2003 from USD 12.4 
billion in 1993. HSBC’s weak investment banking exposure is reflected in its 
trading income, which remained stable at a relatively moderate level of 6.1% 
of operating income in 1993-2003.
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On average 57% of the bank’s operating income originated from lending and 
deposit-taking activities and was therefore booked as net interest income. 
HSBC suffered only a moderate decline in net interest margin, which fell from 
2.68% in 1993 to 2.51% in 2002. Due to the acquisitions of Household 
International and HSBC Mexico the group’s net interest margin increased to 
3.29% in 2003 and was therefore considerably above the 1993-2002 average 
of 2.72%. Without these acquisitions, which enhanced the interest margin, the 
group’s underlying net interest margin would have been 2.46% in 2003. In 
particular, the high-margin consumer finance business of Household 
International lifted the net interest margin by 77 basis points, while HSBC’s 
Mexican business could add another 6 basis points (HSBC, Annual Report
2003).
The takeover of Household International boosted the group’s net interest 
income by USD 10 billion to USD 25.8 billion in 2003. Without the strong rise 
in HSBC’s net interest income in 2003, its compound annual growth rate 
would not have been 14.5% per annum (1993-2003) but around 10%. The 
sharp hike in net interest income in 2003 mirrored a relative decline of HSBC’s 
commission income. It fell from 29% in 2002 to 25% in 2003 and therefore 
below the eleven-year average of 28% of the group’s total operating income.
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On average, HSBC’s trading income contributed 6.1% to its total operating 
income, fluctuating within a relatively narrow band of between 4.8% and 6.5% 
from 1995 until 2003. In 1993 trading was an important source of operating 
income and contributed 13% of HSBC’s total operating income. According to 
the 1993 annual report, this high trading income originated from Midland Bank. 
“The increase was mainly [...] a result of higher volume of business, 
favourable market conditions and the creation of Midland Global Markets” 
(HSBC, Annual Report 1993, p. 11).
In 1994 the bank’s trading income was 76% lower than in the previous year. 
The decline resulted from a loss on proprietary trading operations, poor 
dealing in securities and interest rate derivatives. Trading results were strong 
in 1993, weak in 1994 and then stable from 1995-2003, suggesting that 
Midland’s risk management improved two years after HSBC had taken over 
the ownership.
Unlike the other British banks analysed here, HSBC pursued a consistent 
internationalisation strategy between 1993 and 2003. The bank’s income 
structure changed profoundly in terms of geographic origination, but the type 
of income was relatively stable over time. The acquisition of Midland Bank in 
1992 was driven by management’s urge to reduce the group’s dependence on 
Hong Kong, building on its historical connection with Britain, rather than 
considerations about entering the European common market. The following 
section will analyse how HSBC’s investment/corporate banking activities, 
asset management operations and retail banking business evolved in the 
course of the bank’s internationalisation strategy.
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5.4.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
When HSBC was founded in 1865, its main purpose was to finance trade11 out 
of South East Asia. As a result, the bank has traditionally had a strong 
commercial basis with an international outlook. Despite its commercial 
banking roots and long track record in dealing with corporate clients, HSBC 
found it difficult to develop a strong position in international investment 
banking in the 1990s (Graham, FT, 5 January 2000). It laid the foundations for 
its capital markets expertise through the acquisition of the British brokerage 
firm James Capel & Co in 1986, at the time of the Big Bang. Through the 
takeover of Midland Bank, it was able to further expand its investment banking 
operations as it gained control over merchant bank Samuel Montagu.
At the beginning of the 1990s the majority of HSBC’s profits were still derived 
from its separate domestic commercial banking operations. Although the bulk 
of revenues came from Asia, in particular Hong Kong, its earnings structure 
reflected the enormous autonomy of its numerous subsidiaries scattered 
around the world. Due to rising demand from customers for disintermediation 
services as well as the internationalisation of the bank’s client base, HSBC 
began to revise its corporate banking strategy in the early 1990s. 
Subsequently, the bank tried to shift its balance of business towards 
international investment banking. However, HSBC soon had to realise that the 
risks of investment banking are different from those involved in the traditional 
corporate banking business. For example, in 1994 the group’s chairman 
William Purves, made clear that HSBC would concentrate on trading for its 
clients rather than for its own account, after it had experienced volatile 
proprietary trading results in 1993/94 (HSBC, Annual Report 1994, p. 5).
In 1994 HSBC began to realign its geographical structure to reflect its 
functional business operations and launched a first initiative to create an 
integrated investment bank (Gapper, FT, 1 March 1994). The initial efforts 
concentrated on consolidating the institutional equity securities activities of 
James Capel and the merchant banking activities of Samuel Montagu in 1995. 
These two operations became the nucleus of HSBC Investment Banking, 
which comprised merchant banking, equity securities, asset management, 
private banking and trustee activities (HSBC, Annual Report 1995). A year
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later HSBC merged the European operations of its securities arm James 
Capel with the bank’s merchant bank, Samuel Montagu. However, in the UK, 
James Capel and Samuel Montagu remained separate entities and merely 
received the “HSBC” prefix (The Independent, 30 January 1996; Tehan, The 
Times, 30 January 1996).
For the following ten years, HSBC’s management spent a good deal of time 
realigning the group’s investment bank with its commercial bank (Capell, 
BusinessWeek, 30 May 2005; Waples, Sunday Times, 19 February 2006). In 
an effort to boost HSBC’s high-margin advisory work, management decided to 
link its investment bank with its main corporate lending business in 2002. As 
management had already explained in the 1996 annual report, “investment 
banking is complementary to our commercial banking activity, and particularly 
relevant to us in newer markets, where customers look to go beyond the 
traditional commercial banking services. We shall organically build our 
investment banking business to become a preferred provider of investment 
banking services to our government, corporate and institutional clients around 
the world” (HSBC, Annual Report 1996, p. 15).
During the period analysed HSBC tried to expand its investment banking 
activities without any major acquisitions. Its organic growth strategy was also 
publicly affirmed when John Bond clearly ruled out the possibility of buying an 
investment bank (Timmons, The International Herald Tribune, 3 November
2004). Management’s decision not to acquire a major US investment bank did 
not help HSBC to be perceived as a prominent player on the capital markets. 
Its US corporate business was mainly built around Marine Midland Bank, 
which became a wholly owned subsidiary in 1987 when the bank raised the 
51% stake it had bought in 1980.12
Although HSBC received US regulatory approval to underwrite and distribute 
debt and equity securities in February 1996, it was not able to build up any
11 Trade financing remained at the heart of HSBC’s activities. For example, in 1994 HSBC formed an 
alliance with Wells Fargo to set up the Wells Fargo HSBC Trade Bank to provide better trade finance for US 
middle market companies engaged in international trade.
12 HSBC experienced one major setback in its US corporate business with its “Concord Leasing" unit. 
Concord Leasing became a loss-making operation as it primarily financed the ailing US airline industry. In 
1993 Concord Leasing reported a loss of USD 244 million and in the following year the loss was still USD 
197 million. Subsequently Concord Leasing tried to shift its financing business into the construction, 
transportation and communications sectors. In 1995 Concord Leasing was finally integrated into HSBC’s 
main US subsidiary, Marine Midland Bank (HSBC, Annual Report 1995, p. 4). In the same year, Marine
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substantial investment banking presence in the US in the following years 
(HSBC, Annual Report 1995, p. 4; Graham, FT, 5 January 2000). It appears 
that HSBC’s initiatives to position itself as a recognised player on the 
international investment banking scene were on the whole somehow half­
hearted. The bank’s partnership with medium-sized US broker Brown Brothers 
Harriman in the area of equity research in 2000 also suggests a reluctance to 
pursue a more aggressive poaching or acquisition-led strategy.
HSBC’s rather thrifty approach towards developing international investment 
banking expertise showed when it stopped paying cash bonuses to its 
investment banking employees in 1998. Instead, management introduced a 
bonus system under which half was paid in HSBC shares as part of a deferred 
compensation scheme. The different remuneration packages in transaction 
(investment) banking and traditional, i.e. transformational, commercial banking 
can reinforce the different risk cultures that prevail in these two types of 
businesses. In February 2002, HSBC even announced that it would cut 
investment banking bonuses to zero. This decision caused an exodus among 
senior staff (Saigol, FT, 29 April 2002; Saigol, FT, 21 May 2002; Ringshaw, 
Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 2002).
Midland Bank further expanded through various small acquisitions, of which most were intra-group, such as 
the takeover of Hongkong Bank’s six New York branches.
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5.4.2.3. Asset Management
HSBC Asset Management was formed in 1993 when the asset management 
operations of the HSBC group were restructured and its regional units were 
unified. Therefore HSBC Asset Management comprised James Capel Fund 
Managers in Europe, Wardley Investment Services in the Asia-Pacific region 
and Marinvest in the US. HSBC Asset Management became part of HSBC 
Investment Banking and was responsible for managing the investments for 
retail customers and for institutional clients. HSBC Asset Management began 
offering the full range of fund products, including unit trusts, mutual funds 
(retail funds), offshore umbrella funds and Individual Savings Accounts 
(‘ISAs’).
Despite the division’s global reach, funds under management were just USD 
30 billion in 1993, and the profit contribution (GBP 32 million) from asset 
management was about 1.2% of the group’s 1993 pre-tax profit (HSBC, 
Annual Report 1993). In the following ten years, HSBC retained its threefold 
geographic fund management structure (Asia-Pacific, Europe and the 
America). While a global committee drawn from the regional teams decided 
the overall asset allocation, HSBC Asset Management adopted a local fund 
management concept under which clients’ assets were managed as close as 
possible to the market in which they were invested.
In 1998, when HSBC Asset Management had still only USD 50 billion in 
assets, Stephen Green, who was at that time head of HSBC Investment 
Banking (he became CEO of HSBC Holdings in 2003), demonstrated the 
group’s commitment to asset management when he said, “asset management 
is one of the core businesses within investment banking and we see it as 
strategically important, especially given the expectations for the growth of 
investible funds from institutional pension funds and individuals” (Capon & 
Marshall, Euromoney, June 1998).
Just like with the group’s overall investment banking strategy, HSBC avoided 
the great leap forward and did not make any major acquisitions of stand-alone 
fund management houses. Nevertheless, HSBC successfully grew its assets 
under management through selective acquisitions of small and medium-sized 
financial institutions around the globe. Most of these institutions operated their 
own asset management arm, which was integrated into HSBC’s existing asset
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management infrastructure. Despite this piecemeal approach, the bank was 
able to grow funds under management to USD 137 billion by 2000. In the 
following three years, two large acquisitions, namely CCF and Household 
International, contributed to a strong rise in assets under management. 
Consequently HSBC’s assets under management amounted to USD 399 
billion at year-end 2003 (HSBC, Annual Report 2003, p. 56).
272
5.4. HSBC Holdings pic
5.4.2.4. Retail Banking
Prior to the acquisition of Midland Bank, HSBC’s retail banking activities 
mainly concentrated on Hong Kong where the bank operated an extensive 
branch network. Through the takeover of Midland Bank, retail banking gained 
significance in HSBC’s strategy. HSBC’s entry into the UK retail market 
proved timely as the British economy was gradually recovering from its 
recession.13 In 1993, inflation was at a 30-year low and consumer spending 
was slowly picking up. The low inflation rate and relatively low interest rates 
led customers to turn away from conventional savings towards investment 
products (HSBC, Annual Report 1993).
Midland Bank responded to this disintermediation trend through the pension 
and investment products of its personal financial services business and a new 
range of life assurance-based savings programmes. In addition, HSBC 
completed the restructuring of Midland Bank’s British retail network in 1993. 
The previously separate personal and business customer streams were 
brought together and management decided to improve the quality of the retail 
banking service by putting experienced bankers back in high-street branches 
(HSBC, Annual Report 1993).
When HSBC bought Midland Bank, it also acquired First Direct, Britain’s 
market leader in direct banking. As Britain was gradually coming out of 
recession, First Direct was able to benefit from rising demand for home 
mortgages. While First Direct, which was founded in 1989, only had 250,000 
customers in March 1993, its client-base rose to more than 1 million by the 
end of 2003. Due to First Direct’s rapid growth and subsequent efficiency 
gains, it was able to report its first full-year of profitability in 1995 (HSBC, 
Annual Report 1995, p. 14).
Although First Direct became a profitable and successful14 stand-alone unit of 
HSBC, the profits it contributed to the HSBC group remained negligible and 
were below 1% even in 2003 (Bank Marketing International, 28 August 2003;
13 In 1993 GDP rose by 2%, the best rate since 1989.
14 A less successful online banking venture than First Direct was HSBC’s cooperation with Merrill Lynch, 
launched in 2000. Merrill Lynch and HSBC wanted to serve the mass-affluent market with investment-led, 
broking and banking services. Initially the joint venture targeted the Canadian and Australian markets, and a 
research capability was also available in the UK. Merrill Lynch and HSBC planned to also expand into the 
German, French, Hong Kong and Japanese markets (HSBC, Annual Report 2000). However, as this online 
private banking joint venture fell short of expectations it was absorbed into HSBC in May 2002, just two 
years after its beginning (Ringshaw, Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 2002).
273
5.4. HSBC Holdings pic
Ross, FT, 27 March 2004). With the exception of First Direct, HSBC pursued a 
“clicks and mortar” strategy. In other words, its internet offerings had to mesh 
with HSBC’s existing distribution channels (HSBC, Annual Report 2000).
HSBC’s acquisition of Midland Bank was certainly the most decisive strategic 
move during the period analysed. However, it should not be forgotten that 
there were also many other important deals that turned HSBC into a global 
retail bank, with 47% of pre-tax profits coming from retail banking15 in 2003. A 
case in point is the less prominent, albeit strategically no less relevant, 




At the time CCF was France’s seventh largest bank with businesses in ]
personal, corporate and investment banking. Despite being a universal bank, j
CCF’s major strength was its focus on the mass-affluent personal retail \
banking market in France. In total CCF operated 650 branches in France, 
serving 1 million customers, predominantly in the country’s wealthiest regions 
(HSBC, Annual Report 2000). The acquisition of CCF primarily served HSBC’s 
strategic objective of expanding its personal wealth management business.
Buying CCF also meant gaining a significant client base in continental Europe.
The CCF deal was typical of HSBC’s internationalisation strategy, which 
mainly concentrated on acquisitions that allowed the bank to gain access to 
established structures and networks. Traditional universal banks with a strong 
bias towards retail banking tend to have a highly developed system of 
structures and networks. In contrast, pure investment banks generate the bulk 
of revenues by a much smaller number of employees. These “revenue hubs” 
are more sensitive to organisational changes and may be more difficult to 
integrate into an existing organisation. HSBC’s refusal to acquire a large US 
investment bank in order to get a foothold on the US market, but to 
concentrate on a series of acquisitions in retail and private banking, illustrates 
this strategy.
In 1996 HSBC’s retail and private banking operations in the USA were still 
concentrated on the State of New York. Several smaller deals16 enabled the
15 This comprised the three divisions Personal Financial Services, Private Banking and Consumer Finance.
16 HSBC acquired 11 branches from the “East River Savings Bank”, 79 retail branches from the “First 
Federal Savings and Loan Association” in New York State and 15 mortgage origination offices in nine other 
US states.
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bank to continuously expand its branch network during 1996 and 1997. The 
acquisition of Republic New York Corporation and Safra Republic Holdings for 
USD 9.85 billion, which was completed in 1999, further strengthened the 
bank’s presence in New York and improved its international private banking 
capabilities. Yet HSBC’s pathbreaking move into the US retail market came in 
2003 through the USD 14.8 billion acquisition of the consumer finance bank, 
Household International (HSBC, A brief history). Household International 
brought HSBC a network of over 1,300 branches, providing consumer finance 
to 53 million customers across 45 US states.
HBSC built up its insurance capabilities using the same rationale as for 
expansion of its international personal financial services business. During the 
1990s, insurance business gradually became a key component of the bank’s 
wealth management philosophy. HSBC’s insurance businesses operated 
through various companies that engage in life and pension underwriting, 
insurance broking, employee benefits consultancy and general property and 
casualty insurance underwriting. Several acquisitions of medium-sized 
insurance companies, as well as the insurance operations of the banks 
acquired, contributed to the continuous rise of the bank’s insurance activities.
In 1996 management committed itself to furthering the group’s insurance 
operations and said it would define them as the group’s third business 
segment (HSBC, Annual Report 1996). Despite the growing significance of the 
group’s insurance operations the company did not disclose premium income 
from its insurance operations in its annual report until 2005, when it totalled 
USD 5.4 billion, i.e. around 9% of total operating income. The risks that arise 
with a universal banking expansion and the gradual build-up of a 
bancassurance model are subject of the following section.
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5.4.3. Cost and Risk Management
The risks that HSBC were underwriting through its insurance operations were 
not disclosed in the group’s annual report during the period analysed. 
However, the 2005 annual report revealed that 58% of net earned premiums 
were from non-linked life insurance policies, 10% were from unit-linked life 
insurance policies and the remaining 32% originated from non-life policies. 
The structure of premium income has probably not changed substantially 
since 2003, as HSBC did not make any major insurance acquisitions in these 
two years (interview, investor relations, Tuesday, 4 April 2006).
HSBC Holdings: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
in % in USD million
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The high proportion of non-linked life insurance policies, that is where the 
investment risk is largely borne by the shareholders of HSBC and not the 
policyholders, along with a retention-rate of 87%17 suggests that a relatively 
high degree of risk was carried on the bank’s books (HSBC, Annual Report 
2005, p. 258). Although it was not disclosed, it is likely that a substantial 
proportion of premium income originated from the bank’s retail operations as 
HSBC’s bancassurance strategy mainly served the purpose of expanding its 
wealth management business.
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The bank’s strong position in wealth management and its rather lean 
investment banking exposure was visible in a stable and moderate cost 
income ratio. The cost income ratio fluctuated between 52% and 63% 
between 1993 and 2003, with an average of 56%. Given the group’s 
continuous expansion and integration measures, this low cost income ratio is 
evidence of a disciplined cost policy. Yet, the downside of such stringent cost 
discipline is the difficulty of breaking into new business areas such as 
investment banking. A bank without a clear investment banking reputation 
usually has to pay a hefty premium to recruit investment bankers. The scarcity 
of investment banking talents, who can generate commission from capital 
markets and M&A transactions, keeps salaries high and does not make it easy 
for new players to enter international investment banking.
An additional aspect of HSBC’s cost control is its long-term strategy of 
developing its own computer systems to support core activities. Management 
regarded the right use of technologies as vital to the bank’s success and 
proved great skill in carefully reviewing the risks and opportunities that came 
from the use of new technologies. Part of HSBC’s successful integration 
strategy was that it swiftly implemented the same systems around the world, 
enabling it to optimise accounting processes and quickly gain economies of 
scale (HSBC, Annual Report 1995, p. 7).18
Moreover, HSBC’s internationalisation strategy allowed the relocation of 
certain back-office services to developing countries in which it was already 
present and where wages were low. It mainly used outsourcing operations 
within HSBC group (Business Week Online, 27 January 2006). Staff costs 
rose during the 1990s, especially in the UK. Therefore, management 
accelerated its outsourcing to other parts of the world. This mainly affected its 
UK operations because of the outsourcing of cash and cheque processing 
services (Griffiths, The Independent, 2 July 2004).
17 A retention rate of 87% means that 13% of gross premium income was passed on to reinsurance 
companies.
HSBC considered it a major managerial challenge to link the different parts of the HSBC group more 
closely together through the use of information technology. It distinguished between technologies used to 
deliver faster, more convenient and more attractive services for its clients and technologies for internal 
processes, in order to improve efficiency, effectiveness and productivity (HSBC, Annual Report 1996, p. 16).
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The proportion of personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total operating 
expenses before risk provisions improved from 56% in 1993 to 53% in 2003. 
Given the bank’s threefold increase of revenues, this 3 percentage point 
improvement is not overly impressive, corroborating the view that there are 
limits to scale efficiency in the banking industry. Further evidence is the stable 
cost income ratio and the comparison of revenues and costs per employee. In 
1993, HSBC employed 98,716 staff, compared to 219,286 in 2003. HSBC’s 
total personnel costs per employee rose by a compound annual growth rate of 
4.0% during the period analysed. This compares to an average annual 
increase in revenues per employee of just 4.2%, underlining the limited scale 
efficiencies of a global expansion policy.
As previously discussed, the cost income ratio is an imperfect indicator of a 
bank’s efficiency, as it does not say anything about the group’s risk- 
management skills. The cost income ratio does not include loan loss 
provisions. HSBC’s acquisition-led growth strategy entailed the risk of taking 
over loan portfolios, which had not been adequately provisioned for. Although 
HSBC did not have major loan loss provisions, the relatively high volatility of 
loan loss provisioning suggests that due to these acquisitions HSBC either 
over- or under-provisioned at times. Overall, HSBC’s loan portfolio increased
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by a factor of 3.6 during the period analysed, rising from USD 150 billion in 
1993 to USD 543 billion in 2003.
HSBC Holdings: NPL coverage (loan loss reserves/impaired loans gross)
in %
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Despite the strong loan portfolio growth and loan loss volatility, HSBC’s loan 
loss provisions ate up on average just 13% of net interest income between 
1993 and 2003. Taking into account that loan loss provisions remained low, a 
coverage ratio below the usual comfort level of 100% was acceptable. 
Although HSBC’s loan loss provisions relative to its total operating expenses 
were on average only 12%, the bank19 did not build up its loan loss reserves to 
such an extent that they would cover or even exceed problem loans. The low 
coverage ratio suggests that, despite a cautious lending policy, HSBC’s 
acquisition-spree posed a constant challenge in terms of risk management.
19 This compares to 12% at Barclays and 13% at Lloyds TSB.
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5.4.4. Asset-Liability Structure
An analysis of HSBC’s assets and liabilities reveals three fundamental 
structural changes during the period analysed. The bank’s “other earning 
assets” increased from 17% in 1993 to 23% in 2003 as a proportion of total 
assets. Other earning assets comprise, for example, securities instruments, 
equities and treasury bills. This development originates largely from the bank’s 
insurance operations and growing activity on the international capital markets, 
not least reflecting HSBC’s effort to build up investment banking expertise.
An additional structural shift that took place during this time was the decline of 
deposits held with other banks (22% in 1993 versus 11% in 2003). A similar 
trend can be identified at other banks and shows their increased direct activity 
on the capital markets. Therefore, banks should not be described merely as 
“victims” of disintermediation as they were in fact important shapers of this 
development.
—
HSBC Holdings: liabilities and equity structure
1999 2000 2002 2003
Customer deposits 
Other funding
i Banks deposits 
Other liabilities
■ Money market funding 
□ Equity
The majority of HSBC’s funding came from client deposits, which on average 
comprised 63% of the banks’ liabilities and equities. The high proportion of 
deposits resulted from HSBC’s strong retail and personal finance business 
and remained stable until the acquisition of the consumer finance bank
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Household International. The proportion of customer deposits declined sharply 
as a result of this takeover, falling from 65% in 2002 to 55% in 2003 as the 
importance of money market instruments increased.
Most revealing is the impact of the Household International deal on HSBC’s 
asset-liability structure as shown by the development of net loans relative to 
deposits. In 2002, 64% of deposits were tied up in loans, whereas by the end 
of 2003 the ratio had risen to 82%. Until HSBC acquired the consumer finance 
bank, on average 48% of its assets were loans. Following the Household 
International deal in 2003, this ratio increased to 51%, up from 46% in 2002, 
mirroring the nature of the consumer finance business.
---------------------------------------------------------
HSBC Holdings: asset structure
I Loans (net) 
Goodwill
1998
I Deposits with banks 
Non earning assets
2000 2002 2003
■ Other earning assets 
Fixed assets
Due to HSBC’s frequent acquisitions, its tier 1 ratio did not rise significantly 
despite retained earnings (on average 41% of earnings). HSBC’s tier 1 ratio 
remained on average at 9.1 % and peaked at 9.9% in 1996, leaving the bank 
very well capitalised. However, even then its chief executive, John Bond, said: 
“As long as we can make a respectable return on our shareholders’ money, 
we don’t see the need to return capital. If we did have surplus capital, we 
would probably prefer to do it through the payout rather than through share 
buy-backs” (Graham, FT, 4 March 1997). The clarity of this statement and the 
ongoing acquisitions meant the issue of share buy-backs was not raised again
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during the period analysed.
HSBC’s sound capital position is also reflected in its average equity ratio of 
7% during the period analysed, whereby it was just 5.3% in 1993 as it still bore 
the marks of the recent takeover of Midland Bank. It is also worth noting that 
HSBC did not make particularly strong use of hybrid or subordinated bonds as 
a means of financing its business. These instruments played a minor role and 
were responsible for just 2.4% of the group’s funding.
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5.4.5. Profitability
HSBC did not formulate a strategy that set certain profitability targets until the 
end of 1998, when it introduced the concept of Managing for Value. The goals 
of Managing for Value were to beat the average total shareholder returns 
(TSR) performance of a peer group of financial institutions and to double 
shareholder return over a five-year period (HSBC, Annual Report 1998). 
Managing for Value was neither particularly innovative nor timely and merely 
followed many other banks20 that had recognized the growing importance of 
the shareholder value concept. In its 2003 annual report, HSBC’s 
management proudly reported that it had achieved these targets (HSBC, 
Annual Report 2003).21





1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
During the period analysed, HSBC’s net profit grew by an average of 12.2% 
p.a. while the compound annual growth rate for total operating income was 
12.9%. In absolute figures the group’s net profit rose from USD 3.1 billion in 
1993 to USD 9.7 billion in 2003. While revenues and profits rose strongly in 
absolute terms, the return on equity actually declined between 1993 and 2003.
20 For example, Lloyds Bank had already set return-on-equity targets in 1984.
21 Subsequently Managing for Value was superseded by an equally innovative strategy, called Managing for 
Growth.
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On average HSBC’s return on equity was 17.3% after tax and 22.9% before 
tax during this period.
Between 1993 and 1997, the bank’s return on equity still exceeded 20%, but 
then dropped sharply to 15.6% in 1998 -  the year when management 
presented “Managing for Value”. This was due to the poor economic situation 
in several Asian countries in which HSBC has a strong presence. Moreover, 
the economic uncertainty over Asia affected HSBC’s banking operations in 
Latin America (HSBC, Annual Report 1998). Loan loss provisions rose to USD 
2.6 billion in 1998, up from USD 1 billion in the previous year. Even in 1999, 
HSBC’s loan loss provision remained relatively high, eating up 17.1% of the 
group’s net interest income. This compares to 22.6% in 1998 and the eleven- 
year average of 13.4%.
By 1993, HSBC had achieved the goals set in 1998, but its return on equity 
did not regain the same levels as before the Asian crisis and was on average 
just 14.4%. There is no single factor that could explain the lower profitability 
expressed in terms of return on equity. The bank suffered partly from higher 
administrative expenses and write-downs, but loan loss provisions also 
remained a burden. As it appears impossible from the outside to identify the 
reasons behind the decrease in profitability, one tentative hypothesis would be 
that it resulted from the bank’s growing organisational complexity.
As discussed above, a case in point would be the increased volatility of 
HSBC’s loan loss provisions as evidenced by over- and under provisioning for 
problem loans following its numerous acquisitions. For instance, HSBC’s loan 
loss provisions soared after the takeover of Household International: 23.6% of 
total net interest income was consumed by loan loss provisions, so the return 
on equity only improved to 17.8% (2003) compared with 17.4% in 2002, 
despite the higher net interest margin. The acquisition of Household 
International helped HSBC boost net interest margin to 3.36% in 2003. From 
1993 until 2002, HSBC’s net interest margin moved between 2.96% (1997) 
and 2.51% (2002) and was finally lifted by the high margin consumer finance 
business of Household International.
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5.4.6. Conclusion
HSBC pursued an acquisition-led internationalisation strategy during the 
period analysed. However, Europe and the liberalised European banking 
market appear to have played only a subordinate role in the group’s overall 
global multi-local corporate strategy. The pivotal move was its entry into the 
British market in 1992/1993. The acquisition of Midland Bank paved the way 
for HSBC’s internationalisation strategy in retail and commercial banking. In 
the following years, HSBC developed a global network in private wealth 
management, including high street banking, and commercial banking through 
a series of takeovers. At the same time, it avoided overly expensive 
investment banking endeavours.
Within about ten years, HSBC became a financial services institution that 
derived half its profit from stable, mature economies and half from the faster 
growing, albeit more volatile, emerging markets (HSBC, Annual Report 2003). 
Moving into different interest rate areas, in particular into emerging markets, 
also served as a means of counteracting disintermediation. Moreover, HSBC’s 
decision to expand into US consumer finance helped to alleviate the pressure 
on net interest margins. However, geographically diversified income streams 
also increased exposure to countries undergoing economic and political 
turmoil. While capital can be quickly reallocated, operating units that provide 
banking structures are resistant to fast and efficient portfolio adjustments. The 
embeddedness of operational units does not allow the unfettered application 
of portfolio theory.
The bank’s initial multi-local internationalisation strategy was also reflected in 
a decentralised leadership structure with varying management styles. 
However, most of HSBC’s top management had worked for many years for 
the original Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. It appears that 
HSBC established a learning culture, which allowed one managerial 
generation to learn from the previous one. In particular, HSBC’s management 
demonstrated great skill in mastering the incessant integration processes with 
all the latent operational risks, following each takeover.
The transition from a collection of local banks to a single global brand was one 
of HSBC’s greatest achievements. In 1995 HSBC’s management still believed
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in retaining local names for local businesses22 and in using HSBC to brand its 
global businesses, such as investment banking, capital markets, securities 
trading and fund management (HSBC, Annual Report 1995, p. 7). These 
global businesses were successively brought together under the HBSC brand 
name. Eventually, in 2000, HSBC established the “HSBC” logo and hexagon 
symbol as a global brand, introducing the advertising slogan: “HSBC, the 
world’s local bank”.
22 In 1995, management still showed confidence in its multi-local brand name strategy. It felt that since 
customers viewed these banks as domestic, this was an important asset (HSBC, Annual Report 1995).
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5.5. Commerzbank AG
5.5.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
When the newly founded Commerzbank went public on 4 March 1870, its 
shares were 33 times oversubscribed. It was reported that demand was so 
overwhelming that several hundred interested investors besieged the main 
entrance of the lead bookrunner, the Hamburg-based bank M.M. Warburg 
(Commerzbank, 1970). A consortium of Hamburg merchants and private 
bankers established Commerzbank whose initial name was Commerz- und 
Disconto-Bank.1 The driving force behind the establishment of a bank in 
Hamburg to focus on trade finance was Theodor Wille, a merchant with strong 
ties to South America.
Right from its inception Commerzbank had an international focus. Long before 
it opened a branch anywhere in Germany, it became a major shareholder in 
the London and Hanseatic Bank when it was founded in 1872 (Commerzbank, 
1970; Hoover’s Company Records, 2007). During the first decades, 
Commerzbank built close relationships with Scandinavian countries where it 
often entered into cooperation with local banks (Commerzbank, 1970). Finally, 
in 1891 the bank began to catch up with its domestic rivals which had built a 
strong presence in Berlin. Through the takeover of bank J. Dreyfus & Co, 
Commerzbank acquired branches in Berlin and Frankfurt in 1897. 
Commerzbank further strengthened its presence in Germany’s capital when it 
bought Berlin Bank in 1905.
In the following years, Commerzbank rapidly expanded throughout Germany 
by acquiring more than 45 regional and private banks (Commerzbank, 2005). 
Notable developments were the mergers with Mitteldeutsche Privat-Bank 
(1920), Mitteldeutsche Creditbank (1929), and the forced merger with Barmer 
Bank-Verein (1932) in the wake of the crisis in the German banking sector. 
The banking crisis weakened Commerzbank to such an extent that it had to be 
bailed out by the state, which thereafter owned 70% of the bank. Five years 
later, Commerzbank was full privatised again through the placement of shares




held by the government and Reichsbank (Commerzbank. 2005).2 In 1940 
Commerzbank operated 359 branches in Germany and changed its name 
from Commerz- und Privat-Bank to Commerzbank.
The bank’s strong standing in central Germany meant that 45% of its 
branches became part of the zone controlled by the Soviet Union after the 
Second World War. Commerzbank experienced the same fate as Deutsche 
Bank and Dresdner Bank and was broken up into three smaller banks by the 
Allied authorities (Commerzbank, 1970; Commerzbank, 2005). However, 
these were re-amalgamated in 1958 and Commerzbank resumed business as 
a universal bank with 185 branches, 317,000 clients and 7,690 employees. By 
the end of 1969, Commerzbank operated 675 branches with 14,290 
employees and served 1.4 million clients. After having successfully rebuilt its 
German operations, Commerzbank began internationalising its business in the 
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.3 A New York representative office was 
opened in 1967. This was converted into a full-scale bank branch in 1971, 
becoming the first branch of a German bank in the United States 
(Commerzbank, 2005).
Commerzbank introduced its new logo, which it still uses today, shortly after 
Europartners had been formed in 1972. Analogously to several other banking 
clubs established at the time, Europartners was a cooperation with Credit 
Lyonnais4, Banco di Roma and Banco Hispano Americano (now part of Banco 
Santander Central Hispano). The purpose of such banking clubs was not so 
much to benefit from the increasing integration of the European market, as to 
counter the perceived threat posed by large US banks (FT, 10 May 1982).
Commerzbank’s logo, developed by a French advertising agency, known as 
the “quatre vents”, meaning the four winds symbol, “was intended to portray 
the open attitude of the bank and its partners to the world”, underlining 
Commerzbank’s international outlook (Commerzbank, undated a).5 In theory,
2 Commerzbank was involved in the expropriation of Jewish property and the financing of Nazi war efforts. A 
detailed account of Commerzbank’s activities during the Nazi era is provided by Herbst & Weihe eds. 
(2004).
An early initiative was the formation of the International Commercial Bank in London in 1967, which 
Commerzbank set up with Irving Trust Company, First National Bank of Chicago, Westminster Bank, and 
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (Hoover’s, 2007).
4 The same logo (but blue on a yellow background) also remained in use by Credit Lyonnais for more than 
thirty years and was only dropped after the takeover by Credit Agricole in 2003.




Europartners was the largest banking organisation in Europe at the time. 
However, differences in national banking laws and the lack of strategic co­
ordination prevented a full merger and Europartners eventually petered out 
after twenty years and a final attempt to coordinate joint expansion into 
Eastern European (FT, 24 November 1984; Commerzbank, Annual Report 
1990; Borsen-Zeitung, 4 September 1999; Commerzbank, 2005).6
Like Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank owned substantial 
shareholdings in German companies. Yet, in contrast to its rivals it divested 
many of its holdings in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s (Hoover’s 
2007). So by 1993, the bank’s major investments in industrials amounted to 
just DM 5.7 billion worth of equity capital (Commerzbank, Annual Report 
1993). In 2003, total shareholders’ equity allocated to investments in non­
banks was EUR 420 million. Although Commerzbank’s rapid 
internationalisation in the 1970s contributed to weak profitability in the early 
1980s, it resumed its expansion in the second half of the decade and by 1988 
its commercial banking network operated branches in Brussels, Antwerp, 
Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Osaka, New York, 
Chicago, Atlanta, and Los Angeles (Hoover’s, 2007).
Commerzbank’s management regarded German reunification as an 
opportunity to catch up with its two larger competitors, Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank. Consequently, it launched a DM 500 million project to expand 
into Eastern Germany by setting up 120 branches. It decided against 
cooperation with or the takeover of existing banks and pursued an organic 
growth strategy in the five new Eastern German states (Commerzbank, 
Annual Report 1990; Hoover’s, 2007). By end-1993, Commerzbank had 
300,000 customers in Eastern Germany, which were served by 2,150 
employees in 113 branches (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993).
Encouraged by the initial enthusiasm about the progress made in Eastern 
Germany, Commerzbank’s management felt it should counter the challenges 
of the Single European Market through internationalisation (Commerzbank, 
2005; Hoover’s, 2007). For most of the remainder of the decade analysed in 
the following pages, the bank was led by Martin Kohlhaussen. In 1993,
6 Some years later Commerzbank’s CEO Kohlhausen blamed the two state-owned banks in Europartners 
(Credit Lyonnais and Banco di Roma) for insufficient commitment to profitability targets (BOrsen-Zeitung, 12
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Kohlhaussen had already been chief executive officer of Commerzbank for 
two years,7 a position he held until May 2001, completing two five-year 
tenures.8 Klaus-Peter Muller, who joined the board of management in 1990, 
mainly to oversee the bank’s international activities, succeeded Kohlhaussen 
as CEO. In accordance with German corporate governance tradition, 
Kohlhaussen was then appointed chairman of the bank’s supervisory board.
November 1998).
7 He joined the company in 1965 after graduating in law and became a member of the board in 1982.
8 From 1991 to 1999, former CEO Walter Seipp was chairman of the supervisory board. He was succeeded 





Commerzbank’s rapid internationalisation prior to the launch of the Single 
European Market is reflected in the geographical breakdown of revenues in 
1993. 30% of revenues9 came from outside Germany, largely from other 
European countries (24%). Commerzbank published a regional split of interest 
income in its 1993 annual report, but not the respective interest expenses. In 
the following years, interest expenses were also disclosed. The figures for 
1994 show that Commerzbank’s international loan portfolio generated 36% of 
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Notwithstanding the geographical split of loan loss provisions, it may be 
concluded that Commerzbank earned relatively little from its international 
lending as it had to spend most of its income on refinancing costs. As of 2003, 
Commerzbank no longer distinguished between its German and European 
operations. In its geographic breakdown, it only disclosed its European 
business, which was responsible for 89% of revenues in 2003. At the time, 
22% of the group’s staff were employed abroad -  a strong rise from just 6% in 
1993. Despite that higher proportion of personnel abroad, the bank’s revenues
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showed a high degree of dependency on the German economy.
In 1993 Commerzbank’s management demonstrated insurmountable optimism 
in its assessment that the 1.1% decline in German GDP growth in that year 
would spark reforms, making the country more competitive (Commerzbank, 
Annual Report 1993). During the following decade, the German economy grew 
by a compound annual growth rate of 1.2%, while the country’s unemployment 
rate rose from 7.7% in 1993 to 9.6% in 2003. Against this macroeconomic 
background, Commerzbank expanded its loan portfolio by an average of 5% 
p.a. Yet, net interest income increased by a moderate annual rate of 0.7% p.a. 
The bank’s poor net interest income was primarily a reflection of its falling net 
interest margin, which was due to an unfortunate refinancing mix and weak 
pricing power. Commerzbank’s net interest margin still stood at 2.11% in 
1993, but had dropped to 0.89% by 2003.






The meagre results from Commerzbank’s lending business, along with the 
greater importance of commission and trading income, contributed to the 
relative decline of net interest income over time. In 1993 Commerzbank still 
generated 65% of its total operating income from transformation activities, but 
by the end of 2003 net interest income accounted for just 44%. Evidently, the
9 In 1993 revenues comprised interest income (but not interest expenses), current income, commission
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deconsolidation of the mortgage bank Rheinhyp in 2002 had a marked impact 
on Commerzbank’s net interest income. The deconsolidation of Rheinhyp 
reduced Commerzbank’s loan portfolio by EUR 63 billion (28%) and 
accounted for an estimated10 decline of 12% in net interest income 
(Commerzbank, Annual Report 2002, p. 108).
Besides this deconsolidation effect, Commerzbank’s greater dependence on 
trading and commission income resulted from its attempt to develop expertise 
in investment banking services in the late 1990s and the revenue growth from 
the sale of third-party financial products. In particular, the successful sale of 
insurance policies and mortgage savings on behalf of its bancassurance 
partners contributed to commission income. From 1993 to 2003, net 
commission income increased on average by 7.9% p.a. Trading income grew 
at an even higher average annual rate, namely, by 10.1% p.a. Consequently, 
trading results accounted for 9% and commission income for 29% of 
Commerzbank’s total operating income during the period analysed. This 
compares to an average of 56% of operating income coming from net interest 
income during this period. In absolute figures, Commerzbank’s total operating 
income rose from EUR 4 billion in 1993 to only EUR 6.2 billion in 2003, 
implying a compound annual growth rate of 4.5%.11
Besides these sources of operating income, Commerzbank continuously 
generated additional income from the sale of diverse investments, albeit to a 
lesser extent than Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. These non-operating 
and exceptional items made a positive overall contribution to the bank’s net 
profit, despite exceptional charges and write-downs (a EUR 2.2 billion write­
down in 2003 being the most drastic). These exceptional items lifted 
Commerzbank’s pre-tax return on equity by 1.1% p.a. in the period analysed. 
Given the significant extraordinary charges reported between 2001 and 2003, 
it might make sense to consider the development for the years 1993 to 2000 
separately. In fact, for this period, the net effect of exceptional items were on 
average EUR 321 million p.a., boosting the group’s pre-tax ROE by 4.4%.
income, trading income and other income (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993).
10 Commerzbank did not quantify the effect on its net interest income. However, most of the 12.5% net 
interest income decline in 2002 is probably due to the deconsolidation of Rheinhyp.
11 The year 2000 was Commerzbank’s strongest year between 1993 and 2003 in terms of revenues, with 
total operating income of EUR 7.6 billion.
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5.5.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
At the beginning of the 1990s, Commerzbank’s corporate banking activities 
largely revolved around lending, bond underwriting, trade finance and some 
treasury services. Its clientele was mainly German and principally comprised 
small and medium-sized enterprises, what is known as the German 
Mittelstand. As part of its client relationship management approach to SME 
firms, Commerzbank bought and sold stakes in a broad range of companies 
and as such played the role of an active investor and intermediary (FAZ, 6 
March 1997; FAZ, 20 March 1997).12 Through this kind of participation 
management, which frequently entailed the placing of shares on the market, 
Commerzbank widened its experience in capital market transactions and laid 
the foundations for its subsequent investment banking operations.13
Besides its strong footing with the German Mittelstand, Commerzbank’s other 
expertise came from its tradition as a bond underwriter, mainly in DM- 
denominated bonds (Wittkowski, Borsen-Zeitung, 11 October 1997). From its 
position as an established underwriter of fixed income instruments, 
Commerzbank built a reputation as an arranger of syndicated loans in the 
second half of the 1990s. Commerzbank’s strong mortgage banking activities 
also made it an important issuer of mortgage bonds. Building on its bond 
expertise and client relationship management with German Mittelstand 
companies, Commerzbank established investment banking as a separate 
corporate division in 1995. Through the establishment of its investment 
banking unit, the bank’s internationalisation gained new momentum.14 
Commerzbank regarded itself as a European bank and international 
expansion therefore had the same priority for management as its German 
operations (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1999).
Shortly after the demise of communism, Commerzbank had expanded its 
commercial banking services into Central and Eastern Europe. In 1993, it had 
offices in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and opened its second Russian
12 For example, in 1993, Commerzbank increased its investments in the non-financial sector by 36% to DM 
2.4 billion. Significant holdings were Karstadt (25%, reduced to 10% in autumn 1993); KUhnle, Kopp & 
Kausch (19.9%); Heidelberger Druckmaschinen (13.8%); Turbon International (13%); Salamander (10.9%); 
Linde (10.4%); Friedrich Grohe (10%); Mineralbrunnen Oberkingen-Teinach (10.1%); Schweizer Electronic 
(10%); Linotype-Hell (6.7%); MAN (6.5%); Thyssen (5%); Hochtief (2.5%) (Commerzbank, Annual Report 
1993).
13 In 1994 management pointed out that on average, between 1984 and 1994, Commerzbank had been 
responsible for a fifth of all IPOs in Germany (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1994, p. 24).
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office in St. Petersburg. By the end of 1993, Commerzbank was also present 
in Budapest and Prague. It swiftly entered into a strategic partnership with the 
Polish Bank Rozwoju Eksportu (also known as BRE-Bank) in 1994, a 
partnership which was backed up by an initial investment of 21%  
(Commerzbank, Annual Report 1994). Subsequently, Commerzbank raised its 
stake in this former state-owned15 Polish export development bank and owned 
72% of it by the end of 2003 (FAZ, 4 September 2004).
Throughout the 1990s, Commerzbank continued its internationalisation and 
proudly announced that it was building an “ever denser foreign network” 
(Commerzbank, Annual Report 1996, p. 22). In addition to the bank’s own 
international branches and representative offices, Commerzbank’s 
management kept eagerly investing in foreign banks. For example, 
Commerzbank bought a 20% stake in an Indonesian bank in 1993 and held a 
21% investment in Korea International Merchant Bank, which was merged into 
Korea Exchange Bank (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993). In 1998, in the 
midst of the Asian crisis, Commerzbank raised its stake in Korea Exchange 
Bank (KEB) to just under 30% and participated in two necessary capital 
increases in the following two years, lifting its stake to 32.6% (Commerzbank, 
Annual Report 1999).16
With the appointment of Mehmet Dalman17 as head of investment banking in 
1997, Commerzbank began to concentrate more on securities, especially 
equities and equity-related products, such as equity derivatives.18 Dalman was 
asked to build a global investment bank for Commerzbank after the bank’s 
failed attempt to takeover Smith New Court in 1995 (Ipsen, International 
Herald Tribune, 22 July 1995; FAZ, 6 May 1998). He built a global securities 
business with a common platform for research, origination, distribution and 
risk management of cash and derivative products (Treanor, The Guardian, 2 
October 2004; Commerzbank, Annual Report 1999). Commerzbank enhanced 
its corporate finance product range through mergers and acquisitions, asset
14 A more international profile was also reflected in bond underwriting. For example, in 1997 36% of bonds 
issued by Commerzbank were denominated in currencies other than DM (Commerzbank, Annual Report 
1997, p. 32).
15 Bank Rozwoju Eksportu (BRE) was founded in 1986 as a joint stock company and privatised in 1990 
through an IPO (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1994).
16 Eventually, Commerzbank sold this investment to US private equity investor Lone Star in two tranches in 
2003 and 2006 (Bdrsen-Zeitung, 8 December 2006).
17 In 2001, he was appointed to the board of managing directors at Commerzbank.
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securitisation and structured finance (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1998, p. 
25). By the end of 1999, Commerzbank had almost 700 employees in its 
global equities division in Frankfurt, London, New York and Tokyo, reflecting 
management’s global aspirations during this period (Commerzbank, Annual 
Report 1999; Hockmann, 2000).
Dalman also pushed for integration of the corporate and investment banking 
operations -  possibly as he expected to have better access to 
Commerzbank’s Mittelstand clients (Treanor, The Guardian, 2 October 2004). 
At the start of 2000, Commerzbank’s entire equity and bond activities, 
including the derivatives and mergers and acquisitions teams, were brought 
together in one securities department, which then employed 1,200 people. At 
the same time, management decided to link investment and commercial 
banking, in an effort to promote a relationship banking approach (FAZ, 13 
June 2001). This project continued well into the year 2001 (Commerzbank, 
Annual Report 2000 & 2001) and ultimately led to the dissolution of the bank’s 
Anglo-Saxon investment banking activities in London. While management 
began trimming back its investment banking operations, through reducing staff 
by 30%, it refocused on the Mittelstand and launched a lending offensive to 
these firms in 2003 (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2002 & 2003; FAZ, 31 May 
2003).
18 Commerzbank launched its derivatives operations in 1994 with some 100 staff and the declared objective 




Asset management became a separate corporate division when 
Commerzbank’s management reorganised the bank’s head office in 1993. At 
the time, the bank had funds under management of DM 70 billion (i.e. EUR 36 
billion). The division comprised Commerzbank Investment Management 
(CIM), which administered funds for institutional investors and Commerz 
International Capital Management (CICM), which was active in international 
portfolio management (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1992 & 1993).
Moreover, Commerzbank owned 39.6% of ADIG (Allgemeine Deutsche 
Investmentgesellschaft), through which it marketed mutual funds to retail 
clients. Commerzbank became a shareholder in ADIG in 1951, two years after 
its establishment by several Bavarian banks as Germany’s first asset 
management company. After lengthy negotiations, Commerzbank became 
ADIG’s majority shareholder with a stake of 85.4% in 1999 (Borsen-Zeitung, 2 
February 1999; Borsen-Zeitung, 29 July 1999). Although management initially 
planned to develop ADIG as a brand name for the German retail fund industry, 
it was merged into Cominvest Asset Management in 2002.
The creation of Cominvest Asset Management in 2002 resulted from a 
restructuring programme which began at the start of 2001. Parts of the 
previously independent portfolio management and research activities in 
Germany were combined to improve efficiency. These restructuring measures 
took place against the background of a difficult market environment and net 
outflows from its funds following the end of the dotcom era. Administrative and 
personnel costs had to be adjusted to the significantly lower value of assets 
under management (FAZ, 10 April 2002).
During the phase of booming equity markets in the late 1990s, assets under 
managed also soared at Commerzbank, peaking in 1999 when it had funds 
under management of EUR 140 billion. The first time Commerzbank disclosed 
profitability figures for its asset management unit was in 2000: it delivered a 
net loss of EUR 39 million.19 The following year the loss widened to EUR 165 
million. 2,351 employees contributed to a cost income ratio of 142% at the 
time, revealing the need for the aforementioned restructuring measures. Along
297
5.5. Commerzbank AG
with the reorganisation of its domestic asset management units and the 
streamlining of product ranges, Commerzbank began also cutting back its 
international engagements outside Europe in 2001.
Throughout the 1990s, Commerzbank had internationalised its asset 
management operations, mainly through acquisitions. In 1993 it acquired 
Paris-based Caisse Centrale de Reescompte (CCR), which at the time 
employed 45 people and managed DM 5.8 billion in 1993 (Commerzbank, 
Annual Report 1993). CCR was particularly strong as a manager of money- 
market funds, but as of 1998 it also gained a reputation in the French market 
for its “value” management approach in equities. Due to the funds’ solid 
performance and a good inflow of new funds, CCR managed assets worth 
EUR 12.8 billion, at the end of 2003 (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2003).
While the acquisition of CCR was a “lucky buy”, Commerzbank’s endeavours 
in the Anglo-Saxon asset management world were less fortunate. In 1995, 
Commerzbank internationalised its asset management through two 
acquisitions. In the UK, it bought Jupiter International with DM 11.6 billion 
funds under management and a focus on investing in international equities. 
Although most of Jupiter’s funds performed well and the company enjoyed a 
strong inflow20 of new funds, it was reported that Jupiter was not a very 
profitable investment for Commerzbank due to the high compensation 
schemes of its fund managers and founder John Duffield (FAZ, 28 February 
2002).
In the same year as it bought Jupiter, Commerzbank also took over the small 
US asset manager Martingale Asset Management, which mainly invested in 
US equities. Two years later Commerzbank was able to strengthen its position 
in the US-market through the acquisition of Montgomery Asset Management in 
San Francisco. In 1997, Montgomery managed USD 9.4 billion, mainly retail 
funds for some 320,000 retail customers (Commerzbank, Annual Report 
1997).
19 In 2000 Commerzbank managed EUR 135 billion of assets. 65% were funds for institutional investors and 
35% were publicly-offered funds and funds for retail customers. 54% were equities and 28% fixed income, 
15% money market funds and 3% real estate funds (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2000, p. 19).
20 By the end-2003, Jupiter managed EUR 15 billion.
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Montgomery’s assets declined in the following years and were down to USD 
7.5 billion by the end of 2001. Although falling equity markets in 2001 certainly 
accounted for a substantial part of this decline, it is obvious that Montgomery 
also found it difficult to attract new funds. Given that Montgomery managed 
funds for retail clients, part of the problem of this outflow of money was that 
Commerzbank did not operate an established distribution network in the USA.
Despite renewed distribution efforts and 20% lower costs, Commerzbank’s 
management decided to sell Montgomery Asset Management to Wells Capital 
at the end of 2002 (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2001). Martingale was also 
sold through a management buy-out in the same year (Pensions and 
Investments, 16 September 2002). The disposal of these two units marked the 
complete withdrawal of Commerzbank’s asset-management group from the 
US, in accordance with management’s plan to focus on Europe.
With the exception of its brief Italian21 and Czech22 intermezzos, 
Commerzbank kept all of its European asset management units intact. In 
Spain, where it had had a presence since 2000, Commerzbank remained 
active via its small Madrid-based subsidiary Afina, which broke-even at year- 
end 2001. In Poland, ADIG continued its joint venture with BRE-Bank, which 
had been established in 1996 (Commerzbank, Annual Reports 2000 & 2001).
Commerzbank’s decision to scale back its asset management operations and 
to refocus on a few European markets paid off. Although assets under 
management were a mere EUR 83.3 billion in 2003, 40% less than in 1999, 
the bank’s asset management division was turned around and delivered an 
operating profit of EUR 90 million, contributing 16% to the group’s total 
operating income. With capital employed totalling EUR 639 million, this 
operating profit translated into a return on equity of 14.1% and the cost income 
ratio stood at 79.3% (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2003).
21 Management said the disposal of the Italian US operations in 2003 “removed a sizeable burden from the 
cost side” (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2003, p. 24).




In 1993, Commerzbank operated 1,006 branches worldwide and had 3.4 
million clients. At the time, the number of East German clients was 300,000, 
served by 2,150 employees in 113 branches, with the number of branches still 
growing. Management explained that its strategy in its retail customer 
business23 was to manage its clients’ assets in an all-inclusive approach, while 
improving the bank’s results through greater standardisation of processes 
(Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993, p. 21).
Throughout the period under review, Commerzbank remained committed to a 
bancassurance concept (Allfinanz). Thus, it offered a broad range of financial 
services, including insurance and mortgage savings products to its retail 
clients (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993). Initially, Commerzbank 
extended its all-round financing approach through cooperation agreements 
with the building society Leonberger Bausparkasse and insurance company 
DBV in 1988 (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1992; Schneider, Borsen- 
Zeitung, 17 February 1995).24 This bancassurance strategy reduced 
Commerzbank’s dependence on net interest income from retail banking as the 
sale of third-party savings contracts and insurance policies generates 
commission income.
The cooperation with DBV-Winterthur and Leonberger Bausparkasse came to 
an end when the Italian insurer Generali acquired a 5% stake in 
Commerzbank shares in 1998.25 Subsequently, Commerzbank became the 
exclusive German partner of AMB, Generali’s German subsidiary (Sen, 
Metzler Equity Research, 10 November 1998). As the building society Badenia 
Bausparkasse belonged to AMB, Commerzbank also parted ways with 
Leonberger Bausparkasse.26 In addition to life insurance policies and 
mortgage savings schemes, Commerzbank also opened its distribution 
network to other third party funds in 2001, pursuing an open architecture 
strategy (FAZ, 14 March 2002; Bender, FT, 11 October 2004). By the end of 
2003, half of the mutual funds (retail funds) sold by Commerzbank were not
23 Until 1999 Commerzbank’s retail banking segment was part of the group’s domestic banking segment.
24 Commerzbank had acquired 40% of the building society Leonberger Bausparkasse in 1988. DBV merged 
with the Swiss insurer Winterthur to create DBV-Winterthur in 1995 (Schneider, Borsen-Zeitung, 17 
February 1995).
25 Generali increased its stake in Commerzbank to almost 10% in 2000 (Hoymann, Metzler Equity 
Research, 4 September 2000).
26 Commerzbank sold its stake in Leonberger Bausparkasse to WGrttembergische Versicherungsgruppe in 
1998 (Bdrsen-Zeitung, 10 December 1998).
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from its own asset management arm, but from some other fund management 
company (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2003).
AMB and Commerzbank intensified their cooperation by further integrating 
their distribution expertise in 2000. Around 850 insurance and mortgage 
specialists became part of the Commerzbank branch network. In return, 
banking centres were established at 250 insurance agencies, offering banking 
products to insurance policyholders. Besides the all-round financing approach, 
which was a cornerstone of its distribution strategy in retail banking 
Commerzbank also made use of telephone banking27 and direct banking.
Commerzbank began its direct banking services in early 1994, through 
comdirect bank. Its initial approach was to offer retail customers an investment 
account and discount brokerage facilities for securities trading. Prices could be 
kept low compared to traditional branch banking services as customers were 
not offered advice. The range of products was extended in the following years 
and as of 1996, comdirect began to offer online banking services. Four years 
after its formation it reached break-even point, with a total of 577,000 
customers (Comdirect, Annual Report 2001).
In 2000, Commerzbank decided to float comdirect by placing 20% of its 
shares on the market. In the following two years comdirect expanded into the 
United Kingdom, France and Italy. However, falling stock markets caused a 
decline in commission income and comdirect reacted with a far-reaching cost- 
cutting programme that concentrated its activities on the UK and German 
markets. In Germany, comdirect enjoyed the position of market leader in 
online banking and the reputation as having the best online banking website 
(Commerzbank, Annual Report 2001). Despite lower revenues, comdirect was 
the only German online broker to report a profit from ordinary activities in 2002 
(EUR 75 million, after a loss of EUR 752 million in the previous year), proving 
that it had achieved the necessary size to operate a viable business model.
For several years much of Commerzbank’s client growth came from comdirect 
- for example, nearly all of Commerzbank’s 110,000 new clients in 1997 were 
gained via its direct banking arm. Other attempts to differentiate
27 From 1994 onwards, Commerzbank offered a telephone banking service called Comphone in Germany. 
By end-1996, 200,000 clients used this service.
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Commerzbank’s distribution channels were less successful. In 1997, 
Commerzbank opened its first of a series of Commerzbank shops in a self- 
service store. These branches were open longer hours and on Saturdays. By 
the end of 1998, Commerzbank operated 26 of these outlets, which served 
25,000 customers. However, they were closed as part of the cost-cutting drive 
launched in 2001 as they were not profitable enough (Commerzbank, Annual 
Report 2001).
Commerzbank’s group-wide cost-reduction measures also affected the bank’s 
retail banking operations. The number of domestic branches was reduced to 
724 by end-2003, down from a peak of 939 in 1999. Moreover, branch 
personnel were cut by nearly 1,700 between 2001 and 2003. These measures 
contributed to a 20% improvement in sales productivity between 2001 and 
2003 (Blessing, 2004). At the same time, Commerzbank tried to increase the 
number of online customers, which amounted to 420,000 in 2001 - excluding 
comdirect’s 649,000 clients.28
The reviewed differentiation in retail banking included an attempt to accelerate 
growth in private banking, which Commerzbank had stepped up in an initial 
effort in 1997, after many years of low profile existence within the bank. In 
1997, advisory teams were set up in six of Germany’s largest cities to serve 
the estimated 40,000 affluent private-banking clients among its existing 
customers. Within five years, Commerzbank expanded its private banking 
services to 20 branches where it had private-banking teams.
Following on from its “play to win” restructuring programme in retail banking 
which was launched in 2002, management introduced a “grow to win” strategy 
for retail banking in 2003 and proclaimed an ROE target of 17%. As a first sign 
of this renewed growth strategy in retail banking, Commerzbank bought 
SchmidtBank with 350,000 retail customers and 70 branches (Blessing, 2004). 
Subsequently, Commerzbank gradually expanded its branch network and 
gave retail banking a high priority in the following years.
28 Alongside comdirect, Commerzbank itself began offering its banking services via the internet in 1997.
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5.5.3. Cost and Risk Management
Commerzbank initially failed - and subsequently avoided - buying an Anglo- 
Saxon investment bank, unlike its German peers, Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank. Thus, the bank’s risk management was spared the challenges 
of integrating a bank of notable size (Ipsen, International Herald Tribune, 22 
July 1995; Wittkowski, Bdrsen-Zeitung, 11 October 1997; FAZ, 7 November 
1997; FAZ, 6 May 1998). Even the process of becoming the majority 
shareholder in Poland’s BRE-Bank was done in slow and cautious mode. Yet, 
the acquisitions in the field of asset management, especially the takeover of 
Jupiter, gave Commerzbank’s management a flavour of what its two German 
rivals went through after they bought Anglo-Saxon investment banks.










1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
The internationalisation of Commerzbank’s asset management operations in 
1995 through two acquisitions contributed to a rise in personnel expenses per 
employee of 7-8% p.a. in the following two years (Pretzlik & Targett, FT, 3 
June 2000). Equally striking was the impact of management’s decision to 
move into investment banking through an organic growth strategy, with 




During the period under review, Commerzbank’s total personnel costs per 
employee rose by a compound annual growth rate of 3.5%, compared to an 
average increase of total revenues per employee by just 3.1% p.a. The 
number of employees was 28,241 in 1993 and peaked at 39,481 in 2001. In 
the following two years, Commerzbank’s workforce declined again to 32,377. 
Although the deconsolidation of Rheinhyp, the mortgage-banking arm, 
accounted for a headcount reduction of 867 employees in 2002, the sharp fall 
in employees between 2001 and 2003 was largely due to layoffs 
(Commerzbank, presentation, 6 November 2001).
Commerzbank: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
in % in EUR million
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
■  Loan loss provisions Cost to income ratio
As part of the bank’s major restructuring program, CB 212 9 , management cut 
around 6,200 jobs, i.e. 16% of its staff, between 2001 and 2003. These 
redundancies affected most areas of the bank, yet in relative terms, 
investment banking was hardest hit. The CB 21 included merging the 
corporate and investment banking activities, thereby effectively closing down 
the investment banking operations in London. Furthermore, it was decided to 
combine retail banking and asset management in one division. Management 
expected from CB 21 to improve the bank’s pre-tax profit by roughly EUR 1 
billion until 2003, helping the bank to achieve its long-standing net profit target 
of a 15% return on equity (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2000).
29 “CB 21 -  Commerzbank in the 21st century” (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2000, p. 5).
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Despite these substantial headcount reductions, Commerzbank’s cost income 
ratio was still 76% in 2003, compared to 63% in 1993.30 The persistently high 
cost income ratio stemmed from diverse administrative costs, such as 
expenses for information technology and office space (Commerzbank, Annual 
Reports 2002 & 2003). Commerzbank’s investments for internationalisation 
and expansion into investment banking contributed to this development. 
Initially, revenues lagged behind these high investments, driving up the cost 
income ratio. By the time these investments were expected to translate into 
higher revenues, an economic downturn had begun and revenues were falling 
faster than expenses could be scaled back (Hoymann, Metzler Equity 
Research, 6 February 2003). On average, Commerzbank’s cost-income ratio 
stood at 73% during the decade analysed.
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While personnel costs averaged 44% and administrative spending 28% of 
Commerzbank’s total operating expenses between 1993 and 2003, loan loss 
expenses made up an average of 19% of the bank’s cost base. During the 
years analysed, loan loss provisions ate up 30% of the banks net interest 
income. Even after the deconsolidation of Rheinhyp in 2002, loan loss 
provisions exceeded EUR 1 billion, thereby still eating up 44% of net interest
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income of that year.31 The high loan loss provisions largely originated from its 
German clientele. Commerzbank’s strong exposure to the German economy, 
which was slipping into recession in 2002/03 and the bank’s focus on 
Mittelstand companies that were going through the trough, was reflected in a 
deteriorating loan portfolio quality.
Besides the loan portfolio exposure to Germany, the bank’s diverse 
investments were also largely held in German companies. Thus, 
Commerzbank had to write down EUR 2.3 billion on its portfolio of financial 
assets and participations in 2003. These value adjustments, along with 
another high loan loss provision of EUR 1.1 billion and personnel cuts were a 
necessary clean sweep, which paved the way for renewed growth in the 
following years. CEO Muller made it clear, after the substantial reduction of 
expenses in 2002 and 2003, that further cost cuts could not be achieved if the 
bank wanted to grow again (Borsen-Zeitung, 19 February 2004).
30 Management planned to achieve a cost income ratio of 60 to 62% in 2000 (Wittkowski, BOrsen-Zeitung, 
11 October 1997).
31 In 2003 40% of Commerzbank’s net interest income was still eaten up by provisions for loan losses.
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5.5.4. Asset-Liability Structure
After a review of its risk management approach in 1993, Commerzbank 
concluded that the main metric used for financial management of the bank 
should be the return on risk capital. “It is this yield which determines how 
funds are allocated between the various banking departments and, within 
these units, to the various product groups, right down to the steering of 
individual transactions” (Commerzbank, Annual Report 1993, p. 20). This 
statement suggests that Commerzbank’s management had a clear 
understanding of the scarcity of capital and the implicit cost of capital. That 
said, Commerzbank’s frequent capital increases during the period analysed, 
give the impression that management viewed the capital market as a self- 
service organisation. During the decade under review, Commerzbank raised a 
total of EUR 4.4 billion in seven separate share issues. That was more than its 
shareholders’ equity had been in 1993.32 The need for fresh capital becomes 
evident from an analysis of Commerzbank’s rather expansive lending policy 





Deposits with banks 
Fixed assets
2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Other earning assets
In 1993 Commerzbank had EUR 82 billion of loans outstanding, which rose to 
a peak of EUR 220 billion in 2000. During that seven-year period, the bank’s
32 Shareholders’ equity was EUR 4.1 billion at the end of 1993.
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loan portfolio grew by 15% p.a. on average, while its tier 1 ratio averaged just 
5.7%. Commerzbank’s tier 1 ratio stood at 4.4% in 1993 and remained 
relatively low throughout the first half of the decade. Following two large 
capital increases in 1997 and 1998, the bank’s tier 1 ratio rose above 6%. 
Commerzbank’s loan portfolio declined to EUR 133 billion again in 2003 -  
mainly because of the deconsolidation of Rheinhyp in 2002 and the 
securitisation of risks - implying an average growth rate of 5% p.a. for the 
period 1993 to 2003.
Besides its customer lending spree, Commerzbank also increasingly 
deposited more money with other banks, although not as much as it received 
from other banks. In 1993, the ratio of deposits with banks versus deposits 
from banks was still nearly 1:1, whereas in 2003 it was around 1:2. The larger 
proportion of funds from other banks deposited at Commerzbank could have 
become a major challenge for Commerzbank’s liquidity management if these 
institutions had withdrawn their short-term liquidity. The high volume of 
interbank business was due to Commerzbank’s increased activities in 
securities lending and in securities transactions, involving, for example, 
repurchase agreements (repos) (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2000, p. 8).
Commerzbank: liabilities and equity structure
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Customer deposits ■ Banks deposits ■ Money market funding *  Other liabilities Equity
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The most striking structural shift on the asset side came from Commerzbank’s 
non-earning assets. While in 1993 non-earning assets made up just 4% of the 
group’s total assets, the figure rose to 20% in 2003. These non-earning assets 
were largely trading-related assets, primarily financial derivative instruments 
with positive market values (Commerzbank, Annual Report 2002, p. 131). 
Equally, Commerzbank’s trading activities were reflected on the liabilities side, 
where derivative financial instruments with a negative fair value were shown. 
The growth of these trading and derivative-related items originated from 
Commerzbank’s attempt to build an investment bank, with trading and 
derivative products playing a pivotal role in this effort.
The most remarkable structural change on the balance sheet was the 
continuous decline in customer deposits relative to total liabilities and equity. 
In 1993, 44% of the bank’s funding still came from customer deposits. During 
the following decade, the proportion of customer deposits declined to 26% in 
2003. On average 30% of funding stemmed from customer deposits, 
compared to 23% from other banks’ deposits. As the weak tier 1 ratio 
suggests, Commerzbank’s shareholders equity base was relatively lean and 




Despite Commerzbank’s lean equity base, its after-tax ROE still averaged just 
4.8% between 1993 and 2003. Certainly, this did not cover the bank’s 
undisclosed cost of equity, and was far below management’s targets. In 1994, 
Commerzbank announced an after-tax return on equity target of 9.5-10% for 
the next five years (FAZ, 16 April 1994). However, by 1996 CEO Kohlhaussen 
was declaring that the bank’s return on equity target was 15% after taxes 
(FAZ, 28 October 1996). This upward revision of the target came after 
Commerzbank delivered a ROE of 9.8% in 1996, without any major 
extraordinary disposal gains.






1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
In contrast to the 1996 results, non-operating items affected Commerzbank’s 
net profit in all other years between 1993 and 2003. In particular, the massive 
net loss of EUR 2.2 billion in 2003 and EUR 269 million in the previous year 
reduced the average return in the period analysed, even though the bank 
boosted its profits in most years under review through disposal gains. For 
example, the sale of a 15% shareholding in Karstadt and the disposal of 
37.5% of the insurer DBV largely contributed to a non-operating income of 
EUR 534 million in 1994.
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Another major disposal was the partial IPO of comdirect in 2000, which 
accounted for the EUR 1.2 billion extraordinary gain in 2000. Taking into 
account these numerous disposal gains, the pre-tax return on equity was 3.7% 
higher for the years 1993 to 2001 and averaged 13.3% on a pre-tax level and 
8.7% on an after-tax level, still falling short of the declared profitability targets. 
Commerzbank did not reach its ROE target of 15% in a single year between 
1993 and 2003 and its highest return on equity of 11.7% (1995) was only 
achieved through a substantial disposal gain of EUR 534 million.
Commerzbank’s total operating income grew by a compound annual growth 
rate of 4.5%, while its total operating expenses rose on average by 5.4% p.a.. 
Obviously, if costs rise faster than revenues this is not conducive to a 
company’s profitability. Commerzbank’s higher costs and the related decline 
of profitability were attributable partly to provisions for loan losses, and to an 
even greater extent to mounting administrative and other operating expenses, 
as the continuously rising cost income ratio demonstrates. This suggests that 
part of Commerzbank’s problems lay within its organisational structure. More 
specifically, the bank’s branch network was inefficiently structured, the costs 
for maintaining a relatively large international network were too high and the 
bank’s IT infrastructure lacked coherence. An additional reason for 
Commerzbank’s weak profitability was the erosion of its net interest margin. 
The bank’s net interest margin fell from 2.11% in 1993 to 0.89% in 2003, while 
the total loan portfolio increased by 63% (1993 vs. 2003). Thus, the bank’s 




The analysis of Commerzbank’s corporate strategy between 1993 and 2003 
leaves the impression of an institution that eventually benefited from being a 
latecomer. This German commercial bank with a substantial retail banking 
network achieved very little that is likely to find its way into the annals of 
strategic bank management history, but it still scored some minor successes. 
For example, it built the country’s largest online bank that survived the dotcom 
boom and Commerzbank became a well-positioned player on the German 
asset management market through the establishment of cominvest.
Arguably, the bank’s two greatest successes were its failure in investment 
banking and its continuous commitment to retail banking in Germany. With 
hindsight, the bank’s late start in investment banking, turned out to be a 
competitive advantage with the Mittelstand. Commerzbank wanted, but failed, 
to buy an investment bank and was not ready to pay sums that management 
considered unjustifiable. Thus, the bank with the yellow logo gained capital 
market expertise by hiring staff and organically building a unit that operated 
out of London and somewhat resembled an investment bank, providing the 
whole range of transaction services.
When the capital markets turned down in 2000, Commerzbank was still in the 
process of expanding its investment banking operations and could therefore 
react swiftly to the altered macroeconomic environment. As it had not lost 
touch with its clientele of small and medium-sized enterprises, it could credibly 
reconnect to this segment, something which some of its peers found difficult 
as they had neglected the Mittelstand while indulging in international 
investment banking.
Moreover, Commerzbank remained committed to retail banking in Germany 
throughout the 1990s. Despite poor profitability, there was little reason for its 
retail clients to feel abandoned during a phase of investment banking and 
internationalisation hype. Commerzbank’s decision to cooperate in the field of 
bancassurance, instead of buying or founding its own insurance company, 
helped avoid balance sheet risks from this business and still allowed to 
provide the services expected by its retail clients.
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Apart from these small successes which, taken together, form an uninspiring 
bank, Commerzbank’s greatest success was its slowness, which with 
hindsight could be considered to be the outcome of a thoughtful strategy. 
Although it remains hypothetical, one possible reason for Commerzbank’s 
slow, not to say cumbersome, strategic moves was the relative stability of the 
management team, with Martin Kohlhaussen as the bank’s CEO from 1991 to
2001. Kohlhaussen ruled unchallenged and none of his management 
colleagues seemed to feel the need to undertake attention-grabbing initiatives.
This management stability is also reflected in Kohlhaussen’s effort to keep the 
bank independent. For this purpose, he entered into various European 
cooperation agreements in the early 1990s. Several years later, he regarded a 
cross-border merger between Commerzbank and another European institute 
as unlikely. More specifically, he did not believe in any mega-merger and 
showed great scepticism about cost synergies from such deals (FAZ, 13. 
March 2000).33 Towards the end of his tenure, Kohlhaussen remarked that 
nationalism regarding banking matters in Europe seemed much more 
prevalent than he had imagined a few years ago (FAZ, 13. March 2000). This 
sobering view of European financial integration was shared by his successor 
Muller (FAZ, 13 Juni 2001).
33 The confirmed talks between Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank in July 2000 were primarily a reaction to 
demands made by Commerzbank’s largest shareholder at the time, Cobra, which owned 17% of the bank in 
May 2000 (FAZ, 18 May 2000; Major, Pretzlik & Ratner, FT, 17 June 2000; Major, FT, 20 June 2000; FAZ, 
14 July 2000; FAZ, 19 July 2000; FAZ, 20 July 2000).
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5.6.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
Barclays epitomised British banking for most of the twentieth century. The 
bank was closely associated with the British Empire and thereafter with the 
Commonwealth, which earned it the title of the “empire’s bank” (Rogers, 1999, 
pp. 67-68). Founded by Quaker families1 in 1896, Barclays emerged as 
Britain’s largest bank in the 1950s - a position it spent the 1990s trying not to 
lose to National Westminster (Vander Weyer, 2000; Ackrill & Hannah, 2001). 
As a result of fierce competition for size, Barclays became rather improvident 
with its lending policy throughout the 1980s.2
This growth strategy culminated in a strong rise in loan loss provisions and the 
bank’s first net loss in 1992, which led to the resignation of John Quinton, who 
had held the joint position as the group’s chairman and chief executive. 
Andrew Buxton, an offspring of one of the Barclays’ founding families, 
succeeded John Quinton as chairman and also became the bank’s chief 
executive on 1 January 1993. However, in response to pressure from 
shareholders separation of these two posts was brought about and Barclays 
started searching for a new a chief executive. Andrew Buxton remained 
Barclays’ chairman until 1999, when he was succeeded by Peter Middleton 
(chairman until 2004).
Finally, in autumn 1993 Barclays named an outsider, Martin Taylor, as the 
company’s new chief executive. Taylor joined Barclays from Courtaulds 
Textiles, where he had demonstrated his managerial skills as the company’s 
chief executive. Prior to Courtaulds Textiles, he had worked as a journalist 
with the Financial Times (Hosking, The Independent, 22 August 1993). He 
was appointed to the board on 1 November 1993 and officially became the 
group’s chief executive on 1 January 1994. Despite Taylor’s initial intention of
1 Barclays was formed as a new joint stock bank through the merger of 20 private banks in the London area 
(Rogers, 1999, p. 70). However, the very beginnings of Barclays can be traced back to several goldsmith- 
bankers in the late 17th century. In 1690, John Freame and his partner Thomas Gould set up a goldsmith- 
bank in Lombard Street. The name Barclay became associated with the bank when John Freame’s son-in- 
law, James Barclay, became a partner in 1736 (Source: Barclays Group Archives).
2 Barclays raised GBP 921 million in new capital in 1988. Between 1990 and 1992 Barclays took charges of 
over GBP 4 billion for bad and doubtful debts. In 1992, Barclays had to provision for nearly GBP 800 million 
of bad lending to the property sector (FT, 5 March 1993).
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staying at Barclays for seven years (interview Martin Taylor)3 he stepped down 
just over four years later in October 1998. The reason4 why he took this 
decision was the lack of support from some board members for his strategic 
views. More specifically, it became obvious to him that the bank’s chairman, 
Buxton, would not keep his promises (interview Martin Taylor).5
Taylor was succeeded by Middleton as an interim CEO. Middleton had joined 
Barclays in 1991 as group deputy chairman after nearly 30 years as an 
adviser at the Treasury. In 1999, Michael O’Neill a former Bank of America 
executive was named as chief executive but had to resign on his first day for 
health reasons.6 Eventually, Matthew Barrett joined Barclays as chief 
executive officer from Bank of Montreal and held that position until 2004.
Taylor’s legacy of restructuring measures helped Barrett to refocus Barclays 
on growing revenues. During his time as CEO Barrett could take advantage of 
a reduced cost base, a more nimble organisation, improved risk management 
and a flourishing British economy. Therefore, the period analysed (1993 to 
2003) can be divided into two phases: the cost-cutting and trimming phase 
under Taylor and the expansion phase during Barrett’s time.
Clearly, the arrival of Taylor in 1993 had a much greater immediate impact for
3 Publicly Martin Taylor said he planned to stay for ten years, but he did not want people to tick off the days 
to his departure (interview Martin Taylor; Cohen & Gapper, FT, 20 August 1993).
4 At the time, it was suggested that Taylor stepped down as Barclays’ CEO for four reasons: First, the 
choice of a controversial public auction for the sale of BZW’s equities and advisory business in 1997 had 
been frowned upon. Second, a disagreement between Martin Taylor and Sir Andrew Large about his role as 
the bank’s executive deputy chairman emerged in May 1998. Third, the Russian crisis in August 1998, in 
which Barclays Capital lost GBP 250 million, added fuel to the fire. And, finally, the October 1998 board 
meeting in New York at which Martin Taylor suggested a break-up of the bank into a retail and a corporate 
bank led to an 6clat (Dixon, FT, 30 November 1998; Vander Weyer, 2000).
5 At the time, it was reported that Taylor wanted to break up the bank into a retail arm and a corporate arm 
(Dixon, FT, 30 November 1998; The Economist, 18 November 2000; Vander Weyer, 2000). This was not
confirmed by Taylor during the interview for this research. He told the board of directors in a meeting in New 
York: “I wanted to look at other ways of handling the Barclays Capital risk position and we were looking at 
merging with Paribas and all sorts of other things and the board, the chairman and one of the directors
simply did not want to talk about it. Their view was we don’t want to hear about any ideas and my view was 
that I was not happy staying in a situation where I was not even able to propose courses of action. The 
board meeting in New York, which was October 1998, actually crystallised this issue and I said to the board 
I’m extremely unhappy and I think the board is ducking its responsibility and is not behaving as a board and 
I am going to consider my position. I went home the next week and I went to see the chairman and said to 
the chairman: ‘Look I am very unhappy with the situation, I can’t possibly stay two more years. I find this, I 
mean, I had to communicate to shareholders and you ask me to lie to them’. So, I said ‘Do you want me to 
go now?’ He said ‘No’. I said, o.k. ‘I will go at the end of next year, 1999, but I want you to promise that you 
let me manage Barclays Capital and I want you to promise to get rid of one director because he is causing 
trouble on board and I can’t work with him. Get rid of him. We have a deal. You help me let me manage 
Barclays Capital and I will stay for one more year.’ He said ‘Fine that is a solution’. He talked to the director. 
He did not go and he then interfered the next week with a very major Barclays Capital issue. So, I said to 
him, ‘I am sorry, I am out off here. You have twice broken my agreements with you. I can’t stay1” (interview 
Martin Taylor).
8 Michael O’Neill seemed to have recovered from cardiac arrhythmia when he accepted the job offer as 
chairman and chief executive officer of Bank of Hawaii on 3 November 2000. He stayed with Bank of Hawaii 
until 31 August 2004 (source: Bank of Hawaii press releases).
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Barclays than the advent of the European Common Market especially as 
Barclays had already positioned itself as the most pro-European British bank 
through two acquisitions on the continent in 1990. Among its UK peers, 
Barclays was the first to make inroads into the European continent in the late 
1980s and pursued the most aggressive, acquisition-led European strategy. In 
1989, Barclays’ managers explained that they considered Barclays to be “the 
best-represented European bank, with operations in 11 out of 12 of the EC 
countries” (Landau, JP, 11 October 1989). At the time, Alex Dyce of the bank’s 
strategic planning department pointed out that the European Common Market 
changed the perspective and that Barclays’ 24% of the UK market 
represented only 2% of the European market, which would allow for significant 
growth opportunities (Landau, JP, 11 October 1989).
In France, where the bank has been present since 1915, it bought 
Europeenne de Banque for FRF 1.5 billion (GBP 153 million) in 1990, thereby 
doubling its retail market presence to more than 70 offices and 100,000 
customers (Lascelles, FT, 29 December 1990). Until 1990, Barclays’ German 
operations primarily served the corporate sector. Following the acquisition of 
private bank Merck Fink in 1990 for an estimated DM 600 million it also 
expanded into the German market for high-net-worth individuals (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 4 July 1995). In Spain Barclays opened its first branch in 1974 and 
developed a retail banking network long before the European Common Market 
was launched, and gained an additional 38 branches through the acquisition 
Banco de Valladolid in 1981 (The Economist, 14 March 1981).
Upon his arrival, Taylor’s analysis of Barclays’ European operations concluded 
that it owned one very good bank in Spain and one very bad bank in France 
(interview Martin Taylor). Moreover, there were start-ups in Portugal and 
Greece and Merck Finck, which Barclays should have never bought according 
to Taylor, as it did not know how to manage it. He referred to it as a terrible 
mistake and remarked that the only thing Merck Finck had in common with 
Barclays was “arrogance and self-delusion” (interview Martin Taylor). Taylor 
also held the view that most members of Barclays senior management did not 
have a clear view what the European Common Market meant and showed 
little interest in this subject.
Despite Barclays’ undifferentiated European expansion strategy prior to the
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completion of the Single Market, the bank’s retail operations ultimately 
focused on just few countries, namely Spain, France and, of course, Britain. 
Barclays strengthened its domestic position in retail banking and broadened 
its product range. In contrast, Barclays’ corporate banking initially started with 
a broad product range, predominantly in the UK and subsequently 
internationalised, while concentrating on debt products. The development of 





Despite Martin Taylor’s rapid action to refocus Barclays’ strategy and Matthew 
Barrett’s expansion policy, the bank’s income structure did not change 
significantly during the period analysed. Although Barclays exited investment 
banking in 1997, this decision is hardly reflected in its trading and commission 
income.
Barclays generated 52% of its total operating income from net interest income 
in 1993 and this proportion remained stable until 2003. The same trend is 
observed in the bank’s commission income, which stayed more or less around 
35% throughout the period under review. Barclays’ trading income is the least 
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■ Net interest income ■ Net commission income ■ Trading income *  Other operating income
While Barclays’ proportion of net interest income was stable between 1993 
and 2003, its net interest margin declined. The net interest margin fell from 
2.60% in 1993 to 1.71% in 2003. The bank’s low net interest margin resulted 
from a low interest rate environment in the UK and other western countries 
during that period and from disintermediation through various new savings 
products, such as investment funds for retail clients. Moreover, competition in
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commercial lending intensified in the UK during the 1990s (interview Martin 
Taylor).
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Management’s focus on improving the quality of its loan portfolio, reducing 
costs and introducing better risk management tools is reflected in the flat 
revenue development between 1993 and 1998. Total operating revenues 
stayed around GBP 7.4 billion throughout that time. In contrast, total operating 
income rose to GBP 12.4 billion in 2003, up from GBP 7.4 billion in 1998. The 
compound annual growth rate for total operating income was 5.3% p.a. in 
1993 to 2003. The following section will analyse the implications of the “cost 




5.G.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
In 1984 Barclays took steps to position itself for what was to become known 
as the 1986 Big Bang in Britain’s banking industry by acquiring a broker and a 
jobber. It bought Zoete & Bevan7 (broker) and Wedd Durlacher Mordaunt 
(jobber) and merged them with its rudimentary merchant banking unit to form 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd (BZW) (Vander Weyer, 2000). In the following years, 
the different business cultures had to be integrated, while BZW continued 
expanding its business around the globe. With hindsight, Taylor described the 
response of Barclays’ management to the challenges of Big Bang through the 
formation of BZW as a very courageous attempt, although it became his 
biggest problem as CEO of Barclays (interview Martin Taylor).
Effectively, BZW conducted Barclays’ global investment banking operations 
and provided a broad range of transaction, advisory and risk management 
services. Since 1993, Barclays’ large corporate banking business in the United 
States, including the bank’s large corporate lending operations had been 
assigned to BZW (Barclays, Annual Report 1993, pp. 19-20). As of 1994 BZW 
also “assumed overall country responsibility for the management of large 
corporate lending in certain European and Asia-Pacific countries” (Barclays, 
Annual Report 1994, p. 11). In 1993, BZW still included the bank’s asset 
management division, which became a separate business entity after the 
acquisition of Wells Fargo Nikko Investment Advisors in 1995.
1993 was the best year in the twelve-year history of BZW.8 The 1993 
operating profit of GBP 501 million (Barclays, 1993, Annual Report, p. 34) 
meant a return on equity of over 40% (Vander Weyer, 2000, p. 215). However, 
the strong operating profit of 1993 was largely driven by a very fortunate 
trading result9 of GBP 625 million, which offset the losses from other divisions 
(Vander Weyer, 2000, p. 216). By 1993 BZW had developed a strong 
reputation as a lead underwriter for sterling bonds, an area of expertise on 
which Barclays Capital would be built after the disposal of its equities business 
in 1997 (Vander Weyer, 2000, p. 215).
7 The Bevans were one of the founding families of Barclays (Vander Weyer, 2000).
8 This was the same year as BZW launched the enhanced scrip dividend scheme. “A simple but radical 
solution to the problem of unrelieved Advance Corporation Tax for UK companies with substantial overseas 
earnings” (Barclays, Annual Report 1993, p. 19).
9 In 1993, 67% of Barclays’ trading income came from interest and foreign exchange dealing and only 33% 
from equities (Barclays, Annual Report 1994, p. 23).
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With some 6,000 employees (1993), half of whom were located in the UK, 
BZW considered itself a global investment bank. Yet Taylor conceded in the 
interview for this research that in fact the corporate finance division was of 
sub-scale and the equity business was only reasonably well positioned in 
Europe and in non-Japan Asia. It had a loss-making business in Japan and no 
significant business in the US. He then remarked, “You cannot be a global 
equities business and not be in the US. So we had no choice, we had to either 
buy an American broker or get out of it” (interview Martin Taylor).
By the end of 1996, BZW had staff of around 7,500, who contributed 17% of 
Barclays’ total operating income and 9% of the group’s GBP 2.3 billion 
operating profit. Taylor’s intellectual interest in investment banking allowed 
him to quickly understand the volatile nature of this business and what that 
meant for capital allocation within the group. He also realised that the 
complexity of investment banking would continue to tie up management 
resources that were disproportional to the division’s earnings contribution 
(interview Martin Taylor).
Following the sudden death of David Band, who was BZW’s chief executive 
from 1988 until 1996, Martin Taylor decided to break up BZW and sell the 
equities business10 to CSFB, the investment banking arm of Credit Suisse. He 
was quoted as saying that the recent consolidation on the US investment 
banking market had contributed to his decision (Graham & Martinson, FT, 4 
October 1997). More specifically, Taylor was concerned about the structural 
cost-income problem at BZW, which he believed could not be overcome 
(interview Martin Taylor). In October 1997, Barclays publicly announced11 that 
it intended to withdraw from the equities, equity capital markets, and mergers 
and advisory businesses, together with all of the investment banking business 
in Australasia12 (Corrigan & Lewis, FT, 3 October 1997; Suddeutsche Zeitung,
10 According to press articles at the time, CSFB paid GBP 100 million for the acquisition of BZW’s equities 
business. By contrast, according to The Economist, Barclays actually paid at least GBP 688 million to exit 
investment banking. In his account, Martin Vander Weyer derives a total of GBP 724 million (The 
Economist, 7 February 1998; Vander Weyer, 2000, p. 244).
11 Taylor was much criticised for publicly declaring that he wanted to dispose BZW ahead of the actual deal. 
CSFB, the eventual buyer, probably enjoyed greater bargaining power after Taylor’s statements. However, 
Taylor’s public announcement could also have been seen as an invitation to other potential bidders, thus 
intensifying the competition among interested buyers.
12 The 1997 annual report revealed that the BZW businesses sold had been loss-making in the years 1995, 
1996 and 1997. The breakdown of Barclays’ segmental income statements into the “Former BZW 
Businesses” and “Barclays Capital” also shows that the largest proportion of trading income originated from 




4 October 1997; Graham & Martinson, FT, 4 October 1997; Barclays, Annual 
Report 1997, p. 8).
After the sale of BZW’s equities business - some operations were closed 
down, e.g. the equities business in Japan - Barclays found itself left with 
interest rate sensitive and credit sensitive businesses. These comprised the 
fixed-income, foreign exchange treasury, structured finance, trade financing, 
derivative, and commodity trading operations, which were renamed “Barclays 
Capital”. Under the leadership of Robert Diamond, who joined Barclays from 
CSFB where he had been in charge of global fixed income and foreign 
exchange (Vander Weyer, 2000, p. 224), Barclays built an “integrated credit 
and capital markets operation to offer syndicated lending and bond 
underwriting” (Corrigan & Lewis, FT, 23 October 1997).
Robert Diamond was quoted as saying that the new focus on the integration of 
the credit side would be a bet on the emergence of a large and liquid credit 
market after the beginning of European Monetary Union -  not least as the 
focus would shift to credit risks after the disappearance of currency risks. 
Barclays’ management expected that this strategy would allow the bank to 
benefit from structural changes in the financial services industry. Barclays 
Capital’s focus on the European debt market was the bank’s response to the 
breaking up of traditional bank relationships, i.e. the trend towards 
disintermediation, which should spur the issuance of corporate bonds. 
Management anticipated a reduction in government bond issuance, but also 
foresaw the development of private pensions to drive the demand for 
corporate bonds (Corrigan & Lewis, FT, 23 October 1997; Shearlock, The 
Banker, 1 December 1997).
While BZW contributed 17% to Barclays’ total operating income and only 9% 
to the group’s operating profit in 1993, the division’s best year, Barclays 
Capital generated 22% of total operating income and 22% of the group’s total 
operating profit in 2003. Alongside this more balanced structure in 2003, 
Barclays Capital also achieved an operating profit of GBP 835 million (1993: 
GBP 532 million) with a lower headcount (5,800 vs. 6,000). At the end of 2003 
Barclays Capital was number 4 in the global all debt league table, with a 
market share of 4.7% (i.e. USD 200 billion of debt issuance) and maintained
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its lead position in Sterling bond issuance with a 19% market share (Barclays, 




With the exception of the acquisition of Wells Fargo Nikko Investment 
Advisors (WFNIA) in 1995, Barclays grew its asset management operations 
organically during the period analysed. The bank’s organic growth strategy 
concentrated on increasing assets under management. Although Barclays 
managed some GBP 30 billion worth of assets at the beginning of 1993, it 
gained substantial volume through the Wells Fargo Nikko Investment Advisors 
deal13 which brought in another GBP 110 billion14 (USD 170 billion) (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 20 September 1995).
It was only after the acquisition of the San Francisco-based WFNIA for GBP 
280 million (USD 440 million) that Barclays’ asset management operations 
became a separate business segment within the Barclays group (Gapper, FT, 
24 January 1996; Barclays, Annual Report 1996). Before that Barclays’ asset 
management operations were part of the bank’s investment banking arm, 
BZW. The newly formed segment, Barclays Global Investors (BGI), was 
created through the merger of BZW Asset Management and WFNIA, 
fundamentally changing the structure of Barclays’ asset management 
business.
While BZW’s asset management unit was primarily an active asset 
management house (with around two third being actively managed mandates), 
WFNIA was particularly strong in passive and quantitative fund management 
(FT, 22 June 1995; Barclays, Annual Report 1996). Because of the WFNIA 
acquisition, Barclays Global Investors (BGI) became the largest passive fund 
manager in the world with GBP 170 billion of passive funds and GBP 36 billion 
of active funds (Barclays, Annual Report 1995). At the end of 2003, Barclays 
had GBP 598 billion assets under management, of which 69% were index- 
linked mandates (i.e. passive funds).
The rather technical and standardised approaches to passive (indexed) asset 
management generally keep profit margins thin in this particular area of asset 
management. As Barclays remained primarily focused on passive asset 
management15 after the acquisition of WFNIA, BGI’s profit contribution was
13 The deal was closed on 31 December 1995.
14 At the time, WFNIA had some 800 employees.
15 Additional asset management services and products were also offered. For example, stock lending and 
the development of exchange traded funds.
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moderate for most of the time. In 1994, Barclays’ asset management business 
contributed only 2.3% to the bank’s operating income and a meagre 1.5% to 
the operating profit. This compares to 5.4% of Barclays’ operating income and 
3.8% of the bank’s operating profit in 2003 (Barclays, Annual Report 1994; 
Barclays, Annual Report 2003). The improved profitability was largely due to a 
gradual expansion into active asset management from 2002 (Gapper, FT, 16 





Under Martin Taylor’s leadership, Barclays’ retail banking strategy 
concentrated on enhancing efficiency by reducing branch numbers and 
personnel and investing in information technology. In Barclays’ 1993 annual 
report management emphasised the good progress in introducing 
complementary delivery channels in its UK retail banking (Barclays, Annual 
Report 1993), not least through the heavy investment in information 
technology - some GBP 800 million throughout the group in 1993 (a divisional 
breakdown was not disclosed).
In 1993, a separate brand, Premier Banking, was introduced to serve high- 
earning personal banking customers and the following year a telephone 
banking service, Barclaycall, was launched in the UK. As noted in the 1994 
annual report, Barclays’ retail banking arm in the UK underwent a “major 
investment programme to improve and expand the range of customer services 
and delivery channels, reduce costs and improve operating efficiencies and 
risk management” (Barclays, Annual Report 1994, p. 6).
In the same year, Barclays also set up the European Retail Banking Group 
(ERBG) to bring together its retail banking operations in six continental 
European countries and Merck Finck, its German private bank (Barclays, 
Annual Report 1994, p. 9). The 1995 annual report presented The European 
Retail Banking Group as a separate business unit that delivered a widening 
operating loss of GBP 31 million (GBP 8 million loss in 1994). The mounting 
losses in this segment were due to higher loan loss provisions and 
restructuring expenses at Barclays’ German subsidiary, Merck Finck 
(Barclays, Annual Report 1995, p. 16; Borsen-Zeitung, 28 February 1996).
Shortly after the poor results of its European Retail Banking Group had been 
revealed, Barclays subsumed these operations into a newly formed division 
called International and Private Banking. In the following years, Merck Fink 
received several capital injections.16 Finally Barclays’ management officially 
explained that Merck Fink no longer fitted into its strategy (Borsen-Zeitung, 26 
March 1999) and sold the bank with its 414 employees to Belgium’s KBL bank 
in 1999 for DM 500 million (Graham, FT, 17 June 1999). As previously stated, 
Taylor held the view that Barclays should not have bought Merck Fink in the
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first place (interview Martin Taylor).
Under Taylor, Barclays’ pan-European strategy gradually withered away as he 
did not really have one. He preferred to consider each of Barclays’ European 
operations as a separate business. Most of them were wealth management 
businesses that did not compete with the local retail banks as their focus was 
on a small number of wealthy clients. Taylor took a particularly strong interest 
in the Spanish banking market which he considered the most professional one 
on the European continent at the time, as it had not been nationalised, and did 
not have “the dead weight of the subsidised competition” (interview Martin 
Taylor). Enthusiastically he remarked, “in Spain banking was fantastic and it 
was the first country to use computers in retail banking, and also the 
customers were very educated” (interview Martin Taylor).
Notwithstanding the absence of a coherent European strategy, Barclays and 
especially Taylor worked very hard at buying Credit Lyonnais in 1997. What 
stopped Barclays in the end was not Barclays’ board of directors, which was 
interested in the acquisition, but the change of government in France. 
President Jacques Chirac called an election in 1997, as a result of which 
conservative Prime Minister Alain Juppe lost his job and socialist Lionel Jospin 
took over. This caused Barclays to lose interest (interview Martin Taylor).
Martin Taylor’s successor, Matthew Barrett revived the bank’s European 
vision. Barrett saw European expansion as essential, as continental 
economies would become more integrated and Barclays’ internationally 
recognised brand should make it easy to enter foreign markets (Willman, FT, 
20 September 2000). He said, “Barclays wants to become a pan-European 
bank,” and added that Barclays wanted to increase the proportion of earnings 
from outside the UK from 20% in 2001 to 50% in the coming years. However, 
this target would not necessarily have to be achieved through acquisitions, but 
rather through organic growth of the Barclays Capital and Barclays Global 
Investors business units (Borsen-Zeitung, 9 February 2001).
Management deviated from its organic growth path when it launched a EUR 
1.1 billion takeover bid for the Spanish bank Banco Zaragozano in May 2003. 
At the end of 2002, Banco Zaragozano had 570,000 clients that were served
16 A total of DM 400 million was estimated (Borsen-Zeitung, 26 March 1999).
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through 526 branches. According to Barclays’ management, the estimated 
cost synergies were just EUR 100 million, while revenue synergies were not 
quantified (Barclays Press Release, 8 May 2003).
With the arrival of Barrett, the bank’s retail strategy gradually shifted from cost-  ^
cutting measures towards new ways of increasing revenues (Graham & 
Targett, FT, 16 February 2000). Despite this more expansive policy, Barclays’ 
management deemed it had too many branches relative to its UK peers. 
Therefore, the board decided to close 171 of its 1,729 UK branches on a 
single day in April 2000. Unfortunately, 60 of these branches were the last 
remaining banks in their towns, which led to a public uproar.17 This led to a 
general debate about social exclusion18 if access to bank branches is impeded 
(Tighe, FT, 8 April 2000; Treanor, The Guardian, 8 April 2000; The Economist, 
18 November 2000).
Barrett considered Barclays’ growth potential to be particularly significant in 
the UK retail mortgage market, where he felt that the bank had fallen behind 
its competitors. In summer 2000, he announced that he would like Barclays to 
expand its mortgage operations. At the time Barclays had a market share of 
1% of the British mortgage business (Borsen-Zeitung, 4 August 2000), which 
Barrett intended to double within three years (Graham & Targett, FT, 16 
February 2000).
A month later Barclays made a GBP 5.6 billion friendly bid for Woolwich, the 
former building society.19 The initial estimates published in the offer document 
suggested the deal would yield GBP 150 million cost savings and GBP 90 
million of increased revenues by 2003. As with most domestic mergers in the 
banking industry, the biggest savings were expected to come from job cuts in 
the bank’s back office and from the closure of urban branches in the same 
neighbourhood.
Woolwich offered Barclays access to a large IFA (independent financial 
advisor) distribution network and added another 412 UK branches to Barclays’
17 The whole debate got particularly heated as Peter Middleton’s (Barclays’ chairman) salary package of 
GBP 1.4 million was revealed on the same day as the branch closures were announced (The Economist, 18 
November 2000).
18 The discussion was fuelled by the Cruickshank report on bank profitability, which argued that insufficient 
access to bank accounts may be a source of social exclusion.
19 Woolwich was founded in 1847 and converted from mutual to pic status in 1997.
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1,728 UK branches, around 100 of which were subsequently closed. The 
complementary multi-channel distribution networks of Barclays and Woolwich 
provided a compelling strategic rationale for the deal according to Barclays’ 
management (Barclays, Presentation, 11 August 2000; Willman, FT, 6 
September 2000). The acquisition of Woolwich increased Barclays’ share of 
the UK mortgage market to 10% (Willman, FT, 20 September 2000). 
Furthermore, Woolwich successfully operated a state-of the-art technology 
platform to combine products for customers, which facilitated cross-selling.
The increased revenues were expected to come for instance from selling 
Woolwich customers Barclays’ credit cards. The Barclaycard has arguably 
been Barclays’ most successful product since its introduction in 1969. 
Barclaycard emerged as Britain’s biggest credit card issuer with 9 million 
customers at the end of 2003. The Barclaycard segment contributed 13% 
(GBP 284 million) to Barclays’ overall pre-tax profit in 199620 and increased to 
19% (GBP 723 million) in 2003. Barclaycard also helped Barclays to tap the 
small and medium sized enterprise market by offering credit card solutions for 
corporate customers.
At the time of the Woolwich acquisition Barclays had 1.25 million online 
customers, making it Britain’s largest internet bank (Willman, FT, 24 May 
2000; Barclays, Presentation, 11 August 2000). In 2000, Barclays stepped up 
its investments in e-commerce to GBP 325 million, compared with GBP 180 
million in the previous year. By the end of 2003, Barclays had in total 4.5 
million online banking clients. Matthew Barrett refrained from building a stand­
alone internet bank and preferred an online solution that was fully integrated 
into the organisational structure of the group (Graham & Targett, FT, 16 
February 2000). Barrett wisely foresaw in 2000 that “five years from now there 
will be no e-business and no dotcoms. There will only be companies that have 
learned how to change their business models and survive and those that have 
fallen by the wayside” (Graham & Targett, FT, 16 February 2000). He added 
“this thing of running out and doing some kind of anorexic internet bank to 
impress the dotcom market is kind of fun, but it isn’t good strategy” (Graham & 
Targett, FT, 16 February 2000).
While Barclays dealt with the bank’s weak position in the mortgage business
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by acquiring Woolwich, it opted for a strategic alliance to strengthen its life 
insurance operations. Only few months after the Woolwich deal, Barclays 
announced that it had agreed with UK insurer Legal & General (L&G) to sell 
L&G’s pension and investment products in return for a commission fee 
(Bolger, FT, 17 January 2001; The Banker, 1 February 2001). Barclays shut 
down its own life assurance operations and passed administration of unit trust 
sales over to L&G. The agreement was not exclusive and allowed L&G to 
broaden its access to the small business market, which was expected to gain 
significance following the introduction of the so-called stakeholder pensions, a 
low-cost, government-backed pension scheme, in April 2001 (Bolger, FT, 17 
January 2001; The Banker, 1 February 2001).
20 There are no figures for earlier years.
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5.6.3. Cost and Risk Management
When British interest rates began to rise in the early 1990s, Barclays faced a 
backlash from its improvident lending policy during the 1980s. As already 
referred to in the introduction to this case study, the bank’s desire to grow and 
keep its position as Britain’s largest bank motivated a lending spree21 to UK 
homebuyers (Vander Weyer, 2000). As interest rates rose, the property values 
against which loans were secured declined (The Economist, 26 October 1996; 
The Economist, 18 November 2000). Consequently, Barclays’ risk provisions 
soared to GBP 2.5 billion in 1992, eating up 37% of its total operating income 
for the year and 67% of net interest income.
Barclays: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
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According to Martin Taylor, who took over as CEO in 1993, the provisions for 
impaired loans booked in 1992 were not enough. Therefore, he had to make 
loan loss provisions in 1994/95 that should have been taken in 1992 (interview 
Martin Taylor). When he arrived at the bank, he identified three fundamental 
problems with the loan portfolio. After nearly two years in office Taylor 
concluded that the bank had grown too fast, had wrongly priced its loans and
21 Barclays also lent to US companies on terms that did not adequately price in the underlying risk, hoping 
for more profitable business at a later stage, in particular for its investment banking arm BZW. It used to be 
common practice for large banks with “strong balance sheets" to “buy” investment banking deals in the 
1990s (Waters, FT, 10 November 1994). At the start of 1993, Barclays did business with 900 US 
companies, but reduced the number to 200 within two years, in order to have fewer and deeper
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had built up huge industry concentrations on its loan books, which posed a 
cluster risk (The Economist, 26 October 1996).
Subsequently, Barclays reviewed its lending policy, especially with the aid of 
new information technology. In 1994, it introduced the “Lending Adviser” 
programme that helped to assess individual loans and monitor its overall loan 
portfolio. The experience of rocketing loan loss provisions prompted 
management to abandon the bank’s growth paradigm and shift towards a risk- 
adequate pricing policy (The Economist, 26 October 1996).
Moreover, Taylor addressed the efficiency of retail banking and cut the 
number of branches drastically, while investing heavily in new technologies for 
new distribution channels. Introducing new technologies along with further 
measures to improve efficiency cut the bank’s headcount by 18,500 between 
1991 and 1996, reducing total staff numbers to 66,000. Barclays’ focus on 
domestic retail banking and its relatively moderate investment banking 
exposure is reflected in a moderate rise in personnel expenses per employee.












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
While the proportion of personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total 
operating expenses before risk provisions remained stable at 58% on
relationships according to Martin Taylor (Waters, FT, 10 November 1994).
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average, it rose by a compound annual growth rate of 7.6% p.a. during the 
period analysed. The absolute number of employees declined from 99,000 in 
1993 to 74,800 in 2003.22 As fewer employees continuously generated more 
income during the period under review, the group’s cost income ratio improved 
from 66% in 1993 to 58% in 2003. This positive development mirrors the 
efficient use of new technologies and economies of scale.
The development of the UK economy and Barclays’ continuous focus on UK 
retail banking did not lead to a decline in the bank’s overall loan portfolio 
between 1993 and 1999. However, the quality of the loan portfolio improved 
noticeably during that period, as illustrated by the rise of Barclays’ coverage 
ratio (loan loss reserves relative to problem loans). The accelerated 
improvement of asset quality was facilitated by using a “workout bank".23 A 
separate segment called “Business in transition”24 was set up to deal with 
assets that needed “restructuring” and that would be ultimately disposed of as 
they did not constitute core activities of the bank.










22 At the end of 1990, the number of employees was still 116,800 (Barclays, Annual Report 1990, p. 26).
23 The “United States Transition" division was established in 1993 to scale back credit exposure in the US. 
As of 1995 it was renamed “Businesses in Transition” and also comprised various loans and other assets 
that were not considered to be of long-term interest to the group or which required significant restructuring 
(Barclays, Annual Report 1995, p. 10). “Business in Transition” was dissolved in 1999.
Nearly a decade later, Dresdner Bank, shortly after its takeover by the insurer Allianz, set up an 




More risk-adequate pricing of loans also reduced the proportion of annual loan 
loss provisions relative to total outstanding loans. However, this ratio 
deteriorated again in the aftermath of the 1998 financial markets crises in Asia 
and Russia.25 The subsequent attempts to bail out the highly leveraged hedge 
fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) required Barclays to contribute 
USD 300 million (The Economist, 18 November 2000). These turbulent 
financial market conditions certainly accelerated Taylor’s departure, despite 
his successful efforts to improve the bank’s risk and cost management.
During the years under Taylor’s leadership, Barclays’ loan portfolio fluctuated 
between GBP 90 and 100 billion, but subsequently more than doubled in the 
years up to 2003. His time as Barclays’ CEO was dominated by stringent cost 
and risk control, whereas Barrett’s era was characterised by rising revenues 
and a new growth paradigm. Yet, in 2000 Barclays’ management proclaimed 
that the group’s sustainable annual cost base would be reduced by GBP 1 
billion over the four years from 2000 to 2003 (Graham & Targett, FT, 16 
February 2000; Barclays, Annual Report 2003). Although the cost income ratio 
did not improve between 2000 and 2003, management still explained in its 
2003 Annual Report that the cumulative total cost savings of GBP 1.26 billion 
exceeded the four-year goal by 26% (Barclays, Annual Report 2003).
25 Barclays lost some GBP 250 million on Russian government bonds (The Banker, 1 January 1999; The 




The more restrictive lending policy during the period when Taylor was 
Barclays’ chief executive officer would have led to a strong rise of the bank’s 
tier 1 ratio if the bank had not launched a share buyback programme in August 
1995. Between 1995 and 1999 Barclays bought 207 million of its own shares 
for GBP 2.3 billion.26 Further share buyback programmes followed in each 
year until 2003. In total Barclays spent an additional GBP 1.1 billion to buy its 
own shares, thereby keeping the equity level low and the tier 1 ratio between 
7% and 8% for most of the time.27
  —
Barclays: liabilities and equity structure
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
I Deposits ■ Money market funding ■ Sub-debt and hybrids capital ■ Other liabilities Equity
During the period analysed, Barclays’ equity ratio was 4% on average, 
fluctuating in a narrow band between 3.5% (1997) and 4.8% (2000). In 
contrast to that stable picture, the proportion of deposits (from customers and 
banks) relative to total liabilities declined from 1993 until the end of 2003. This 
decline can be partly explained by Barclays’ shift to funding through money 
market instruments in response to the growing importance of 
disintermediation.
26 Barclays Investor Relations homepage [online] Available from: http://www.investorrelations.barclays.co.uk 
[Accessed 23 January 2005],
The two exceptional years were 1993 (5.9%) and 2002 (8.2%).
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Disintermediation also seemed to be the driving force behind the decline in net 
loans relative to deposits from 1993 until 1999. In 1993, 77.5% of deposits 
were still tied up in loans, whereas by the end of 1999 the ratio was down to 
67.4%. However, in 2000, the “loans-deposits ratio” rose sharply again to 
77.4% as a reaction to the acquisition of Woolwich. In the following three 
years, this ratio increased further to 81.3%, demonstrating Barclays’ 
continuous focus on retail banking. The high “loans-deposits ratio" indicates 





Deposits with banks 
Fixed assets
2000 2001 2002 2003
■ Other earning assets
Net loans to customers as a proportion of total assets were relatively stable 
during the period analysed. They declined by just 5 percentage points from 
57% in 1993 to 52% in 2003. The average was 50% in this period. Deposits 
with banks, which may also be regarded as loans to other banks, tied up on 
average 16% of Barclays’ assets. Notwithstanding the 9.3% compound annual 
growth in its loan portfolio between 1993 and 2003, Barclays’ asset structure 




In 1992, the first ever loss in Barclays’ history (net loss of GBP 343 million) 
prompted management to review the growth maxim of the preceding years. 
Andrew Buxton, Barclays’ chairman between 1993 and 1999, set an after-tax 
return on equity target of 15% for the group and acknowledged that the bank 
could afford to lose market share in return for improved profitability (Gapper, 
FT, 6 August 1993).
After a still weak return on equity of 6.4% in 1993, a reduction of nearly GBP 
250 million in operating expenses and a significant reduction in loan loss 
provisions boosted the group’s ROE to 20% in 1994. Relatively tight cost 
control, along with the efficiency gains from new technologies in retail banking 
and a benign lending environment led to ROEs that were consistently above 
15% in the years up to 2003.
With the arrival of Taylor in autumn 1993, Barclays embarked on a course that 
would trim costs, improve risk management and cut the range of business 
activities. Taylor’s previous experience in the textile industry helped him to 
recognize the “industrialisation” of banking in general and of retail banking in 
particular (interview Martin Taylor). The use of complementary delivery 
channels, which became possible through new information technology in the 
1990s and the implicit unbundling of retail banking contributed to significant 
efficiency improvements.
Setting a return on equity target for the whole bank ultimately has implications 
for each segment. First, internal rivalry about capital allocation arises. Second, 
a comparison of segmental ROEs may create tension among the different 
business segments, if the profitability deviates significantly, regardless of the 
actual level of profitability. This relative profitability was also the underlying 
cause for the disposal of Barclays’ investment banking arm, BZW, in 1997 
(interview Martin Taylor).
BZW’s returns on equity increasingly diluted the group’s overall profitability. In 
1996 BZW made an operating profit of GBP 204 million, producing a return on 
capital of 8% compared to some 34% for personal banking (Graham & 
Martinson, FT, 4 October 1997). The improved returns reported by Barclays’
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UK banking services, along with the rising demand for risk capital at BZW, 
represented conflicting developments. Moreover, the different corporate 
cultures of a UK clearing bank and an international investment bank became 
insurmountable (interview Martin Taylor).






1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
In the light of these different performances and internal competition for risk 
capital, Barrett introduced the concept of value-based management (VBM). 
The value-based management approach focuses on economic profit. 
Barclays’ definition of economic profit is the “profit after tax and minority 
interests, excluding goodwill amortisation, less a charge for the cost of 
average shareholders’ funds (which includes purchased goodwill)” (Barclays, 
Annual Report 2001, p. 15).
In 2000, Barrett announced that he wanted the bank to double economic profit 
in four years (Graham & Targett, FT, 16 February 2000; Barclays, Annual 
Report 2003). The cumulative economic profit over the period 2000 to 2003 
would have been GBP 6.1 billion. According to management’s own 
calculations, which are difficult to check, the cumulative economic profit for 
this period totalled GBP 5.3 billion. Although Barclays’ management missed 
its, maybe overly ambitious, profitability target, the bank still delivered an
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average return on equity of 18% for that period, and therefore exceeded the 




Barclays underwent two phases during the decade under review, each 
distinctly shaped by its CEO at the time. During the years under Martin 
Taylor’s leadership, Barclays was dominated by stringent cost and risk control, 
whereas Matthew Barrett’s era was characterised by rising revenues and a 
new growth paradigm. Barrett was only able to concentrate on revenue growth 
again because of Taylor’s legacy. Without Taylor’s managerial rigour in 
addressing cost, risk and cultural issues at Barclays, Barrett would not have 
been in such a comfortable position to induce a new momentum.
Taylor remarked that upon his arrival the prevailing characteristic of this old- 
style traditional British bank was its arrogance and lack of realism, which he 
found everywhere within Barclays, most strikingly among the bank’s top 
management (interview Martin Taylor). According to Taylor, there existed a 
strong cultural affinity to some of the weakest businesses in the bank, 
combined with a weak affinity to some of the best businesses in the bank. He 
found that this corporate culture was also reflected in the bank’s risk and 
capital management (interview Martin Taylor).
Besides putting decent risk and credit management tools in place, Barclays 
under Taylor rethought its financial strategy and particularly its capital 
structure. It was the first major European bank to buy back its own equity, 
based on the view that the ROE could be raised through less equity, rather 
than trying to push for returns (interview Martin Taylor). This financial strategy 
laid the foundation for Barrett’s concept of value-based management (VBM) 
and the respectable return on equity that averaged 17.6% (net) in 1993 to 
2003.
In many ways Taylor, with his non-banking background, was the right person 
for the position as Barclays’ CEO after the bank’s first ever loss in 1992. His 
unbiased approach and sharp intellect allowed him to analyse the situation at 
Barclays thoroughly. He arrived in time to ring the alarm bell at this incrusted 
institution and addressed issues that appeared sacrosanct, such as the 
disposal of BZW and the closure of branches. Taylor was an apt choice for a 
job that required understanding archaic traditional structures, paired with the 
challenges of fast-changing financial markets. Overall, he introduced the right,
340
5.6. Barclays pic
and in any case necessary measures, for Barclays to be turned around.
Although an analytic mind like his is well suited for disentangling a complex 
situation and putting forward sensible solutions, this type of intellectual 
approach weighs heavy when it comes to the mundane task of pushing sales, 
developing new products and being alert towards the needs and interests of 
clients. For example, unlike most of his colleagues at Barclays, Taylor took an 
intellectual and political view on European financial integration. More 
specifically, this caused him to worry about the absence of a proper EU 
services directive and to call off the acquisition of Credit Lyonnais because of 
a change of government in France (interview Martin Taylor).
By contrast, the more hands-on Barrett bought the Spanish bank Banco 
Zaragozano, without much ado, thereby strengthening Barclays’ position on 
the Iberian Peninsula. A gifted salesman, he stepped in just at the right time to 
introduce a client and sales-oriented corporate culture that would boost 
revenues. During his time as CEO, he could take advantage of a reduced cost 
base, a more nimble organisation, improved risk management and a 
flourishing British economy. After the cost cutting and trimming phase under 
Taylor, Barrett revived growth and took a more entrepreneurial approach, for 
example, through the acquisition of Woolwich.
During the period analysed, Barclays broadened its product range in retail 
banking, but remained focused on few countries. The bank’s corporate 
banking moved in the other direction, as it internationalised while confining its 
activities to debt capital market services. These changes were reasonably 
managed by two dissimilar CEOs, whose arrivals were well timed, 
notwithstanding Taylor’s premature resignation. The complementary nature of 
Martin Taylor and Matthew Barrett persuasively illustrates that different times 
need different types of CEOs.
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5.7. HVB Group AG I Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
5.7.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
When the Italian banking group Unicredit acquired Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank AG (also referred to as “HVB” or “Hypovereinsbank”) for EUR 16 
billion in June 2005, this was Europe’s largest cross-border takeover in the 
banking industry (Jenkins, et al., FT, 14 June 2005). The deal came seven 
years after the two Munich-based banks Bayerische Vereinsbank 
(“Vereinsbank”) and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank (“Hypo- 
Bank” or just “Hypo”) announced their decision to join forces through a 
“merger of equals” to create what they called a “bank of the regions”.
According to Hilmar Kopper, CEO of Deutsche Bank at the time, the deal was 
provoked by Deutsche Bank’s disclosure in July 1996 that it had acquired a 
5.2% stake in Vereinsbank. Vereinsbank’s management and Bavarian 
politicians became concerned that Deutsche Bank could pursue a complete 
takeover of Vereinsbank and therefore called for a “Bavarian solution” (Koehn, 
Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998; interview Hilmar Kopper; interviewee II).1 
There was considerable concern in Bavaria that a takeover by Deutsche Bank 
could subsequently trigger a bid for Hypo-Bank by Frankfurt-based Dresdner 
Bank, depriving Bavaria of its significance as a financial centre (Koehn, 
Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998). Kopper made it clear in an interview with 
the author of this thesis that he indeed approached Albrecht Schmidt, 
Vereinsbank’s CEO, and offered talks but realised after the phone call that his 
ideas were not welcome. Shortly afterwards Deutsche Bank sold its stake, 
which it had raised to just below 10%, realising a book gain of some DM 1 
billion (interview Hilmar Kopper).
Regardless of Kopper’s real intentions, the announcement certainly set off 
intensified talks between the two Bavarian banks. Moreover, there is little 
doubt that the merger between Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank was welcomed
1 For the HVB case study, the researcher did two structured and formal interviews. Both interviewees asked 
to remain anonymous. One interviewee is a well-informed, Munich-based financial journalist working for a 
leading German newspaper. This interviewee is referred to as “interviewee I”. The other interviewee joined 
Vereinsbank in the early 1980s and rose to the rank of a member of HVB’s executive management team 
(Bereichsvorstand). This interviewee is referred to as “interviewee II”. Both interviews were carried out on 6 
December 2006. In addition, several informal conversations with leading German bankers contributed to this 
case study.
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by the Bavarian State (Associated Press, 21 July 1997; Borsen-Zeitung, 23 
April 2004). Although it appears unlikely that politicians played an active role, 
the prime minister of Bavaria (Edmund Stoiber) obliged the banks with a one- 
off tax waiver on the implicit capital gains from the exchange of shares in the 
merger transaction (Koehn, Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998; The Economist, 
5 August 2000).2
Despite the deal being described as a “merger of equals”, there is sufficient 
evidence that Vereinsbank effectively took over Hypo-Bank3 (Sen, Metzler 
Sector Insight, 3 November 1998; The Economist, 5 August 2000). While this 
argument will be considered throughout the case study, at this stage of the 
analysis it is only of relevance in that it helps to clarify which bank this 
research should concentrate on in the period before the merger. Since 
Vereinsbank was the dominant force and provided the merged group’s CEO, 
Albrecht Schmidt, as well as the majority of the management board members, 
Vereinsbank should be at the heart of this study for the period between 1993 
and 1997.
Bayerische Vereinsbank was founded as a mortgage bank by several private 
investors and members of the Bavarian nobility in 1869.4 When the large 
Berlin banks expanded their branch network into Bavaria at the turn of the 
century, Vereinsbank reacted by increasing the number of branches -  not 
least so it could use deposits as a means of financing loans. 34 years before 
Vereinsbank was established, the business-minded Bavarian King Ludwig I 
initiated the formation of Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank to 
provide mortgages (1835). The banks’ proximity and focus on mortgage 
banking had led to the idea of a merger back in the 1930s -  a plan favoured
2 As Vereinsbank owned 10% of Allianz, it offered Hypo-Bank shareholders six Hypo-Bank shares in 
exchange for one Allianz share. This enabled Vereinsbank to reduce its Allianz stake by around 8 
percentage points without paying capital gains tax and to finance the deal without significantly diluting the 
share base (Koehn, Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998). In order to bolster its capital base, the new group 
raised raised its capital by DM 3.6 billion through a capital increase (Koehn, Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 
1998). Besides, the State of Bavaria owned 25% of Vereinsbank. Allianz held a 25% stake in Hypo-Bank.
3 Throughout the case study, the term “merger" will be used.
4 In addition three large banks were integrated into the two institutions that later formed HVB. These were 
Bayerische Notenbank, Bayerische Disconto- und Wechsel-Bank and Bayerische Staatsbank. Bayerische 
Notenbank founded in 1875, merged into Bayerische Staatsbank in 1935. Bayerische Disconto- und 
Wechsel-Bank was set up in 1905 and taken over by Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank in 1923 
(officially dissolved in 1936). In 1971 Vereinsbank merged with Bayerische Staatsbank, the oldest bank in 
what later became the HVB Group. Bayerische Staatsbank was founded in 1780 in order to facilitate the 
leasing of Bavarian soldiers to the English throne. These soldiers fought the French in the new American 
colonies (HVB (undated). Hypovereinsbank Geschichte [online]: Available from:
http://geschichte.hypovereinsbank.de/ [Accessed 20 December 2006]).
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by the Nazis but which did not materialise due to the outbreak of the Second 
World War (HVB, undated).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Vereinsbank built up an international 
network, with offices and subsidiaries around the world (The Wall Street 
Journal Europe, 14 November 1995; interviewee II). Vereinsbank continued its 
internationalisation policy during the 1990s5. By contrast, Hypo-Bank had a 
more regional focus. Nevertheless, it also moved beyond the Bavarian border 
at the beginning of the 1970s, for example, as a founding member of 
Associated Banks of Europe Corporation (ABECOR). Moreover, in the early 
1990s it expanded into Eastern Europe and therefore paved the way for HBV’s 
Central and Eastern European strategy.6
Like the other three large German private banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank, Commerzbank), Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank moved into East 
Germany shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (FT, 29 June 1990; The 
Economist, 5 August 2000). Vereinsbank’s CEO Albrecht Schmidt, who was 
born in East Germany and lived in Leipzig until he was 16, said in 1995: “For 
us East Germany was an important challenge and an unbelievable opportunity 
[...]. We had the chance to prove we could grow beyond being a regional 
bank. Our expansion into East Germany speeded up the process of us 
becoming a national big bank” (Fisher, FT, 19 July 1995).
Both Bavarian mortgage banks pursued relatively aggressive lending policies 
and rapidly grew their loan books through mortgage financing in the new 
German states. This “early-mover strategy” backfired some years later when it 
became obvious that many loans could not be repaid. The assumptions on 
which these loans had been based included an over-optimistic 
macroeconomic outlook (interviewee I). For example, the substantial loan loss 
provision of EUR 1.8 billion that HVB had to book shortly after the merger 
predominantly originated from its East German mortgage portfolio. Albrecht 
Schmidt blamed this “unexpected” write-down on the management of Hypo-
5 Initially Vereinsbank concentrated its European expansion policy on Mediterranean countries. For 
example, in 1989, it opened a branch in Greece and in 1990, Bayerische Vereinsbank announced a 
cooperation agreement with Spain’s Banco de Sabadell. The cooperation should focus on commercial 
lending, stock-broking and corporate finance, but not much was heard about this cooperation thereafter (FT, 
10 September 1990; interviewee II).
6 Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank opened a subsidiary in Prague in 1992 (Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 20 February 1995). Subsequently, subsidiaries in Budapest (1993), Warsaw (1995), and Bratislava 
(1997) were established.
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Bank. This write-down helped Schmidt, who was CEO of Vereinsbank from 
1990 until its merger with Hypo-Bank, to get rid of his rival Eberhard Martini, 
CEO of Hypo-Bank. Martini was CEO of Hypo-Bank from 1988 until the 
merger with Vereinsbank, when Albrecht Schmidt ousted him (The Economist, 
5 August 2000).7
When the deal was sealed, the supervisory board appointed Schmidt as CEO 
of the new bank. He remained in this position until the end of 2002, when he 
was succeeded by Dieter Rampl, who was the bank’s CEO until the end of 
2005. Clearly, the most dominant figure throughout the period analysed was 
Albrecht Schmidt. He contributed substantially to the rise (at times HVB was 
Europe’s largest lender) and fall of the bank. The rise and fall of HVB 
culminated in the takeover by Unicredit in 2005. The following case study will 
investigate the developments of HVB and its predecessor institutions from 
1993 until the end of 2003.
7 The chairman of the supervisory board at Hypo-Bank between 1980 and 1997 was Klaus Gotte. He also 
chaired the supervisory board of the merged bank until April 1999, when Kurt F. Viermetz replaced him. 
Viermetz held this position until the end of 2002 and was subsequently the bank's Vice-Chairman until the 
end of 2003. Chairman of the supervisory board of Vereinsbank between 1990 and 1998 was the bank’s 
former CEO Maximilian Hackl, predecessor of Albrecht Schmidt.
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5.7.2. Income Structure
5.7.2.1. Structural Overview
The dominant role8 of Vereinsbank during the integration process was 
certainly also supported by the fact that at the time of the alleged “merger of 
equals”, the institution headed by Albrecht Schmidt was bigger in terms of 
revenues (+15%), assets (+22%) and number of employees (+11%) (Sen, 
Metzler Sector Insight, 3 November 1998). Vereinsbank’s EUR 3.9 billion total 
operating income in 1997 was generated with EUR 223 billion assets. This 
compares to EUR 183 billion assets at Hypo-Bank, which earned EUR 3.4 
billion operating income in the same year. Total operating income of the 
merged HVB grew by a compound annual growth rate of 5.8% p.a. from the 
beginning of 1998 until the end of 2003. On a pro forma9 basis, HVB grew its 
total operating income from EUR 5.6 billion in 1993 to EUR 9.9 billion in 2003 
-  giving an average annual growth rate of 6%.10
HVB Group: income structure*
1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2002 2003
■  Net interest income ■ Net commission income ■ Trading income ■ Other operating income 
* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
8 Only five out of fourteen executive board members at the newly created HVB were from Hypo-Bank (Sen, 
Metzler Sector Insight, 3 November 1998).
9 Bankscope “merged” Vereinsbank’s and Hypo-Bank’s balance sheets and income statements for the years 
1993-1997. This pro-forma data allowed an analysis of HVB for the complete period of 1993 until the end of
2003.
10 In 1993, total operating income was 16% higher at Vereinsbank than at Hypo-Bank.
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Although Vereinsbank was larger than Hypo-Bank, the sources of income and 
income structure of both banks were alike. In fact, both institutions’ income 
structure followed a similar trend, namely a relative decline in net interest 
income. This trend persisted after the merger and reflected the banks’ strong 
footing in low-margin mortgage banking. In 1993, Vereinsbank generated 68% 
of its total operating income through its net interest margin. In the case of 
Hypo-Bank, this was even 71%. The merged banking group earned 66% of its 
total operating income from net interest income in 1998. During the following 
years, the proportion of net interest income continued to fall and contributed 
just 59% in 2003. While net interest income lost significance during the period 
analysed, commission income and trading income gained prominence.
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* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
Prior to 1997 only Vereinsbank disclosed its trading income as part of its total 
operating income. As there is little information about the role of trading at 
Hypo-Bank (it was subsumed under “other operating income”), an analysis of 
the group’s pro forma figures (1993-1997) is not possible. However, trading at 
Vereinsbank was comparatively low and contributed on average 3.7% of 
operating income in 1993-1997. On average 6.7% of HVB’s total operating 
income originated from trading between 1997 and 2003. As the trading figures 
for 1997 are available for Vereinsbank (5% of operating income) and HVB 
(6.4% of operating income) it is possible to deduce that 7.7% of operating
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income, i.e. EUR 262 million, originated from Hypo-Bank’s trading desk in 
1997. Between 1997 and 2003, trading gained further significance as it grew 
by a CAGR of 10.2% p.a. compared to HVB’s total operating income which 
rose by just CAGR of 5.8% p.a. during the same period. Therefore, 8.3% of 
HVB’s operating income came from trading in 2003. A relatively high figure for 
a bank that was not renowned for its investment banking expertise.
Despite Hypo-Bank’s presumably higher earnings contribution from trading 
activities before 1997, the two banks’ income structures were quite similar. 
Similarity also showed the low net interest margins of Vereinsbank and Hypo- 
Bank. HVB’s net interest margin fell from 1.42% in 1993 to 1.34% in 2003 and 
bottomed out at 0.95% in 2000. The pro forma average net interest margin for 
the period 1993 to 2003 was 1.28%. The net interest margins of the two banks 
prior to the merger were very close and averaged 1.47% in the case of Hypo- 
Bank and 1.46% in the case of Vereinsbank. Possibly the best explanation of 
the low net interest margins is their focus on low-margin mortgage lending in 
the same region (Bavaria) during a phase of falling interest rates. The 
similarity of the banks’ income structures and their identical geographic focus 
are likely to have almost certainly fostered unwanted cluster risks.
At the time of the merger, HVB’s strategy was already geared to expanding its 
international reach, albeit only in Europe. In his first letter to the combined 
group’s shareholders in 1998, Albrecht Schmidt said: “Our target market is 
Europe.” He added that HVB was the first “bank of the regions in Europe” and 
that management planned to expand in Europe (HVB, Annual Report 1998). 
Geographical diversification gained significance following the EUR 7.1, billion 
takeover11 of Bank Austria in 2000 (Kroneck, Borsen-Zeitung, 2003; Major & 
Hall, FT, 27 September 2000).12 This allowed HVB to move into Eastern 
Europe and gain a foothold in Poland, the largest economy in the region.
As with all other banks analysed in this thesis, HVB’s reporting segments 
varied during the period analysed.13 Therefore, a consistent segmental 
analysis is not feasible, corroborating the view that this research needs to 
combine quantitative and qualitative methods. In 2003, HVB reported a
11 The takeover was in the form of a share-swap.
12 Prior to the deal, more than 80% of earnings came from Germany (Major & Hall, FT, 27 September 2000).
13 The first time the bank disclosed its segments was in its 1998 annual report when it changed to the IAS 
accounting standards.
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Germany segment, which comprised three sub-segments: Private Customers, 
Corporate Customer & Professionals and Commercial Real Estate Finance. 
Another major segment was Austria/CEE and consisted of: Private Customers 
Austria, Corporate Customers Austria, and Central and Eastern Europe. The 
third reporting segment in 2003 was Corporates & Markets. This case study 
follows the same structure as the others. Therefore, the next section will first 
discuss Corporate and Investment Banking, then HVB’s Asset Management 
activities and finally Retail Banking.
349
5.7. HVB Group AG / Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
5.7.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
For HVB and its two predecessors, real estate financing played an important 
role throughout the period analysed. In 1993, 45% of HVB’s total loan portfolio 
was classified as mortgages (on a pro forma basis). This (figure) rose to 53% 
at the time of the merger14 (1997). Following the merger, the new bank’s 
management continued to regard real estate financing as one of its core 
competences (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 1997). HVB was the largest real estate 
bank not only in Germany, but in the whole of Europe (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 
1997). As a substantial proportion15 of HVB’s mortgage portfolio came from 
commercial property lending, the bank’s real estate business will be discussed 
as part of this section on “Corporate & Investment Banking” (Dries, Borsen- 
Zeitung, 3 May 1995).
The scale of HVB’s real estate exposure to the corporate sector became 
obvious when management decided to spin off Hypo Real Estate as part of its 
restructuring plan in 2003. Each shareholder received one share in Hypo Real 
Estate for every four HVB shares. The bank therefore spun-off a fifth of its 
business. Due to the spin-off of Hypo Real Estate, HVB’s loan portfolio 
declined by EUR 112 billion, i.e. 23%. The reduced lending volume was 
mirrored by a EUR 139 billion reduction in its liabilities, i.e. they declined by 
24% (HVB, Annual Report 2003, p. 5).
While management consistently considered real estate financing a core 
competence of HVB and its predecessor banks, two distinct phases can be 
identified in its investment banking activities. During the first phase,16 
Vereinsbank’s management endeavoured to build up an international 
investment banking presence. In 1995, when Vereinsbank tried to acquire 
Oppenheimer & Co., a mid-size US brokerage firm with a strong asset 
management arm, Vereinsbank’s CFO, Dieter Rampl, said he wanted 
Oppenheimer for the same reason rival Deutsche Bank bought Morgan 
Grenfell and Dresdner Bank bought Kleinwort Benson (The Wall Street 
Journal Europe, 14 November 1995). The rationale for the bank’s decision to 
expand into transaction-oriented services was management’s belief that
14 The merger was announced on 21 July 1997 and became effective on 1 September 1998.
15 For example, in 1994 commercial property lending at Vereinsbank made up 41% of the bank’s mortgage 
portfolio and 13% of its total loan book (Dries, Bdrsen-Zeitung, 3 May 1995).
The first phase began in the early 1990s and lasted until around 1997/1998 (HVB, Annual Report 1998).
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German corporate clients would increasingly request investment-banking 
services (The Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 November 1995).
Although management claimed it did not intend to compete against “bulge- 
bracket” US investment banks (The Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 November 
1995), there were still signs of an international investment banking ambition 
until the late 1990s. For example, in 1995 Vereinsbank concentrated its 
treasury business in London, in other words, the focus of these operations 
shifted away from and Munich and Frankfurt. It even considered setting up a 
trading centre in New York just for its treasury business (effectively, this is 
trading for its own account). In the same year, Vereinsbank also opened an 
office in Singapore to gain a foothold in Asia, where it generated just 5% of its 
revenues, but aspired to achieve 20% in 2000 (Borsen-Zeitung, 1 December 
1995).17 During this first phase, management said regarding its international 
investment banking plans that, “in the event of an opportunity, for which there 
are no plans yet, the bank would rather strike a deal in the US than in the UK” 
(Borsen-Zeitung, 10 August 1995; Fisher & Urry, FT, 15 December 1995).18
As these international investment-banking scenarios did not really materialise 
- not least, because the bank did not buy an Anglo-Saxon investment bank - 
HVB entered a second phase. During this phase, management began to 
describe Vereinsbank’s failed attempts in the first phase as a “selective 
investment banking approach” (Dries, Borsen-Zeitung, 3 May 1995; Hellmann, 
Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 1997; interviewee II). Presenting past mishaps as 
“strategy” corroborates the importance of Mintzberg’s distinction between 
intended and realised strategies. All too often, the realised strategy is 
presented as the one that was initially intended. In many cases, the 
discrepancy between intended and realised strategy is hard to measure since 
there remains more uncertainty about what was really intended than about 
actual (past) developments.
With hindsight, of course, HVB found itself in the comfortable position that the 
realised strategy in the first phase appeared superior to the strategy of some 
of its competitors which had bought Anglo-Saxon investment banks. Some of
17 Sources of revenue were corporate finance, trade finance, asset management and treasury (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 1 December 1995).
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them subsequently realised that for a universal bank to own and manage a 
transaction-oriented investment bank is not “a walk in the park”. Therefore, 
HVB’s second phase continued, this time intentionally, with the notion of a 
“selective investment banking strategy” (FAZ, 20 September 2002; interviewee
I).
In the 1998 annual report management highlighted HVB’s corporate and 
investment banking activities as core competences. CEO Schmidt said, “We 
are purposely concentrating on expanding our corporate profile along the lines 
of our core strengths: real estate financing, structured finance, selected 
treasury products, and asset management" (HVB, Annual Report 1998). Yet, 
he also made it clear at the time that HVB did not have any global ambitions 
and that the intentionally cautious approach to global investment banking 
would pay off (HVB, Annual Report 1998).
When Schmidt outlined his vision of a European bank with a strong regional 
flavour, he reiterated that HVB did not want to become a global force in 
investment banking (Major, FT, 22 February 2000). Because of further 
streamlining, HVB merged its corporate and markets activities and brought 
equity and debt-related products closer together (FAZ, 20 September 2002; 
interviewee I). In the bank’s 2003 annual report management announced that 
it had successfully completed the strategic switch from a lender to an 
integrated capital market bank, with specific expertise in the field of structured 
finance solutions (HVB, Annual Report 2003).
18 Vereinsbank raised DM 1 billion through a rights issue in spring 1995. At the time, it was suggested that 
this fresh capital would be used for the bank’s internationalisation and expansion into investment banking 
(Fisher, FT, 3 April 1995; Dries, BOrsen-Zeitung, 3 May 1995).
5.7. HVB Group AG /  Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
5.7.2.3. Asset Management
Next to real estate financing and corporate banking, asset management was 
named as one of the core competences of the newly merged HVB group 
(HVB, Annual Report 1998). Asset management was already a strategic 
cornerstone at Hypo-Bank but only played a subordinate role at Vereinsbank. 
Hypo-Bank owned Hypo Capital Management Investmentgesellschaft (Hypo- 
Invest) through which it managed its mutual funds (retail funds) and had 
entered into a joint-venture with the UK institutional fund management house 
Foreign & Colonial Management (F&C) in 1989. Initially Hypo-Bank owned just 
50% of F&C. In 1996 it increased its stake to 65% and finally raised it to 90% 
in 1999 (Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechsel-Bank AG, 14 November 1996; 
Stuedemann, FT, 31 December 1998). Not least due to this cooperation with 
F&C, asset management became a separate business unit and as such 
gained a place in Hypo-Bank’s annual reports.
By contrast, Vereinsbank’s asset management activities19 were subsumed 
under “Private Customers”. Vereinsbank and Commerzbank jointly owned 
“Allgemeine Deutsche Investment-Gesellschaft” (Adig), an asset management 
company that managed assets of around DM 40 billion in 1993 (DM 23 billion 
fixed income, DM 12 billion equities and DM 5 billion balanced funds, i.e. 
equities and bonds). Each bank owned 42.7%20 of Adig, which continuously 
lost market share between 1993 and 1999 (SOddeutsche Zeitung, 20 August 
1993; Borsen-Zeitung, 23 February 1999).21 In 1999, HVB sold its stake in 
Adig to Commerzbank, commenting that it intended to merge F&C and Hypo- 
Invest, which together managed assets totalling DM 200 billion (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 23 February 1999).
Following the merger, HVB had assets under management of DM 160 billion,
19 The aforementioned effort by Vereinsbank to acquire US investment bank Oppenheimer in 1995 would 
have been welcomed by management, as it would have doubled Vereinsbank’s assets under management. 
When the negotiations became public, Schmidt described the move as “a great leap forward”, since he felt 
Vereinsbank, which managed around DM 45 billion of assets, had to catch up in the area of fund 
management (Funds International / Lafferty, December 1995; The Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 
November 1995). Moreover, and possibly of even greater importance, the takeover of Oppenheimer would 
have facilitated a very necessary knowledge transfer (Funds International / Lafferty, December 1995). The 
deal did not materialise as the US banking regulators asked Vereinsbank to give up its entire commercial 
banking operations in the US to comply with the terms of the Glass-Steagall Act (Fisher & Urry, FT, 15 
December 1995; Funds International, December 1995).
20 Adig was Germany’s oldest fund management company, founded in 1949 by four financial institutions. 
Vereinsbank joined them in 1951 and Commerzbank became a member one year later (SUddeutsche 
Zeitung, 17 June 1997). A wide range of insurance companies and several banks held the remaining 14.6% 
stake (Borsen-Zeitung, 17 June 1997).
21 Adig’s market share fell from 15.6% in 1993 to 12% in 1999 when it had assets under management of DM 
58.1 billion (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20 August 1993; Borsen-Zeitung, 23 February 1999).
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which Schmidt considered to be respectable volume (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 
1997). However, two-thirds (i.e. DM 100 billion) of these assets came from 
F&C, in which HVB had a stake of just 65% at the time. Moreover, in 1997 the 
bank’s assets under management still included those attributed to the 42.7%  
stake in Adig (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 1997). With F&C managing such a 
substantial part of the group’s institutional funds, it is somewhat difficult to 
understand the reasons for the disposal22 of F&C in 2000 (Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 23 December 2000).23
The bank’s official explanation for the sale of its institutional asset manager 
highlighted HVB’s new “open architecture” strategy and its focus on the retail 
market. Under the new name of Activest, its remaining asset management 
operations24 tried to compete against other mutual funds (retail funds). The 
idea of an “open architecture” was to gain market share in the German retail 
fund sector by offering a whole range of third party mutual funds in addition to 
its own funds (Felsted & Major, FT, 5 September 2000). It was believed that 
an open architecture strategy would incentivise HVB’s asset managers and 
improve commission income from the sale of mutual funds through the bank’s 
retail network. Yet, it mercilessly revealed that HVB’s asset managers were 
only “second best" (Boerse Online, 1 March 2001; interviewee I).25 At the end 
of 2003, Activest’s market share was just 6%, with EUR 56 billion of assets 
under management (HVB, Annual Report, 2003).
22 F&C was sold for EUR 667 million (DM 1.3 billion), leading to a realised book gain of EUR 370 million 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23 December 2000; HVB, Annual Report, 2001).
Neither interviewee could offer a convincing explanation for the sale of F&C.
24 This also comprised Capitalinvest (Bank Austria) and Nordinvest (Vereins- und Westbank).
25 Interview with Andreas WOlfer, head of Activest.
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5.7.2.4. Retail Banking
In retail banking, Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank had in common a multi-brand 
approach, which continued after the creation of HVB.26 Moreover, both banks 
showed a strong leaning towards Eastern Europe in general and Eastern 
Germany in particular. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Vereinsbank and Hypo- 
Bank concentrated on expanding into Germany’s five new federal states. 
Hypo-Bank opened up some branches in Eastern Germany under its original 
name but also launched a low-budget self-service branch network called 
Hypo-Service-Bank (HSB). HSB offered only a few banking products, 
relatively attractive interest rates and mainly operated with staffs who were not 
qualified bankers27 (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 24 March 1993).
In 1993, HSB had 47 branches across Eastern Germany while Hypo-Bank had 
64 branches in this region. This compares to 72 Vereinsbank branches in the 
five new federal states at the time (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 24 March 1993; 
Borsen-Zeitung, 9 June 1993). By June 1993, three years after German 
reunification, Vereinsbank had granted loans totalling DM 15.5 billion, while 
customer deposits came to about DM 5 billion. It speaks volumes that the 
bank had a share of 18% of the East German loan market but only 9% of the 
market for deposits (Borsen-Zeitung, 9 June 1993).
Vereinsbank’s multi-brand retail banking strategy began with the acquisition of 
Vereins- und Westbank. In 1990, Vereinsbank bought 75% of Hamburg-based 
Vereins- und Westbank to be present in northern Germany and therefore 
extend its geographic reach. Under the name of Vereins- und Westbank, the 
bank opened its own 13 branches in three East German states: Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg (FAZ, 18 June 1993). In 
1996 Vereins- und Westbank also spearheaded a move into the Baltic28 
states, thereby supporting Vereinsbank’s Eastern European retail banking 
strategy (FAZ, 2 April 2002). Vereins- und Westbank kept its own name and 
branding until 2005, when it was fully integrated into HVB.
26 Vereinsbank had a distribution agreement with insurer Victoria since 1990. Following the creation of 
insurance group ERGO, of which Victoria is part, the distribution agreement was extended to ERGO. 
ERGO, Germany’s second largest primary insurer (retail insurance), belongs to Munich Re, which, in 2001, 
owned 25% of HVB (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20 December 2001). Hypo-Bank had a distribution agreement 
with Allianz.
27 The term “qualified bankers” refers to those who underwent the traditional three-year apprenticeship, 
qualifying them as “Bankkaufmann” or “Bankkauffrau".
The first Baltic office was in the Latvian capital Tallinn (FAZ, 2 April 2002).
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Increasing its market share from below 5% of the German retail banking 
sector was the main rationale for Vereinsbank’s decision to launch a direct 
banking subsidiary, Advance Bank, in 1996 (Borsen-Zeitung, 23 March 1996). 
Initially, Advance Bank enjoyed the patronage of CEO Schmidt (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 23 March 1996; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 12 March 1998). Its target 
group comprised the well-off between the ages of 25 and 50. It was clear right 
from the beginning that Advance Bank needed to establish its own brand and 
effectively compete against Vereinsbank. Management believed that during 
the first year Advance Bank could gain 25,000 clients and that by the year 
2000 the number of clients might reach 250,000 (Fisher, FT, 25 March 1996).
After the merger, it emerged that Hypo-Bank’s Direktanlagebank (DAB) had a 
better standing and would be the preferred online bank for the new HVB. DAB 
was Germany’s first direct bank, founded in 1994. By 1999 it had 120,000 
clients and held 18% of the German direct banking market (Bohringer, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 3 November 1999). Consequently, Advance Bank was 
sold to Dresdner Bank in late 1997 (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 12 March 1998).
HVB decided to list DAB on the stock exchange and floated some 30% of the 
group’s capital in 1999 (Die Welt, 16 November 1999; Borsen-Zeitung, 13 
November 1999). In the following years, DAB expanded into Austria, 
Switzerland, Spain, Italy, the UK and France (Borsen-Zeitung, 18 May 2001). 
In France it bought online broker Self-Trade for EUR 900 million in September 
2000 (Major, FT, 23 May 2001), which it sold again at the beginning of 2003 
(Borsen-Zeitung, 18 July 2002; Borsen-Zeitung, 24 January 2003).
Vereinsbank also pursued a multi-brand strategy in its private banking 
segment. Over the years, the bank acquired several small private banking 
institutions and tried to maintain their traditional identity. For example, it took 
full control of the Swiss private bank Bank von Ernst in 1994 by acquiring the 
remaining 50% it did not already own (Parkes, FT, 21 July 1994). Vereinsbank 
had already bought 50% of Bank von Ernst from Hill Samuel29 in 1993 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 17 February 1993; Brenner, NZZ, 22 January 1993). 
Other private banking brands that belonged to Vereinsbank were Bankhaus 
Maffei (Munich), Bethmann Bank (Frankfurt), Westfalenbank (Dortmund),
29 At the time, Hill Samuel belonged to TSB.
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Neelmeyer (Bremen) and Austrian Schoellerbank (Vienna) (Buchholz, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 13 June 2001; Die Presse, 21 March 1997).
These private banking institutions originally kept their distinct traditional brand 
(with the exception of Bethmann Bank30), but the multi-brand strategy was 
abandoned when HVB’s management launched “Next Step” in 2001 (HVB, 12 
June 2001). “Next Step” was part of the bank’s restructuring programme, 
which entailed the closure of 165 branches, 1,000 job cuts and the 
introduction of “Hypovereinsbank” as a common brand name for all retail 
operations (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 7 March 2001; FAZ, 13 June 2001). In 
1999, HVB had already closed down 139 branches, followed by an additional 
80 branches in 2000. It also reduced the number of branches in Eastern 
Germany from 81 to 37 as the economic development of the five new federal 
states fell short of management’s initial expectations (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 7 
March 2001).
In June 2001, the group had a total of 902 branches in Germany. 612 were 
HVB branches, 180 Vereins- und Westbank branches and 110 Norisbank 
branches (Associated Press, 12 June 2001). Vereinsbank bought the 
consumer credit bank Norisbank and merged it with its existing consumer 
credit bank Franken WKV in 1997. This deal provided Vereinsbank with a 
retail network of some 100 branches, serving 370,000 clients, of which 
280,000 came from Norisbank. Vereinsbank’s loan volume amounted to DM 
3.6 billion and deposits totalled DM 5.5 billion (Bayerische Vereinsbank, 18 
June 1997). With a pre-tax return on equity of 26% in 2001, Norisbank was 
one of Germany’s most profitable banks at the time and as such, one of HVB’s 
pearls (Retail Banker International, 14 January 2003).
Given Norisbank’s profitability and its niche position in the attractive German 
consumer credit market, the disposal of Norisbank in 2003 reveals how 
stretched its situation was. Albrecht Schmidt’s successor, Dieter Rampl, tried 
to explain the sale of Norisbank with the relatively unconvincing argument that 
it no longer fitted into the group’s strategy. However, he also conceded that 
the sale of Norisbank was an important measure to raise HVB’s tier 1 ratio 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 17 July 2003). Interviewee II commented upon being
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asked why Norisbank was sold as follows: “Well, the bank simply needed 
money... it just needed money” (interviewee II). At the time of the sale, 
Norisbank had around 500,000 customers, 1,100 employees and 100 
branches (Retail Banker International, 14 January 2003).
Further evidence of the bank’s tight capital position is the partial IPO of Bank 
Austria in the same year. The sale of 22.5% of Bank Austria occurred less 
than three years after HVB had acquired it for EUR 7.8 billion (Frey & Major, 
FT, 24 July 2000). Through the acquisition of Bank Austria, HVB had become 
the majority owner of Creditanstalt as Bank Austria had bought a 69% stake in 
this bank in 1997 (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 13 January 1997). Through 
Creditanstalt,31 Bank Austria was able to make further inroads into several 
Eastern European countries32 (Hall, FT, 16 September 1996).
The takeover of Bank Austria was above all a boost for HVB’s retail banking 
business and paved the way for Schmidt’s strategy of a “European bank of the 
regions”. At the heart of the deal was the idea of creating a network of banks 
with regional characteristics that would share a group-wide transaction 
platform. Following the deal, the combined bank held a 15% share of the 
market in southern Germany, 25% in Austria and more than 10% in Poland.33 
It also gained sizeable market shares in the Czech Republic and Hungary 
(Frey & Major, FT, 24 July 2000).
The rationale for expanding into Eastern Europe was the economic growth 
potential of these countries, which were expected to join the European Union 
in the near future. Moreover, these countries had a far lower density of banks 
than Western Europe. On average, there were 1,700 inhabitants per bank 
branch in Western Europe in 2000, compared to 11,000 in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Hall & Reed, FT, 8 August 2000). Following the takeover of
30 Bethmann Bank belonged to Hypo-Bank, which had taken full control of it in 1983 (it first bought a 50% 
stake in 1976). In 2003, HVB merged Bethmann Bank with Maffei Bank and subsequently sold it to the 
Dutch banking group ABN Amro.
31 Creditanstalt was founded in 1855 at the initiative of the Vienna branch of the Rothschild Bank.
32 During the heyday of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Creditanstalt operated the biggest banking network in 
central and eastern Europe (Hall & Reed, FT, 8 August 2000).
33 In particular, Bank Austria’s exposure to the Polish banking sector proved complementary for HVB as 
Bank Austria already owned 57% of Warsaw-based Powszechny Bank Kredytowy (PBK), as well as the 
Polish subsidiary of Creditanstalt. PBK was strong in the north of Poland, while HVB’s Krakow-based Bank 
Przemyslowo-Handlowy (BPH) was strong in the country’s south (Frey & Major, FT, 24 July 2000). In 
October 1998, HVB bought a 37% stake in the sixth largest Polish bank, Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy SA 
(BPH). BPH had 1 million private clients, served through 170 branches and 6,200 employees. Schmidt 
announced that HVB planned to increase its investment in BPH to above 50% and that the bank would
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Bank Austria, HVB had a total of 8 million customers, 2,000 retail branches 
and 65,000 employees (Frey & Major, FT, 24 July 2000). At the time, 
management estimated that cost savings amounted to EUR 500 million (Frey 
& Major, FT, 24 July 2000). Although there is no clear evidence that HVB 
realised the cost savings announced, the following section will argue that 
operating costs were not the principal reason for its weakened position.
maintain its original brand name (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23 October 1998). In 2003, HVB raised its stake to 
71% (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23 May 2003).
5. 7. HVB Group AG /  Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
5.7.3. Cost and Risk Management
The proportion of personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total operating 
expenses before risk provisions was on average 54%. This ratio remained 
within a narrow band, fluctuating between 56.6% in 1993 and 50.1% in 2001. 
In 2003 it was 56.3%, more or less the same level as ten years previously. 
The relatively stable ratio suggests that HVB could not realise significant scale 
efficiencies despite increasing total operating income by 78% during the 
period analysed (2003 versus 1993). Moreover, this cost structure lends 
credence to the argument that personnel expenses were not the essential 
factor behind HVB’s deplorable profitability. The bank’s average cost income 
ratio of 65% corroborates this view. Still, in 2002, management decided to 
shed at least 9,100 jobs (Buchholz, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2002; AFX, 
18 February 2003), further reducing HVB’s headcount from its peak in 2000, 
when it still employed 72,867 people (Major, 18 October 2001).










1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
In 1993, Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank together employed 40,056 staff. That 
compares with HVB’s headcount of 60,214 in 2003. Obviously, the largest 
boost came from the acquisition of Bank Austria, which added some 19,000 
employees to the group (HVB, Annual Report 2000; Gemperle, NZZ, 24 July 
2000). HVB’s total personnel costs per employee rose by a moderate
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compound annual growth rate of 2.4% during the period analysed. However, 
revenues per employee grew more slowly, namely, by just 1.7% p.a. The 
bank’s personnel expenses remained under control, not least because the 
institution abandoned its international investment banking endeavours after a 
relatively short time. However, HVB’s staff did not prove to be the distribution 
powerhouse management made investors believe (Hoymann, Metzler Equity 
Research, 16 October 2000). The decline in pre-tax profit before loan losses 
per employee also illustrates the low efficiency of HVB employees. In 1993, 
this figure was still EUR 55,120, but by 2003, it had fallen to EUR 12,755.
HVB Group: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions’
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While HVB’s staff was neither a persuasive sales force nor a distorting cost 
factor, the bank’s real shortcoming was its inability to adequately assess risk. 
The development of HVB’s loan loss provisions and coverage ratio pinpoints 
this weakness. Although HVB did not grant inadequately priced loans to 
corporate clients in return for investment banking mandates (at least not to 
such an extent as some of its competitors), the merged bank’s loan portfolio 
became the principal reason for its low earnings. On average, HVB generated 
67% of its total operating income from interest-bearing activities. The bank’s 
transformation services are reflected in the size of its balance sheet, including 
a loan portfolio that was one the biggest in Europe in 2001/2002 (Bohringer,
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Suddeutsche Zeitung, 24 October 2002). Thus, HVB’s profitability hinged upon 
its ability to manage its credit risks.
As discussed in the section on income structure, Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank 
had low net interest margins due to their high proportion of mortgages which 
at the time were considered to be low-risk loans. Furthermore, the two banks’ 
focus on the same region is likely to have increased unrecognized cluster 
risks. Additionally, both institutions had rapidly built up an East German loan 
portfolio (The Economist, 5 August 2000). Vereinsbank’s annual loan loss 
provisions relative to its net interest income was 17.8% between 1993 and 
1997. This compares to 26.8% at Hypo-Bank for the same period.
Management’s announcement in October 1998 that the newly merged bank 
would have to raise risk provisions to DM 3.5 billion (EUR 1.8 billion) for the 
year has to be seen against the background of Vereinsbank’s arguably better 
risk management (The Economist, 5 August 2000). In the end, the bank’s 
1998 loan loss provisions came to EUR 1.7 billion, 56% above the previous 
year’s level. This was necessary to cover overvalued real estate projects in 
Eastern Germany, which predominantly stemmed from Hypo-Bank’s portfolio. 
In the early 1990s, the bank had granted loans on incorrect assumptions 
about economic growth in the five new federal states. Shortly after the need 
for these provisions became apparent, Vereinsbank’s CEO Albrecht Schmidt 
was quoted as saying: “The discovery of these risks shocked me deeply 
because I couldn’t imagine a mistake of this magnitude [...]” (Barber, FT, 29 
October 1998).
Schmidt argued that Vereinsbank had been legally banned from carrying out a 
fully-fledged due diligence until 1 September 1998 when the merger became 
official. This led to a serious public quarrel between Martini and Schmidt which 
culminated in Martini accusing Schmidt of being unfit to run a bank (Barber, 
FT, 25 October 1999; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 29 October 1998; Barber, FT, 29 
October 1998; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 31 October 1998; The Economist, 5 
August 2000). An inquiry into this incident brought to light that the auditors 
(KPMG) had indeed alerted Vereinsbank’s management about Hypo-Bank’s 
loan loss provisions, which appeared DM 2 billion too low, before the merger 
was sealed (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 24 November 1998). Therefore, Schmidt’s 
surprise was mere affectation.
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The merger of Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank was the single most challenging 
development from a cost and risk management perspective. Management 
said, the two banks could jointly generate cost savings34 of around DM 1 billion 
p.a. five years after the merger (Sen, Metzler Sector Insight, 24 July 1998).35 
This contrasts to one-off integration costs of DM 1.3 billion, according to 
management’s estimates at the time (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 1997). 
Irrespective of all these potential operational cost savings, the bank’s 
profitability depended on the quality of the bank’s ioan portfolio. Given the two 
banks’ structural similarities, merging their loan portfolios is unlikely to have 
improved diversification.
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* Problem loans were not disclosed prior to 1997
Unfortunately, there is no data available for the NPL coverage ratio prior to 
1997, which might have shed some light on the provisioning policy of 
Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank. However, the picture after the merger shows the 
continuous deterioration of the bank’s coverage ratio, which fell from 196% in 
1997 to 84% in 2003. While the two banks’ did not disclose their coverage
34 At the time of the merger, Vereinsbank had 20,475 employees and 711 branches, while Hypo-Bank had 
18,083 members of staff and 622 branches. When the merger was announced, the trade union Handel, 
Banken und Versicherungen (HBV) said it would expect some 6,000 job cuts as there were around 25% 
overlapping branches in the south of Germany (Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 1997).
35 55% of these cost savings were expected to come from reduced personnel expenses, mainly through the 
layoff of some 5,000 staff members (Koehn, Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998).
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ratio for the time before the merger, it is telling that on average 21% of total 
operating income was eaten up by loan loss provisions (on a pro forma basis). 
This implies that 32% of the bank’s net interest income was spent on loan loss 
provisions between 1993 and 2003 (on a pro forma basis).36
Towards the beginning of 2002, HVB’s management seemed to realise that it 
had to undertake drastic action to rescue the bank from a situation in which its 
weakened capital position could mean the loss of its banking licence 
(interviewee II). The bank’s already moderate 6.0% tier 1 ratio at the end of 
2001 fell to 5.1% at the end of 2002. If the bank’s tier 1 ratio had fallen below 
4%, the regulatory authorities could have withdrawn its banking licence 
(KWG37 §§ 10, 10a, 33; Buschgen & Borner, 2003). Two senior German 
bankers38 confirmed the severity of HVB’s state in 2002 and 2003 and 
acknowledged that the bank was on the verge of collapse.
In July 2002, management explained that the bad debts provision could total 
EUR 2.5 billion, up from its initial estimate of EUR 2.1 billion (Buchholz, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2002). It turned out that this estimate was far 
too optimistic and unrealistic as loan loss provisions eventually amounted to 
EUR 3.4 billion in 2002, contributing to a net loss of EUR 850 million. Rightly, 
management described the year as one of the most difficult banking years 
since the end of the Second World War (Buchholz, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 
July 2002). HVB suffered particularly badly from its exposure to the 
Mittelstand, and the German real estate market during a phase of economic 
decline (Cameron, FT, 26 July 2002).
Finally, in 2003, HVB addressed the issue of capital adequacy and launched a 
transformation program. The aim was “to bolster the capital base of HVB 
Group and make a major improvement to operating performance” (HVB, 
Annual Report 2003, p. 3). The bank could release capital through the 
placement of 22.5% of Bank Austria shares and the spin-off of a large part of 
HVB’s commercial real estate finance business.39 HVB transferred its 
domestic mortgage banking subsidiary and European real estates business to
36 In relative and absolute terms, the bank’s biggest loan loss provision was EUR 3.4 billion in 2002, which 
ate up 57% of the its net interest income for the year.
37 KWG = Kreditwesengesetz (German banking law)
38 The researcher gained these insights from informal personal conversations with senior bankers, who 
would not wish to be associated with such statements.
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the newly formed Hypo Real Estate, which was listed on the stock exchange 
in October 2003. Besides, HVB scaled back its risk assets through 
securitisation, the sale of loan portfolios and by simply lending less (HVB 
Financial Review 2003, p. 5). Moreover, HVB sold Norisbank and Bank von 
Ernst, generating gains of EUR 468 million (HVB, Annual Report 2003).40 
Through these measures, HVB reduced its risk assets by EUR 99 billion 
during 2003.41
39 Already in February 2001, HVB announced it would begin to bundle its property lending operations in 
order to found a separate real estate bank at the end of the year.
40 Additionally, HVB significantly reduced its shareholdings in Allianz and Munich Re.
41 HVB expected to generate cost savings of EUR 160 million from 2004 through the establishment of Hypo 
Real Estate (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 6 February 2001; Major, FT, 6 February 2001). In 2003, Hypo Real 
Estate employed 1,461 people and had total assets of EUR 153 billion. The bank was well capitalised and 
its tier 1 ratio stood at 7.6% at the end of 2003 (HVB, Annual Report 2003; Hypo Real Estate, Annual 
Report 2003). It is somewhat ironic that two years after the listing of Hypo Real Estate, it replaced HVB as a 
member in the DAX 30 Index, following the takeover of HVB.
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5.7.4. Asset-Liability Structure
In 1993, Vereinsbank’s total assets were EUR 145.2 billion, while Hypo-Bank 
had total assets of EUR 133.4 billion. At the time of the merger, Vereinsbank’s 
assets were EUR 222.9 billion, of which 72% were loans. Between 1993 and 
1997, Vereinsbank’s balance sheet grew by a CAGR of 11.3% p.a. Hypo- 
Bank’s assets showed an 8.3% annual growth rate for the same period. Thus, 
assets at Hypo-Bank amounted to EUR 183.4 billion in 1997, of which 68% 
were loans. In both cases, the growth in loans clearly exceeded Germany’s 
nominal economic growth rate (GDP), which averaged 3.1% p.a.42 Such 
growth rates suggest that the two banks wanted to gain market share, even at 
the risk of inadequately pricing loans.
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■ Loans (net) ■ Deposits with banks ■ Other earning assets
■ Non earning assets Fixed assets 
* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
Besides the merger itself, the two largest impacts on HVB’s balance sheet 
structure came from the acquisition of Bank Austria and the spin-off of Hypo 
Real Estate. In 2000, HVB’s total assets rose by 44% (y-o-y) to EUR 694 
billion, predominantly due to the takeover of Bank Austria. As a result of the 
Bank Austria deal, the relative significance of loans declined because the 
proportion of securities held by the bank jumped by 80% to EUR 83.1 billion. 
Moreover, HVB’s bond portfolio rose by 75% (y-o-y) to EUR 43.6 billion and
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some EUR 2.6 billion of goodwill from the Bank Austria deal was added to the 
balance sheet (HVB, Annual Report 2000). This compares to an increase of 
customer loans by just 30% (y-o-y) in the year of the Bank Austria acquisition. 
Consequently, HVB’s loan portfolio made up only 59% of HVB’s total assets 
after it had bought Bank Austria.
The spin-off of Hypo Real Estate was one of the cornerstones of HVB’s 
transformation programme in 2003 (interviewee I; interviewee II). This spin-off 
meant that HVB could reduce its risk assets by EUR 55 billion. Consequently, 
the bank’s core capital ratio rose, alleviating pressure from rating agencies 
and regulators. In July 2003, HVB’s new CEO Dieter Rampl said the bank’s 
target was to lift its tier 1 ratio to 7% by the end of the year43 (Major, FT, 9 July 
2003; Borsen-Zeitung, 31 July 2003; HVB, Annual Report 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
The bank did not achieve this target in 2003 and, despite additional capital 
measures such as the EUR 3 billion capital increase in March 2004 (Borsen- 
Zeitung, 12 March 2004), its tier 1 ratio remained below 7% even at the end of
421.6% real GDP growth p.a. for that period (1993-1997).
43 In order to lift the tier 1 ratio to 7%, HVB had to raise its equity base by EUR 1.7 billion (Major, FT, 9 July 
2003; Borsen-Zeitung, 31 July 2003).
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200544 (HVB, Annual Report 2005). The share price at which Bank Austria 
was placed valued the bank EUR 1.9 billion below the EUR 7.1 billion 
acquisition price paid by HVB in 2000 (Kroneck, Borsen-Zeitung, 21 June 
2003). Therefore, it should not have come too much of a surprise that HVB 
had to write down its goodwill from Bank Austria by EUR 800 million in 2003 
(HVB, Annual Report 2003).
Comparison of average funding structures at Hypo-Bank and Vereinsbank 
between 1993 and 1997
in %
HYPO-BANK VEREINSBANK
Customer Deposits 26.7 25.2
Banks Deposits 13.8 15.1
Money Market Funding 4.1 0.8
Mortgage Bonds 16.3 18.9
Other Bonds 31.7 33.4
Subordinated Debt 1.4 1.2
Hybrid Capital 0.5 0.2
Other Liabilities 2.6 2.1
Equity 2.8 2.9
Total Liabilities and Equity 100.0 100.0
Comparison of average asset structures at Hypo-Bank and Vereinsbank 
between 1993 and 1997
in %
HYPO-BANK VEREINSBANK
Total Loans - Net 70.1 74.0
Deposits with Banks 12.0 10.2
Due from Other Credit Institutions 4.7 3.7
Total Securities 9.9 9.5
Treasury Bills 0.2 0.1
Equity Investments 0.5 0.4
Cash and Due from Banks 0.5 0.7
Intangible Assets 0.0 0.0
Other Non Earning Assets 1.1 0.8
Total Fixed Assets 1.0 0.8
Total Assets 100.0 100.0
When Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank merged, their asset and funding structures 
were in fact quite similar (see table). For example, at both banks just 23% of
44 HVB’s tier 1 ratio was still only 6.8% in 2005 (HVB, Annual Report 2003). In fact, neither Vereinsbank, nor 
Hypo-Bank, nor HVB had a tier 1 ratio of more than 6% between 1991 and 2005.
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funding came from customer deposits in 1997. The importance of customer 
deposits as a source of funding had already fallen prior to the merger. In the 
case of Vereinsbank, it dropped by 7 percentage points and in the case of 
Hypo-Bank, the decline was even 9.3 percentage points between 1993 and 
1997. Yet, both institutions made virtually no use of hybrid financing 
instruments and the new bank only slowly began to issue subordinated debt 
after the merger.45 While money market funds only played a role at Hypo- 
Bank, the bulk of funding came from bonds. After the merger, deposits by 
other banks gained importance, replacing some bond financing. This 
development suggests that HVB raised a far higher proportion of its 
refinancing needs on the short-term interbank market.
Since bond financing played such a significant role, the bank’s liquidity ratio, 
measured as net loans relative to deposits does not look too favourable. This 
ratio illustrates how much of depositors’ funding is tied up in lending (Golin, 
2001, p. 328). During the period analysed, this ratio never fell below 100%, 
although it came down from levels of above 180% in the early 1990s (at both 
institutions) to 108% in 2003. Notwithstanding this liquidity improvement, a 
ratio of above 100% suggests that HVB’s refinancing was highly dependent on 
the group’s rating by international credit rating agencies 46 HVB’s stretched 
liquidity position and slim capital adequacy were mirrored by appalling 
profitability, as discussed in the next section.
45 Hybrid capital and subordinated debt instruments reached their peak at 3% of the group’s funding in 
2003.
48 “We aim to reach a core capital ratio of over 7% and enhance the quality of our core capital at the same 
time. The capital-raising measure will help us improve our credit ratings and achieve a stable “A” from the 
three rating agencies relevant for us over the medium term” (HVB, Annual Report 2003, p. 43). In 1998, all 
rating agencies had double-A long-term ratings. S&P’s rating was “AA-”. S&P as well as the other rating 
agencies (Fitch and Moody’s) lowered their ratings in the following years, so that S&P's rating was “A-” at 
the end of 2003.
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5.7.5. Profitability
During the period analysed, HVB’s stated net profit varied substantially, all too 
often distorted by significant extraordinary effects. For example, in 1998 it 
delivered a net profit of EUR 2 billion, boosted by a one-off merger-related 
consolidation effects of EUR 1.2 billion. In fact, the operating profit fell by 14% 
(y-o-y) in 1998. Therefore, the underlying profitability implied a return on equity 
of 6.1%, which CEO Albrecht Schmidt described as unacceptable (Buchholz, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March 1999; Hermann, Borsen-Zeitung, 10 April 
1999).
Understandably, Schmidt had to express his displeasure, as he had declared 
only eight months earlier that the newly merged bank should deliver returns on 
equity of at least 15% after tax (AFX, 21 July 1997; Borsen-Zeitung, 22 July 
1997). However, in the years after the two banks joined forces, HVB’s profits 
remained relatively low. As more and more loans turned sour, the bank finally 
slipped into loss. For the first time, HVB delivered a loss of EUR 850 million in 
2002. In the following year, the bank’s loss amounted to EUR 2.4 billion and in 
2004 it totalled EUR 2.1 billion. Finally, in 2005, the year when HVB was taken 
over, this trend could be reversed.







1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
* On a pro forma basis for 1993 to 1997
370
5.7. HVB Group AG /  Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
Between 1998 and 2003, the average net profit per year was EUR 214 million. 
This level of profitability was an average return on equity of just 1.7% (1998- 
2003). On a pro forma basis, HVB’s return on equity for the period between 
1993 and 2003 was on average 4.4%. This figure indicates that neither 
Vereinsbank nor Hypo-Bank was exceptionally profitable on its own. Hypo- 
Bank’s return on equity averaged 8% between 1993 and 1997. At 
Vereinsbank, the situation was equally unimpressive as its average ROE was 
7.8%.
It is worth pointing out that the return on equity could have been even lower if 
HVB had been better capitalised. As shown, HVB and its predecessor 
institutions had relatively moderate tier 1 ratios. A stronger capitalisation would 
have implied a higher equity basis. However, this would not have 
automatically improved profitability. Therefore, the bank’s returns on equity 
could have been even worse if management had tried to lift its tier 1 ratio, 
through additional capital measures.
The reasons for the bank’s poor profitability largely originated from bad risk 
management and a weak net interest margin for loans that turned out to be 
much riskier than initially estimated. The acceptable level of the group’s long­
term cost income ratio of 65%47 corroborates the view that HVB’s weak profits 
were less related to administrative and personnel expenses than to its loan 
portfolio. Notwithstanding the somewhat good cost income ratio, CEO Schmidt 
also failed48 to meet the cost income ratio target of 50% he had announced at 
the time of the merger (Koehn, Borsen-Zeitung, 28 August 1998). In fact, 
HVB’s cost income ratio rose towards 70% after the merger. Obviously, 
Schmidt had wildly underestimated the integration costs and overestimated 
the scale efficiencies.
47 On a pro forma basis for the period 1993 to 2003.
48 In all fairness, this mediocrity was also lived up to by the bank’s other board members. For example, 
Wolfgang Sprissler, HVB's current (2006) CEO, was quoted as saying in July 2002: “We live in bad times 
and it would be untrustworthy to maintain one could forecast the loan loss provisions for the year-end. We 
are not clairvoyants” (Buchholz, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2002). True, bank managers are no 
clairvoyants and no one expects them to be. However, one could and should expect board members to 
know their loan portfolio, have an understanding of their clients’ financial situation, and be intellectually 
capable of applying this knowledge adequately in the prevailing macroeconomic context.
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5.7.6. Conclusion
Rooted in Bavaria’s strong economy, Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank embarked 
on an adventurous journey, which ended in Italy seven years after their 
merger. Once the uneven merger was sealed, Vereinsbank’s international 
profile dominated the new bank and paved the way for its “European bank of 
the regions” strategy (interviewee II). The idea, a brainchild of Vereinsbank’s 
management, was to build a network of European banks with regional 
characteristics that share a group-wide transaction platform (Major, FT, 12 
May 2000). This concept was not unlike HSBC’s successful “world’s local 
bank” approach to international expansion.
At last, there seemed to be a German bank that presented an appealing 
strategy, a story that journalists, investors, analysts and the likes appreciated 
(interviewee I; interviewee II). A bank led by a clever leader who first created a 
regional champion that would then branch out into its neighbouring countries. 
The countries’ different business cycles made Schmidt’s strategy even more 
convincing, as they should have stabilised revenues and profits. HVB 
presented itself as a bank that did not seem to fall into the investment banking 
trap with a “me-too” strategy (interviewee I). On the contrary, it cherished not 
only German, but also Polish, Hungarian and other Eastern European retail 
clients at a time when many of its peers were busy underwriting equity and 
pitching for M&A deals. CEO Schmidt portrayed it as a bank with a European 
vision. In many ways, he was a model for those who called for a pan- 
European banking approach.49
HVB’s European strategy appeared convincing and it could have been so 
different without the incessant problems with the bank’s loan book 
(interviewee I). Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank merged two inadequately 
provisioned and similar loan portfolios that could not be conducive to HVB’s 
risk diversification. The loan portfolio, predominantly real estate loans, first 
depleted the bank’s profitability and eventually pushed it into the red for three
49 Moreover, there is ample research that shows that “proximity” is a parameter that matters for a successful 
takeover. “The most successful deals display on average a much stronger home bias and distinctively 
smaller distance between acquirer and target than the least successful deals. Proximity in M&A transactions 
therefore is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success” (e.g. Grote & Umber, 2006). The case of 
the two Munich based banks demonstrated that Grote and Umber are right in pointing out that proximity 
itself is not sufficient for a successful merger.
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consecutive years (2002/03/04). Total losses amounted to EUR 5.4 billion for 
those years and culminated in the takeover by Unicredit.
Albrecht Schmidt believed Vereinsbank should be present in virtually every 
major world market (The Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 November 1995). He 
pressed ahead with the bank’s internationalisation as announced when he 
took office in 1990. His second ambition was to complement the bank’s 
geographic reach and, as previously quoted, emerge from the role of a small 
regional player. The acquisition of Vereins- und Westbank and expansion into 
the Eastern German market were milestones in achieving this goal. However, 
as his third objective, he also committed himself to improving earnings (The 
Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 November 1995; interviewee II).
Perhaps because earnings were third on his list, they played only a 
subordinated role. Clearly, profitability is not a strategic objective in its own 
right and all strategy should serve to improve profits and the quality of profits.50 
It is remarkable that the chief executive of a large publicly traded bank could 
stay at the top of such an institution for so long despite repeatedly missing 
profit targets. An average return on equity of 6.6% between 1990 and 2002, 
i.e. during Schmidt’s tenure, certainly did not cover the bank’s cost of equity. It 
therefore raises questions about the role of the supervisory board and 
corporate governance in Germany during the 1990s.
The HVB case demonstrates that a well sounding strategy alone is not sufficient 
for a bank’s success. Analogously to the skills of an artisan, a bank’s strategy 
must begin with a thorough understanding of its trade. For a bank, that is risk 
management. This holds true for banks that focus on transformation services 
just as much as for those that are transaction-oriented. HVB’s case also 
demonstrates that even if the intended strategy becomes the realised strategy, 
this is not necessarily in the best of interests of stakeholders and shareholders. 
The HVB experience, not to say experiment, should make CEOs wary of talking 
too explicitly about strategy, unless they can be certain about their skills. If the 
company successfully generates stable risk-adequate profits and remains
50 “Quality” refers to stable, risk adequate and therefore sustainable profits.
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competitive among its peers, then with hindsight, any corporate development is 
likely to be commended as having had a good strategy.
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5.8. Lloyds TSB pic
5.8.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
Lloyds Bank, which became Lloyds TSB when it merged1 with the Trustee 
Savings Bank (TSB) in 1995, can look back at a long corporate history rich in 
international experience.2 Founded in Birmingham in 1765 by John Taylor and 
Sampson Lloyd, the bank became a joint stock company in 1865 and 
thereafter expanded across England and Wales, primarily through mergers 
and acquisitions. In 1911 Lloyds Bank bought Armstrong & Co. in Paris and Le 
Havre and only seven years later it moved into the South American banking 
market (Sayers, 1957; Winton, 1982; Rogers, 1999).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Lloyds continued to internationalise its retail 
and wholesale business. This included the purchase of a majority stake in 
National Bank of New Zealand (1966), and the acquisition of the Bank of 
London South America (1971). Lloyds’ international operations were brought 
together in 1974 under the newly formed Lloyds Bank International (LBI), 
which was merged into Lloyds Bank in 1986 (Lloyds TSB, Lloyds TSB Group 
History, 20053). On the European continent, Lloyds bought a small minority 
stake in the traditional private bank Schroder Miinchmeyer Hengst (SMH) in 
1983 which it increased to 91% in 1985.
At the peak of its expansion spree in 1984, Lloyds operated a branch network 
around the globe and was present in 47 countries (Rogers, 1999; Batiz-Lazo & 
Wood, 2000). Despite this diverse early international experience, Lloyds Bank 
had largely withdrawn from most of its international operations and developed 
into a domestic retail and small business bank by the time the Single 
European Market was created in 1993. The reasons for Lloyds’ strategic shift 
and the focus on its home market can be explained mainly by its exposure to 
the international debt crisis of the early 1980s and the arrival of a new chief 
executive, Brian Pitman.
1 Given that Lloyds was much bigger than TSB in terms of assets, employees and market capitalisation, this 
deal can be described as a takeover of TSB.
2 Throughout this research “Lloyds Bank”, “Lloyds TSB” and “Lloyds” will be used interchangeably without 
any historical reference.
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Lloyds’ Latin American portfolio could not escape unscathed from the 
implications of the debt crisis that began in Mexico4 in August in 1982 and 
spread throughout the whole South American continent in the following years 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2000). Lloyds’ senior management 
described Mexico’s announcement that it was defaulting on its debt as the 
turning point for the bank’s international strategy (Rogers, 1999, p. 49). In the 
following year Pitman, who had joined the bank in 1953 and spent some time 
in its international divisions, was appointed as the bank’s CEO. Under his 
leadership, Lloyds scaled back its international activities and concentrated on 
its domestic market.
From 1983 to 1997 Pitman served as the bank’s chief executive, then became 
chairman, a post he took over from Sir Robin Ibbs (1993-1997) and held until 
2001. TSB’s former CEO, Peter Ellwood succeeded Pitman as Lloyds TSB’s 
chief executive and remained at the helm of the bank until June 2003. 
Subsequently, Eric Daniels, an American born to German and Chinese 
parents, assumed the leadership of Lloyds TSB (Croft & Pretzlick, FT, 16 April 
2003). The choice of Dutchman Maarten van den Bergh as chairman in 2001 
paved the way for greater internationalisation of the board following the turn of 
the millennium.5
18 years as CEO allowed Pitman to shape the group’s strategy and manage 
the institution through various business cycles. He transformed Lloyds from a 
small clearing bank with exposure to heavily indebted Latin American 
countries, into a multiproduct, multiregional and multicustomer retail financial 
services firm in the UK (Rogers, 1999, p. 46). At the heart of Pitman’s strategy 
was his belief that a company should be managed to create shareholder value 
and thus forego growth opportunities for profitability. As a result of this highly 
focused strategic understanding Pitman began trimming back operations that 
did not meet the required return on equity.
For example, Lloyds sold Lloyds Bank California in 1986, closed down its 
branches in the US and in 1992 it ended the investment banking endeavour it
3 Lloyds TSB (2005). Lloyds TSB Group History [online]. London: Lloyds TSB. Available from: 
http://www.investorrelations.lloydstsb.com/gr/history.asp [Accessed 12 April 2005].
4 As a result of the LDC crisis some big corporations enjoyed better credit ratings than the banks they had 
borrowed from, contributing to the general disintermediation trend (BStiz-Lazo & Wood, 2000).
5 According to Jochen Neynaber ‘Lloyds lost its Englishness through the arrival of these new board- 
members, not necessarily to its advantage" (interview Jochen Neynaber).
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had introduced in 1978 (Rogers, 1999; Batiz-Lazo & Wood, 2000). Lloyds also 
exited the Portuguese banking market in 1990, where it had been present for 
128 years6 (FT, 19 June 1990). While cutting back its international operations, 
the bank stepped up its UK business. Prior to 1993, its most prominent move 
to expand in the UK was through the acquisition of a majority stake (60%) in 
Abbey Life in 1988 (The Economist, 13 June 1992).
6 The 12 branches were sold to Spain’s Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (FT, 19 June 1990).
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5.8.2. Income Structure
5.8.2.1. Structural Overview
Lloyds’ income structure did not change notably between 1993 and 2003. On 
average, Lloyds’ operating income grew by 9.5% p.a. during the period 
analysed. In absolute terms, its total operating income more than doubled 
from GBP 4.0 billion in 1993 to GBP 9.9 billion in 2003. Lloyds’ focus on retail 
banking is reflected in the relatively high proportion of total operating income 
coming from net interest income.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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On average 57% of the bank’s operating income originated from lending and 
deposit-taking activities and was therefore booked as net interest income. 
Although Lloyds’ net interest income remained the biggest source of income, it 
still suffered from the decline in its net interest margin. This narrowing of the 
net interest margin was offset by a compound annual growth rate of 9.5% for 
net interest income from 1993 until 2003. Effectively, net interest income rose 
from GBP 2.1 billion in 1993 to GBP 5.3 billion in 2003 as a result of the 
bank’s growing balance sheet.
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Lloyds Bank/Lloyds TSB: net interest margin
in % 








The proportion of income from commission declined from 33% in 1993 to 24% 
in 2003. The relative decline in commission and net interest income arose 
from the greater significance of the bank’s other operating income as a result 
of Lloyds’ bancassurance strategy and the rise in premium income, which 
comprised most of this item. While trading gained importance during the 
period analysed, growing by 10.5% p.a. (CAGR), the overall proportion of 
trading income remained comparatively low. As Lloyds was not active in 
investment banking, trading only contributed on average 3.2% to its total 
operating income.
Lloyds had already undergone a major strategic revamp in the 1980s when 
management decided to scale back the bank’s international operations and 
concentrate on retail clients in its home market. By the time the European 
Common Market was launched, Lloyds had already embarked on a strategy 
that it consistently pursued during the following 10 years. Therefore the 
following analysis will concentrate primarily on the bank’s retail banking 
business and offer only a brief account of Lloyds’ investment/corporate 
banking activities and asset management operations.
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5.8.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
Between 1993 and 2003 an average of 35% of Lloyds’ profits before tax came 
from wholesale operations. While corporate banking services7 were offered to 
institutional clients throughout this period, Lloyds had already abandoned 
transaction advisory services, i.e. investment banking, in 1992. During the late 
1970s and 1980s Lloyds Bank, the traditional UK clearing bank, made various 
attempts to expand into international investment banking (Rogers, 1999, p. 48; 
Batiz-Lazo & Wood, 2000). However, unlike most of its UK competitors, it 
began to withdraw from investment banking shortly after the Big Bang in 1986. 
In 1987 Lloyds closed down its gilts and Eurobond trading but kept its 
corporate finance operations, the asset management division, and its stock- 
broking arm (Bennett, The Times, 20 October 1992).
Finally, at the end of 1992 the bank dissolved Lloyds Merchant Bank (LMB). 
This entailed the closure of its corporate finance business and integrating its 
stock-broking, asset management and venture capital divisions into the 
Corporate Banking and Treasury division (Lloyds Bank, Annual Report 1992; 
Barchard, FT, 20 October 1992; Bennett, The Times, 20 October 1992). 
Lloyds Merchant Bank was not a major contributor8 to group earnings and the 
decision to exit international investment banking underlined Lloyds’ strategic 
focus on the British market. Subsequently, Lloyds served corporate clients in 
the UK primarily through its Wholesale Markets division (formerly the 
Corporate Banking and Treasury division) and the International Banking 
division.
Management pulled out of investment banking at a time when other British 
banks were still indulging in a kind of post-Big Bang hype. Exiting investment 
and international corporate banking appears with hindsight to have been a 
proactive move.9 Yet, it should be pointed out that others considered the 
decision to leave investment banking as a reaction to Lloyd’s failed bid10 for
7 Corporate banking services were for example, treasury, large value lease finance, long-term agricultural 
finance, share registration and factoring (Lloyds TSB, Annual Report 2003).
8 In fact, LMB delivered a pre-tax loss of GBP 21 million in 1992 after GBP 1 million pre-tax profit in 1991 
and GBP 10 million in 1990, i.e. less than 2% of the bank's pre-tax profits (Lloyds Bank, Annual Report 
1992).
9 Jochen Neynaber, Member of the Executive Committee of Lloyds Bank from 1985 until 1997 and 
Chairman of Schrdder Munchmeyer Hengst & Co, recalled the words with which Brian Pitman described the 
closure of Lloyds Merchant Bank. He said: “Investment banking, all my colleagues are in the concrete up to 
their hips, I am only in there up to my ankles, so at the loss of my shoes I am gonna get out of it” (interview 
Jochen Neynaber).
10 In April 1992, Lloyds announced a GBP 3.7 billion bid for Midland Bank. Ultimately Midland fell to HSBC, 
which had already owned a 15% stake in Midland Bank since 1987. According to Lloyds the deal would
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Midland Bank in 1992. At the time it was argued that if Lloyds had succeeded, 
it would have merged LMB into Samuel Montague, Midland’s well-positioned 
merchant bank (Bennett, The Times, 20 October 1992).
Only three years later Lloyds again found itself exposed to investment banking 
after the merger with TSB which included the merchant bank Hill Samuel 
which TSB had bought in 1987 (Denton & Harverson, FT, 10 October 1995). 
Hill Samuel was not particularly profitable and results were depressed by high 
loan loss provisions for its property lending business (Blanden, The Banker, 1 
March 1993). Following the merger with TSB, Pitman said Lloyds would want 
to hold on to some of Hill Samuel’s businesses. He explicitly expressed his 
interest in private banking and fund management, but did not specify the 
future of the corporate finance arm (Gapper, FT, 12 October 1995). Therefore, 
it was of little surprise that Lloyds TSB sold the corporate finance department 
of Hill Samuel a year later but kept the commercial and private banking 
operations (Atkins, FT, 1 June 1996).
Management’s decision to sell its German merchant bank Schroder 
Munchmeyer Hengst (SMH) took somewhat longer. In fact, the sale of SMH 
was triggered by SMH’s chief executive Jochen Neynaber. Although SMH was 
a highly-regarded private bank which focused on serving investors in the 
German bond and equity markets (Lloyds Bank, Annual Report 1993), 
Neynaber believed that the size and momentum of US investment banks 
would not leave enough room for a German niche player (interview Jochen 
Neynaber). In August 1997 Lloyds TSB announced the sale of its 90% stake in 
Schroder Munchmeyer Hengst, explaining that the German bank no longer 
formed part of its core business.11
Despite its apparently clear strategic focus on domestic operations, Lloyds did 
not sell its other international businesses until the 2003 strategic review. Eric 
Daniels succeeded Peter Ellwood as CEO on 31 May 2003 and presented the 
results of his strategic review in October of the same year. Lloyds TSB’s new 
strategy foresaw the re-invigoration of its UK franchise and therefore paved 
the way for a reduction of the bank’s international activities (Lloyds TSB
have allowed cost-savings of GBP 700 million, primarily by cutting 20,000 jobs and shutting 800-1,000 
branches (The Economist, 2 May 1992).
11 UBS paid DM 350 million (GBP 110 million) for SMH, which Lloyds had bought in 1984 as a turnaround 
case.
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Presentation, 5 November 2003; Sheridan & Napier, 2005). In the following 
months the majority of Lloyds TSB’s international businesses were sold. 
These comprised, first and foremost, the disposal of National Bank of New 
Zealand in October 2003 for GBP 2.25 billion, which led to a net capital gain of 
GBP 1.1 billion (FT, 25 October 2003). Thereafter, Daniels also disposed 
Lloyds’ Latin American businesses and the group’s French private banking 
and fund management businesses.
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5.8.2.3. Asset Management
Asset management at Lloyds was primarily an integral part of the bank’s 
bancassurance strategy for its retail operations and to a lesser extent a stand­
alone fund management arm. Therefore Lloyds did not disclose figures for a 
distinct asset management segment. Instead it consolidated these activities in 
its Insurance and Investments segment (from 1998). The Insurance and 
Investments segment comprised Abbey Life and the bank’s Edinburgh-based 
life assurance company Scottish Widows and Scottish Widows Investment 
Partnership (SWIP), which it had bought in 1999.
The merger with TSB added new momentum to Lloyds’ fund management 
activities through Hill Samuel’s substantial asset management division. After 
the merger with TSB Hill Samuel formed the nucleus of the group’s new fund 
management operation. Following the acquisition of Scottish Widows, Lloyds 
TSB’s management integrated its Hill Samuel asset management unit into 
Scottish Widows and transferred Hill Samuel’s asset management arm from 
London to Edinburgh. At the time Hill Samuel had GBP 55 billion assets under 
management while Scottish Widows managed GBP 35 billion (Targett, FT, 1 
March 2000). The decision to relocate the fund management business to 
Scotland led to an exodus of asset managers from Hill Samuel (Croft, Orr & 
Nichol, FT, 27 September 2003).
SWIP managed funds for Lloyds TSB’s retail life, pensions and investment 
products, but also served institutional clients such as corporate pension 
schemes and local authorities (Lloyds TSB Annual Report, 2003, p. 11). 
Although management expressed its interest in becoming a global player in 
asset management (Targett, FT, 1 March 2000), Lloyds TSB’s asset 
management activities remained an integral part of its retail banking activities 
and did not achieve the size and the status of a leading global asset manager. 
In fact, SWIP’s total assets under management were less than GBP 77 billion 
at the end of 2003, compared to GBP 90 billion when Scottish Widows and Hill 
Samuel were merged in 2000.
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5.8.2.4. Retail Banking
When Pitman made a hostile takeover bid for UK rival Midland Bank in 1992 
he left little doubt that he considered Lloyds’ future to be in the domestic retail 
market and that a higher market share was essential to improve profitability. 
However, Midland was acquired by HSBC and Lloyds had to consider other 
options. Finally, in April 1994, Lloyds approached Cheltenham & Gloucester 
(C&G), the mutual building society where Pitman had started his banking 
career in the early 1950s.
C&G was Britain’s sixth largest building society and its cost income ratio of 
26% suggested it was one of the most efficient players in the market; the 
industry average was just under 50% (The Economist, 23 April 1994). The 
acquisition of C&G proved a cumbersome and slow undertaking as it had to 
be demutualised before Lloyds could buy it. Lloyds was the first British bank to 
take over a building society and thus paved the way for a new consolidation 
wave in the UK financial services industry (The Economist, 23 April 1994).
According to the 1986 Building Societies Act it was not allowed to make a 
cash offer to people who had been members of C&G for less than two years. 
This Act was intended to avoid “speculative flows” of deposits between 
building societies if a takeover scenario were in the offing (The Economist, 23 
April 1994; Gapper & Mason, FT, 9 June 1994). C&G needed 75% of its 
825,000 members’ approval for a takeover. However, 27% had been with the 
building society for less than two years in 1994 (Gapper & Mason, FT, 9 June
1994). Finally, Lloyds paid the society’s members GBP 1.8 billion in cash in 
return for voting to abandon mutual status in April 1995 (The Economist, 23 
April 1994; Gapper & Mason, FT, 9 June 1994; Smith, FT, 1 April 1995).
In October 1995 Lloyds already announced another deal that would boost 
revenues and strengthen the bank’s position as the driving force in the British 
retail banking market. Lloyds pursued a GBP 15 billion merger with the 
Trustee Savings Bank (TSB), which created the most extensive high street 
banking network in the UK with 2,850 branches and more than 12 million 
customers (Denton & Smith, FT, 10 October 1995; Lloyds TSB, Annual Report
1995). Although it was legally a merger, the relative size of the two companies 
suggested that it was de facto a takeover of TSB by Lloyds. After the merger, 
former Lloyds’ shareholders held 70% of the new group's shares while former
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TSB shareholders held 30%. The acquisition of C&G was generally 
considered as revenue-led, whereas the merger with TSB focused on cost 
savings (Linnell, The Banker, 1 January 2000).
Lloyds and TSB estimated that they could save about GBP 350 million a year 
by 1999, which would be around 10% of their combined costs. When the 
merger was announced, management said it would want to keep most of the 
new group’s 2,850 branches but would have to reduce the number of staff. 
However, Lloyds and TSB had to wait until an Act of Parliament was passed 
before they were allowed to merge their branches, exchange data and transfer 
customers from one institution to another (Gapper, FT, 12 October 1995). 
Because of this legal obstacle, Lloyds and TSB had to remain separate 
identities12 until 1999.
Pitman emphasised the benefits for British retail banking clients in his 
arguments in favour of the merger, as the newly formed bank would be able to 
offer financial products at lower rates due to a reduction in unit prices (Gapper, 
FT, 12 October 1995). Alongside the scope for cost synergies, the deal offered 
complementary revenue sources. TSB was stronger in the North of England 
and in Scotland, whereas Lloyds had a better presence in the South of the UK 
(Denton & Smith, FT, 10 October 1995). The deal was not only a good 
geographic fit, it also made sense from a product perspective. Pitman 
explained that the merged bank would operate specialist providers for a 
variety of products, which would be sold under the most appropriate brand 
name (Smith, FT, 12 October 1995).13
Combining savings and insurance products were at the heart of the 
bancassurance model. Lloyds originally embarked on a bancassurance 
strategy when it bought a majority stake in Abbey Life in 1988. In 1995 it 
owned 62% of Lloyds Abbey Life (LAL), which comprised Abbey Life and 
Black Horse Financial Services, while TSB had a life insurer and a motor 
finance division (UDT). According to Lloyds’ management, the integration of 
Lloyds and TSB’s bancassurance models posed the greatest challenge of the 
merger (Smith, FT, 12 October 1995). Through the minority buy-out of LAL in
12 The first joined branch of Lloyds and TSB was opened in Salisbury in August 1997 (Graham, FT, 2 
August 1997).
13 According to this reasoning, Hill Samuel emerged as the group's private banking and fund management 
arm.
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September 1996, which valued LAL at GBP 4.5 billion, management was able 
to overcome some of the integration difficulties and underline its clear 
commitment to the group’s bancassurance approach. Pitman reiterated the 
bank’s expansion plans for its insurance operations through organic growth 
and acquisitions (Graham, FT, 24 September 1996).
Lloyds TSB’s bancassurance approach received further impetus from the 
acquisition of Scottish Widows, the UK’s sixth-largest life assurer, in June 
1999 (Lloyds TSB Presentation, 23 June 1999). Lloyds paid in total GBP 7 
billion14 for this Edinburgh-based mutual life insurance and pension group and 
doubled the bank’s share of the life insurance and pension markets to 7.2% 
(Linnell, The Banker, 1 January 2000). The deal did not allow for annual cost 
savings of more than GBP 60 million, but Scottish Widows’ strong position as 
an independent financial adviser helped Lloyds enhance its distribution 
capabilities (The Banker, 1 July 1999). Although Scottish Widows was said to 
have escaped largely “unscathed from the pensions mis-selling scandal that 
has devastated the reputations and balance sheets of much of the UK life 
industry - including Lloyds’ own life affiliates" (Graham, FT, 23 June 1999),15 
the company did not pay any dividends to the group until the 2004 financial 
year (Bolger, FT, 18 April 2005).
Following the takeovers of C&G, TSB and Scottish Widows, Lloyds’ 
management had to realise that its growth prospects in its domestic market 
were becoming limited due to concerns expressed by the UK’s Competition 
Commission. In August 1997 Peter Ellwood recognised that Lloyds had 
reached a size that could run into competition problems if it expanded its UK 
business further. Ellwood explained that he would still like to grow in the UK 
through acquisitions, but also conceded that “there has to be a limit to 
expansion in the UK, simply because of the regulatory forces, so we are 
exploring other parts of the world” (Graham, FT, 2 August 1997).
The limits to non-organic growth in the UK became obvious when Lloyds 
approached Abbey National in 2001 and was rebuffed by the Competition 
Commission on the grounds that Lloyds TSB and Abbey National would have
14 This comprised a GBP 5.7 billion cash payment and a further GBP 1.3 billion in form of policyholder 
benefits (The Banker, 1 July 1999).
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had 27% of all current accounts in the UK. The Competition Commission 
regards a 25% market share as the limit for market consolidation (The 
Economist, 14 July 2001). This decision put an end to any further 
consolidation among the UK’s big four clearing banks (Lloyds TSB, Barclays, 
HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland). Peter Ellwood, Lloyds TSB’s chief 
executive, explained after the failed deal that acquiring Abbey National had 
not been a strategic imperative. He said that the bank’s future would lie in an 
overseas deal, preferably a European merger of equals (The Economist, 14 
July 2001). Subsequently Lloyds TSB reviewed its options on the international 
scene16 and embarked on a long but fruitless search for a European 
acquisition.
The only significant attempt to grow organically on the European continent 
was via the bank’s online banking operations. Evolvebank, Lloyds TSB’s 
internet bank, was launched in Spain at the beginning of 2001. Management 
planned to roll it out in Italy, France, and Germany in the following years and 
aimed to attract 1.4 million customers by 2003 when it was expected to break 
even (Croft, 2000 FT, 29 November 2000). Jayne Almond, managing director 
of evolvebank, was quoted as saying “the strategy is to build a pan-European 
bank but we are doing it one country at a time” (Snoddy, Independent on 
Sunday, 7 October 2001).
Prior to the launch of evolvebank, Lloyds had pursued a low-profile internet 
banking strategy in the UK. It kept its internet operation integrated into the 
main bank and did not introduce a new brand for its online services. Pitman 
had occasionally downplayed expectations on the use of online banking as a 
means of reducing distribution costs (Graham, FT, 22 October 1999). Before 
evolvebank could be launched as a stand-alone unit in the UK, Lloyds TSB 
established a cooperation with Centrica, a diversified utility company that had 
moved into financial services. Lloyds and Centrica created an online bank for
15 The first UK pension mis-selling scandal occurred between 29 April 1988 and 30 June 1994 “when people 
who would have been financially better off at retirement in their employer’s pension scheme were advised to 
leave or not join their employer’s pension scheme” (BBC online, 27 June 2002).
16 From 2001 several newspapers and news agencies reported over and over again that Lloyds TSB and 
Deutsche Bank were in merger talks (for example: Nisse, Independent on Sunday, 25 November 2001; The 
Banker, 1 May 2002; Griffiths, The Independent, 26 November 2001; vwd, 26 November 2001; dpa-AFX, 22 
September 2004). Jochen Neynaber told the researcher that there had been talks between Deutsche Bank 
and Lloyds TSB before Deutsche Bank made its bid for Bankers Trust in 1998. According to Neynaber 
these talks faltered due to Deutsche Bank’s smaller market capitalisation and the implicit junior role it would 
have had to play (interview Jochen Neynaber, 22 November 2005).
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the UK called Goldfish17 (Croft, 2000 FT, 29 November 2000; Croft & 
Cameron, FT, 14 December 2000). Evolvebank, for which Lloyds did not 
disclose the costs, gradually withered away and was effectively dissolved in 
2005 when it was announced that it had started to phase out its credit card 
services and would not accept any new applications (Evolvebank, 200518).
With the closure of evolvebank Lloyds’ one and only pan-European retail 
banking strategy came to an end. According to Neynaber, Lloyds did not have 
any European ambitions and no European strategy while Pitman was on the 
board. Neynaber recalled that “Lloyds had set up a team of some 10-12 
experts, who exclusively studied all European countries in great detail at an 
early stage. This team of experts concluded that product differentiation across 
Europe was so significant that it would be impossible to develop and sell pan- 
European retail products.” An additional important argument “against Europe” 
was the low profitability of most takeover targets relative to Lloyds’ own 
profitability and the fact that a cross-border deal of this sort offered little 
prospect of substantial cost synergies that could lift the profitability of these 
companies (interview Jochen Neynaber). Therefore, the focus remained on 
the UK and the exposure to the British economy increased over time (Lloyds 
TSB, Annual Report 2003).
17 Goldfish was named after Centrica’s existing credit card operation (Croft & Cameron, FT, 14 December 
2000).
18 Evolvebank (2005). Evolvebank [online]. London: Evolvebank. Available from: http://www.evolvebank.com 
[Accessed 1 April 2005].
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5.8.3. Cost and Risk Management
When Lloyds revealed its plan to buy Abbey National in 2001, Ellwood also 
announced that the group would abandon the cost income ratio target of 35% 
set the previous year (Willman, FT, 6 February 2001). Under Pitman’s 
leadership the bank was managed according to stringent profitability criteria, 
which necessitated forceful cost-reduction measures. From 1993 until 2000, 
the year when Pitman stepped down as chairman, the cost income ratio 
improved from 62% to 46%. Following Ellwood’s statement that the efficiency 
target would be abandoned, Lloyds’s cost income ratio rose to 55% in 2003.
Lloyds Bank/Lloyds TSB: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
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As previously remarked, the cost income ratio is an imperfect indicator of a 
bank’s efficiency as it does not say anything about the group’s risk- 
management skills. The cost income ratio does not include the bank’s loan 
loss provisions. For banks with large loan portfolios and a significant 
proportion of earnings coming from net interest income, the size of loan loss 
provisions essentially determines profitability. The relative size and volatility of 
loan loss provisions reflects the bank’s ability to correctly price the risk of its 
outstanding loans. In the case of Lloyds TSB, risk assessment played a pivotal 
role in the group’s success. The group’s loan portfolio increased from GBP 42
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billion in 1993 to GBP 137 billion in 2003 with the greatest boost coming in the 
years 1996/97 due to the acquisitions of C&G and TSB.
Lloyds’ improved efficiency can also be illustrated by its 6.1% compound 
annual growth rate for total revenues per employee compared with a CAGR of 
3.5% for total personnel costs per employee. In 1993 Lloyds employed 61,710 
staff, which rose on average by 3.1% p.a. to 84,102 in 2003. The average 
personnel costs per Lloyds’ employee in 1993 were GBP 21,717 and rose to 
GBP 30,463 in 2003.19 During the same period the bank’s revenues per 
employee nearly doubled from GBP 59,443 to GBP 117,547. The proportion of 
personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total operating expenses before risk 
provisions declined from 54% in 1993 to 47% in 2003.
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These improved personnel cost ratios resulted from the efficient use of new 
technologies, economies of scale due to rising revenues, a benign 
macroeconomic environment in the UK and a pay scheme that emphasised 
individual performance. In 1993 Lloyds introduced a new pay and performance 
policy which foresaw no general salary increases but aligned pay completely
19 When Lloyds TSB adopted the accounting requirements of Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17) 
‘Retirement Benefits’ in 2001 personnel expenses rose significantly (+35% y-o-y). According to FRS 17 the 
assets of post-retirement defined benefit schemes have to be included on the balance sheet together with 
the related liability to make benefit payments. This change of accounting standard led to higher personnel 
expenses from additional costs for accruing benefits for active employees, benefit improvements and 
severances. A comparative analysis is therefore of limited use (Lloyds TSB Annual Report, 2002, p. 64).
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to performance (Lloyds Bank, Annual Report 1993). Moreover, Lloyds used 
new technologies to reorganise people around processes. For example, in 
1992 it introduced the Service Quality Improvement Programme (SQIP) in 
order to optimise and streamline the processes at its branches. Lloyds turned 
towards these re-engineering concepts as a reaction to the growing 
competition from the more customer-oriented building societies (The 
Economist, 22 July 1995).
A sophisticated and finely tuned database on the UK housing market 
(interview Jochen Neynaber) was decisive for risk-adequate pricing of loans 
and mortgages. The group’s top management drove this risk awareness. 
Pitman argued that profit growth in traditional banking would primarily come 
from fewer bad debts rather than from more loans (The Economist, 13 June 
1992). The rise of the group’s coverage ratio (loan loss reserves relative to 
problem loans) from 78% in 1993 to 204% in 1999 illustrates the quality of 
Lloyds’ loan portfolio. Due to accounting adjustments in 2000/2001 the 
coverage ratio fell sharply but it still remained well above 100%.
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Lloyds’ overarching guidance for its cost and risk management originated from 
an understanding that each business had to at least cover its cost of equity to 
justify its existence. Pitman introduced this shareholder value-based concept,
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which became the mainstream tool for many bank managers in the 1990s, in 
1984. Lloyds’ management was among the first to conceive this idea and to 
implement across the bank. An important aspect of such a shareholder value 
oriented management method was the unambiguity of a single quantitative 
objective. In numerous articles Pitman explained how in the mid-1980s he and 
his management team derived “a single definition of success” in order to avoid 
multiple goals (Gapper & Smith, 1994, FT, 23 April 1994; Bose & Morgan, 
1998; Pitman, 2000; Pitman, 2003, HBR).
Pitman explained: “As our performance measure, we would use return on 
equity, a key indicator of profitability [...] and we decided that we would seek a 
return on equity of 10% above the prevailing rate of inflation, which at the time 
was 5%” (Pitman, 2003, HBR, p. 42). Pitman then went on to describe that 
they (Lloyds’ management) realised that the group’s return on equity should 
be measured against the bank’s cost of equity. Management calculated that 
the cost of equity was somewhere between 17% and 19%, reflecting the high 
interest rate environment in the UK in the late 1980s. Management concluded 
that every business had to deliver returns on equity that exceeded the cost of 
equity, which management agreed to be 18%. As interest rates came down 
during the 1990s the group’s cost of equity also fell. It stood at 9% in 1999 and 
remained there until 2003 (Lloyds TSB Annual Report, 1999, p. 28; Lloyds 
TSB Annual Report, 2003, p. 27).
A company’s cost of equity also reflects its risk profile and is therefore subject 
to structural and operational changes. Retail banks are generally understood 
to have a lower risk profile than investment banks, as their revenues are more 
stable. However, operational risk may increase if tighter consumer protection 
rights coincide with profitability requirements and an aggressive sales force. 
Lloyds TSB’s experience with the so-called “precipice bonds”20 is a case in 
point. The Financial Services Authority fined Lloyds TSB GBP 1.9 million for 
mis-selling high-income precipice bonds to inexperienced investors between 
October 2000 and July 2001. The FSA argued that Lloyds exposed its clients 
to the risk of substantial losses without sufficiently informing them about the 
product. This resulted in Lloyds having to pay GBP 98 million in compensation
20 “The bonds promised a high income - 10.25% to 9.75% over three years - but the return of investors’ 
capital was linked to the performance of 30 stocks. They are widely known as “precipice” bonds because 
investors’ capital returns “fall off a cliff if markets fall below a pre-set trigger point” (Burgess & Croft, FT, 26 
September 2003).
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to 22,500 investors (Burgess & Croft, FT, 26 September 2003).
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5.8.4. Asset-Liability Structure
Lloyds’ organic growth and the three large UK deals (C&G, TSB, and Scottish 
Widows) led to an increase in the bank’s assets from GBP 72 billion in 1993 to 
GBP 202 billion in 2003. On average, 63% of the group’s assets were tied up 
in customer loans and some 12% were held as deposits with other banks. 
Customer loans increased from 58% of total assets in 1993 to 68% in 2003. 
The largest rise in loans occurred after the acquisition of C&G and the merger 
with TSB. While 19% of assets were deposits with other banks in 1993, this 
ratio had declined to 8% in 2003. This development could be explained by the 
fall in interest rates and more liquid capital markets, e.g. in the form of money 
market instruments. Furthermore, the higher proportion of loans may also 
account for this structural shift.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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An analysis of Lloyds’ liability structure reveals that an average of 59% of its 
financing came from deposits, mainly from current accounts. Financing from 
other banks declined over time, while money market instruments gained 
significance. During the period analysed they represented an average of 10% 
of the group’s refinancing sources. The relatively high proportion of deposits 
resulted from Lloyds’ strong retail client base. Particularly after the C&G and
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the TSB deals, deposits increased -  from 57% of total liabilities and equity in 
1995 to 63% in 1996.
During the period analysed, Lloyds’ equity ratio was 4.9% on average, 
fluctuating quite substantially between 3.4% (1995) and 6.3% (2000). Hybrid 
and subordinated products rose from 3.4% in 1993 to 5.2% in 2003. The 
stronger demand for such more differentiated finance instruments may again 
be explained by the low interest rate environment towards the second half of 
the period analysed. Moreover, these hybrid products helped it manage the 
volatility of net profits and therefore stabilise the return on equity.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Despite the greater use of hybrid and subordinated bonds Lloyds did not buy 
back any of its own shares. On various occasions management said it would 
consider buying back shares provided it did not find suitable takeover targets 
(Gapper, FT, 7 August 1995; The Economist, 17 January 1998; Linnell, The 
Banker, 1 January 2000). However, due to the aforementioned acquisitions 
and in preparation for several deals, which were planned but never realised, 
the bank did not launch a share buy-back programme during the period 
analysed. Consequently, its tier 1 ratio was relatively volatile as it fluctuated 
between a low of 5.8% in 1995 and a peak of 9.9% in 1999. Although Pitman 
explained in 1995 that he would consider a tier 1 ratio of 6.5% to be adequate
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the average figure was 7.9%, leaving the company well capitalised (Gapper, 
FT, 7 August 1995).
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5.8.5. Profitability
When Lloyds’ chief executive Brian Pitman decided in the late 1980s to focus 
on the bank’s return on equity as the key measure of profitability, he was one 
of the first European bank managers to recognise that a bank’s balance sheet 
size cannot be the yardstick for success. The focus on return on equity 
provided the guiding principle for management to expand or exit a business. 
Under Pitman return on equity criteria were applied rigorously in decision­
making processes. Business units that did not cover the cost of equity and 
were not likely to achieve the return targets were slashed with Pitman’s 
comment: “let’s plough it under” (interview Jochen Neynaber).
Due to a continuous and rigorous review of the group’s business activities, 
cost control and operational focus Lloyds achieved an average net return on 
equity of 29% between 1993 and 2003. The bank’s net profit grew by an 
average of 17% p.a. while its revenues increased at a compound annual 
growth rate of 9.5%. In absolute figures, the group’s net profit rose from GBP 
694 million in 1993 to GBP 3.3 billion in 2003. These extraordinarily high 
levels of profitability were achieved through the bank’s strategic focus on its 
domestic retail clients, which increasingly emerged as the most profitable 
business segment, and the readiness to make use of new technologies.
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Lloyds’ decision to concentrate on the retail market in the UK and to become a 
driving force for consolidation within the British financial services industry 
allowed it to benefit from cost-synergies. In addition, an increasingly 
consolidated market with relatively high barriers to entry kept competition at 
bay. Pitman described his view of Lloyds as a force for consolidation with the 
words: “If you do not dictate the competition, someone else will” (Pitman, 
2000). Moreover, the UK’s economic recovery in the 1990s was particularly 
beneficial for a bank with such clear geographic focus.
The bank’s high profitability and geographic focus led to the strategic dilemma 
of what to do with its excess capital and where to grow next. Given its average 
return on equity of 29% most acquisitions within the financial services industry 
in the 1990s would have diluted the ROE. On the other hand, the ongoing 
globalisation in the financial services industry, which primarily involved 
consolidation at national level, made Lloyds appear increasingly vulnerable to 
political and macroeconomic developments in the UK.
The bank’s 2003 annual report noted that Lloyds TSB’s earnings were heavily 
dependent upon its domestic activities as 81% of the group’s operating profit 
was derived from its UK operations. Accordingly, management pointed out 
that the state of the British economy had significant implications for the way in 
which Lloyds ran its business and for its performance. Following the disposal 
of its remaining international operations in New Zealand and Latin America in 
2003/04 this would increase substantially (Lloyds TSB, Annual Report 2003). 
Therefore it may be concluded that Lloyds’ domestic profitability posed the 
major obstacle for the bank’s international expansion strategy.
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5.8.6. Conclusion
Since the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s Lloyds’ corporate strategy was 
guided by the relatively simple but clear idea that shareholders provide capital 
in the expectation of earning a return on their investment. Thus, there was no 
other objective for management than to improve the bank’s profitability. 
Lloyds’ strategy during the period analysed was predominantly shaped by the 
views of Brian Pitman. Under his leadership, the ultimate goal was to 
maximise the group’s return on equity and to compare it with shareholders’ 
opportunity costs, namely the cost of equity. He believed that this could be 
achieved by focusing on the things the bank could do well and then striving to 
do them better than anybody else (Lloyds Bank, Annual Report 1993).
With his decision to establish a return on equity target as the single governing 
objective, he provided an operational framework for the group. When the 
executive committee set an 18% cost of equity hurdle rate in 1984, it paved 
the way for the bank to focus on the British market. The 18% cost of equity 
and the implicit ROE target reflected the high interest rate environment in the 
UK during the late 1980s. Applying the same return requirements to its foreign 
operations led to withdrawal from some of these markets.
Management saw the greatest potential for efficiency improvements in the 
bank’s domestic retail and small business market. Scale efficiencies were 
primarily achieved through acquisitions, thereby shaping the competitive 
landscape in the UK retail banking market. Innovative risk scoring methods 
and the advantages of the latest information technology were used to optimise 
the bank’s operations and to enhance efficiency.
The shareholder value principle served to analyse the performance of each 
line of business from a portfolio perspective and to concentrate on the most 
profitable ones. Despite the use of portfolio theory, Lloyds’ management did 
not adequately consider the importance of diversification as a source of 
growth opportunities. With the high levels of profitability achieved by Lloyds, it 
became increasingly difficult to expand without diluting its existing business. 
Therefore management concluded that acquisitions on the European continent 
were not an issue as cost synergies could not be realised and the returns of 
available players were not promising enough (interview Jochen Neynaber).
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The concentration on the UK did not merely create a dependence on a single 
national economy and its regulatory and legal changes; it also made it difficult 
for Lloyds to escape from its profitable isolation. The vulnerability to national 
idiosyncrasies became apparent, for example, with the legal disputes about 
pension mis-selling and the “precipice bonds”. It remains to be seen whether 
local knowledge of a bank’s home market outweighs the implicit “cluster risk” 
of such national strategies in an increasingly interdependent global economy.
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5.9. Dresdner Bank AG
5.9.1. Introduction and Status Quo in 1993
Dresdner Bank was established through the conversion of private bank 
Michael Kaskel1 into a public limited company and was initially listed on the 
Berlin stock exchange on 7 January 1873. Eugen Gutmann was instrumental 
in founding Dresdner Bank and served for 48 years as the bank’s first CEO 
(Ziegler, 2003). During its first decade, Dresdner Bank remained a provincial 
bank serving the Saxony region of Germany. However, following the opening 
of a Berlin branch in 1881, and the relocation of its headquarters to Berlin 
three years later, the bank quickly expanded throughout Germany. It gained 
market share in the highly fragmented German banking market, partly through 
organic growth, but also through the acquisition of smaller private banks 
(Dresdner Bank ed., 1969; Birkefeld, 1997).
Retail banking was a cornerstone of the bank’s operations right from the 
beginning. It provided a relatively attractive source of funding for the bank, 
which had to satisfy the demand for financing from the growing German 
industry in the late nineteenth century (Ziegler, 2003). Subsequently Dresdner 
Bank emerged as the archetypical German universal bank. In 1911, it had 25 
branches across Germany and opened another 62 deposit-taking institutions 
in Berlin and Hamburg in the same year. While Dresdner Bank’s retail network 
appeared moderate compared with the big British clearers, its size was 
significant by German standards at the time (Dresdner Bank ed., 1969; 
Birkefeld, 1997; Dresdner Bank, undated).
Dresdner Bank quickly attained international prominence and opened its first 
overseas branch in London in 1895.2 In the following years, it stepped up its 
international activities and founded the Deutsche Orientbank (German Orient 
Bank) and Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Bank (German South American Bank). 
Under the auspices of Eugen Gutmann, Dresdner Bank rose from a small 
provincial bank to one of Germany’s leading financial institutions (Ziegler, 
2003). Having achieved such an important position also meant that its 
profitability and therefore stability were of systemic significance for the
1 Private bank Michael Kaskel was founded in 1771.
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German financial sector. Following the German banking crisis in 1931, 
Dresdner Bank’s capital position was so weakened that it had to be bailed out 
by the state. The German state remained Dresdner Bank’s majority 
shareholder until 1937. According to a group of independent historians, this 
ownership structure facilitated the institute’s close ties with the Naziregime, 
from which it benefited enormously (Eugen-Gutmann-Gesellschaft, 2006; 
Henke ed. 2006; Dresdner Bank, undated).3
Although Dresdner Bank emerged again as one of Germany’s leading 
financial institutions after the Second Wold War, its organisational structure 
remained highly decentralised until 1971 (Birkefeld, 1997). Like many other 
banks, both British and German, Dresdner Bank rapidly internationalised 
throughout the 1970s. In 1973, it re-opened its London subsidiary and was the 
first western bank to set up an office in Moscow. Following German 
reunification Dresdner Bank was able to reforge ties to its East German roots. 
In fact, the bank’s heritage provided an additional argument for its eager 
expansion into the five new states after German reunification in 1990 
(Birkefeld, 1997, interviewee4). Dresdner Bank was the first West German 
bank to move into the GDR and by the time of the two countries’ monetary 
union (1 July 1990) it had 35 of branches there and operated another 72 
through its joint venture with Deutsche Kreditbank, the East German state 
bank (FT, 11 April 1990; Birkefeld, 1997).5
Launching Dresdner Bank’s East German operations was given top priority 
and handled by management board member Bernhard Walter with close 
involvement of CEO at the time, Wolfgang Roller. Wolfgang Roller served as
2 The London office had to be closed in 1914 at the beginning of the First World War.
3 During the Third Reich Dresdner Bank benefited from its close political ties to the regime and was active in 
the expropriation of Jews (“Arianisation"). Dresdner Bank’s management expected to become the leading 
bank in a Germanised Europe (Henke ed. 2006). A major study published in 2006 concludes: "Dresdner 
Bank, which originally had strong Jewish roots, was very close to the National Socialist regime. This was 
due to the fact that the Bank was 91% state-owned after the 1931 banking crisis and was only reprivatised 
six years later. The Bank was particularly susceptible to the regime’s influence and demands, especially 
with regard to staffing measures. Dresdner Bank participated in the financing for arms manufacturers. It also 
had investments in companies that had business links with concentration camps” (Eugen-Gutmann- 
Gesellschaft, 2006; Henke ed. 2006).
4 For this case study around a dozen informal and unstructured interviews were carried out over a period of 
four years (2002-2006). Important sources were several of the researcher’s colleagues, who were former 
employees of Dresdner Bank. Moreover, shortly after the acquisition of Dresdner Bank, the researcher took 
over research coverage for Allianz, thus for Dresdner Bank. This gave him the chance of meeting board 
members and other senior management figures from Dresdner Bank. In addition to these sources, one 
member of the enlarged senior management team, who was closely involved in Dresdner Bank’s corporate 
strategy during the period analysed, was interviewed in a formal and structured interview. This person 
asked to remain anonymous and is referred to as “interviewee”.
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chief executive from 1985 until 1993, when he became chairman of the 
supervisory board. He was succeeded by the somewhat hapless6 Jurgen 
Sarrazin, who took early retirement in 1997 (The Economist, 20 December 
1997)7 Thereafter Bernhard Walter became CEO in 1998 and oversaw the 
bank’s fate during the following two years. He stepped down after the planned 
merger with Deutsche Bank fell through in April 2000. Bernd Fahrholz took 
over as CEO and remained at the helm until 2003, when retail banking expert 
Herbert Walter was poached from Deutsche Bank to run the institution.
Besides focusing on its East German business in the early 1990s, Dresdner 
Bank also wanted to expand its international network.8 In 1988, Dresdner 
Bank had founded Banque pour I'Europe S.A. (Europa Bank AG) in 
Luxembourg. The purpose of Europa Bank was to target the European single 
market and to provide support for medium-sized companies. Europa Bank 
kept a relatively low profile for most of the time and was eventually liquidated 
in 2003 (Dresdner Bank Annual Report, 2003; Dresdner Bank, undated b). By 
contrast, the agreement signed in 1989 with Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) 
to intensify the two bank’s long-standing international cooperation attracted 
more attention, not least, as it fuelled merger speculation.9 This cooperation 
was primarily aimed at jointly entering the markets of the former communist 
states in Eastern Europe and was backed by symbolic cross-shareholdings of 
0.8% (FT, 11 January 1991; Sen, Metzler Equity Research, 19 January 1999; 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23 December 2000).1°
The cooperation with BNP did not lead to a merger, nor did the countless 
other rumoured takeover scenarios materialise, but in 1991 Allianz, Germany’s 
largest insurance company, announced that it was increasing its stake in 
Dresdner Bank. In July 1991 it disclosed that it had raised its holding in 
Dresdner Bank to 23%, up from around 10-15% at the end of 1990 (FT, 30
5 Through the joint venture with Deutsche Kreditbank, Dresdner Bank had 340,000 private customers, some 
13,000 commercial customers and 3,500 employees in East Germany (FT, 30 November 1990; Birkefeld, 
1997).
8 During Sarrazin’s time, Dresdner Bank had to deal with an investigation into smuggling depositors’ money 
to tax-free accounts in Luxembourg (The Economist, 20 December 1997). Departing from German 
corporate governance tradition, Sarrazin was not even offered a seat on the bank’s supervisory board when 
he left the management board.
7 In 1997, Wolfgang Roller handed over the position as chairman of the supervisory board to Alfons Titzrath, 
a former member of Dresdner Bank's management board. Alfons Titzrath was succeeded by Henning 
Schulte-Noelle, CEO of Allianz, in 2001. When Michael Diekmann became Allianz’ new chief executive in 
2003 he also began chairing Dresdner Bank’s supervisory board.
8 In 1990, Dresdner Bank opened representative offices in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.
9 The cooperation ended in 2002 (Dresdner Bank, undated b).
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July 1991). This increased stake underpinned the distribution agreement that 
Dresdner Bank had concluded with Allianz in 1989 to sell insurance products 
through its retail network. Ten years later, in July 2001, Munich-based Allianz 
took over Dresdner Bank, which was headquartered in Frankfurt. Dresdner 
Bank was delisted from the stock market on 7 November 2002, precisely 129 
years and 10 months after it went public. The following case study will analyse 
the bank’s strategic odyssey during the last decade of its independence and 
the first years under the ownership of Allianz.11
10 When Dresdner Bank established a subsidiary in St. Petersburg in 1993 in conjunction with BNP, it 
became the first foreign bank in Russia with a full banking licence (Dresdner Bank, undated b).
11 CEO Sarrazin said in October 1997 that there were no plans to intensify the cross-ownership between 
Dresdner Bank and Allianz (Sudddeutsche Zeitung, 31 October 1997). Some four months later his 
successor Walter said, “From today's standpoint, this topic is not on our agenda,” thus not categorically 
ruling it out (Fisher, FT, 2 February 1998).
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5.9.2. Income Structure
5.9.2.1. Structural Overview
In 1993 Dresdner Bank generated 72% of its total operating income in 
Germany and 23% in other European countries (Dresdner Bank, Annual 
Report 1993, p. 5). At the time, it employed 93% of its 42,017 staff in its 
domestic markei. Apart from the acquisition of UK merchant bank Kleinwort 
Benson (1995) and the M&A boutique Wasserstein Perella of the US (2000), 
Dresdner Bank predominantly continued its organic internationalisation 
throughout the 1990s and opened offices in such “global financial hubs” as 
Antananarivo (Madagascar), Oshakati (Namibia) and Yekaterinburg (Russia) 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1997).12 By 2003, the proportion of income 
from Germany was down to 54% and the bank received 34% of its revenues 
from the rest of Europe (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2003).
Besides internationalisation, Dresdner Bank pursued an expansive strategy in 
Eastern Germany, after reunification. Given the bank’s roots in the Eastern 
German city of Dresden, management felt that the bank was obliged “to make 
a decisive commitment at an early stage to the new Federal States. From this 
basic conviction the bank developed an expansion strategy [...]” (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1994, p. 18). In 1993, three years after German 
reunification, Dresdner Bank’s CEO remarked that “the task of rebuilding 
eastern Germany requires a volume of resources [...] [which] means 
accepting restraint for a number of years” (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 
1993, p. 5).13
In 1993, Dresdner Bank’s universal banking model resulted in an income 
structure, which was still largely dominated by net interest income. 59% of the 
bank’s revenues were net interest income, whereas 30% came from 
commission income. With the acquisition of Kleinwort Benson in 1995, 
commission income gained significance and rose by 5 percentage points in 
1996. Management explained in the 1998 Annual Report that it aimed to
12 Despite the word “focus", the following quote exemplifies management’s lack of it: “Dresdner Bank’s 
international strategy is focussed upon developing its business in central and eastern Europe, the high 
growth regions of Asia and the NAFTA zone in North America; this is in addition to expanding the Bank’s 
global presence in investment banking [...] (Annual Report 1994, p. 18). Four years later, at the advent of 
the single European currency zone Dresdner Bank’s management explained that it regarded Euroland as its 
domestic market (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998, p. 21).
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further expand its commission income relative to its interest income through 
more advisory work (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998, p. 21).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Indeed, Dresdner Bank’s transaction services increased to such an extent that 
in 2000 42% of total operating income originated from commission income, 
thereby equalling net interest income. In absolute figures, this meant net 
interest income and commission income each amounted to EUR 4.3 billion. 
During the period analysed, commission income grew at a compound annual 
growth rate of 4.8% and accounted on average for some 35% of group’s total 
operating income.
While the proportion of net interest income declined continuously, this source 
of income still made up 50% of the group’s total operating income between 
1993 and 2003. Over the entire period analysed, Dresdner Bank’s net interest 
income fell by an average of 1.2% p.a. (CAGR) as interest expenses rose 
faster than interest income, eroding the net interest margin. Dresdner Bank 
expanded its loan portfolio up to 2001, when it totalled EUR 240 billion, 
compared to EUR 111 billion in 1993. The bank grew its loan portfolio into
13 The book with the telling title “With full steam ahead into the unknown" (“Mit voller Kraft ins Ungewisse" 
Birkefeld, 1997) recounts Dresdner Bank's early expansion phase into East Germany and concludes that it 
vastly built personnel overcapacity, and misjudged the development of the real estate market.
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declining profitability during that time as net interest margin fell from 1.86% 
(1993) to 0.94% (2001) and decreased further to a mere 0.68% in 2003.
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Since commission income rose and interest income fell, these two earning 
components were relatively balanced by 2003. At the end of the period 
analysed, Dresdner Bank’s net interest income contributed 38% to the group’s 
operating income while commission income contributed 35%. Over time, the 
share of trading income also gained importance. In 2003, trading contributed 
19% of the group’s total operating income. This high proportion of trading 
income resulted from an average annual growth rate of 13%, due to 
management’s decision to step up its investment banking operations.
The strong rise in trading income and the moderate growth of commission 
income were able to make up for the fall of net interest income so that the 
bank’s total operating income nevertheless showed a positive trend with a 
3.2% CAGR for the whole period. Between 1993 and 2003 Dresdner Bank’s 
total operating income rose from EUR 5.4 billion to EUR 7.4 billion. The year 
2000 was the best year ever for Dresdner Bank in terms of revenues, with 
total operating income reaching EUR 10.2 billion.
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So far, this structural review has considered only sources of operating income. 
However, for Dresdner Bank to deliver the levels of profitability it did, the 
group’s non-operating income was decisive. Dresdner Bank boosted its 
income by an average of EUR 775 million p.a. through non-operating income, 
which more than offset the EUR 442 million p.a. in non-operating expenses 
that were booked between 1993 and 2003. Therefore, the positive net effect 
was on average EUR 334 million, lifting the group’s pre-tax ROE by 3.1 
percentage points.
The group’s non-operating income resulted from the continuous sale of its 
large shareholdings in non-banks. Dresdner Bank held shares, directly or 
indirectly, in several German companies (non-banks). These insurance and 
industrial stakes were valued EUR 7.7 billion at the end of 1994 (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1994). The value of these non-bank shareholdings rose 
in the following years and stood at EUR 17.6 billion at year-end 2000. 
However, Dresdner Bank’s policy of divesting its interests14 in the non-bank 
sector and the falling equity markets reduced the value of the group’s 
shareholdings to EUR 4.6 at the end of 2003 (Dresdner Bank, Annual Reports 
1994, 2000 & 2003).
The build-up of these industrial holdings has its roots in the structure of the 
German economy in the late nineteenth century when German banks were 
effectively the forerunners of today’s private equity investors. Through 
shareholdings in the companies they lent to, banks tried to overcome 
information asymmetry and the “principal-agent problem” between lender and 
owner. This ownership structure prevailed and was instrumental in the 
reconstruction of Germany’s economy after the Second World War. It 
constituted the hub of the bank-client relationship in the post-war period, 
continuing until the 1990s. Dresdner Bank’s attempt to break out of this 
established structure and transform its business model into one that could 
combine an Anglo-Saxon investment banking style with its traditional 
commercial banking approach is the subject of the following section.
14 For example, in 2000, Dresdner Bank realised EUR 2.3 billion from the sale of its corporate holdings 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2000 p. 18).
408
5.9. Dresdner Bank AG
5.9.2.2. Corporate and Investment Banking
Dresdner Bank’s corporate banking activities in the early 1990s were 
dominated by its efforts to gain market share through lending to companies in 
Eastern Germany. Three years after German reunification, Dresdner Bank’s 
management explained that it arranged “for an increasing number of 
customers to obtain loans available under government assistance 
programmes for the funding of investment projects” in East Germany 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1993, p. 18). By 1994, it was lending to
33.000 companies in Eastern Germany -  at a time when the number of 
corporate customers amounted to 200,000 (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report
1994). Besides historical reasons for wanting to have a strong position in 
Eastern Germany, Dresdner Bank also regarded itself as the bank for small 
and medium sized companies, the German Mittelstand.15
Of its German corporate client base, 95% were small and medium-sized firms. 
While these companies form the backbone of the German economy, they are 
also most vulnerable to weak economic growth. In 1994, Dresdner Bank’s 
management pointed out that the past recession16 in fact vindicated “the 
house bank principle”, as the bank was better placed to resolve the problems 
of its long-term clients because of the established relationship (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1994). However, this house bank principle seemed to be 
less suited for gaining new clients and growing revenues. In 1998, Dresdner 
Bank still referred to 200,000 corporate and institutional customers, of which
145.000 were German clients. The number of clients fell to 175,000 in 1999 
and 160,000 in the following year (Dresdner Bank, Annual Reports, 1994, 
1999, 2000).
As shown in the previous section, Dresdner Bank’s net interest margin more 
than halved in the period analysed. Notwithstanding the bank’s declining 
margins, Joachim von Harbou, the member of the management board 
responsible for corporate clients, explained in 2000 that the bank would not 
withdraw from lending to small companies. He argued that over the past ten 
years, Dresdner Bank’s lending to smaller and medium-sized companies had 
grown by a compound annual growth rate of 10% (Dresdner Bank, Annual
15 These two factors probably explain best why Dresdner Bank pursued such an expansive lending policy in 
Eastern Germany.
16 Real GDP declined by 1.1% y-o-y in 1993.
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Report 2000).17 Contrasting this growth rate with the 1.8% German GDP 
growth during the same time should have alerted management to the poor 
quality of the loan portfolio, given that their market share did not rise.
After its expansive lending spree in Eastern Germany, Dresdner Bank began 
internationalising corporate and investment banking in 1994 (Dresdner Bank, 
Annual Report 1994, pp. 25-31). It had already realigned its investment 
banking activities in 1992 and tried to sharpen its profile in the following years. 
Despite such measures as the launch of a securities research unit, Dresdner 
International Research Institute (DIRI), the bank’s capital markets expertise 
remained rudimentary compared to Anglo-American and Japanese securities 
institutions. It also employed just some 160 members of staff in London in 
1994 (Waller, FT, 14 March 1994; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 June 1995).18 
Management was determined to move into international investment banking 
and follow its rival Deutsche Bank, which had bought the British investment 
bank Morgan Grenfell in 1989.
Eventually, Dresdner Bank successfully bid for UK merchant bank Kleinwort 
Benson in June 1995, for which it paid GBP 1 billion (Borsen-Zeitung, 27 June 
1995). Kleinwort Benson operated an asset management business, enjoyed a 
good reputation as a corporate finance house, advising on mergers and 
acquisitions and was strong in equities brokerage. It delivered a pre-tax profit 
of GBP 97 million in 1994, which implied a ROE of 20%. Kleinwort Benson 
added a workforce of 2,900 and strengthened Dresdner Bank’s international 
position in investment banking through offices in Paris, New York, Tokyo and 
Hong Kong (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 June 1995). Dresdner Bank’s CEO 
Sarrazin said Kleinwort Benson would be run on a long lead, but he conceded 
that the overarching strategy would be determined in Frankfurt (Fisher, FT, 10 
August 1995).19 The decision to keep control over investment banking in 
Frankfurt remained an ongoing issue and led, for example, to the departure of 
Simon Robertson, chairman of Kleinwort Benson, in 1997 (Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 3 March 1997).20
17 In 2000, 55% of Dresdner Bank’s corporate clients had less than DM 1 million of revenues (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 2000).
18 This move followed Deutsche Bank’s establishment of DB Research in 1992 (Waller, FT, 14 March 1994).
19 This decision differed from Deutsche Bank’s approach: Deutsche Bank handed over all investment
banking power to its London subsidiary Morgan Grenfell.
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Following the acquisition of Kleinwort Benson, Dresdner Bank merged its 
commercial and investment banking products in 1996 to offer its clients a 
“universal banking” approach (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1996, p. 32). 
The bank’s management in Frankfurt am Main regarded investment banking 
primarily as a product group. This meant Dresdner Bank’s traditional lending- 
oriented commercial bankers had to market British transaction services to an 
international clientele (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998; interviewee). 
Combining traditional commercial banking services with transaction services 
created managerial challenges regarding the different risk perceptions of 
these two types of bank, different approach taken by investment and 
commercial bankers vis-a-vis clients, and rivalry over compensation.
Moreover, the milestone acquisition of Kleinwort Benson inspired Dresdner 
Bank to become even more international21 and to grow its investment banking 
operations in the USA. Dresdner Bank’s CEO Sarrazin stressed the bank’s 
determination to expand its global investment banking activities. He said with 
regard to investment banking, “We don’t want to be niche players. [...] We 
want to play with the big players worldwide” (Peterson, Business Week, 10 
November 1997). This view was shared by his successor Walter, who also 
wanted Dresdner Bank to be a global player in investment banking, and 
therefore saw the need to have a greater presence in the USA and Asia 
(Fisher, FT, 2 February 1998; Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998, p. 21).
Consequently, it did not come as a complete surprise when Dresdner Bank 
announced the USD 1.4 billion acquisition of US investment bank Wasserstein 
Perella in 2000. Wasserstein Perella enjoyed a good reputation as US M&A 
boutique, co-founded and managed by Wall Street “legend” Bruce 
Wasserstein, who defected in November 2001 to run Franco-American 
investment bank Lazard Freres. Just as the takeover of Kleinwort Benson 
seemed like a belated emulation of Deutsche Bank’s 1989 purchase of 
Morgan Grenfell in London, the 2000 Wasserstein Perella deal seemed to 
mimic Deutsche Bank’s Bankers Trust acquisition of 1999 (Major, Saigol & 
Silverman, FT, 13 September 2000; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 2 March 2002). 
The acquisition of Wasserstein Perella was also symbolic. It fulfilled the
20 Robertson had been with Kleinwort Benson since 1963 and was considered one of the most senior 
investment banking figures in the City of London (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 3 March 1997).
21 In 1998 Dresdner Bank acquired 67% of Albertini & C, the Italian equity and bonds broker, and took over 
the remaining stake in 2001.
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purpose of rebuilding morale among Dresdner Bank’s investment bankers, 
who needed reassurance about the future of investment banking at Dresdner 
Bank after the failed merger with Deutsche Bank in April of the same year 
(interviewee).
In summer 2000, after the failed merger with Deutsche Bank, which will be 
analysed in the section on cost and risk management, Dresdner Bank’s 
management set out its plans to become a “focused European advisory bank” 
(Willman, FT, 22 May 2000). This revised strategy acknowledged that it was 
not and probably would not be an international investment bank. Moreover, 
management conceded at the time, that it should scale back its international 
commercial loans. This was expected to release up to EUR 1 billion of core 
capital by 2003 (Willman, FT, 22 May 2000).
CEO Fahrholz confirmed that there was indeed a general policy of linking 
lending to the sale of investment banking services. He was quoted as saying, 
“We shouldn’t stretch our capital to lend to companies unless they are buying 
our investment banking products” (Willman, FT, 22 May 2000). Finally, a new 
division, Corporates & Markets, was devised to merge Dresdner Bank’s 
investment banking and corporate customers’ activities. This suggests that the 
previous idea of selling investment banking products and capital markets 
solutions through Dresdner Bank’s traditional commercial bankers did not 
work well.
Following the takeover of Dresdner Bank by Allianz in July 2001, the new 
owners turned their attention to the bank’s corporate and investment banking 
activities. Against the background of the accelerating downturn on the equity 
markets and heightened economic and political uncertainty, the real costs and 
risks of Dresdner Bank’s investment banking strategy and lending policy over 
the past years became evident. When Allianz realised the consequences of 
Dresdner Bank’s policy, the focus was on limiting the financial damage from 
write-downs, falling revenues and volatile trading results.22
During the following two years, Allianz was primarily concerned with scaling 
back risks and costs at its new banking segment. In order to stabilize and
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reposition the bank, the institutional restructuring unit (IRU) was set up and the 
headcount was cut by some 15,000 between 2001 and 2004. These measures 
will be discussed in the sections on cost and risk management and asset- 
liability management. In 2002 Fahrholz, CEO of Dresdner Bank who was also 
responsible for the Corporates & Markets division, said “We cannot be 
satisfied with this result and we will make every effort to return to profitability in 
2003” (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report, p. 20). In 2003, the corporate and 
investment banking divisions together did deliver a pre-tax profit of EUR 651 
million. However, this achievement resulted only from realigned segmental 
reporting, whereby Dresdner Bank set up two new divisions in which it booked 
a total pre-tax loss of EUR 2.4 billion.23
22 Seen through the eyes of an equity analyst who followed Allianz at the time, all these measures at 
Dresdner Bank resembled an emergency operation rather than running one of Germany largest banks with 
nearly EUR 250 billion of outstanding loans (2001).
23 EUR 1.3 billion before taxes were booked to the Institutional Restructuring Unit and EUR 1.1 billion was 
allocated to the Corporate Investments segment (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 109; Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 2003, p. 11).
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5.9.2.3. Asset Management
One important reason for the acquisition of Dresdner Bank was the view held 
by Allianz management that scale efficiencies provide a major competitive 
advantage in the fund management industry. In 2000, Dresdner Bank had 
EUR 272 billion of assets under management, while Allianz managed EUR 
750 billion. Shortly after the takeover, Allianz merged the two institutions’ fund 
management arms. Subsequently it managed more than EUR 1,000 billion of 
assets and, measured by total assets under management, ranked among the 
five largest asset managers in the world. The new corporate division Allianz 
Dresdner Asset Management (ADAM) was in charge of developing, producing 
(i.e. portfolio management) and providing sales support on a global basis.24 
However, sales and customer management were organised locally (Allianz, 31 
March 2001; Allianz, 3 April 2001).
Besides sheer size, Allianz management argued that joining forces with 
Dresdner Bank would make it a bancassurance firm with a "unique position in 
the attractive long-term savings market in Germany” through an improved 
distribution network in the retail market for mutual funds and equities (Allianz, 
31 March 2001; Allianz, 3 April 2001). In fact, Dresdner Bank and Germany’s 
largest insurer had already intensified their corporation in the fields of asset 
management and personal savings in 1997 and ADAM had existed since 1998 
as an IT operation, although it did not gain prominence before the takeover 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 30 July 1997; Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998). 
Allianz considered combining its insurance skills with the capital market and 
asset management expertise of Dresdner Bank as particularly conducive to 
gaining market share in the growing corporate pension fund market. 
Obviously, Dresdner Bank’s corporate client base was also a point of contact 
for cross-selling insurance and corporate pension products (Janssen, Metzler 
Equity Research, 5 March 2004).
For the German retail fund market, Allianz kept Dresdner Bank’s asset 
management arm, Dresdner Investment Trust (dit). At the time of the takeover, 
dit ranked fourth among German investment companies, with a market share 
of 14% (Allianz, 31 March 2001). Dresdner Bank had achieved this position in 
asset management through a combination of organic growth and acquisitions.
24 Joachim Faber was appointed member of the board of Allianz responsible for the group’s asset 
management business.
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At the beginning of the period analysed, Dresdner Bank had assets under 
management of some DM 85 billion (EUR 43 billion). Through the takeover of 
Kleinwort Benson in summer 1995 it increased this by GBP 14 billion25 
(Cohen, FT, 14 June 1995) and gained a foothold in the Anglo-Saxon fund 
management community. In the same year, Dresdner Bank also bought the 
US asset management group RCM for USD 300 million. Headquartered in 
San Francisco, RCM managed US and international securities with a focus on 
equities. Its total assets under management amounted to USD 27 billion in 
1995. RCM had also a notable track-record in managing corporate pension 
funds -  an area in which Dresdner Bank’s German asset management 
division could benefit from the experience of their US colleagues (Fisher, FT, 
30 November 1995; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 December 1995).
Despite the expansion into the USA, which gave Dresdner Bank greater 
international acceptance, management said it wanted to keep the focus on 
Europe where it expected 15% annual growth in the coming years 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 December 1995; Fisher, FT, 18 December 1995). 
The takeover of Kleinwort Benson and RCM greatly increased Dresdner 
Bank’s international profile in fund management.26 Following these two 
sizeable acquisitions, the bank’s asset management operations were 
recognised as a separate strategic business division within Dresdner Bank 
group and gained momentum (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1996, pp. 38- 
39). Total assets under management rose to DM 250 billion in 1995 and DM 
330 billion a year later (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 December 1995; Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1996).
As of 1998, Dresdner Bank began using an increasing number of different 
distribution channels, such as the internet and call centres for its retail funds 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998). For most of the period analysed, the 
structure of assets under management remained relatively well balanced. 
Equities and fixed income each fluctuated between 40 and 50% with the 
remainder being invested in property and money market instruments (Sen, 
Metzler Equity Research, 19 January 1999). Following the acquisition of 
Dresdner Bank, its asset management operations were combined with those 
of Allianz at an early stage of the integration process. Subsequently, Dresdner
25 Kleinwort Benson managed a further GBP 13.5 billion of assets through fund management joint ventures.
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Bank’s asset management activities became part of Allianz Dresdner Asset 
Management, a separate division within the Allianz group, and were therefore 
reported in Allianz annual report as of 2001 -  effectively this meant the end for 
Dresdner Bank’s asset management activities.
26 In 1998, Dresdner Bank's asset management arm initiated a joint venture with Japanese life insurance 
company Meiji Life that helped the company to position itself in the Japanese pension fund market.
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5.9.2.4. Retail Banking
Retail banking at Dresdner Bank in the early 1990s was marked by expansion 
into Eastern Germany. Within five years after reunification, 245 branches had 
been opened across the new federal states (Birkefeld, 1997).27 The cost of 
setting up the new branches in Eastern Germany were substantial. Each new 
branch cost around DM 1 million and the cost of interim premises (mobile 
units) used before a bricks-and-mortar branch could be opened, amounted to 
DM 500,000 each (Birkefeld, 1997). Besides these initial investments, 
Dresdner Bank’s expansion into Eastern German had also repercussions for 
its asset-liability structure. Until the end of 1993, loans and deposits from East 
German retail clients rose proportionally.28 However, in the following years 
deposits stagnated while the demand for loans continued to rise, putting a 
strain on funding Dresdner Bank’s East German undertakings (Birkefeld, 
1997, p. 93).
In 1994, Dresdner Bank reviewed its organisational structure and introduced a 
Private Customers/Private Investors Advisory business division (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1994). Along with the new structure, management 
proclaimed the mediocre strategic goal of improving “the quality of services for 
the benefit of Dresdner Bank customers” (Annual Report 1994, p. 20). CEO 
Walter reiterated similar self-evident “strategic wisdom” when pointing out in 
1998 that client orientation and new services were the bank’s two strategic 
targets (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 1998; Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 
1997, p. 27). Despite such vague views about retail banking and strategic 
ignorance, Dresdner Bank expanded its branch network. In 1995, the peak 
was reached with 1,629 branches worldwide (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report
1995).
In an effort to differentiate its distribution channels, Dresdner Bank considered 
stepping up its online banking activities and private banking services 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 2 November 1996). In 1997 it bought Hardy & Co. 
Privatbankiers, which then formed the core of the German private banking 
operations (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1997, p. 28). In the same year 
Dresdner Bank opened private banking centres in Geneva, London, Miami, 
and Singapore, thereby implementing its internationalisation strategy, which
27 In 1992, Dresdner Bank had 4.9 million retail clients of whom 1.5 million lived in Eastern Germany 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1992).
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dated back to 1993 (Annual Report 1994, p. 20; Dresdner Bank, Annual 
Report 1997, p. 28).29
Dresdner Bank broadened its multi-channel distribution approach, through the 
acquisition of Advance Bank from Bayerische Vereinsbank in 1997.30 This 
one-year old advisory-oriented direct bank had 40,000 clients at the time of 
the takeover and increased its customer base to 100,000 in 1998 (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1998).31 Although Advance Bank targeted prosperous 
young people and successfully grew the number of clients in the following 
years, it remained unprofitable and was fully integrated into Dresdner Bank in 
2002 (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002).
Introducing online banking services brought new momentum to cost-cutting at 
Dresdner Bank’s branches. In 1998, Dresdner Bank operated the largest 
domestic retail network in the German banking sector with a total of 1,464 
branches (Sen, Metzler Equity Research, 19 January 1999). CEO Walter 
announced that 800 jobs would be cut in high street branches in 1998, 
following on from the previous headcount reduction of 4,500 since 1993 (FAZ,
27 March 1998). Moreover, in 1999, 53 branches were closed down in 
Germany and in the following year, it was announced that Dresdner Bank 
would close down another 300 of its German retail banking branches, bringing 
the total down to 850 by the year-end 2003 (Willman, FT, 22 May 2000).
As of 2000, Dresdner Bank’s retail banking distinguished between customers 
who required little advice and high-net-worth private clients who were 
interested in sophisticated investment banking and asset management 
products. In 2000, over 50% of total income of the private clients division 
came from commission income in the securities business. At the time 
management said it expected a further positive development of the securities 
business with retail clients in Germany. Yet, precisely the opposite happened 
and in the following year, revenues were substantially down “mainly due to 
lower commission income from domestic securities business with private 
clients” (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2001, p. 55).
28 Around DM 3.4 billion loans versus DM 7 billion deposits (Birkefeld, 1997, p. 93).
29 By 1999, it served 550,000 high-net-worth private customers in Germany and 65,000 international private 
banking clients. This compares to around 5.9 million high-street banking clients (Dresdner Bank, Annual 
Report 1999).
30 The deal was closed on 1 January 1998.
418
5.9. Dresdner Bank AG
Allianz made its bid for Dresdner Bank in spring 2001, just as the stock 
markets started to crash. The deal was closed in July of the same year. At the 
time of the takeover, the main German equity index, DAX, stood still at around 
5,800 points, but declined to 5,100 at the end of the year and continued to fall, 
dropping to 2,200 in March 2003. It was against the background of this capital 
market trend and weak macroeconomic environment that the integration of 
Dresdner Bank into Allianz began.
In the presentation held by Allianz’ management to convince investors of the 
takeover, retail banking was core. It was argued that the acquisition of 
Dresdner Bank would allow Allianz to secure control of a distribution channel 
that was key to effectively penetrating the German market for mutual funds 
and equities (Allianz, 3 April 2001). This reasoning is not very persuasive, 
given Dresdner Bank’s moderate domestic market share of approximately 5% 
in retail banking and the fact that a distribution agreement between the two 
companies had existed since the early 1990s (Fitch Ratings, Dresdner Bank, 
25 October 2004). Moreover, Allianz operated a distribution network with 
11,900 full-time insurance agents in 2001. Self-employed tied agents are 
compensated on a variable commission basis, while bank clerks earn a fixed 
salary.
Following Dresdner Bank’s takeover, “the renaissance of financial advice” was 
proclaimed as the new credo (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2001). 
Subsequently, 960 Allianz employees were deployed in bank branches as 
“financial planning and insurance representatives” whereas only 160 of 
Dresdner Bank’s securities advisors joined Allianz agencies in 2002 (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 2002). Management highlighted that individual financial 
advice would be the key to banking in the future and appointed Herbert 
Walter, a retail banking expert from Deutsche Bank, as Dresdner Bank’s new 
CEO at the beginning of 2003. Under Walter the Private and Business Clients 
division, established in 2001, focused on the broad mass of retail customers, 
while further reining in costs and cutting back the number of branches 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2003).32
31 In 1999, the number of Advance Bank clients climbed to 151,000 and rose further to 210,000 in the 
following year (Dresdner Bank, Annual Reports, 1999 & 2000).
32 At the end of 2005, the total number of Dresdner Bank branches worldwide was 959, compared to its 
peak of 1,629 in 1995 (Dresdner Bank, Annual Reports 1995 & 2005).
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5.9.3. Cost and Risk Management
Between 1993 and 2003, an average of 32% of Dresdner Bank’s net interest 
income was eaten up by loan loss provisions, which amounted to around 15% 
of each year’s total operating expenses. Moreover, the bank’s cost income 
ratio averaged 80% from 1993 to 2003 and even exceeded 100% in 2002. 
Evidently, Dresdner Bank did not only have a risk problem, it also had a cost 
problem. For the first half of the period analysed, the risk problem originated 
from an unreasonably hazardous lending policy and an archaic risk 
management system (interviewee). Dresdner Bank did not make use of 
sophisticated risk models based on statistical methods. Hence, the price of 
loans was largely unrelated to the default risk until around 1997/98 when it 
introduced stochastic models and a capital market approach to determine the 
right price for risks (interviewee).33
Dresdner Bank: cost to income ratio and loan loss provisions
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Once Dresdner Bank had the right risk management tools at hand, their use 
was held back by its ambition of building an international investment banking 
operation. It began granting inadequately priced loans to corporate clients, 
hoping to receive compensation for these unattractive lending conditions in the 
form of lucrative investment banking mandates (interviewee). Furthermore,
33 Dresdner Bank uses KMV’s quantitative analysis tools for managing its credit risks.
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Dresdner Bank was keen to lend to corporate clients in many parts of the 
world where it actually lacked local expertise to correctly evaluate the risks. 
This overestimation of its risk management skills is a sign of managerial 
hubris, for which Dresdner Bank had to pay dearly.
For example, its 1997 results were burdened by DM 600 million of charges for 
the Asian crisis, where the bank's exposure was DM 4 billion34 (Fisher, FT, 23 
February 1998; Suddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 1998). In the following year 
Dresdner Bank was battered by the economic crises in Latin America and 
Russia which required country risk provisions of DM 400 million (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Report 1998, p. 37). Moreover, Dresdner Bank was invested in 
the LTCM hedge fund that collapsed, requiring a write-down of DM 240 million 
in 1998 (Sen, Metzler Equity Research, 19 January 1999).
Dresdner Bank: NPL coverage (loan loss reserves/impaired loans gross)'
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* Problem loans were not disclosed prior to 1997
However, the largest loan loss provisions had to be booked for its domestic 
engagements. Even on its home turf, Dresdner Bank’s risk management 
failed. As the economic situation in Eastern Germany did not brighten, 
substantial loan loss provisions for corporate customers became necessary. In 
1998, provisions for Germany soared by 52% (y-o-y) to DM 2.1 billion 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998). German borrowers, besides Latin
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American and North American borrowers, remained the main reason for high 
loan loss provisions in the following years (Allianz, 20-F 2003, pp. 85-107).
Dresdner Bank’s loan portfolio peaked in 2001 with EUR 247 billion of 
outstanding customer loans. In the same year, the net interest margin was 
0.79%, down from 1.86% in 1993, and management had to book a total of 
EUR 1.9 billion loan loss provisions. That was 45% of net interest income. 
Against the background of this record loan loss, a NPL coverage consistently 
below 100%, which actually dropped from 81% in 1997 to 72% in 2003, raised 
regulators’ concerns about the bank’s risk management (interviewee). The 
serious state of Dresdner Bank’s loan portfolio became evident when 
management, under the pressure from Allianz and possibly the regulatory 
authorities, had to set up the IRU (Institutional Restructuring Unit) at the end of 
2002.35 Swedish bank manager Jan Kvamstrom, who had successfully 
completed a similar task at one of Sweden’s largest banks, was recruited to 
lead and ultimately liquidate the IRU when its job was completed.
The IRU36 pooled Dresdner Bank’s non-performing loans, non-strategic loans 
and private equity investment amounting to a total of EUR 35.5 billion 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002; Janssen, Metzler Equity Research, 21 
March 2003).37 Its purpose was to free up risk capital by reducing risk- 
weighted assets, primarily through the sale or securitisation of loan portfolios 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 18; Allianz, 20-F 2003, pp. 85-107). 
Through the transfer of the bank’s EUR 123 billion mortgage activities to a 
separate company38, Eurohypo, reduced lending, and the progress at the IRU, 
risk-weighted assets were scaled back by EUR 87 billion between 2000 and 
2003. Consequently, Dresdner Bank’s tier 1 ratio rose again, after having 
bottomed out at 5.5% in 2001. Eventually, the IRU was closed down in 
September 2005, after it had completely wound up the remaining loans.
34 These were mainly country risk provisions for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand.
35 Dresdner Bank’s board members were frequent visitors to the German regulatory authority BaFin at the 
time (interviewee).
38 The IRU held EUR 14.8 billion in performing and non-strategic loans, EUR 6.9 billion non-performing and 
EUR 1.1 billon potential problem loans. Risk provisions for the IRU were EUR 4.1 billion (Janssen, Metzler 
Equity Research, 21 March 2003).
37 Some of these non-strategic loans originated from the cooperation with BNP in Eastern European 
countries (interviewee).
38 Around EUR 25 billion of risk-weighted assets from Dresdner Bank’s mortgage banking activities were 
transferred to Eurohypo.
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The IRU was a cornerstone of Dresdner Bank’s “Turnaround 2003”- 
Programme launched in 2002. This restructuring drive supplemented the 
existing restructuring plans introduced in 2000. In total 15,700 job cuts were 
planned. By the end of 2003, a headcount reduction of 9,910 had taken effect 
(Allianz, 20-F 2003, pp. 85-107).39 As a result of these drastic measures, the 
number of full-time employees stood at 34,998 in 2003 compared to 45,508 in 
1993, paving the way for some EUR 2 billion of cost savings (Dresdner Bank, 
Annual Report 2002, pp. 16-19; The Economist, 17 August 2002). Indeed, the 
proportion of personnel expenses relative to the bank’s total operating 
expenses before risk provisions declined from 62% in 1993 to 52% in 2003. 
However, this picture is distorted by the significant restructuring charges 
booked under other operating expenses, which for the years 2002 and 2003 
alone amounted to EUR 1.1 billion (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 
18; Allianz, 20-F 2003, pp. 85-107).
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For the whole period analysed personnel expenses per employee rose by a 
compound annual growth rate of 8.1%, compared to an average rise of 5.9% 
p.a. in revenues per employee. This partly explains the continuously climbing 
cost income ratio, which exceeded 100% in 2002 and averaged 80% for the 
time between 1993 and 2003. The increase in personnel expenses was driven
39 After the integration of the bank’s asset management arm into Allianz, the 2,500 staff (2000) from this
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by the takeover of Kleinwort Benson in 1995, the acquisition of Wasserstein 
Perella in 2000 and guaranteed bonus payments after the failed merger with 
Deutsche Bank.
In March 2000, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank announced plans to 
merge, but Dresdner Bank called the merger off in April, posing an unusual 
kind of operational risk for itself. The reason for the failed merged was a 
dispute over the future of Dresdner Bank’s investment banking arm Kleinwort 
Benson, which Deutsche Bank’s investment bankers wanted to be sold after 
the deal. As Dresdner Bank’s management did not want to accept this 
decision, they terminated the merger process (Willman, FT, 19 May 2000; 
Borsen-Zeitung, 7 April 2000; interviewee).
During the merger phase and after the deal was called off, a sense of 
uncertainty caused many investment bankers to leave Kleinwort Benson 
(interviewee). Dresdner Bank felt that this exodus had to be stopped and 
therefore offered guaranteed bonus payments. Yet, it appears to be a general 
management problem that in phases of crisis the best performers usually jump 
ship first and underperformers are likely to hang on to the planks. While in 
2000 personnel expenses rose by 27% and revenues increased by 12% per 
employee, the following year saw revenues down by 2%, but personnel 
expenses up by another 9%, mirroring the deteriorating capital market 
situation and lavish compensation conditions (Barber et al., FT, 12 April 2000; 
Willman, FT, 19 May 2000). CEO Fahrholz later said that the expenses to 
“secure Dresdner Bank’s competitive position in investment banking” 
amounted to EUR 553 million in 2000 (Annual Report 2000, p. 6).
At the annual general meeting only two weeks after the failed merger, 
Dresdner Bank’s management announced a EUR 3.5 billion investment and 
restructuring programme for the next three years. EUR 1.5 billion were 
allocated for the group’s investment banking activities40 and another EUR 1.5 
billion were earmarked for asset management-related private customer 
business in Germany and Europe.41 In essence, the restructuring program
division no longer counted as Dresdner Bank employees.
40 Most of that investment was for technology and to strengthen its the local presence in selected European 
countries.
41 EUR 0.5 billion were for investment in e-business activities.
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comprised shedding 5.00042 jobs, scaling back lending outside Europe and the 
aforementioned closure of 300 branches in Germany (Hoymann, Metzler 
Equity Research, 22 May 2000). These investment and restructuring 
measures, along with the purchase of Wasserstein Perella in September 
2000, were last attempts to breathe life into this decaying institution, to no 
avail. Notwithstanding its efforts, the failed merger with Deutsche Bank 
substantially and sustainably weakened Dresdner Bank in general and its 
investment banking operations in particular.
42 2,900 jobs in retail banking and 2,100 jobs at the bank’s headquarters.
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5.9.4. Asset-Liability Structure
An analysis of Dresdner Bank’s liability structure reveals that an average of 
37% of its financing came from deposits, mainly from current accounts. At the 
beginning of the period analysed, 46% of the bank’s funding still originated 
from deposits. The relative decline in deposits as a source of funding can be 
largely explained by developments that were not specific to Dresdner Bank. 
The declining interest rates in Germany during those years and the growing 
opportunities for retail clients to invest in capital market instruments were 
important factors. However, the weak customer deposit growth was 
compensated by a strong rise in deposits from other banks.
While customer deposits grew at a compound annual growth rate of 5.8% 
between 1993 and 2003, bank deposits increased by an average of 16.6% 
p.a. Consequently, Dresdner Bank’s liabilities to other banks amounted to 
EUR 166 billion, i.e. 35% of total liabilities and equity in 2003 and were 
therefore above the EUR 153 billion relating to non-bank customers. It seems 
that Dresdner Bank offered these other financial institutions such attractive 
terms, that they preferred to deposit short-term excess liquidity rather with 
Dresdner Bank than through capital market products, such as money market 
funds. This high proportion of bank deposits certainly did not help increase 
Dresdner Bank’s net interest margin.
Besides this strong rise in deposits from banks, Dresdner Bank also 
increasingly tapped the capital markets for funding, mainly in the form of 
money market instruments, hybrid capital and subordinated debt. In 2003, 
these sources of financing contributed EUR 27.6 billion i.e. 2.1% of total 
liabilities and equity. This compares to 1.1% in 1993. Shareholders’ equity 
grew by a compound annual growth rate of 7.5%, below the bank’s balance 
sheet growth of 9.6% p.a. Shareholders’ equity made up on average only 
3.1% of the bank’s total funding, a fact reflected in the consistently weak tier 1 
ratio.
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Dresdner Bank’s tier 1 ratio averaged 5.8% for the period 1993 to 2003. This 
resulted from its expansive lending policy, which it did not abandon until 2001 
despite poor net interest margins and constant loan impairments. Given the 
bank’s strong exposure to the German economy, its 10% loan portfolio growth 
between 1993 and 2001 should be seen in the context of Germany’s 1.7% 
GDP growth during the same years. Considering that the bank did not gain 
market share that would have justified such strong growth of loans and that 
the risks of its loans were not reflected in the interest rates charged, the 
massive loan losses should not have caused any astonishment.
During the decade under review, the tier 1 ratio reached a low of just 5.1% in 
1996. Unsurprisingly, Dresdner Bank raised some DM 1.6 billion fresh equity 
in July of the following year. At the time, CEO Sarrazin explained the need for 
this capital increase was to enhance the scope for strategic options in the field 
of investment banking and asset management (Borsen-Zeitung, 30 July 1997; 
Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1997).43 Since the reasons given highlighted 
expansion and not capital strengthening, rating agency Standard & Poor’s cut 
Dresdner Bank’s credit rating four months later, expressing its concern about 
the deterioration in its tier 1 ratio (Borsen-Zeitung, 14 November 1997).
43 Dresdner Bank increased its capital four times, by raising fresh equity, adding in total EUR 2.3 billion.
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When it introduced the economic value added concept in 2002, Dresdner 
Bank began comparing returns with the cost of capital, taking into account the 
underlying risk (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2002, p. 19). Subsequently, 
management scaled back the bank’s risk-weighted assets, i.e. its loan 
portfolio. A more selective lending policy with risk-adequate pricing was one 
important aspect of that process. Another, more immediate, effect was brought 
about through the deconsolidation of Deutsche Hyp, Dresdner Bank’s 
mortgage bank. Deutsche Hyp’s East German mortgage portfolio represented 
a potential threat for Dresdner Bank. For example, in 2000 it was responsible 
for EUR 500 million of Dresdner Bank’s total EUR 1.6 billion loan loss 
provisions.44
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As Dresdner Bank’s German competitors, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, 
had similar sentiments with regard to their mortgage banking arms, they 
decided to merge these operations into one big German real estate bank, 
called Eurohypo. Following the merger, each bank held around a third of the 
new entity and thus could deconsolidate its stake.45 In the case of Dresdner 
Bank, this reduced total assets by EUR 85 billion in 2002. Deconsolidating 
Deutsche Hyp, coupled with a more restrictive credit policy, contributed to a
44 This was offset by the sale of 2.5% of Munich Re shares in November 2000 (Dresdner Bank, Annual 
Report 2000, p. 7).
45 Dresdner Bank held 28.5% of Eurohypo and it was accounted for at equity (Fitch Ratings, 2004).
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44% decline in the bank’s lending volume (y-o-y) in 2002 and an additional 
16% drop (y-o-y) in 2003 (Dresdner Bank, Annual Reports 2002 & 2003). 
While the reduced risks made Dresdner Bank’s loan book manageable again, 
these measures inevitably had an effect on interest income. Net interest 
income fell from EUR 4.4 billion in 2001 to EUR 2.5 billion in 2003 (Dresdner 
Bank, Annual Reports 2002 & 2003). Subsequently, Dresdner Bank had to 
adjust its cost base to its lower revenues in order to boost profitability.
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5.9.5. Profitability
With an average cost income ratio of 80% and loan loss provisions that ate up 
around 32% of net interest income p.a., it is obvious that Dresdner Bank’s 
profitability was poor in most years between 1993 and 2003. Its return on 
equity after tax was on average 4.9% during the period analysed and thus 
significantly below its cost of equity. Dresdner Bank disclosed its cost of equity 
(8.85% after tax) for the first time in 2003 (Borsen-Zeitung, 15 August 2003). 
Although Dresdner Bank did not publish its cost of equity earlier, it may safely 
be assumed that it was not below 8.85% in 1993 to 2003.46
Maybe the net loss of EUR 1,978 million in 2003, with an implicit return on 
equity of -15%, was the right time for Dresdner Bank to develop a shareholder 
value concept that compared cost of equity with return on equity. In the 
previous year, Dresdner Bank had already run up a loss of EUR 935 million. 
These significant losses originated from high loan loss provisions and 
administrative and personnel costs that could not be adjusted at the same 
pace as revenues had been falling since 2000. In 2003, total operating income 
was down by 28% from 2000, while operating expenses before loan losses 
declined by only 20%. The 2003 result of -15% ROE after tax was in sharp 
contrast to the initially envisaged +15% target for 2003 (Dresdner Bank, 
Annual Report 2000, p. 6).
In 1994, management announced a target return on equity after tax of 12% 
(FAZ, 21 May 1994; Borsen-Zeitung, 20 May 1995). Four years later, it 
reiterated this profitability criterion, stating a pre-tax ROE target of 20-25%, 
which is the equivalent of 12-15% after tax, assuming a tax rate of 40% 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 1998; FAZ, 27 March 1998). In order to 
achieve this goal, CEO Fahrholz conceded that the bank should no longer 
attempt “to be present in all business areas, everywhere”, but should focus on 
“high-level advice in the securities and capital markets business, to corporates 
and institutions as well as to private clients and in asset management” 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2000, p.6). It is questionable whether 
sweeping statements of this kind deserve to be described as “focused 
strategy”.
46 Using CAPM a COE exceeding 9% is derived for the entire period after 1992 and prior to the takeover by 
Allianz.
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As discussed in the section on income structure, Dresdner Bank delivered a 
mediocre return on equity despite the continuous sale of its non-bank 
holdings. In 1994 the market value of Dresdner Bank’s non-bank 
shareholdings amounted to DM 15 billion, i.e. around EUR 7.7 billion 
(Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1994, p. 46). By year-end 2000, the market 
value of the entire non-bank shareholdings of the Dresdner Bank had reached 
EUR 17.6 billion. The highest was the 10% stake in Allianz47 (Dresdner Bank, 
Annual Report 2000, p. 67). Falling equity markets and the need to accelerate 
the sale of the non-bank shareholdings diminished the value of Dresdner 
Bank’s investments to EUR 4.6 billion by the end of 2003.48 Excluding the 
netted non-operational disposal gains for the period analysed, Dresdner 
Bank’s pre-tax ROE would have been 3.1 percentage points lower. On an 
after tax level, assuming a tax rate of 40%, it would have reduced Dresdner 
Bank’s return by another 1.9 percentage points to an average of just 3% ROE 
after tax.49
47 The eight largest investments were: Bilfinger & Berger (25.1%; EUR 118 million); Heidelberger Zement 
(17.7%; EUR 540 million); Dyckerhoff (10.5%; EUR 105 million); Allianz (10.0%; EUR 9,847 million); mg 
technologies (9.4%; EUR 231 million); Munich Re (7.4%; EUR 4,999 million); Karstadt Quelle (7.1%; EUR 
277 million); BMW (5.0% EUR 1,130 million) (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 2000, p. 68).
48 This comprised a EUR 1.7 billion investment in Allianz shares (4.5%) and a EUR 1.6 billion stake in 
Munich Re (7.3%).
49 Dresdner Bank’s tax rate was 41% on average for the years 1993 to 2003. While Dresdner Bank paid up 
to 59% taxes in 1997, it also enjoyed substantial tax breaks from 2000 until 2003 amounting to EUR 1.2 
billion.
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5.9.6. Conclusion
European integration was a recurring theme in Dresdner Bank’s annual 
reports.50 Management made frequent references to the importance of the 
European market and the bank’s international opportunities. It even regarded 
Euroland as the bank’s domestic market, although it held less than 5% of the 
German retail market (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report 1998). However, 
Dresdner Bank did not benefit from the opportunities that European market 
liberalisation and globalisation brought about in the 1990s. On the contrary, 
the enlarged set of opportunities lured it into too many temptations, with 
management neglecting the need to prioritise.
There is very little that suggests a strategic pattern or coherent action at 
Dresdner Bank during the decade under review. The bank’s pronounced 
expansion into Eastern Germany in the early 1990s was followed by visible 
signs of internationalisation. Notwithstanding any potential pitfalls, Dresdner 
Bank wanted to be international for the sake of being international. 
Internationalisation was a strategic objective in its own right. The bank rapidly 
expanded around the world through lending on terms and conditions that did 
not take account of the risk and price environment. Examples were the US 
loan portfolio, the bank’s exposure to South America and its lending to Asian 
countries. All of these engagements led to significant loan loss provisions. 
Moreover, the bank’s initial lending spree was not even intended as a door- 
opener for subsequent investment banking mandates, but merely fulfilled the 
purpose of having an international presence.
However, this lending policy changed when the bank realised it could use its 
lending facilities as a means of getting investment banking mandates. 
Subsequently, Dresdner Bank began granting inadequately priced loans, in 
return for corporate finance mandates. Besides a clash of cultures within the 
bank, the effort of linking traditional German commercial banking with 
transaction-oriented investment banking created trading and credit risks that 
were beyond management’s control. Although Dresdner Bank’s move into 
investment banking through the acquisitions of Kleinwort Benson, caused
50 Examples can be found in Dresdner Bank’s Annual Report 1997 (page 65), Annual Report 1998 (page 
35), Annual Report 2000 (page 22).
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management to reconsider its high street banking approach, the measures to 
raise profitability at Germany’s largest retail banking network were not enough.
The fragility of Dresdner Bank’s business model became evident in the wake 
of the failed merger with Deutsche Bank in 2000. By then, Dresdner Bank had 
built up large administrative and personnel costs and a huge loan portfolio with 
insufficient loan loss reserves. Despite the continuous sale of its non-bank 
holdings, the bank’s profits were not sufficient to cover even its cost of equity. 
Instead of having used this capital cushion to stringently rebuild and focus its 
business model, Dresdner Bank’s management pursued too many 
opportunities with too little vigour.
In many ways, Dresdner Bank wanted to follow in the footsteps of its bigger 
rival Deutsche Bank. This “me-too” strategy was most obvious in investment 
banking. However, Dresdner Bank did not address the challenges and 
opportunities with the same strategic rigour as Deutsche Bank. Its too 
passionate East German expansion prevented substantial cost reductions in 
retail banking and its move into international investment banking began too 
late and had not been completed by the time the investment banking cycle 
turned. Moreover, during a period when Deutsche Bank had just three 
different CEOs, Dresdner Bank had five, three of whom were unable to 
prepare a handover of office. This draws attention to Dresdner Bank’s 
supervisory board members and the negligence of their duty. Thus, it appears 
quite appropriate that Allianz, who as the largest shareholder was on the 
supervisory board all these years, had ultimately to bear the brunt of its own 





This research set out to explain why banking integration remained slow during 
the first decade of the European Common Market. More specifically, the aim 
has been to explore how British and German banking strategies differed in an 
increasingly integrated European economic system and why market 
liberalisation seemed to provoke two fundamentally different strategic 
reactions among banks, neither of which appears to have promoted European 
banking integration to any significant degree.
Most research into European banking integration has involved an analysis of 
aggregate data in the context of macroeconomic research projects. However, 
there is little research into European banking integration that considers the 
interdependency of the macro and micro levels. Therefore, this research 
approached the macroeconomic integration of the European banking sector 
through a microeconomic perspective, namely the analysis of realised banking 
strategies.
The objective has been to study major decisions made by a few selected 
banks in Britain and Germany from the beginning of the Single European 
Market in 1993 until 2003 in an attempt to fill the gap between the ample 
research into the European banking sector as a whole and the few isolated 
case studies. Most existing case studies on banks concentrate either on a 
time span that is too short to identify strategic patterns or focus too exclusively 
on specific business strategies (e.g. “retail banking strategy”).
This research has applied a methodology that is unique in the study of 
European financial integration and the banking sector. Rooted in Giddens’ 
ontological concept of structuration (Giddens, 1984, 1988), it recognises that 
structure and agency are complementary forces. This approach takes into 
account the interdependence of the macro and micro levels of a financial 
system. Based on the view that an examination of continuous processes in 
context sheds light on the interconnected levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1990), 
the method chosen to study the interdependence between the European
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financial system and eight of its largest institutions in two countries was a 
longitudinal comparative case study.
In order to strengthen the validity of this research, a variety of different 
methods have been used. Triangulation has been achieved through two 
qualitative methods with two different data sources and one quantitative 
method using a third set of data, supplemented by a few formal interviews and 
numerous informal interviews. The four British and four German banks were 
studied through accounting analysis, archival research and a qualitative 
database survey. This research has analysed the realised corporate strategies 
of publicly listed banks as opposed to emerging business strategies at non­
listed institutions. Consequently, the tightly drawn research design did not 
permit an investigation of internal organisational issues, such as power politics 
within the banks, which usually condition any decision-making process.
This concluding chapter comprises five sections in addition to this introductory 
one. The second section summarises the findings of each case study and 
then, in section three, ties together all eight cases in order to identify cross­
case patterns. Discussing the findings and the cross-case pattern analysis 
refers back to chapter three on corporate strategy and the applicability to the 
banking sector. Subsequently, section four answers the research questions 
about how and why British and German banking strategies differed between 
1993 and 2003. Moreover, it takes up the question of agent-structure 
interdependence. Since Giddens’ theory of structuration has been the guiding 
ontological concept of this research, this section also reviews the ramifications 
of the banks’ strategies for European financial integration. Section five shows 
which questions have not been answered and pinpoints the limitations of this 
research by putting forward ideas for complementary research projects. Based 
on the experience obtained from the case studies, section six contains an 




6.2. Discussion of the findings from each case study
In 2003, the last year of the period analysed, three of the eight banks 
delivered a loss; all of them were German. The only German bank that did not 
make a loss was Deutsche Bank. During the period analysed, Deutsche Bank 
managed to transform its business model from a domestic commercial bank 
with a weak retail client base to a bank largely operating in international 
investment banking. This colossal rebuilding of its business model resulted 
from management’s view in the early 1990s that it had to reduce its exposure 
to Germany and that it should scale back its transformation activities and 
instead focus on transaction services. This meant expanding into international 
investment banking.
Besides achieving the highest average ROE of all four German banks 
examined, Deutsche Bank had the lowest loan loss provisions relative to its 
net interest income between 1993 and 2003. From this, it may be concluded 
that its decision to reduce its loan portfolio and to diversify internationally was 
right. Yet, expanding into international investment banking contributed to a 
strong rise in personnel expenses. At 77%, Deutsche Bank’s cost income ratio 
was the highest ratio of all eight banks covered by this research. However, in 
all fairness to the other German banks, Deutsche Bank’s transformation 
process was greatly assisted by the continuous sale of industrial holdings, 
which bolstered its profits. None of the other German banks could rely on such 
a comfortable capital cushion. This is also reflected in the fact that Deutsche 
Bank had the highest average tier 1 ratio of the German sample, albeit one 
percentage point below the average for the British banks.
The development of Deutsche Bank during the period analysed shows a clear 
pattern, which suggests that the group pursued a coherent and consistent 
strategy. The bank’s strategy was based on management’s belief that it could 
not change the structure of its domestic playing field and that it effectively had 
to reduce its exposure to the German market. This strategic insight paired with 
the growing significance of disintermediation and the prospect of leveraging 
Deutsche Bank’s long-standing relationship with large industrial firms, paved 
the way for its shift towards investment banking. The lesson one can take 
away from studying Deutsche Bank during this period is that if you are
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exposed to an unfavourable environment and you can neither change the 
structure to your own benefit, nor carve out a profitable niche within your area 
of expertise, you must leave.
Two other banks among the eight studied reinvented themselves. These were 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and HSBC. RBS showed the strongest 
revenue growth of all the banks analysed. Its total operating income increased 
by a compound annual growth rate of 29% p.a. between 1993 and 2003. In 
absolute figures, that constitutes a rise from GBP 1.5 billion in 1993 to GBP 
19.3 billion in 2003. RBS concentrated on the domestic market and actively 
participated in consolidation in order to grow. Growth by itself is not 
necessarily a strategic achievement, but in the case of RBS this was 
consistently profitable growth, as, for example, illustrated by management’s 
successful integration of NatWest after its hostile takeover.
During the period analysed, RBS’ return on equity averaged 22%, thereby 
putting it in second place after Lloyds TSB’s 29% (1993-2003). RBS’ high level 
of profitability resulted more from operational excellence than from an over­
arching strategy. Management appeared to have a clear awareness of which 
businesses it wanted to avoid, while granting its key staff sufficient 
entrepreneurial freedom to develop innovative solutions. Its corporate strategy 
was the successful management of business portfolios with clear business 
strategies that did not follow a common rule. Thus, RBS showed a relatively 
unique and original pattern as it did not try to be everything to everybody. The 
lesson learned from RBS is not to talk about strategy, but simply to be good at 
what you are doing and consistent.
While RBS reinvented itself within its domestic market, an environment it was 
familiar with, HSBC’s transformation process could have hardly taken place in 
a more international setting. Its pivotal move was its entry into the British 
market in 1992/1993. The acquisition of Midland Bank paved the way for 
HSBC’s internationalisation strategy in retail and commercial banking. In the 
following years, it developed a global network in private wealth management, 
high street banking, and commercial banking through a series of takeovers.
HSBC’s management demonstrated great skill in mastering the integration of 
its numerous international takeovers, thus turning itself into a global multi-local
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banking group. HSBC grew its total operating income by an average of 13% 
p.a., the second highest growth rate of the eight banks, after RBS. In addition 
to such strong revenue growth, HSBC had the second lowest average cost 
income ratio in the sample between 1993 and 2003, not least as management 
avoided overly expensive investment banking endeavours. HSBC 
demonstrated how a successful global strategy has to recognise local 
differences, while reaping the benefits of the scale and scope of 
internationalisation.
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In contrast to HSBC’s decision not to acquire an investment bank, 
Commerzbank wanted to buy one in the early 1990s, but failed to do so. 
Commerzbank was still in the process of organically building its investment 
banking operations when the capital markets turned down in 2000. It reacted 
swiftly to the altered macroeconomic environment and launched drastic cost- 
cutting measures that went beyond its investment banking operations. Despite 
Commerzbank’s global and investment banking aspirations in the 1990s, 
management did not lose touch with its traditional clientele of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, it remained committed to retail banking 
in Germany throughout the 1990s.
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The analysis of Commerzbank’s corporate strategy between 1993 and 2003 
leaves the impression of an institution that eventually benefited from being a 
latecomer. Apart from some small successes in building Germany’s largest 
online bank and gaining a leading position on the German asset management 
market, Commerzbank was the least impressive bank. Yet, this uninspiring 
and slow “strategic” muddling through left it in a position from which it could be 
quickly turned around and set on a more focused course as of 2003.
Commerzbank had less rigorously tried to break out of Germany’s financial 
and socio-economic structure in which it was deeply embedded. 
Unintentionally, it remained part of this structure and as of 2001 recognised 
that it could neither change it, nor break out of it, but had to carve out its little 
and carefully identified niches within retail banking and SME commercial 
banking. The lesson learned from Commerzbank is that slowness may not 
simply save the agent from the trial and error mistakes of the first-mover, but 
may even prevent it trying to escape too quickly and radically from a structure 
in which it was far more firmly embedded than appeared at first sight.
The case study on Commerzbank also concluded that managerial stability is 
likely to have worked to its benefit. The importance of management, 
particularly the role of the CEO, was very apparent in the case of Barclays. 
Barclays went through two phases during the period analysed, each distinctly 
shaped by its CEO at the time. Martin Taylor’s leadership from 1993 to 1997 
was dominated by restructuring and the introduction of stringent cost and risk 
controls. Besides putting decent risk and credit management tools in place, 
Barclays under Taylor rethought its financial strategy and particularly its 
capital structure, leading to a massive share buyback programme.
In many ways Taylor, with his non-banking background, was the right person 
for the position as Barclays’ CEO after the bank’s first ever loss in 1992. His 
unbiased approach and sharp intellect allowed him to analyse the situation at 
Barclays thoroughly. Without Taylor’s managerial rigour in addressing cost, 
risk and cultural issues, his successor Matthew Barrett would not have been 
able to induce a new growth paradigm, prompting revenues to rise again.
During the period analysed, Barclays broadened its product range in retail 
banking, but remained focused on a few countries. The bank’s corporate
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banking moved in the other direction, as it internationalised while confining its 
activities to debt capital market services. The complementary nature of Martin 
Taylor and Matthew Barrett persuasively demonstrates that different times 
need different types of CEOs, emphasising the importance of leadership.
When the merger of the two Bavarian banks, Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank, 
created HVB in 1997, a leadership battle of the two CEOs ensued. Albrecht 
Schmidt, CEO of Vereinsbank, which was the slightly bigger of the two banks, 
prevailed. Once the uneven merger was sealed, Vereinsbank’s international 
profile dominated the new bank and paved the way for its “European bank of 
the regions” strategy. The idea was to build a network of European banks with 
regional characteristics sharing a group-wide transaction platform - a concept 
that was not unlike HSBC’s successful “world’s local bank” strategy. However, 
in contrast to HSBC, HVB suffered from a loan portfolio cluster risk.
The merger of Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank meant that two inadequately 
provisioned banks with very similar loan portfolios were amalgamated, with 
detrimental effects for HVB’s risk diversification and loan loss provisions. 
Thus, HVB had primarily a risk and not a cost-problem. In fact, its average 
cost income ratio of 65% (1993-2003) was the lowest of all four German banks 
analysed. Yet, the high loan loss provisions pushed the bank into the red and 
depleted its capital base. Measured by its tier 1 ratio, HVB had the weakest 
capitalisation of all eight banks and delivered an average return on equity of 
4.4% between 1993 and 2003. The HVB case demonstrates that a plausible 
strategy alone is not sufficient for a bank’s success. Moreover, it is a reminder 
that the geographical proximity of the two parties that merge may increase the 
likelihood of success but is certainly not sufficient for a prosperous deal.
In the case of HVB, geographic concentration became part of its problem. For 
Lloyds TSB, geographic focus meant local expertise and the possibility of 
reaping efficiency gains from proximity. From the late 1980s and throughout 
the 1990s, Lloyds’ corporate strategy was strictly guided by the shareholder 
value principle. Thus, there was no other objective for management than to 
improve the bank’s return on equity. Scale efficiencies were primarily achieved 
through domestic acquisitions, thereby shaping the competitive landscape in 
the UK retail banking market. Lloyds TSB was the bank with the best results 
and most impressive ratios in our sample, and yet this bank ended the period
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in a strategic dilemma. Its own efficiency criteria and the fear of diluting its 
results by moving into new areas to promote revenue growth confined it to its 
domestic market.
Lloyds’ strategy during the period analysed was predominantly shaped by the 
views of its long-serving CEO Brian Pitman. With his decision to establish a 
return on equity target as the single governing objective, he provided an 
operational framework for the group, which paved the way for the bank to 
increasingly focus on the British market. The great success of Lloyds TSB 
showed the importance of prioritising and not pursuing too many goals at 
once. However, it also brought to light the fact that the search for ever higher 
returns can lead to such a degree of concentration that it creates a 
dependence on a single national economy, depriving the bank of any growth 
prospects.
Unlike Lloyds, the devastating consequences of a lack of focus were 
exemplified by Dresdner Bank, clearly the worst bank of the eight studied. 
There is very little that suggests a strategic pattern or coherent action at 
Dresdner Bank during the period analysed. All that stands out is Dresdner 
Bank’s desire to be international for the sake of being international, to such an 
extent that internationalisation seemed to become a strategic objective in its 
own right. However, Dresdner Bank did not benefit from the opportunities that 
European market liberalisation and globalisation brought in the 1990s.
It is clear that the enlarged set of opportunities lured Dresdner Bank into too 
many temptations, with management neglecting the need to prioritise. The 
bank rapidly expanded around the world through lending on terms and 
conditions that did not take account of the risk and price environment. 
Moreover, its expansion into international investment banking contributed to 
rising operating expenses that were not matched by revenue growth. All of 
these engagements led to significant loan loss provisions and a continuously 
deteriorating cost income ratio, making its average performance the worst of 
all the banks analysed. In many ways, Dresdner Bank wanted to follow 
example its bigger rival Deutsche Bank, but its management pursued too 
many opportunities with too little vigour. Moreover, the frequent changes of 
CEO did not help to maintain a single strategic direction.
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The author of this thesis subscribes to Mintzberg’s understanding that 
“strategy” is a “strategy process” which comprises planning, positioning, and 
the use of ploy and perspective, which in retrospect, may feature some 
pattern. Thus, strategy becomes the mediating force between an organisation 
and its environment, that is, between the internal and the external context 
(Mintzberg, 1987, p. 15). Notwithstanding the differentiated view of strategy 
offered by Mintzberg, this research stands in the tradition of Porter’s approach 
to studying corporate strategies, as discussed in chapter three. Thus, for the 
purpose of this research strategy has been understood as the changing 
position over a period. The changed corporate positions are analysed with 
hindsight to identify strategic patterns. Patterns are defined as the result of 
consistency of behaviour over time (Mintzberg et al., 1998).
Mintzberg provides a definition of strategy as a pattern, stating that strategy “is 
consistency in behaviour, whether or not intended” (Mintzberg, 1987b, p. 12). 
The case study on the Royal Bank of Scotland, arguably the most successful 
bank in the sample, showed that there was no clear pattern of strategic 
positioning. While there was no clear pattern over time, a review of RBS’ 
corporate strategy revealed that its role as an important consolidator in the 
British financial services industry, its multi-brand strategy and sound risk 
management were essential for the bank’s profitable growth. RBS’ impressive 
development can be better explained by Porter’s view that the “essence of 
strategy is choosing what not to do” (Porter, 1996, p. 70). As a result, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland achieved “a unique and valuable position, involving a 
different set of activities” (Porter, 1996, p. 68). Moreover, RBS met the 
necessary condition for achieving superior profitability, namely operational 
effectiveness.
Unlike RBS, Deutsche Bank, arguably the best bank from the German sample, 
showed a coherent strategic shift, most obviously from the changed earnings 
composition (see diagram in case study). Yet, this commitment to expand into 
international investment banking, while still being rooted in the German SME 
and retail client markets, made this transition nearly incompatible, as it ran 
counter to the necessary condition for a sustainable strategic position, which 
according to Porter requires trade-offs (Porter, 1996). And yet, what 
contributed to Deutsche Bank’s relative success is the uniqueness of its 
strategy, pursued with sufficient stamina. Thus, Deutsche Bank’s strategy
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supports the view that “uniqueness” is indispensable for a successful strategy 
(Henderson, 1989; Porter, 1996), a theory that, in fact traces its origins to Sun 
Tzu’s ancient writings on strategy, as elaborated in chapter three of this thesis.
The case studies showed that, as well as avoiding the pitfall of going after too 
many opportunities and failing to pursue an original strategy, successfully 
managing volatility is vital for a prosperous banking strategy, whereby volatility 
refers to earnings, profit and organisational volatility. Organisational volatility 
comes in the form of personnel fluctuation, divisional and reputed “strategic” 
reorganisations, which deprive employees of their sense of orientation. 
Stability is a key factor for operational progress and an organisation’s 
profitability can be enhanced by managing volatility. Thus, managing volatility 
should constitute a primary strategic task. Strategic management therefore 
becomes the managing of risks, i.e. financial and organisational risks. As risk 
emerges in dealing with external conditions, a company needs to be analysed 
in its environment. Risk and strategy analysis respond to complexity by 
concentrating on the essential structural factors which determine the 
sensitivities of a system. This research concludes that risk management 
needs to be given greater prominence in corporate strategies.
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6.3. Cross-case pattern analysis
The preceding paragraphs summarised the strategies or, in some cases, 
simply the development of the eight banks analysed for this thesis and drew a 
direct comparison between them. What follows is a cross-case pattern 
analysis covering all the banks. At first sight the comparison seems to reveal 
national patterns but in fact many of these national characteristics can be 
explained by bank-specific strategic decisions, which are discussed in the 
case studies. In chapter three of this research Porter’s five forces framework 
was applied to the banking industry and provided the theoretical framework for 
the analysis of the eight banks in two different national economic structures, 
against the background of the enlarged opportunities for banks to operate 
across the EU. By analysing and comparing the strategies of the eight banks 
in this changing national and European environment, using a modified version 
of Porter’s model, this research substantiates Giddens’ theory of structuration.
Applying Porter’s five forces framework, as outlined in chapter three (see 3.4.), 
this research has explained the changing competitive landscapes in the UK 
and Germany. The findings from the case studies show that the consolidation 
in British banking helped to slow down the decline of net interest margins. On 
the one hand, the greater concentration of British banking during the period 
analysed strengthened the banks position vis-a-vis retail clients as providers 
of cheap funding, while on the other hand deterring potential entrants into 
British high street banking.1
Moreover, the higher market concentration weakened retail clients’ position as 
“buyers” of banking products and services, thus reducing competitive pressure 
on banks. The widespread bancassurance approach of British banks meant 
that retail clients who turned away from traditional banking products for 
savings and sought insurance-based solutions, for example to save for old 
age, could still be retained as clients within the same banking group. In 
Germany, the much more fragmented banking and insurance market resulted 
in an entirely different competitive structure.
1 The first major inroad of a foreign bank into the British retail market was the acquisition of Abbey National 
by Spain's Banco Santander in autumn 2004.
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Compared to the UK, Germany’s fragmented banking and insurance market 
left clients to choose between many more providers of financial services. To 
attract deposits banks had to offer competitive interest rates, putting pressure 
on net interest margins. Entering the German banking market was relatively 
easy, as demonstrated by Germany’s automobile industry, which set up banks 
to finance car sales, and the inroads made e.g. by Citibank of the USA and 
Holland’s ING direct. These examples suggest that barriers to entry were 
lower in Germany than in the UK.
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The consolidation of the British banking market explains a significant 
proportion of the strong revenue growth at the four British banks. The British 
banks’ revenues grew by a CAGR of 14% between 1993 and 2003, much 
more strongly than their German peers, which delivered a compound annual 
growth rate of 5%.2 During this period, German GDP grew by a compound 
annual growth rate of 1.4% while British GDP grew by an average of 3.0% p.a. 
The better shape of the British economy contributed to higher demand for 
banking products and kept risk provisions low. The fact that the British 
economy fared better during the decade analysed accounts for an important,
2 The deconsolidation of the jointly owned mortgage bank of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and 




albeit unquantifiable, part of the revenue growth of British banks and facilitated 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector.3
For example, the impressive average annual growth rate of 29% at RBS is 
largely due to the quantum leap resulting from the NatWest takeover (2000). 
Other important takeovers were Lloyds’ purchase of TSB (1995) and Barclays’ 
acquisition of Woolwich (2000). HSBC was the least involved in the 
consolidation of the British banking market but achieved a 13% revenue 
growth rate p.a. as a result of numerous international takeovers such as the 
acquisition of Republic National Bank of New York (1999), Credit Commercial 
de France (2000) and Household International (2003).
Besides the merger of Vereinsbank and Hypo-Bank, all other relevant 
acquisitions made by the German banks were in international investment 
banking. Most prominent were the acquisition of Bankers Trust by Deutsche 
Bank (1998) and the takeover of Kleinwort Benson by Dresdner Bank (1995). 
The fragmented German banking market, with around two-thirds of the market 
being either state-owned savings banks or the mutual banking organisation 
(cooperatives), did not foster a consolidation process. The prevailing three 
pillar structure (savings banks, cooperative banks and private commercial 
banks), has prevented banks from merging with or acquiring institutions from 
other pillars in the system. Although this market structure confined 
consolidation to each separate market segment, this cannot be accepted as 
an excuse for weak revenue growth. After all, it can be expected that 
management’s analyses of market structures identify new means of growing 
revenues.
Deutsche Bank’s management recognised the limited growth prospects on the 
bank’s home market and concluded that it should expand internationally. By 
focusing on international investment banking and exploiting the opportunities 
arising from increasing disintermediation, it achieved average revenue growth 
of 8% p.a., the highest of its German peers. Deutsche Bank succeeded in 
rebuilding its business model as it was the first of the large German banks to 
branch out in new directions. Moreover, it showed sufficient stamina and had 
enough capital to smooth the transition through the disposal of its investments.




The other German banks, especially Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, 
either lacked the creativity and initiative to adopt a radically new approach to 
align their business model to prevailing market structures, or, in the case of 
HVB, suffered from deplorable risk management, that prevented it putting its 
strategies into practice as its capital base had been depleted.
HVB and Dresdner Bank also tried to rebuild their business models but failed 
for different reasons, as outlined in the case studies. Commerzbank made the 
least effort to transform its business model and as result of its phlegmatic 
approach it remained most embedded within the German financial structure. 
Not having embarked on the colossal transformation process in investment 
banking, it was able to adjust its business model relatively swiftly within the 
existing structure, carving out profitable niches from 2002. Most likely 
Commerzbank would have been less successful with its new SME and retail 
banking strategy if Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and HVB had “stayed put” 
in the 1990s.
All four British banks also rebuilt their business models during the period 
analysed. However, in their case, the transformations revolved around gaining 
market share and streamlining processes. The British banks transformed their 
business models primarily by optimising scale and not by broadening scope. 
For example, the decision not to enter, or to exit, investment banking 
operations meant a reduction of scope and helped to keep them focused on 
few business activities. Despite the increase of size and substantial branch 
closures, the average cost income ratio of the four British banks fell from 62% 
in 1993 to only 57% in 2003. This improvement was mainly driven by Barclays 
and Lloyds TSB, which had the weakest revenue growth of the four British 
banks analysed, lending support to the argument that there are limits to scale 
efficiency in banking.
While Porter includes economies of scale as a barrier to entry (Porter, 1998), 
the findings of this research confirm those studies about efficiency in banking 
that indicate that there are hardly any economies of scale at group level. As 
discussed in section 3.4.2. the analysis of the eight banks corroborates the 
view that a bank’s size does not seem to have a major effect on its 
performance (Benston et al., 1982; Gilligan et al., 1984; Molyneux et al., 1996; 
Walter, 1999; Berger, 2000; Berger et al., 2000; Smith & Walter, 2003).
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In 1993, the four German banks had an average cost income ratio of 62%, 
which was the same as their British counterparts. While RBS, HSBC, Barclays 
and Lloyds TSB continuously reduced their cost income ratios to an average 
of 57% by 2003, all four German banks contributed to the higher average cost 
income ratio calculated for 2003. The cost income ratio of the German banks 
was on average 17 percentage points higher in 2003 than in 1993. Deutsche 
Bank’s cost income ratio was 22 percentage points higher in 2003 than in 
1993, which was the highest rise of all eight banks. This deterioration in its 
cost income ratio was essentially the price Deutsche Bank paid for its 
aggressive expansion into investment banking and reflected only to a lesser 
extent potential cost disadvantages from its relative small size.
The different competitive environments are reflected in the varying refinancing 
conditions in each country. It is a popular argument among German bankers 
that the state-owned savings banks and the cooperative banks, which are not 
expected to maximise profits, are responsible for the country’s low interest 
margins. In particular, the state guarantees given to the Landesbanks (state 
banks of the federal states), through which the savings banks refinance their 
business by issuing bonds, are considered to have distorted competition.
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It is a fact that the four German banks together had an average net interest 
margin of 1.3% during the period analysed, compared to 2.7% for their British 
counterparts. Yet it is worth noting that net interest margins in Germany4 fell 
more strongly than in the UK, namely from 1.9% in 1993 to 1.0% in 2003. 
Despite the consolidation in the UK, the average net interest margin fell from 
2.9% in 1993 to 2.5% in 2003. If HSBC, the bank with the least UK exposure, 
were excluded, then the net interest margin dropped from 2.7% in 1993 (also 
excluding HSBC) to 2.3% in 2003.
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The decline in net interest margins in the UK suggests that disintermediation 
and the general decline in interest rates and inflation contributed to this 
development. However, Lloyds TSB’s average net interest margin of 3.2%, the 
highest of all eight banks, is 1 percentage point higher than its UK rival 
Barclays’ net interest margin of 2.2%. Given that these two banks were largely 
focused on their domestic market this 1 percentage point difference can be 
ascribed to Lloyds TSB’s better refinancing conditions and pricing power -  in 
short, to its better financial strategy.
The distorted competition on the German banking market explains, at least 
partially, the lower net interest margins. While net interest margins are
4 Deutsche Bank’s average net interest margin was 1.4%, which was the highest of the four German banks.
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dependent variables of the country’s market structure, the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to net interest income provides an insight into the banks’ risk 
management. The British and German banks show a marked difference in 
loan loss provisions. On average 28% of the German banks’ net interest 
income was eaten up by loan loss provisions, in contrast to 15% at the four 
British institutions.
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Admittedly, the weaker German economic growth made lending to trouble-free 
companies more difficult. Yet, a bank’s task is to assess correctly the risks of 
its creditors in stormy times and not just when the weather is fair. Moreover, a 
significant proportion of loans that went sour were non-German loans and thus 
independent of Germany’s economic situation. The economic developments in 
Eastern Germany that fell short of many bankers’ expectations explain to 
some extent the need for high loan loss provisions.
Although, all of these macroeconomic developments are reasonable 
explanations, they do not justify the weak record in lending. Deutsche Bank’s 
relatively good ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest income of 17% 
shows that, despite international lending and credit exposure in Eastern 
Germany, better risk management can make a difference. Overall, the far 
higher ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest income in Germany resulted
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from appalling risk management and a lending policy that was blinded by 
delusions of grandeur.






Average income structure of analysed German banks (1993-2003)
in %




Notwithstanding these profound differences between the British and German 
banks analysed, the aggregate average income structures were much alike. 
54% of the German banks’ operating income stemmed from net interest 
income, compared to 55% at the four British banks. Commission income 
accounted for 31% and 30% of operating income at the German and British 
banks, respectively. The gap was only wide in trading income and other
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operating income. Trading income made up on average 10% of the German 
banks’ operating income, but only 6% at the British institutions. The 
proportionately higher German trading results were a reflection, above all, of 
Deutsche Bank’s and Dresdner Bank’s investment banking activities. The high 
proportion of other operating income at the British banks, namely 10%, versus 
5% at the German banks, reflects the UK players’ insurance operations.5 With 
the exception of Barclays, which opted for a strategic alliance in order to offer 
insurance products, the other three banks had their own insurance arms.
Return on equity (average 1993-2003)
in %
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Better risk management, more stringent cost control and higher net interest 
margins made British banks on average four times more profitable6 than their 
German rivals during the period analysed. Despite the similar income 
structures, British banks achieved returns on equity between 1993 and 2003 
that averaged 21%. This compares to the 5% return on equity that the four 
German banks delivered on average during the same period. Even without the 
high losses made by Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and HVB in 2002 and 
2003, the average ROE would have been only 8%. Already in 1993, the 
average ROE of the four British banks exceeded that of their German 
counterparts by 7 percentage points.
5 Insurance premium income was disclosed under “other operating income”.
6 Profitability measured as return on equity.
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6.4. Bridging the micro/macro divide in European 
economic integration
The discussion of the case studies and the concluding cross-case pattern 
analysis in the previous two sections provide a basis for answering the 
question addressed by this research: Why did British and German banking 
strategies differ, leading to different levels of profitability between 1993 and 
2003? Subsequently, this section turns to the part of the research question 
which addresses the implications of the strategies pursued by British and 
German banks for European financial integration.
It is argued that the higher returns on equity generated by the British banks 
compared to their German counterparts came from British bank managers’ 
greater adherence to the shareholder value concept (Llewellyn, 2005). “[...] 
British banks have been highly profitable partly because they have chosen to 
be profitable in that, compared with banks in some European countries, they 
set the ROE as the central and uncompromising business objective. 
Furthermore, structural factors, and a beneficial business cycle, have been 
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Proponents of the shareholder value approach generally regard the 
stakeholder value concept as the competing paradigm for managing firms. 
The stakeholder value approach recognises the multiple interests of a broad 
range of groups affected by the actions of a firm, including its owners, i.e. the 
shareholders (Freeman, 1983). It follows that the stakeholder concept is 
indeed an extension of the narrower shareholder value concept and does not 
stand in contradiction to it. The large number of state-owned banks and 
mutual cooperative banks along with the strong representation of employees 
on the supervisory boards nourished the argument that the German banking 
system is essentially a stakeholder value oriented system, whereas the UK is 
predominantly a shareholder value oriented system, and that this difference 
largely explains the different levels of profitability (Llewellyn, 2005).
Such observations may hold true if one considers how rigorously Lloyds’ CEO 
Brian Pitman applied the ROE criteria when shutting down businesses. The 
frequent rights issues and the ease with which Commerzbank, among others, 
high-handedly tapped the capital markets, thereby ignoring any dilutive effects 
for existing shareholders, supports the view that German banks did not adhere 
to a shareholder value concept. Yet the general assumption that British bank 
managers followed a rational shareholder value approach can also be easily 
shattered, for example, by the statement by Barclays’ long-standing chairman, 
Andrew Buxton, that he would not have cared if Barclays’ share price went 
down a very long way (interview Martin Taylor). Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that all four German banks analysed here had announced ROE 
targets by 1994 at the latest.
The three reasons identified by Llewellyn -  the shareholder value approach, 
structure and a benign British business cycle from the early 1990s -  were 
important factors supporting profitability in the UK. Certainly, Britain’s capital- 
market based financial system, with its strong fund management industry, 
encouraged senior managers at publicly listed banks to give ROE criteria 
priority in assessing strategic options. However, strictly applying a shareholder 
value concept implies constraints for corporate strategy. An orthodox 
shareholder value approach is likely to run counter to business diversification, 
ruling out exposure to different business cycles and risk structures. Moreover, 
setting a return on equity target for the whole bank ultimately has implications 
for each segment. First, internal rivalry about capital allocation arises. Second,
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a comparison of segmental ROEs may create tension among the different 
business segments if their profitability varies significantly, regardless of the 
actual level of profitability.7
The implications of applying a strict ROE approach to managing a bank’s 
strategy became evident in the case of Lloyds TSB. Given the high levels of 
profitability achieved in its home market, it became increasingly difficult for the 
bank to expand internationally without diluting its existing business. Thus, the 
strict application of ROE criteria confined Lloyds TSB to its home market, 
making it difficult for it to escape from its profitable isolation. The development 
of Lloyds TSB illustrates how rigorous application of the shareholder value 
concept may not always be in the best interest of shareholders. What matters 
to shareholders is stable profit growth, which appears to benefit from a 
sustainable business model. Shareholders are also proxy entrepreneurs who 
are willing to accept unknown risks if they could lead to profitable growth.





Barclays Lloyds TSB Dresdner 
Bank
For example, under stringent ROE criteria RBS would not have provided the 
seed money for Direct Line, its hugely successful insurance arm. A consistent 
shareholder value approach at HSBC would have deprived it of becoming a
7 A bank is not a homogenous business, but neither is investment banking, retail banking or corporate 
banking. Arguably, the less knowledgeable the researcher or the observer is, the more homogenous an 
industry appears to be.
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case study for this research, as an investment in the ailing Midland Bank 
would have been unthinkable for such a highly profitable Hong Kong bank. 
Further evidence of the limited and inappropriate use of the shareholder value 
concept is the acquisition of the very profitable investment bank Wasserstein 
Perella by Dresdner Bank. This move was right insofar as it enhanced ROE, 
yet Wasserstein Perella disintegrated within a short period after it had been 
taken over and profits declined.
Notwithstanding the importance of return on equity as the principal criterion for 
the shareholder value concept, the importance of structure finds insufficient 
weight in the studies that merely contrast shareholder value and stakeholder 
value concepts (e.g. Llewellyn, 2005). The distinctive structure of the British 
banking sector results from the fact that bank managements recognised in the 
early 1990s that they could change the banking landscape to their advantage 
through their decisions. For management to recognise this and to act 
accordingly takes analytical, pragmatic and power-driven bank managers. 
Consequently, the management of British banks focused on domestic 
consolidation, expanding scale and streamlining processes. If British banks 
had slavishly followed the shareholder value concept, they would not have 
been able to grow their revenues by a CAGR of 14% p.a. over a decade.
Unlike their British counterparts, the management of several German banks 
found it difficult to accept their path dependency and wanted to switch to a 
business model that was not compatible with the country’s prevailing bank- 
based financial structure. This was the case at Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank and Commerzbank. Deutsche Bank was in the privileged position that it 
could at least partially overcome the structural forces of the German banking 
landscape by building up international investment banking expertise, financed 
by billions of euros of disposal gains from its industrial holdings.
Despite having the same ambitions as Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank did not 
have the same financial cushion. It also had inferior risk management and less 
stable management. Commerzbank wanted to go down the capital market and 
investment banking road as well but was simply too slow, which eventually 
made it easier for management to reverse its strategy. HVB pursued a 
consolidation strategy that aimed at gaining regional strength. It was therefore 
the only bank of the four analysed that accepted the structures of the bank-
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based German financial system. Yet, this high-sounding strategy did not entail 
good risk management.
The case studies of HVB and Dresdner Bank, the two banks with the lowest 
average returns on equity and the weakest capital positions, also brought to 
light the shortcomings of supervisory boards. The role of a supervisory board 
is to monitor the work of the management board and to appoint and if 
necessary dismiss the bank’s executives. There seemed very little reaction by 
the supervisory boards to the fact that both banks consistently missed their 
targets. Overall, the German corporate governance system showed a great 
degree of phlegm and indifference towards the activities of the management 
board.
There appeared little awareness by the supervisory board members that their 
essential task is to oversee the management board and to make the right 
personnel decisions. In the UK, the greater professional experience of non­
executive directors seems to have nourished an environment in which 
personnel issues were addressed more openly. For example, Barclays’ board 
showed excellence in appointing the right CEO for each phase in the bank’s 
development. The different corporate governance systems and their impact on 
the important task of finding the best-suited executive directors would be worth 
a detailed analysis, but that goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finding the leader who is best suited for a particular phase is a soft, but 
important, factor that set German and British banks apart. A less legalistic and 
quantitative and more sales and client-oriented understanding of banking 
contributed to the quality of leadership among British bankers. Thoroughly 
comprehending the clients’ situation and needs also serves as the best initial 
risk management tool. RBS’ US expansion, which followed the maxim ”if you 
cannot drive to it, don’t lend to it” is a case in point, illustrating the importance 
of client proximity as a means of risk management.
Another important reason why British banks fared better in the 1990s is that 
they had already undergone a tremendous crisis in the 1980s. The learning 
curve, i.e. collective memory, seemed to have worked to their favour. The 
1980s included such incidents as NatWest’s Blue Arrow scandal, the crisis at 
Midland Bank and overly ambitious international expansion by Barclays and
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Lloyds that eventually depleted their profitability. The senior managers of the 
1990s had lived through the 1980s and seemed to remember and have learnt 
from that experience.
In addition, Big Bang in 1986 paved the way for greater flexibility. More 
importantly, Big Bang raised the question of what the British clearing houses 
should do with regard to disintermediation and transaction services. Overall, 
the numerous small British merchant banks were too proud to join up with the 
clearers and did not merge with each other. So the more sales-gifted US 
investment bankers with their greater experience of the capital markets swiftly 
moved in. The old clearing houses quickly abandoned any attempts to make 
inroads into this investment banking business. Instead they focused on the 
retail client base which they had been familiar with for decades and knew how 
to serve. The decision to opt for “scale” over “scope” was made and led the 
way for consolidation of the domestic market.
The presence of US American investment banks in London and the 
aggressive Japanese banks on the British corporate lending market in the 
early 1990s helped British banks to focus on retail clients, the last business 
area which appeared difficult for foreign banks to reach. The strong UK 
economy provided additional backwind and British consumers and house­
owners further accelerated revenue growth. Moreover, the presence of US 
investment banks on the London market attracted more and more well- 
qualified bankers to the City. Although most of them stayed within the 
investment banking world, this still provided an intellectual spill-over effect and 
enabled, for example, Barclays to develop Barclays Capital under Bob 
Diamond, an American investment banker and one of the key figures in 
Barclays Capital’s success.
In Germany, banks had not gone through the same traumatic experience as 
their British counterparts during the 1980s. 1989 brought about the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the end of communism and the first signs of globalisation with a 
sense that a new era was beginning. This created an enthusiasm that quickly 
turned into euphoria and from there into megalomania and hubris. Against the 
background of the difficult retail banking market this internationalisation, along 
with Europeanisation and globalisation, was taken as a reason or excuse to
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embark on an internationalisation spree. Moreover, technical innovations 
added to the range of new opportunities.
From the early 1990s German banks slowly but steadily moved into an 
opportunity dilemma. Management perceived incessant opportunities that 
appeared attractive but forgot to prioritise. The banks saw the opportunities 
but not the opportunity costs that came with them. While a more capital- 
market or shareholder value oriented approach might not have stopped such 
projects, it might at least have raised additional questions before some 
projects were launched.
The findings from the case studies clearly demonstrate that, on the whole, the 
British banks analysed pursued defensive strategies, in other words they 
remained focused on the domestic market. For a defensive strategy of this 
type to be successful, a bank needs assets and capabilities that are specific to 
the domestic market (Adamides, et a!., 2003). For example, a well-established 
distribution network may help to deter rivals even in industries like banking 
which have strong globalisation characteristics.
By contrast, German banks, showed a strategic pattern which fully embraced 
all new opportunities that led to an international multi-business strategy. Yet, 
the attempt to capture many of the new opportunities that arose in the early 
1990s deprived the German banks analysed of their strategic focus and 
provoked erratic strategy changes. Even in the case of Deutsche Bank, which 
with hindsight had a coherent strategic reorientation towards international 
investment banking, there were many “trials and tribulations” as its former 
CEO Hilmar Kopper conceded in the interview for this research.
Consequently, these German institutions could not develop sufficient power to 
make inroads into other European countries. Effectively, neither the corporate 
strategies pursued by British banks, nor those followed by their German 
counterparts did much to promote European banking integration and thus 
European financial integration, other than on some wholesale markets. 
Moreover, none of the banks, with the exception of the hapless HVB, pursued 
with great rigour a corporate strategy that was tailored towards the enlarged 




Indeed, HVB can be identified as the only bank of the eight studied for this 
thesis with a clearly formulated pan-European strategy targeted at seizing the 
opportunities of a liberalised market. Ironically, its takeover by the Italian bank 
Unicredit meant it did actually become one of the few banks to be involved in a 
large pan-European banking deal -  but only as prey. Deutsche Bank’s pan- 
European retail banking endeavours were described as mere trials and 
tribulations by its former CEO, Hilmar Kopper, as its focus was on international 
investment banking. Besides some rudimentary European cooperations in the 
1970s, any substantial European strategy seemed out of reach for 
Commerzbank as it was too entangled in its local retail and SME business. 
Dresdner Bank’s talk about being a European, or even a global player could 
never materialise due to its poor risk and cost management and frequent 
changes of CEO.
At HSBC, Europe and the liberalised European banking market appear to 
have played only a subordinate role in the group’s overall global multi-local 
corporate strategy. The acquisition of CCF in France was certainly driven less 
by a pan-European approach than by the chance of acquiring an established 
local player with promising prospects on attractive conditions. Lloyds TSB did 
not “go European” as the expenses for internationalisation would have diluted 
the high profitability generated by its domestic operations. For similar reasons, 
and because of the absence of potential scale efficiencies from branching out 
into other European countries, Barclays remained coy about European 
banking strategies. In the case of The Royal Bank of Scotland, the period 
analysed was used to gain size on the British market and to grow beyond its 
peripheral position, which it primarily achieved through the acquisition of 
NatWest. Thereafter, The Royal Bank of Scotland promoted its pan-European 
interests slightly more intensively, but largely via a cautious organic approach 
focused on commercial and wholesale banking.
Overall, it can be concluded that for economic integration to become effective, 
market liberalisation on a grand scale is certainly a necessary, but by no 
means a sufficient condition. Managing economic integration requires a 
thorough understanding of the interests and capabilities of those players that 
act on a micro-level, thereby ultimately altering the macro-structures. Opening 
up new opportunities does not necessarily mean that the newly available
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opportunities are also seized (as evidenced by British banks) and if they are 
exploited, then it is still not certain that the new situation can be successfully 
managed with the existing set of capabilities (as shown by German banks).
The different outcomes of the strategic reactions of British and German banks 
identified in this research corroborate the theory that a financial system is a 
configuration of its subsystems with a coherent structure (Schmidt, 2001). As 
banks are an integral part of their respective national financial systems, this 
coherence, which in fact contributes to the stability of a financial system, also 
poses a challenge for new corporate strategies that are not compatible with 
the prevailing structure.
Therefore, a stable and coherent financial system with banks forming 
important institutional pillars is relatively resistant to structural change 
(Hackethal & Tyrell, 1998; Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2001). This 
research showed that banks which pursued a defensive strategy, accepting 
the premises of a coherent financial system, fared better than those that 
attempted to break out of a coherent structure to pursue strategies not 
compatible with the overall financial system in their home market.
Studying the corporate strategies of eight large European banks offers an 
unprecedented understanding about the interdependence of agents and 
structure of Europe’s financial system. In the tradition of Giddens’ ontological 
concept of structuration, this research'demonstrates that social action requires 
structure and that structure is the result of social action. According to 
structuration, there is an intrinsic interdependence between the micro and 
macro levels. This interdependence could be shown in the function of banks 
(representing micro structures) as institutions that determine the macro 
structure of a financial system.
Applied to the realm of corporate strategy, Giddens’ concept of structuration 
strengthens the argument that strategy cannot be separated from its 
environment and that the formulation and implementation of strategy are 
closely intertwined, as a natural consequence of the view of strategy as 
process (Clausewitz, 1997; Mintzberg et al., 1998). In economic theory, 
Giddens’ concept of structuration finds its parallels in the structure-conduct- 
performance paradigm (SCP), as discussed in chapter four (Mason, 1939,
461
6. Conclusions
1949; Bain, 1951, 1956, 1959). The SCP paradigm recognises the link 
between industry structure and the conduct of the firms that comprise an 
industry. This research made use of the SCP paradigm through Porter’s more 
specific five forces framework modified for the banking industry.
The importance of power in Giddens’ concept of structuration also 
complements the understanding of strategy as a process. The relative power 
of actors becomes pivotal for the interdependence between agent and 
structure. An actor’s ability to alter the prevailing structure depends upon its 
resources and positioning, and thus its power within the structure. This 
reasoning appears consistent with Schmidt’s previously elaborated argument 
that a financial system is a configuration of its subsystems, which complement 
each other, and that the coherence of such a system renders it resistant to 
structural change (Hackethal & Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2001).
In order to overcome systemic rigidity, a few actors need to become 
sufficiently powerful to change the structure to meet their interests. The 
findings from the case studies brought to light that this is precisely what did 
not happen in Germany, whereas as it drove the consolidation process in 
British banking between 1993 and 2003. As the analysed four British banks 
gained more power relative to the other actors that made up the structure, 
they attained an even more favourable position that enabled them to achieve 
further changes. It can be concluded that the more consolidated a banking 
market, the easier it is for the players to change the structure.
Moreover, applying Giddens’ concept of structuration as a methodological 
framework also pays adequate attention to the unintended implications that 
one level has on the other. The slow progress of banking integration in Europe 
between 1993 and 2003, which fell short of the expectations at the beginning 
of the common market, strengthens the argument that the interdependence 
between actors and structure should be given greater prominence in 
international relations and socio-economic research projects. Merely 
liberalising markets and harmonising the laws of European nations is evidently 
not enough to stimulate European integration.
Therefore, the findings of this research are also a profound criticism of 
Cecchini’s model and other approaches taken by the European Commission
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to evaluate the implications of their policies prior to launching the Single 
Market Programme. Cecchini’s model primarily considered the opportunities of 
economic integration and did not sufficiently consider the large players’ 
strategic reactions to market liberalisation. From this research it may be 
concluded that European policy-makers do not adequately take into account 
the interdependence of agents and structure. Their focus appears either too 
narrow - on the micro level (agent) - or too general - on the macro level 
(structure), ultimately fostering structural inertia.
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6.5. Methodological limitations and suggestions for 
future research
The more knowledge is generated, the more questions arise. Insofar, this 
research probably raises more questions than it answers, especially as it is 
the first longitudinal cross-country multi-case study of the banking sector. It 
offers an answer to the question as to why British and German banking 
strategies differed substantially during the decade after the beginning of the 
Single European Market. By answering that question, it has also shown why 
the four British banks analysed were on average four times more profitable 
than their German counterparts. Moreover, it has explained why none of the 
strategies pursued by German and British banks ultimately enhanced 
European banking integration. What follows are recommendations for further 
research projects, which at the same time pinpoint the principal limitations of 
this research.
One question that emerged as an increasingly obvious problem as this 
research progressed was the different corporate governance systems in 
Germany and the UK. More specifically, how did the different corporate 
governance systems in Britain and Germany affect decisions about the banks’ 
leadership, strategy, risk and capital management? Corporate governance 
issues, as the pinnacle of the principal-agent problem, will remain a pressing 
issue in Germany and the UK and should be thoroughly researched.
Besides identifying specific strategic sub-themes, such as the corporate 
governance issue, complementary research could investigate the strategy- 
making process at each bank. It is likely that not more than one bank per 
thesis would be feasible as - in contrast to the approach used here - such an 
undertaking would require hundreds of interviews. The purpose of such an 
investigation would be to address important socio-psychological questions in 
the tradition of Henry Mintzberg: how do certain strategies emerge over time 
and how are ideas promoted and finally implemented?
Further complementary research could take the form of single in-depth case 
studies, using the same theoretical framework as this research. With the focus 
on just one bank, such an approach would require the full support of the bank,
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ideally fully backed by the management. A bank willing to accept an in-depth 
strategy analysis of its recent past could greatly benefit from it. Management 
could sharpen its awareness of past successes and shortcomings and more 
clearly see the strengths and weaknesses of its current position. Moreover, 
such an in-depth case study could feed into the bank’s risk management 
system as it could also help to deal with the institutional memory problem. 
Additional research projects using the same method should perhaps consider 
different and/or more countries - e.g. Italy, France, Spain (as interesting 
European banking markets) - longer periods, and other financial services 
firms, for example, the insurance sector. These analyses could also take the 
form of a game theory model, studying agent-structure interdependence in 
banking with quantitative tools.
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6.6. Epilogue -  daring an outlook
This research focused on the period stretching from 1993 to 2003. For three 
reasons it appeared pertinent to analyse this decade. First, in 1993 the Single 
Market Programme (SMP) was completed. This triggered wide-ranging 
changes in the financial services industry in the following years. Second, it 
takes several years for strategic adjustments to be implemented at large 
financial institutions and to show results. Third, the time between 1993 and 
2003 spans one full business cycle in Britain and Germany. Moreover, for 
pragmatic reasons there had to be a cut-off date for the case studies, as 
otherwise this would have become a perpetual task. Between the cut-off date 
at the end of 2003 and summer 2007, when this research project was 
completed, the European banking landscape continued to evolve.
After 2003, streamlining and efficiency programmes remained high on the 
agenda at British banks. More widespread use of a wide variety of 
technological innovations has led to signs of increasing industrialisation in 
banking, especially retail banking. The strong economic growth that has 
continued until the present day in the UK has provided further tailwind for 
British banks’ profitability. In fact, without any notable new entrants thwarting 
the banks’ comfortable market position, the degree of market concentration 
has actually increased. Thus, the dependence on the British economy has 
become one of the greatest risk factors for some of the banks analysed in this 
research. In the light of the highly concentrated domestic market, British banks 
have begun to seek again international growth opportunities, with the 
European continent seemingly being given the same consideration as any 
other part of the world.
German banks have recovered from their experiences in 2002/03, which was 
the severest crisis in the German banking sector since the end of World War II 
and nearly wiped out some of the country’s financial institutions. Continued 
restructuring has taken the form of stringent cost control, improved risk 
management, more client-oriented sales approaches and, most importantly, a 
greater awareness of the importance of not wanting to be involved in all 
aspects of the value chain. Notwithstanding the progress made by adopting 
more focused strategies, the structure of the German banking market has not
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changed substantially. The three-pillar structure remains the dominant 
characteristic of German banking and still impedes mergers between savings 
banks, cooperative banks and the private sector banks. Operating in a highly 
fragmented domestic market, none of the German banks has gained such a 
position that a large scale international expansion seems imminent.
While the structure of the German market allows mergers and acquisitions to 
take place only within each pillar of the banking sector, in most other 
European countries consolidation has continued, albeit at a slow pace and 
within national borders. Cross-border mergers remained the exception rather 
than the rule until summer 2007, when Barclays and The Royal Bank of 
Scotland were battling for control of the Dutch bank ABN AMRO in what would 
be the largest ever takeover in Europe. It is obvious that, given the limited 
scope for domestic market expansion in many European countries, except for 
Germany, banks are likely to look abroad for growth opportunities.
Although national banking systems clearly prevail some 14 years after the 
Single Market Programme was completed, the relentless growth of the internet 
and cheaper international phone calls have facilitated both corporate and retail 
clients’ cross-border access to a full range of banking services. Despite 
growing demand for international direct distribution, this trend, which is still 
emerging, is only likely to affect standard financial products and simple 
banking services.
As long as national discrepancies in taxation, consumer protection, contract 
law and financial regulation persist, especially in retail banking, full 
harmonisation of the market entails overcoming very high hurdles. Greater use 
of new technologies is probably reducing the significance of local branches for 
standardised products and transactions. Thus, personal financial advice will 
become even more detached from the manufacture of everyday financial 
products. Already visible in personal finance, this unbundling of distribution 
and production is likely to be applied to institutional/corporate customers as 
well.
Alongside a few financial services conglomerates with excellent risk 
management, financial services firms that focus on a few aspects of the 
unbundled banking and insurance market are likely to emerge. Restructuring
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the value chain in financial services will allow small players to occupy niches 
in an industry that is undergoing structural upheaval. Over time, some players 
may not be able to resist the temptation to expand into other areas of the 
market, and could eventually become major financial institutions by the end of 
the 21st century. In the meantime, however, it is hard to overcome the inertia 
of long-established national financial structures merely by liberalising markets 
and harmonising laws. If anything, this research has shown that for a macro 
project, such as European economic integration, to succeed it must be 
implemented at the micro level by those agents, who give life to structures 
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